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Abstract 
The general theme of the thesis is the relationship between Amsterdam and the 
restored stadholder, William III, from 1672 to 1684. Within this survey, several 
subsidiary themes analyse the interests of the decision-makers during a period of 
war and uneasy peace, and the compromises the principals made to prevent a return 
to the crisis politics of 1650 and 1672. After three years of the restored 
stadholdership the relationship tended to the confrontational, but the study shows 
that effective lines of communication enabled Amsterdam and the stadholder to 
survive their differences over the peace negotiations in 1677-78, the struggle for 
alliances, 1679-1681, and the crises over military expenditure, 1682-1684, and 
eventually to co-operate in the invasion of England in 1688. 
The two major subsidiary themes are firstly, the regency of Amsterdam, in 
particular the burgomasters, their backgrounds, interests and ideologies, and 
secondly, the principal advisers and officials in the service of the stadholder and 
the States. These two groups were not mutually exclusive and the study also 
shows how the Amsterdam regents in the 1680s were able to operate as a more 
coherent group than those in office in the 1670s. 
The first of these groups is examined within a discussion of the role of party, 
factional and individual interest in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, 
which further develops recent theories of party and faction. Analysis of the second 
centres around the changes in the administration of the Dutch Republic and the 
emergence of a new kind of raadpensionails, working both with and for the 
provincial states and the stadholder. Both are further contextualised by analysis of 
the political, economic, religious and social changes which had taken place during 
the "Golden Age" and the first stadholderless period of the mid-seventeenth 
century, and the changing relations with France and England. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
William 111 (1650-1702), stadholder of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland and 
Overijssel, only visited Amsterdam officially three times between 1672 and 1684, 
in 1675,1677 (after his marriage to Mary Stuart) and in 1683. But in the United 
Provinces of the Dutch Republic in the later seventeenth century, where distances 
were not great, communications were not a problem and representative towns and 
cities had delegates and deputies in permanent residence in The Hague, a 
discussion of the relationship between the stadholder and the leading town should 
not therefore be based too much on this failure of William to make formal visits. 
It is perhaps of greater note that he was not on such terms with any of the leading 
regents to make more informal visits. 
The relationship between the Prince and the Amsterdammers was always an official 
one, most frequently fraught with tensions. The Prince's circle of friends did not 
include Amsterdam regents, ' but members of the nobility or those who climbed the 
social ladder through service to the stadholder. ' However, although the Prince's 
friends may have been unofficial advisers, they were not formally empowered to 
act as official advisers, ' and he had to take advice from the States and their 
representatives from the towns, including Amsterdam. The Prince did not always 
act on advice received but tried to devise ways of circumventing States policy 
when he believed it was contrary to his interpretation of the "interest of state". 
Differences of interpretations of the interests of state between the Prince and 
I His one attempt at the serious exercise of patronage within the city's 
government during this period failed (see below p. 129). 
2 For a full discussion on the Prince's circle, see below pp. 179-181. 
The nobles were of more significance on the international stage, where 
they could be seen as comparable to the ambassadorial representatives 
from monarchical states and, as the 1670s progressed William began to 
send separate embassies drawn from his own circle of noble supporters to 
treat with foreign powers, alongside those comprising representatives of 
the States. 
several of the representative constituents were one of the major causes of the 
tensions within the government structure of the Dutch Republic. 
The interests of state were articulated for Holland by Pieter de la Court in Het 
Interest van Holland, as edited by raadpensionaris De Witt. 4 In essence it was 
argued that the good of Holland was dependent on securing the liberty necessary 
for prosecuting the trade fundamental to the state's success. The corollary of this 
was that anything which appeared to work against this purpose, particularly the 
actions of William 11 in 1650, must be rejected and opposed. The stadholdership 
of William 11 (1648-50) was seen as a return to the policies of dynasticism and 
militarism of his great-uncle Maurits (1585-1625), rather than continuing the more 
tolerant attitudes of Frederik Hendrik (1625-50), during whose stadholdership the 
full potential of the economy of Holland began to be realised. Hence after the 
death of William II in 1650, during the first stadholderless period, ideas of state 
were developed which could treat the stadholders more theoretically. The year 
1662, after the failure of the Stuart restoration in England to effect similar changes 
in the Dutch Republic, provided the ideal moment to assert the principles of the 
true freedom (ware vrijheid) within which a successful state should be run. ' Pieter 
4 Pieter de la Court in Het Interest van Holland, ofte Grond van Hollands 
welvaren (Amsterdam, 1662); J. 1. Israel, The Dutch Republic, Its Rise, 
Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806 (Oxford, 1995), p. 760. 
See J. W. Smit, "The Netherlands and Europe in the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Century", in J. Bromley, and E. H. Kossman, eds., Britain and 
the Netherlands in Europe and Asia, Papers delivered to the Third Anglo- 
Dutch Historical Conference (1968), pp. 22-28 for a discussion on the 
theory of True Freedom. Smit, p. 23, quotes Pieter de Groot writing in 
1673: "What constitutes the wealth of the Republic? The opulence of its 
trade. And what is the source of that trade? Good goverm-nent. For 
nothing is more attractive for the whole world than freedom of 
conscience and security of possessions. It is impossible that this freedom 
and this security of possessions would survive the government of a 
monarch. " See also "Considerations Upon the Present State of the United 
Netherlands, composed by a lover of his countrey for the encouragement 
of his countreymen, in this troublesome time. Exactly translated out of 
Nether-dutch into English by a most cordial lover of bothe the nations", 
in Baron Somers, Civil Tracts (1812), pp. 1-26, and Delenda Carthago, 
ibid., p. 37, "The interest and life of Holland, all the world knows is 
trade. It is advantageous to others, but it is necessary to them.... " speech 
made by Shaftesbury at the opening of the English Parliament on 5 
9 
de la Court was however a realist and although he saw established churches as a 
denial of the freedoms of state, he also saw the advantages of adherence to the 
Reformed Church by those with a formal role within the state. 
Amsterdam in the 1670s and 1680s, despite many internal dissensions, was 
securely aligned behind this policy, subject to the pressures of war and peace. 
These two qualifications of internal dispute and the demands of war and peace 
were critical in the 1670s and 1680s. William III's intentions were, in the early 
years of his restoration, less clear. Because he was restored to power on a wave of 
Orangist support sustained by many of those outwardly opposed to Wittian 
principles of toleration and true freedom, assumptions were made that he 
epitomised a combination of the leadership qualities of William the Silent and 
Frederick Hendrik and the Orangism of Maurits and William II. In fact he 
developed very much his own ideas and although they may have been drawn from 
his predecessors' examples, they were also determined by the circumstances of the 
1670s and 1680s and the internal and international affairs with which he had to 
deal. 
Interest dominated the direction of the foreign policy of the Republic. That is to 
say, those determining foreign policy were working from the point of view of their 
own dominant interest. In 1672 the invasion of the Republic by France provided a 
basic common interest, but apart from such major critical events, on the whole 
motives were very mixed, according to the issues at stake and their relation to the 
more fundamental complexity of interests. The combination of powerful interest 
groups and the representative system of government operating in the Dutch 
Republic meant that effective power could not be concentrated in the hands of one 
man or even a small group, although on occasions necessity forced a small group 
to act unilaterally. However, many of the interest groups were very powerful 
within the States and the city government of Amsterdam was one of the most 
February 1673. 
6 Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 639. 
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powerful! 
The primary question which this study will be addressing is the role of Amsterdam 
in the internal and external policy-making of the States during the period from the 
restoration of the Prince of Orange in 1672 to the build-up to the invasion of 
England in 1688. Critical to this is an understanding not only of the final decision- 
making processes, but also of the processes by which the decision-makers were 
empowered. This will necessarily include an analysis of the Amsterdam regency, 
but unlike other studies of regent elites in the seventeenth century, this will not be 
the end in itself. ' For those of us who want answers to the wider questions of 
European history the role of individual groups must be put into a broader context. 
Whatever the particulars regarding the life of one regent, it is his contribution to 
the decision-making processes which affected the whole city, province, state and in 
many cases international events which will be addressed here. 
The question is not being addressed from the point of view of the Prince of Orange 
for several reasons. Firstly, it has already been done by many historians, 
particularly Dutch, English and American. " Secondly, approached from the point 
of view of the stadholder, Amsterdam's importance became identified with the 
personalities who represented the town at the highest level in the States of Holland 
and the States General. In this way the period has become synonymous with the 
activities of Coenraad van Beuningen, whose open determination to put the 
interests of his town first, has led to assumptions of faithful representation of 
Amsterdam within this one personality. Studies of van Beuningen's activities as a 
7 Other influential groups including the major trading companies and their 
close association with Amsterdam will be discussed in chapter 5 below. 
Recent studies of regent elites have tended to the particularist, see for 
example: J. J. De Jong, Met goedfatsoen. De elite in een Hollandse Stad, 
Gouda 1700-1780 (Dieren, 1985); L. Kooijmans, Onder regenten. De 
elite in een Hollandse stad, Hoorn 1700-1780 (Dieren, 1985); M. Prak, 
Gezeten burgers. De elite in een Hollandse stad, Leiden 1700-1780 
(Dieren, 1985). 
9 See Chapter 2 below for a discussion on the historiography of the Prince 
of Orange. 
II 
statesman drawn as representative of Amsterdam have confirmed this impression. 'O 
This will be shown to be a partially flawed assumption. Thirdly, the reaction of 
Amsterdam to various initiatives by the stadholder can be gauged from the central 
point of view, but they cannot be accurately assessed without a fuller analysis of 
the formative arguments. Thus the security of the Republic was deemed vital by 
both the stadholder and Amsterdam, but what constituted such security was at 
times interpreted in widely varying ways. At their widest the differences were 
between territorial security and the needs of trade, but these differences could lead 
to more critical divisions over the relative importance of alliances. Anti-French 
alliances could safeguard the Dutch territories; pro-French alliances would enhance 
the security of trade. But things were not so simple. Fourthly (finally), historians 
of the Dutch Republic in the later seventeenth century have approached its history 
either as a direct reflection of the dominant themes in the extant sources or, as in 
the case of Geyl's Democralische Tendenties, " as a contribution to a particular 
historical debate. 
The original motivation for this research was simple historical curiosity and a 
straightforward approach to a question which posed itself after preliminary study of 
the Dutch Republic and its place in European history in the second half of the 
seventeenth century: did Amsterdam have the power to threaten the political 
survival of William III during the period before he became King of England and, if 
so, why did they not use it? It will become clear that, in seeking answers to these 
questions far more complex issues have had to be tackled. 
'0. M. A. M. Frankcn, Coenraad van Beuningens politiek en diplomatieke 
aktiviteiten in de jaren 1667-84 (Groningen, 1966); C. W. Roldanus, 
Coenraad Van Beuningen Staatsman en Libertijn (The Hague, 193 1); 
G. H. Kurtz, Willem III en Amsterdam 1683-5 (Utrecht, 1928). 
P. Geyl, Democratische tendenties in 1672 (rhe Hague, 1950); D. J. 
Roorda, Partij en Factie: De Oproeren van 1672 in de Steden van 
Holland en Zeeland, een Krachtmeting tussen Partijen en Facties 
(Groningen, 196 1), pp. 11 -3 6 looks at "partij en jacitie in de 
historiografle", from the historical perspective of the period when the 
proponents of the different theories were writing. 
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Before going on to look at the available sources and what has previously been 
made of them, some explanation should be made about the assumptions which led 
to the formulation of the original questions. 
William III had been excluded effectively from the offices of his ancestors during 
the first stadholderless period (1650-1672), when the fortunes of the Republic had 
been in the hands of the raadpensionarls, John De Witt. He was welcomed back 
enthusiastically in 1672 and until 1675 was held in general esteem. Thereafter his 
activities became less and less effective for the perceived general good of many 
parts of the Republic. Amsterdam was in the strongest position of all the 
contributory towns in the States of Holland, which paid the largest quota to the 
States General. She had a long history of cultivating skilled and influential 
politicians and could on occasion effectively veto important decisions. The 
decisions of the burgomasters and the vroedschap (town council) were more than 
once a thom in the flesh of the Prince, but throughout the whole period - even in 
the critical crisis of 1684 - compromises were reached between both parties. Such 
compromises had the effect of strengthening the stadholder's hold on office and 
reducing the influence of Amsterdam to that of a major pressure group. Is there 
any evidence to determine whether the Amsterdammers ever wanted more than 
that? Was it not the case that they could have precipitated a return to the 
stadholderless period if they had wanted to? These questions can only be answered 
by a careful study of the make-up of the regency, their dominant interests, their 
role within the city, and their perception of the place of the Dutch Republic in the 
seventeenth century world. These then need to be considered from the more central 
point of the role of the Prince and his ways of working with and within the central 
government of the Republic. 
The foundations for this study have been laid in two sections. The first is the 
background to the elevation of the Prince of Orange in 1672. This is firmly set in 
the foreign policy of De Witt, the majority of Louis XIV, the weakness of 
restoration English government and the failure of the States to undermine the innate 
Orangist sympathies of a large part of the Republic. The second is the regency of 
13 
Amsterdam itself, and its role within the Dutch Republic. 
The Dutch Republic was an anomaly in seventeenth century Europe. Although 
comparisons may be made with the English Commonwealth insofar as both resulted 
from a struggle against autocratic rule, the Dutch Revolt had been fought against a 
system of government operated from distant Spain, whereas the English Civil Wars 
had been a protest against the interpretation of the rights of kingship by Charles I. 
The Commonwealth hardly lasted beyond the death of Oliver Cromwell; the Dutch 
Republic lasted for two hundred years. A new kind of state had been created 
which had been bom from the common interests of the northern states of the 
Netherlands, had incorporated many of the institutions of government from the days 
of Hapsburg rule and had thrown up a new ruling elite which comprised both the 
aristocratic House of Orange and its peers, and the bourgeois merchant elite of the 
representative towns and cities. " 
The first ten years of the first stadholderless period coincided with the English 
Commonwealth, but the Restoration of Charles 11 in 1660 brought England once 
more into the tradition of monarchical government, while the Dutch Republic 
consolidated the notions of federal republican government. " This small group of 
provinces, each with its own government and interests could not be ignored by the 
rest of the European powers in the way the Swiss Federation had been since its 
secession from the Hapsburg Empire. The Dutch Republic was very different from 
that inland mountainous country, and in the seventeenth century its characteristics 
12 
. For a fuller discussion of the government and institutions and structures 
of the Dutch republic see J. L. Price, Holland and the Dutch Republic in 
the Seventeenth Century: The Politics of Particularism (Oxford, 1994). 
pp. 209-93; S. J. Andreae Fockerna, De Nederlandse staat onder de 
Republiek (Amsterdam, 1962); Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. 276-300, 
and below pp. 49-53. 
13 Israel, op. cit., p. 277, following J. C. Boogman, "The Union of Utrecht: 
Its Genesis and Consequences", BM. G. N., vol. iciv (1979), pp. 390-1, 
argues that the "best way to describe the political entity created by the 
Revolt is a cross between federal state and confederacy, with more of the 
confederacy in form and theory, and more of the federal state in 
substance and practice. ' See also Price, Holland and the Dutch Republic, 
pp. 212-13 
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had made it a major player in European affairs, although whether it could be called 
a major power is a little less certain. 
Geographically the Netherlands have always been a vital focal point for other 
European powers. The delta of the major westward flowing rivers from the 
European hinterland held economic importance from the earliest times and this 
increased as trade grew. The drainage of the surrounding areas created a 
favourable environment for the development of an urban infrastructure which 
quickly assumed its natural place in the politico-economic life of Europe in the 
early modem period. "' A new system of centralised taxation on those with the 
closest interest in the drainage schemes was introduced during the sixteenth century 
and ensured that maintenance was carried out effectively thereafter. " The change 
in the political structure of the Netherlands in the late sixteenth century shifted the 
economic advantage from the southern part (the rump of the Spanish Netherlands) 
to the north and increased the relative importance of the new Dutch Republic in the 
economy of Europe. This change was epitomised by the Dutch closure of the 
Scheldt in 1585, a major interference with the economic geography of the area and 
the trade through Antwerp. 
The contemporary growth of overseas exploration, trade and competition towards 
the Americas added a further dimension, and the advantages of an Atlantic coast 
and a flourishing and innovative shipbuilding industry for a short time put the new 
Republic on an equal footing with the English and gave it an advantage over the 
French. The Dutch West India Company (West Indische Compagnie (W. LC. )), 
founded in 1621 and re-formed under a new charter in 1674), may not have 
achieved the success and status of the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde 
A. Lambert, The Making of the Dutch Landscape (London, 1971), p. 212 
describes the drainage activities at their height in the early seventeenth 
century, just as the Dutch Golden Age was beginning. 
Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, The First Modern Economy: 
Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815 
(Cambridge, 1997), pp. 27-8. 
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Oostindische Compagnie (VO. C. )), " but its struggles against the French and 
English in the Americas, and particularly the Caribbean during the 1670s, were a 
crucial, if not critical, factor in the military and naval conflicts of the late 
seventeenth century. 
if the geographical context of the Dutch Republic gave it the potential for 
developing as the major seafaring and trading nation of the seventeenth century, at 
the same time it made it one of the most vulnerable to military and aggressive 
diplomatic policy. Sandwiched between the Spanish Netherlands in the south and 
the Hapsburg-influenced German States in the north, it necessarily became a factor 
for French interest in these areas. However, until the late 1660s it was the English 
who appeared to pose the greater threat. Competition in trade and conflicting 
assumptions of the control and use of the seas provided a strong scenario for the 
struggles which arose soon after the establishment of the English Commonwealth 
and the first stadholderless period. 17 
The three Anglo-Dutch wars of the seventeenth century (1652-54,1665-67 and 
1672-74) can, from a longer term-historical perspective, appear to be constituent 
parts of one conflict, just as twentieth century historians have seen the First and 
Second World Wars as part of one conflict leading to a European balance of 
power. 's There is some justification for such an approach and the arguments are 
stronger for the first two wars. Equally, however, the third war, which for the 
Dutch was a longer and more serious struggle against France, can be seen as the 
early stages of the wars against Louis XIV and the creation of an eighteenth 
century European power balance. Nevertheless, one contemporary observer noted 
that the English had "publikly pretended causes" for fighting the war which were a 
combination of the economic and political, and clearly continue the themes of the 
J. R. Jones, The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century (London, 
1966), p. 35. 
C. R. Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800 (London (Pelican edition), 
1973), pp. 100-103. 
's. Jones, Anglo-Dutch Wars, p. 4. 
16 
two earlier wars.: 
- "Honour of the King of England and of his people so insolently 
trampled upon by the States-General; 
- "Hindering of our East India trade; 
- "affronts ... upon our merchants at Surinam; 
- "Disputes over sovereignty at sea; 
- "Failure to strike flags"' 
In this context it is perhaps most useful therefore to look at the war of 1672 as two 
independent struggles against allies with widely differing war aims: the Anglo- 
Dutch war of 1672-74, and the Franco-Dutch conflict of 1672-78. 
The successful outcome of the eighty years struggle against Spain had marked the 
new Dutch Republic as an independent state to be reckoned with by the greater 
powers by the middle of the seventeenth century. Economically and politically she 
was important to both the French and the English. The concessions Spain had 
made, together with the vulnerability of the Spanish Netherlands, and the potential 
threats from the French meant that the former masters of the whole Netherlands 
had to strive to achieve working diplomatic relations with the Dutch. Their strong 
presence in the interests of the Atlantic states coincided with the decline of the 
interest of the Austrian Hapsburgs, and the continued conflicts between the various 
German States. " 
If the role of the small Dutch Republic in the international theatre was remarkable 
in relation to France, England and Spain, it was of a more traditional character with 
the neighbouring German states and the Danes and Swedes in the Baltic. These 
were more comparable in size and, with strong interdependence and competition in 
trade, the complexities of tensions and alliances during the latter part of the 
seventeenth century gave all these small northern European states a part in the 
Baron Somers, Civil Tracts (1812), p. 13, "An account of the Reasons 
which induced Charles the Second... to declare war against the States- 
General of the United Provinces in 1672". 
'0. For a full discussion of the Republic's relations with the other European 
powers after the end of the Eighty Years War, see H. H. Rowen, John De 
Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland (Princeton, 1978), particularly 
Chapters 14 and 16. 
17 
struggles between the larger powers. For reasons of trade, dynastic relations and 
contemporary major power interest, the Dutch Republic was normally more 
inclined to reluctant friendship with Brandenburg and Denmark and hostility with 
Sweden and the bishopric of Munster, " but from time to time made temporary 
alliances with these, most notably the 1668 Triple Alliance with Sweden (and 
England). 
The rulers of this small but important Republic in the later seventeenth century had 
therefore a high profile on the international stage. Supreme rulers throughout 
Europe were of course without exception of royal heritage. The Dutch Republic 
had no supreme ruler; since the establishment of the Union in 1585 authority had 
rested in theory with the States General which was itself subject to the constraints 
of the confederacy. Under the Princes of Orange after William the Silent (Maurits, 
Frederik Hendrik and William 11), there had been signs that they were either 
aspiring to royal status, or were identified as such by other powers, by pursuing 
what were seen as the traditional royalist policies of dynasticism and militarism. 
However, the Princes of Orange were in reality less of a royal family, but more of 
a higher nobility. Their powers remained similar to those they had exercised as 
stadholders under the Hapsburg imperial rule, that is, they were the servants of the 
central authority; they remained in theory the servants of the States. 
There was therefore no royal authority within the Dutch Republic, and the role of 
the nobility itself changed. In practice, without the means of ennoblement there 
was an inevitable decline in the numbers of the nobility. 22 The studies by van 
Nierop and Price have raised interesting questions about whether the role of the 
nobility within the administration of the Republic "declined". Van Nierop argues 
that status and traditional roles ensured a separate and continuing role for the 
21 
. Rowen, ibid. pp. 295-6 and p. 317. 
22 JI. Price, "The Dutch Nobility in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries", in H. M. Scott, ed., The European Nobilities in the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Centuries, Vol. I (London, 1995). pp. 84-5. H. F. K. van 
Nierop, The nobility of Holland., From knights to regents, 1500-16.50, 
Marten Ultee, trs. (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 46-66. 
18 
nobility. " Indeed this was also a contemporary seventeenth century interpretation 
by the English Ambassador, Sir William Temple: 
"The Nobles, though they are few in this Province [Holland], yet are 
not represented by all their number, but by Eight or Nine, who as 
Deputies from their Body have session in the States-Provincial; And 
who, when one among them dies, chuse another to succeed him. 
Though they have all together but one voice equal to the smallest 
Town; yet are they very considerable in the Government, by 
possessing many of the best charges both Civil and Military, by 
having the direction of all the Ecclesiastical Revenue that was seized 
by the State upon the change of Religion; and by sending their 
Deputies to all the Councils both of the Generality and the Province, 
and by the nomination of one Councellor in the two great Courts of 
Justice. They give their Voice first in the Assembly of States, and 
thereby a great weight to the business in consultation.... 
Nevertheless, the power of the other representatives, the towns and provinces, was 
more than a counterbalance to that of the nobility, and Price's approach, while 
acknowledging that "the superior status of the nobility went almost unchallenged 
until the second half of the eighteenth century", appears the more realistic. He 
argues that although the actual political power of the Holland nobles at least was 
"slight", in many ways the regent classes of the Dutch towns underwent a form of 
ennoblement. " 
There was therefore a closing of political status, while the traditional social status 
remained unchallenged. This provided a unique political system in which a quasi- 
royal prince and representative commoners had almost equal political influence - 
influence which was far greater than was the traditional role of the aristocracy in 
23. van Nierop, op. cit., pp. 33-45; but the privileges accorded the nobility 
underwent gradual erosion during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
ibid., p. 38. 
Sir William Temple, Observations upon the United Provinces of the 
Netherlands, Sir George Clark, ed. (Oxford, 1972), pp. 58-9. 
21. Price, op. cit., pp. 83-84 and 107-113; De Vries, The First Modem 
Economy, p. 529 draws on Belle van Zuylen's simplistic definition of 
"nobility" as "the right to hunt" to demonstrate that the acquisition of this 
privilege by the regents of Utrecht in 1683 also indicated an 
aristocratisation of the regent class in that province. 
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most other European states. The political power of the regents had been 
consolidated and achieved international credibility during the first stadholderless 
period. The restoration of the Prince of Orange in 1672 to the titles and roles of 
his predecessors did not recreate the situation before 1650, but provided a new 
scenario for the determination of the policy of the States. It is therefore very much 
within the context of the preceding twenty years that this study has been 
undertaken. 
There was high consciousness within the Dutch Republic of its history since the 
Revolt; within the states of Holland and Amsterdam in particular there was a deep 
awareness of the importance of the events of 1650, when the power of Amsterdam 
was openly confronted by William 11. It may be that in the final analysis it was 
economic interest that determined policy, but when economic interest combined 
with this sense of political identity, the development of strong ideological politics 
was an inevitable consequence. It will also be seen that the Prince of Orange was 
the inheritor of his predecessors' experiences, and it is the convergence, tensions, 
confrontations and compromises between these two clearly defined political entities 
which provide the raw chronology of this study. 
20 
Chapter 2 
The Historiography of Amsterdam and William III in the 1670s 
and 1680s 
The Dutch Republic in the seventeenth century is not one of the neglected areas of 
history; much has already been made common knowledge, not least because of the 
cultural contribution of the artists whose secularism has given us a vivid visual 
idea of life within urban Holland and its maritime and overseas interests. ' Its role 
as the leading trading nation and its intervention in international dynasticism have 
been well covered, creating some of the assumptions alluded to. This broad 
knowledge may also be one of the reasons why so many modem Dutch historians 
have turned to the particularist in order to satisfy their (and others') need for 
original research. It has been disappointing to find that several of these studies 
have become so particularist that they do not relate the local interests of their 
subject to the external affairs of the city, States or the whole Republic. ' On the 
other hand Roorda based his study of the regent elites in the Holland towns solely 
within the context of the Rampjaar of 1672 and the consequences of the French 
invasion of the provinces of Gelderland, Overijssel and Utrecht. 3 I have chosen, 
however, to make the most of the work that has already been done in order to 
follow an investigation into a period which, at second glance, proves to have been 
less adequately covered than that of the Wittian period when the Dutch Republic 
was apparently at its zenith. 
For William III the literature speaks for itself. In 1966 Stephen Baxter, 
Simon Schama, The Embarrassment of Riches (London, 1987), admits in 
the opening lines of his preface that his visual image of seventeenth 
century Dutch "culture" stimulated the writing of his somewhat "eccentric 
project". 
2. Jong, Met goedfalsoen. - Kooijmans, Onder regenten; Prak, Gezeten 
burgers. see above p. 10, note 8. 
3 
. Roorda, Partij en Factie. 
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presumably coinciding with his biography of William III, ' analysed the then current 
writings on the stadholder-king. ' 
The Dutch historians tend to be fairly circumspect about the 1670s and 1680s, 
which saw a changing international political and economic role for the Republic; ' 
English and American historians approach the earlier years of William from their 
7 interest in his role as King of England after 1688. 
For the regency of Amsterdam the basic work has been done for all students by 
Elias in his massive reference work on the Amsterdam regency from 1575-1795. ' 
This has been an excellent starting point, but has raised questions. It is itself 
dependent for the 1660s and early 1670s on Bontemantel, 9 an active participant in 
the contemporary events, and more broadly on Wagenaar, 'O and yet manages to 
omit one of the burgomasters of the 1670s from its records. " 
The most notable thing about the primary sources on Amsterdam in the 1670s is 
missing evidence. On the wider canvas the researcher is hampered by the problems 
of the Fagel Archive, which has never been successfully catalogued. The contents 
4 Stephen B. Baxter, William Iff and the Defense of European Liberty 
1650-1702 (London, 1966). 
S. B. Baxter, "Recent Writings on William III", Journal of Modern 
History, Vol. Iviii, No. 3 (1966), pp. 256-66. 
6 N. Japikse, Willem III, De Stadhouder-Koning (Amsterdam, 1930). 
7 Baxter, William Iff; Tony Claydon, in his recent study William Iff and the Godly 
Revolution (Cambridge, 1996), p. 12. 
J. E. Elias, De Froedschap van Amsterdam, 2 vols. (Haarlem, 1903 -5). 
H. Bontemantel, De regeeringe van Amsterdam, soo in 't civiele als 
crimineel en militaire (1653-1672), G. W. Kemkamp, ed. (The Hague, 
1897). 
'o. J. Wagenaar, Amsterdam in zijne opkomst, aanwas, geschiedenissen, 
voorregten, koophandel, gebouwen, kerkensfaat, schoolen, schutterij, 
gilden en regeeringe, 4 vols. (Amsterdam, 1760-88). 
". See below p. 116, note 6. 
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are tantalising, but too often one-sided because of the illegibility of Fagel's 
handwriting, even as far as dating is concerned. " What can be found in abundance 
is the correspondence of Coenraad van Beuningen and Nicolaas Witsen, which has 
made the former the main source of knowledge about Amsterdam and - because of 
his diplomatic service -a major contributory source to Dutch foreign policy 
researches. Although correspondence from Gillis Valckenier, probably the most 
dominant regent in Amsterdam from the late 1660s until his death in 1680, has 
survived in many archives, it is fragmented and appears to have been archived in 
relation to his correspondents' affairs and importance. This fragmentation raises the 
question in the researcher's mind as to how much more correspondence has not 
survived archiving processes. The lack of correspondence between Valckenier and 
Witsen, made much of by Gebhard, is evidence of the kind of gap in evidence. " 
Nevertheless, the final decisions of the Amsterdam regency are easy to follow 
through the cumbersome delegation procedures of the constitution of the Dutch 
Republic. It is therefore at the more basic level of motivation and background that 
evidence should be sought. 
The lack of pamphlet literature in the 1670s is more interesting. Most that is 
extant deals with the past, that is the events surrounding the fall of De Witt rather 
than the contemporary issues. " Not until the crises of the early 1680s does the 
pamphlet literature recapture its earlier dominance; this has been carefully analysed 
12 
. 
K. H. D. Haley, An English Diplomat in the Low Countries: Sir William 
Temple and John De Witt 1665-1672 (Oxford, 1986), Preface, p. vii, 
complains about this as a warning to all students of Fagel, echoing 
Baxter's frustration with "The... disappointing Fagel papers in the 
Algemeen Rijksarchier, S. B. Baxter, "Recent Writings on William III", 
p. 260. 
IF Gebhard, Het Leven van Mr Nicolaas Cornelisz. Witsen (1641-1717), 
2 vols. (Utrecht, 1881), p. 144, although Franken, Van Beuningen, does 
make extensive use of correspondence between Valckenier and van 
Beuningen. 
A. Munt, "The Impact of the Rampjaar on Dutch Golden Age Culture", 
Dutch Crossing, A Journal of Low Countries Studies, Vol. 2 1, No. 1 
(1997), p. 12, shows that there was a threefold increase in the average 
annual publication of pamphlets during 1672-1674, but an average one- 
third decrease during 1675-87. 
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by Kurtz in her study again dominated by the then already failing van Beuningen. 15 
Engravings and prints do continue to centre around major events like the arguments 
over the Gelderland sovereignty issue and the Peace of Nijmegen, particularly the 
large output by Romein de Hooghe, but at the parochial level they are minimal, or 
more concerned with the physical development of the city at a time when visual 
display played an important role in the outward demonstration of economic and 
political power. " The subject matter of engravings followed the pattern of the 
pamphlet literature, returning to themes of internal politics in the 1680s. The 
contrast is clearly seen between a set of four engravings of 1674, illustrating an 
allegoric verse on the struggles of the Netherlands and the importance of the role 
of the Prince of Orange, " and the allegory on the discord between Amsterdam and 
William III in the 1680s over the "Fabel van der Koeyen, de Herder, en de Wolf'. " 
More attention therefore has to be paid to the informal notes appended to official 
documents, the prosaic records of Joan Appelman, " the interests and 
correspondence of the regents, their patronage networks, for instance their role in 
the Kerkeraad, their financial interests and family relationships. From these it is 
possible to build up a picture of the particular activities of the individual regents 
and to understand their degree of contribution to the final decision-making 
processes. 
With such a clearly defined group of ruling class and merchant elite, there is a 
danger of falling into the trap of drawing conclusions about interest and 'party' 
without paying due attention to the finer distinctions of individual and faction. The 
Kurtz, Willem III en Amsterdam. 
The number of similar, but not identical studies of the development of the 
centre of seventeenth century Amsterdam in the Prcntenkabinet of the 
Gerneente Archief in Amsterdam demonstrates this tendency. 
Atlas van Stolk, no. 2570 (1-4), Fig. 1. 
Atlas van Stolk, no. 2705. Fig 2. 
19. G. A. Amsterdam, I Appelman, Notulen van I Gepasseerde in de 
Vroedschap der stad Amsterdam, van 11.9.1672 tot 23.9.1694. 
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1670s in Amsterdam do not follow the pattern of clear-cut divisions which were 
discernible in the 1660s and returned to a certain extent in the 1680s. The 
inspiration of Roorda originally informed these researches, but he was dealing with 
the element of party and faction as reflected throughout the Republic in a single 
historical event where choices had to be made in extreme circumstances . 
20 The 
variables open to the participants after 1672 were far greater and offered greater 
scope, particularly within Amsterdam, for the individual to assert himself in spite 
of factional interests. The analysis of the individual's role in faction, interest and 
states policies will be central to the discussions within this study. 
Stephen Baxter focused his biography of William III by placing him firmly as a 
European, the man who opposed and contained French aggression . 
2, Japikse in his 
two-volume biography dealt in great and effective detail with the internal 
fluctuations of power in the United Provinces until the Peace of Westminster in 
February 1674, but thereafter dealt mainly with foreign policy from the point of 
view of William. 22 Baxter believed he was filling in the gaps left by Japikse whom 
he felt had given an imbalanced view of William's achievement. 23 This 
international military role has become so firmly attached to William because much 
of his time as stadholder and king was taken up with wars against Louis XIV; and 
even during the early 1680s, most of the internal disagreements in the United 
Provinces were concerned with William's desire to pursue a more aggressive 
foreign policy. The result of such approaches has been to distort the reality of 
William's foreign policy and military activities, by either assuming that he was the 
". Roorda, Partij en Factie. 
21 
. Baxter, William III; Tony Claydon, William III and the Godly Revolution, 
p. 12 , 
follows Baxter's thesis and takes the view that William's struggle 
against Louis XIV was firmly based in his status as protestant Prince of 
Orange. 
22 
.N 
Japikse, Prins Willem III: De Stadhouder-konig, 2 vols. (Amsterdam, 
1930-31). 
23 " 
... a wholly disproportionate amount of space is given to the years 1650- 
74 with the result that the account of the prince as soldier and king is 
necessarily superficial. " Baxter, "Recent Writings on William III", p. 258. 
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only true representative of the Dutch Republic on the international stage, or by 
overlooking the greater role played by the regent classes in determining the scope 
of the Prince's activities. " 
Taken together with his assumption of the English crown and the political changes 
thus enforced, this has made William III an important figure in the development of 
Modem Europe. Attempts to make him an attractive figure have often failed, 
partly no doubt because of the over-enthusiasm of his apologists, which has not 
been altogether justified by the available material. For example Baxter argued that 
William was a very successful general and politician; " he certainly took pride in 
his role as Captain-General and was frequently portrayed as the successful military 
leader in commemorative medals and portraits. But the reality was that his 
successes were limited and very often not due to the quality of his generalship. 
Within three years of his appointment as leader of the armed forces, his military 
abilities were being questioned and scrutinised very carefully, once the early 
military successes were followed by stalemate sieges. His political abilities will be 
examined throughout this thesis in the context of his relations with Amsterdam. J. 
Smit saw Fruin's attempts to restore William's respectability in the mid-nineteenth 
century as abortive but undertaken by Fruin as "cen waardig exponent van de 
nationale politieke des Oranjes". " Fruin's defence of William rested on the events 
of 14 August 1678 and the battle of St Denis and the question of the peace treaty 
17 being finalised at Nijmegen at the same time, in opposition to William's wishes. 
This point was also made by Jonathan Israel about the Dutch role in the 
invasion of England in 1688, see J. I. Israel, "The Dutch role in the 
Glorious Revolution", in J. 1. Israel, ed., The Anglo-Dutch Moment 
(Cambridge, 199 1), p. 105. 
25 
. Baxter, William III, p. 36: "The boy was an extreme example of this [family] pattern: weaker, braver, abler, more precocious than any of his 
ancestors, he was to prove both a first-class soldier and a first-class 
politician. " 
26 Smit, J. W., Fruin en de Partijen Ti/dens de Republiek (Groningen, 
1958), p. 189. 
Quoted from Fruin's, Correspondentie, 5 November, 1888, in Smit, op. 
cit., p. 193. 
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The Prince of Orange's international position has often removed him from close 
consideration in internal Dutch historiesý' and his 'foreignness' has been at the 
mercy of the insularity of some British historians. " 
However, from 1672 until 1685 there was a continual relationship between William 
and various components of the States, which had an influential effect, together with 
that of the international situation, on the position he was to reach by 1688, and on 
the role of the United Provinces in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. 
Antagonism between William and these elements is the most obvious theme to 
catch hold of, but the undercurrents of internal factional disputes and the methods 
of avoiding antagonism were perhaps more important in the long run. It is these 
which tells us how the States came to make the policy towards France during the 
crucial years, 1683-88. Always a major factor in the internal balance of power and 
decision-making was the city of Amsterdam, sometimes in the forefront, at other 
times merely a contributory factor. Amsterdam's position was decided by its 
numerical superiority and financial domination of both the provincial and federal 
States. The Amsterdam representatives, however, were limited in theory by the 
rules of representation and circulation of presidency as much as other representative 
towns. But historians following the idea of a European foreign policy have largely 
ignored the composition of the decision-making bodies and concentrated on those 
closely linked to the implementation of policy. There has thus been an emphasis 
on those who participated in foreign policy either in the service of the States or in 
the direct service of the Prince of Orange. 
28. "After 1674 William III's foreign policy belongs so clearly to European 
history in its widest sense that it is perhaps of less interest to the student 
of Dutch history than the analysis of the strength on which it rested", E. 
Kossmann, "The Dutch Republic", in F. L. Carsten, ed., New Cambridge 
Modern History, VoL V The Ascendancy of France 1648-88 (Cambridge, 
1961), p. 298. 
29. Such "pigeon-holing" within distinct historical studies has also been noted 
by Steven Pincus in his study of English foreign policy during the period 
of the Anglo-Dutch Wars, which attempts to provide a fuller analysis of 
the contributions of both domestic and foreign issues, Steven C. A. Pincus, 
Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English 
Foreign Policy, 1650-1668 (Cambridge, 1996), p. 441. 
27 
The challenge of approaching historical research on the basically more orthodox 
lines chosen is two-fold. The choice of one part of the subject (that is William 111) 
is familiar and has often been dealt with and argued by eminent historians of the 
past; in addition to the sources already quoted, there are more "populist" studies. 
There is consequently unlikely to be a large amount of really new material to 
uncover, although any new view of the available material reveals relevant details 
dismissed by previous researches. Secondly, and in part consequent on the first 
point, there are many familiar themes and pre-conceived ideas which have become 
accepted as "fact". Here a debt is owed to the more recent studies which have 
looked closely at the underlying structure of society in all its facets and rationalised 
such myths. " 
Studies of Amsterdam have tended more to the macroscopic, for example, 1.1 
Brugmans, Geschiedenis van Amsterdam, H. Brugmans, Opkomst en Bloei van 
Amsterdam and I Wagenaar, Amsterdam in zijne opkomst, aanwas, 
geschiedenissen... " looking at the last quarter of the seventeenth century as a coda 
to the Golden Age and dealing superficially with the prominent persons. However, 
there have been one or two in-depth studies, apart from Elias' mammoth work on 
the vroedschap, which have discussed Amsterdam's political role as seen by van 
Beuningen. These studies by Franken (Coenraad van Beuningený politicke en 
diplomatieke aktiviteiten in de jarcn 1667-84), Kurtz (Willem III en Amsterdam 
1683-5) and Roldanus (Coenraad van Beuningen Staatsman en Libertijn), inter 
alia, look primarily at the political role of Amsterdam as a factor in the 
determination of the foreign policy of the Dutch Republic. They do not analyse 
the basis of that role. More of the actual nature of Amsterdam in the 1660s and 
1670s can be found in Bontemantel's De Regeeringe van Amsterdam..., which has 
'0- Coymans, op. cit; de Jong, op. cit.; Prak, op. cit.; Roorda, Partij en 
Factie, M. van der Bij1, Idee en Interest: voorgeschiedenis, verloop en 
achtergronden van de politieke twisten in Zeeland en vooral in 
Middelburg tussen 1702 en 1715 (Groningen, 1981). 
31 
. 11. Brugmans, Opkomst en Bloei van Amsterdam (Amsterdam, 1911); I. J. 
Brugmans, ed., Geschiedenis van Amsterdam, 2nd. edn., 6 vols. 
(Utrecht/Antwerp, 1972-73); and I Wagenaar, op. cit. 
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been drawn on extensively by historians, particularly Elias. Perhaps the greatest 
contribution Bontemantel's account makes is to give a contemporary picture of the 
jealousies and factional politicking which were so much part of the regent class; 
much of this comes from Bontemantel's own bitterness after his removal from 
office in September 1672. 
There are also very useful studies by van Dillen and Nusteling on the financial 
organisations and economic history of Amsterdam in this period, " as well as 
individual studies of the great trading companies. More often than not, though, 
they tell us little about the broader picture, as in the case of Klein, De Trippen, 33 
which is a good study of the fortunes of the Trips and their industrial and financial 
empire in the Netherlands and Sweden, or deal with the overseas activities of the 
VO. C and WIL C34 Although these paint a good background to understanding the 
importance of such family merchant houses and trading companies and their 
contribution to the regent class, they do not add any significant detail to the 
foreground. 
Hence in this approach to William III and his relations with Amsterdam, we are 
partly at the mercy of two sets of historians who have produced a large volume of 
works, none of which can be discounted. There are firstly, the historians from 
32 
.IG. van 
Dillen, Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis der Wisselbanken (The 
Hague 1925); "Stukken betreffende der Amsterdamscher Graanhandle 
ornstreeks het jaar 168 1", Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek, Vol. iii 
(1917), pp. 70-85, "Een boek van Phoonsen over de Amsterdamsche 
Wisselbank", Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek, Vol. vii (1921), pp. 1-18; 
"Amsterdam's Role in Seventeenth Century Dutch Politics and its 
Economic Background", Bromley, J. S. and Kossmann, E. H., eds., Britain 
and the Netherlands, Vol. ii (Groningen, 1964), pp. 133-147; H. 
Nusteling, Welwaart en Werkgelegendheid in Amsterdam, 1540-1860. 
Een relaas over demografle, economie en sociale politieke van een 
wereldstad (Amsterdam/Dieren, 1985). 
33. P. W. Klein, De Trippen in de 17e Eeuw: Een Studie over het 
ondernemensgedrag op de Hollandse stapelmarkt (Assen, 1965). 
C. R. Boxer, "Jan Compagnie in Japan, 1672-1674, Anglo-Dutch Rivalry 
in Japan and Formosa", Transactions of the Asiatic Society ofJapan, 
second series, vii (Tokyo, 193 1); W. R. Menkman, De West-Indische 
Compagnie (Amsterdam, 1947). 
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Wagenaar to Israel, who have written large-scale accounts of the period often 
making contemporary political statements. " Secondly, there are the historians of 
particular periods or particular disciplines who have greatly enhanced the work of 
the former. Both of these groups are supplemented by historical biographies. With 
such a wealth of works to draw on there is a temptation to resort to critical 
argument of the major themes already explored. However, the surest way to avoid 
this excessively is to return to the original source material. Professor Haley, in his 
book on Sir William Temple, has argued for the need for research to be based 
more on original works, preferably not even edited printed collections. " 
This approach frees the researcher from an overreliance on pre-conceived ideas and 
allows a fresh viewpoint on incidents and characters, but care needs to be taken not 
to re-invent the wheel, and the researcher therefore needs a good understanding of 
earlier works, particularly where so much valuable work has already been 
undertaken by eminent historians. 
In the case of the Dutch Republic in the late seventeenth century there is a lot of 
unpublished original work, much of which, however, shows signs of previous 
researchers. The greatest loss to the historians of this period is the Fagel archive in 
the Rijksarchief in The Hague which has been collected with care, but has never 
yet been deciphered or indexed fully. Apart from the difficulty of reading Fagel's 
writing, many are undated and, dealing with several subjects, complicated to index. 
Hence the study of Fagel has been relegated to a small biographical entry in 
". Wagenaar, Amsterdam in zijne opk-omst, aanwas, geschiedenissen, 
voorregten... -, J. Wagenaar, Paderlandsche Historie, Vols. 13,14 and 15 
(Amsterdam, 1794); R. Fruin, Geschiedenis der Staatsinstellingen in 
Nederland tot der val der Republiek, Colenbrander, H., ed. (The Hague, 
1922); P. Geyl, Oranje en Stuart 1641-72 (Utrecht, 1939); transl., 
Orange and Stuart (New York, 1969), Algemene Geschiedenis der 
Nederlanden (1954), Vol. 7. and The Netherlands in the Seventeenth 
Century, Vol. 2 1648-1715 (London, 1964); Algemene Geschiedenis der 
Nederlanden, J. A. van Houtte, et al., eds. (Utrecht 1949), vol. 7; P. J. 
Blok, Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, revised ed. (The Hague, 
1980). vol. 8; Israel, The Dutch Republic. 
36 
. Haley, An English Diplomat, preface. 
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Ontbekende Raadpensionarissen" and the use of generally available but not 
particularly enlightening material. 
No study of Amsterdam can be complete or justified without proper consideration 
being given to economic affairs. There is a dilemma in choosing, on the one hand, 
between mere allusion to economic factors by reference to the general works on the 
Dutch Republic of historians like de Vries, Nusteling and van Dillen, " and, on the 
other hand, the more specialised studies on Amsterdam, particularly by van Dillen, 
and attempting to enter the lists by some kind of in depth study of economic life. 
The latter choice is not feasible since the major theme of this thesis is not an 
attempt to enter the arguments on the state of the Dutch economy in the later 
seventeenth century. The aim is therefore to attempt to strike a compromise 
between the two methods, hence acknowledging the debt to major works, and 
drawing all the relevant inferences from the papers in the Genleente Archief in 
Amsterdam which show how the mercantile factor was ever present in all political 
discussions and decision-making by the Amsterdam regents, but did not prevent 
them from being politicians and diplomats. 
Whatever the interpretation of later historians on a particular period, no matter their 
method of study, be it dominated by subjectivity or empiricism, it seems clear that 
the most important starting point for a general overview is to be gleaned from 
contemporary commentators. In the seventeenth century, these were most 
frequently involved in the events of the day, and even if they were working on 
mistaken or limited premises, further policy decisions were often made on the 
grounds of their interpretations. Such an argument has of course to be qualified 
where accounts were compiled from notes several years after the events. For 
example, there are two sources from the French Ambassador in the Netherlands at 
". A. De Fouw, Ontbekende raadpensionarissen (The Hague, 1946). 
38 J. de Vries, S. A. van de Woude, The First Modem Economy; H. 
Nusteling, Welwaart en Werkgelegendheid in Amsterdam; I G. van 
Dillen, Van Rijkdom en Regenten: Handboek tot de economische en 
sociale geschiedenis van Nederland tijdens de republiek (The Hague, 
1970). 
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the end of the 1670s and early 1680s, DAvaux. The first are his notes, letters and 
diaries written at the time and the second are his memoirs written several years 
later. "' Presumably the second were written with reference to the first, but no 
doubt the underlying commentary was informed by hindsight and knowledge of the 
outcomes. 
However, for this period there is a limited wealth which enables the historian to 
wander, inter alia, from the republican Bontemantel to the Orangist Dohna; 40 and 
then to see how these are justified or not by the Observations of Sir William 
Temple, as an author and a working ambassador with sympathies towards both the 
Republic and the Prince of Orange '4' and the wiles of the chauvinist DAvaux 
establishing his contacts in Amsterdam. There are also the pamphlets and news 
sheets to take account of, many of which, while anonymous, show the general 
views. 42 However, as we have seen, there was either a dearth of such literature in 
the mid-1670s relating to Amsterdam, or, following the events of 1672, an informal 
form of censorship restricted pamphlet literature to support of the Orangist 
39 Godefroy D'Estrades, Lettres, Himoires et Nigociations de M. le Comte 
d'Estrades, 9 vols and supplement, P. Marchand, ed. (The Hague, 1743), 
Vols. 7,8 and 9 specifically include the correspondence of the three 
French ambassadors (DEstrades, D'Avaux and Colbert) at Nijmegen 
froml676-1678; Jean Antoine de Mesme, Comte d'Avaux, Nigociations 
de Monsieur Le Comte DAvaux en Hollande depuis 1679, jusquen 1684, 
E. Mallet, ed., 6 vols. (Paris, 1752). 
Bonternantel, op. cit4 Frederic de, Dohna, Les Mimoires du Burgrave et 
Comte Frederic de Dohna 1621-88 (1898). 
There is a wide range of Temple's works available, including his 
structured account of the Dutch Republic as he observed it during his 
time as ambassador, Observations upon the United Provinces of the 
Netherlands, first published in 1673; the edited printed volumes of his 
Works, and his diplomatic correspondence archived in the P. R. O. 
42 W. P. C. Knuttel, Catalogus van de Pamfletten-verzameling berustende in 
de Koninklijke Bibliotheek, Hollandse Mercurius (monthly news sheet). 
The majority of the pamphlet literature published in the Dutch Republic 
between 1672 and 1684 can be referenced through the Knuttel Catalogue, 
but where they have been sourced through the archives at the Institute of 
Historical Research, they are referenced as Dutch Historical Pamphlets, 
1672-84. 
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regime. 43 However, after 1678 this situation changed and, as has already been 
noted, Kurtz was able to draw in detail on the pamphlet literature for her thesis on 
the crisis of 1683/4.44 
There has of course therefore been recourse to the large body of work discussed 
above, but the issues have been looked at principally from the point of view of the 
activities of the whole of the Amsterdam regent class and to a lesser extent of the 
intelligence network operated by Fagel in dealing with Amsterdam and other 
sometime dissident groups, rather than using the foreign policy of William III as a 
starting point. The thesis is therefore firmly set within the Dutch Republic. And 
in this way, it is based largely on researches into the Amsterdam archives, 
comparison and contradictions with earlier works being used as references within 
the arguments. The main exception is the extensive use made of the biographical 
details given in Elias's work on the Amsterdam vroedschap. 
This study is an attempt to analyse the influences on the relationships within the 
most powerful force in the States, the City of Amsterdam, and to understand the 
role of both the Prince and Amsterdam in the policy-making of the Dutch Republic 
during the years 1672-1684. The raison dWal as perceived by the Prince and the 
Amsterdam regents was so different that there were natural inbuilt difficulties to be 
overcome, before the occurrence of domestic and international crises imposed 
additional pressures. 
A brief examination of the extant historiography shows why there is a need to 
repair an omission in the studies of the Dutch Republic in the 1670s and 1680s. 
This study, as an attempt to place a revised perspective on the balance of power 
within the Dutch Republic in the years 1672-1684, might be considered an attack 
on previous histories of the period, and to a certain extent this must be true. But 
the attack is limited. Earlier histories have tended to concentrate on particular 
43 
. Roorda, Partij en Facite, p. 12. 
44. Kurtz, op. cit. 
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aspects determined by the major historical "events" of the period. Thus the revival 
of Orangist fortunes is seen in the light of the Rampjaar of 1672. Thereafter the 
history of the city of Amsterdam and Prince Willem III appear to converge only 
where a crisis is perceived: the peace negotiations at Nijmegen; 45 the struggle for 
alliances 1679-81; the Luxemburg crises of 1682 and 1684 ; 4' and the invasion of 
England in 1688. 
However, by 1688, when William went, with the support of the States General, to 
take up the challenge in England, Amsterdam and William had found enough 
common ground in the anti-French struggle to formulate a coherent foreign policy, 
whatever fundamental differences still remained over the distribution and use of 
power. 47 
The Prince has been perceived to be concerned only with foreign policy, 
Amsterdam only with its own commercial pre-eminence; the majority of studies 
which deal with both restrict themselves to the relationship between the Prince and 
the central States role of Coenraad van Beuningen. The divisions between the two 
have been sharpened by the studies of English historians who have started from the 
point of view of an English king who happened to be Dutch; while at least Dutch 
historians like Japikse describe him as "Stadhouder-konig" thus acknowledging that 
his earlier role and responsibilities were as valid after the Glorious Revolution as 
before. 
45 
. Roorda, D. J., "The Peace of Nijmegen, the end of a Particular Period in 
Dutch History", The Peace of Nijmegen 1676-167819, International 
Congress of the Tricentennial Nijmegen 14-16 September 1978 
(Amsterdam, 1980), pp. 17-28. 
46 
. Kurtz, op. cit. 
J. I. Israel, "The Dutch Role in the Glorious Revolution", pp. 105-162, and 
"The Dutch Republic and the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688-89 in 
England", in C. Wilson, and D. Proctor, eds., 1688, The Seaborne 
Alliance and Diplomatic Revolution, Proceedings of an International 
Symposium held at the National Maritime Museum Greenwich, October 
1988 (London, 1989), pp. 31-44. 
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Studies of William III have appeared regularly and the historiography of the 
Stadholder-King has itself on occasion been the subject of historical discussion. 
The Tercentenary celebrations of the Glorious Revolution added to this output. "' 
The sixteen years between the restoration of William III and the acquisition of the 
English crown demonstrate the exercise of political relationships within the Dutch 
Republic which prevented the stadholder from prosecuting his anti-French policies 
successfully after 1675 until 1688. 
Much of the literature did of course deal with the impact of the 
Revolution on England and the international role of William as King of 
England. However, in D. Hoak and M. Feingold, ed., The World of 
William andAfary, Anglo-Dutch Perspectives on the Revolution of 1688- 89 (Stamford, 1996), the influence of the Dutch role is examined within 
these larger issues. 
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Chapter 3 
The Prelude to 1672 in the Dutch Republic and Amsterdam 
In 1648 the Dutch Republic emerged confidently from the Eighty Years' War of 
independence against Spain. The following two decades were to witness the 
greatest manifestation of the Golden Age of the Republic. The fruition of the 
seeds which had been sown during the war to secure the financial and commercial 
basis of the young Republic was complemented by the material display of the 
wealth generated. Respect, tempered by competition, was paid to these 
achievements by the French and English and led to Dutch involvement in 
international conflict on an almost equal footing with the major powers. The few 
years immediately following peace with Spain did not produce the untroubled 
conditions which the Republicans were to argue were essential for the successful 
prosecution of the true interest of the State. ' The tensions between the new 
Stadholder, William 11 (1648-1650), and those wishing to restrict military activity 
and expenditure took the Republic to the edge of civil war and in the medium term 
put the House of Orange into eclipse. The short stadholdership of William 11 and 
his early death coincided with the consolidation of the Dutch State after the end of 
the Eighty Years' War. Although the following twenty-one years were not years of 
uninterrupted peace, the wars in which the Republic became involved did not 
undermine the progress of the Golden Age. 
The Dutch Golden Age has for long been identified as a specific period when 
everything from arts to commerce, from domestic orderliness to provincial 
government, and from religious toleration to the Republic of Letters, was seen to 
be contributing to the international success of the United Provinces. The dates of 
its inception and demise have been debated by historians, but the terminology has 
rarely, if ever, been denied. ' For the purposes of this study the zenith of the 
I 
. For a full discussion on the "interest of state", see above pp. 8-10. 
2 De Vries, First Modern Economy, dates the "decline after 1660s", see below p. 85, note 1. 
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Golden Age is taken to be the period between the end of the war against Spanish 
authority in 1648 and the Rampjaar of 1672. 
The Golden Age of the Dutch Republic was underpinned by the vibrant economy 
and maritime supremacy which made the States for a brief time a major player in 
European history. Coinciding with civil wars and uncertainties in other countries, 
its secure roots in overseas activities and strong influences over international trade 
gave it a lever in international agreements. The crisis between William II and the 
Loevensteiners was used as a contender for evidence supporting the political side 
of the General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century theory, ' but the death of the 
stadholder did not precipitate the kind of domestic turmoil in which the minority 
rule of Louis XIV in France had resulted; nor was it the culmination of a long 
period of civil struggle as in the execution of Charles I in England. William II died 
of natural causes after a short period of office and a very short illness. It is not the 
purpose of historians to discuss what might have been except insofar as it can help 
our understanding of what did happen. In this way the importance of the brief 
civil strife during William II's stadholdership is therefore the influence it had on 
the administration which followed during the minority of William III, both 
domestically and in international relations; and the continuing influence it had on 
relations between his son on his restoration and the regents of the leading towns. 
When William III was born on 14 November 1650, the week after the death of his 
father from smallpox, there was a power vacuum in the Dutch Republic and chaos 
in the Orangist organisation. The Frisian stadholder William Frederick could not 
command the support of Holland and Zeeland and the two leading women 
remaining in charge of the senior line of the House of Orange, the Dowager 
II. R. Trevor-Roper, "The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century", in 
T. Aston, ed., Crisis in Europe 1560-1660 (London, 1965), p. 87-8; this 
debate of the 1960s was neatly put into perspective as far as the Dutch 
Republic was concerned by Frank-en in his introductory chapter to his 
thesis "Coenraad van Beuningen's politieke aktiviteiten in de jaren 1667- 
1684", translated in Acta Historiae Neerlandica, vol. iii (1968), p. 2, note 
2: "The political crisis in the Republic ... should be explained rather from a point of view of the specific relationships and the situation in the 
[country] rather than as a common problem. " 
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Princess Amalia with her Brandenburg connections, and the Stuart Princess Mary, 
widow of William 11 and mother of the new prince, were at odds with each other. 4 
The death of William II negated his victory over Amsterdam and the States of 
Holland and allowed the opposition to make victory out of defeat. The six 
imprisoned regents in the castle at Loevenstein had provided a focus for those who 
saw potential monarchist dangers in the stadholdership and "Loevensteiners" 
became synonymous with "Republicans". Raadpensionarls de Pauw was getting 
valuable support from the pensionary of Dordrecht, John De Witt, who was to take 
over from him on the former's death in 1653. However, early in 1652 the States 
found themselves at war with Cromwell's England and the peace which De Witt 
conceded in April 1654 was unpopular and caused rifts in the States. The 
conditions, kept secret until after ratification, included the Act of Exclusion in 
Holland which prevented the Prince of Orange from being accorded the title of 
stadholder and it was not until the following year that De Witt persuaded Zeeland 
6 to accept it. ' These events, justified by De Witt in his Deductie (1654), despite 
their unpromising beginnings, established Holland's raadpensionarls as the defacto 
director of the States' foreign policy and strengthened further the domination of 
Holland while it was at the height of its economic power. 
Although the Prince was too young to be involved in all this, the events of these 
years were to be part of his legacy. For the time being, he was educated strictly 
4 M. C. Trevelyan, William III and the Defence of Holland (London, 1930), 
p. 11, Baxter, William III, pp. 15-16. Trevelyan's "royalist" description 
of "The Youth of William 111,1650-1668", pp. 1142, sets the scene for 
those biographers who have attempted to paint a favourable portrait of the 
Prince, and is echoed, although not quoted, by Baxter., pp. 23 and 36-37. 
5 Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. 722-23; Rowen, John De Witt, p. 213. 
6 Deductie, ofte Declaration van de Staten van Hollandt ende West- 
Frieslandt, Behelsende Een waerachtich, ende grondichbericht van De 
Fondamente der Regieringe vande vrye Fereenichde Nederlanden ... Ingestelt ende dienende tot Justificatie van't verlenen van seckere Acte 
van Seclusie, Raeckende 'I employ vanden HEERE Prins van Oraigne... 
(The Hague, 1654). 
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under his mother's guidance and the tutelage of the Orangist Zuylestein 7 and was 
early given ideas of the importance of his Stuart royalty. On the restoration of 
Charles 11 in 1660, the Act of Exclusion was revoked, but the English king 
vacillated and no strong moves were made to restore the House of Orange in the 
person of the young prince to a position of power in the Dutch Republic. And 
when his mother died suddenly on a visit to England in 1661 during protracted 
negotiations with the States over the further education of William, the fortunes of 
the child were dependent on confrontation or consultation between his 
grandmother, Amalia, together with the States, and the King of England whom 
Mary had named as his guardian contrary to previous understandings with De Witt. 
The proposals for making William a Child of State foundered and from the age of 
eleven to sixteen he remained under the influence of the Orangists 
The time was growing nearer when the Prince would be an element to be reckoned 
with and this was reflected in the steps taken to control him during his formative 
years. In 1666 Zuylestein was finally dismissed and William was made a Child of 
State, ' but the plans of De Witt were not wholly successful, as they might have 
been if the agreements reached with Mary before her death had been enforced five 
years earlier, and when the Perpetual Edict was passed in Holland in 1667 
compromises were already being made. The Perpetual Edict acknowledged that 
there would eventually be a role for the Prince by admitting him to the Council of 
State in due course, but tried to curb his eventual powers by prohibiting tenure of 
the office of Captain- and Admiral-General together with that of Stadholder. 
Potentially this allowed both the supporters and opponents of the House of Orange 
to see benefits in the passing of the Perpetual Edict. 9 By the time Holland had 
7 Frederick of Nassau, Hcer van Zuylestein, an illegitimate son of Frederik 
11cridrik. 
The full group responsible for the new status of the prince consisted of- 
Valckenier (from Amsterdam), De Witt, the Heer van Noordwijk 
(representing the Ridderschap), Blijenburg (from Dordrecht), van Fiorrest 
(from Alkmaar, as Road and Reekmeester der Domeinin van Holland en 
Westfriesland), see Elias, Vroedschap, no. 166, Gillis Valckenier. 
9 See below p. 162. 
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persuaded Zeeland to accept this by the Act of Harmony in 1670, it was in fact too 
late for De Witt to have any effective control over the Prince's future. Zeeland had 
already accorded him the ritual acknowledgement of his status as First Noble in 
1668 and accepted Odijk as his nominated representative in its States. 'O 
De Witt's foreign policy had foundered on the failure of the Triple Alliance and his 
influence in Amsterdam had waned. Events were moving too fast for the 
raadpensionafis, but his impressions on the Prince - they had almost daily 
meetings during the late 1660s - were added to his earlier education and gave the 
latter an insight into the raison d'&at of the States as they had been guided under 
De Witt. 
De Witt was unable to be sure of support from Amsterdam during the latter part of 
the 1660s; differences had arisen between him and van Beuningen over relations 
with France. For both these "statesmen" the basis of the differences was political 
ideology not personal conflict and ambition, but they undermined the friendship 
which had been so fruitful for the previous fifteen or so years and prevented De 
Witt from exploiting van Beuningen's mediating skills within Amsterdam. " De 
Witt had lost some of his influence in Amsterdam after the death of the leader of 
the Bicker/De Graeff faction, Cornelis de Graeff, Heer van Zuidpoelsbruik, in 
1665.12 De Witt had married Wendela Bicker (daughter of Jan Bicker) in February 
10. Willem Adriaan van Nassau, Heer van Odijk, a cousin of William III 
through an illegitimate line of Prince Maurits. A contemporary English 
observer writing in 1675 saw Odijk as "a man of no great capacity, but 
knows how to gaine the acquaintances of the ablest men, pomp out their 
sense and sentiments, and so by other men's abilityes and experience gets 
the Prince's faver and Esteeme", in M. Lane, ed., "A Relation of the 
present state of affaires in the United Provinces written about the last of 
April of the yeare 1675, " E. H. R, vol. xxx, 1915, p. 313. 
Franken, Coenraad van Beuningenl politieke en diplomatieke aktiviteiten 
in de jaren 1667-84, p. 69. De Witt had great respect for van 
Beuningen's political methods because he "meer oog had voor het 
algemene belang van de Republiek dan de partikularistisch Amsterdamse 
faktieman die Valckenier was. ", ibid., p. 77. 
12 
. Rowen, John De Witt, p. 662. 
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1654 and exploited the family connection with the Amsterdam vroedschap well 
into the 1660s. However, after the death of De Graeff, new political alignments 
developed in Amsterdam and De Witt's influence waned. At the same time he was 
very much aware that his ablest subordinate was the pensionary of the largely 
Orangist town of Haarlem, Gaspar Fagel. 
Fagel, as raadpensionarls, was to become critical to the establishment of policy 
within the Republic after the fall of De Witt and the restoration of William in 
1672. His role in the history of the Dutch Republic has never been fully 
researched because of the illegibility of his handwriting, but it is clear that he was 
far more than one of the OnIbekende Raadpensionarissen of de Fouw. " His 
relationship with both the Prince and the burgomasters of Amsterdam will form an 
important strand in the following chapters. 
In 1672 the invasion of the Dutch Republic by the forces of France, Munster and 
Cologne in alliance with England sealed De Witt's fate. In the late 1660s the 
European arena was dominated by the French monarchy under Louis XIV, who had 
firmly established his own rule and was creating the absolutism for which he was 
to become the archetype, with the support of Colbert's economic measures. Colbert 
believed that attack on Dutch economic strength was one sure way of continuing 
the promising trends in the French economic expansion. Since 1667, therefore, the 
French and Dutch had in effect been in a state of economic cold war with the 
punitive tariffs imposed by the French on Dutch imports. This threat had been 
reflected politically by the French incursions in the Spanish Netherlands and the 
Triple Alliance between the Dutch, the English and the Swedes. 14 But that alliance 
had been negated by the Treaty of Dover in 1670 between the French and the 
English, once more a sign of the increasing power of the King of France, who 
". See below pp. 176-179. 
14 
. Rowen, De Witt, pp. 683-708. 
41 
could at this stage acquire the support of the English king by financial incentives. " 
Internationally, therefore, the Dutch were torn between France and England. With 
the former there was always a large core who believed in maintaining peace with 
France and attempting to work out compromise agreements, based on the Treaty of 
the Pyrenees of 1659 and the alliance of 1662 in order to preserve the strength of 
the Dutch Republic, based as it was on economic not military resources. At the 
same time there was a strong feeling of threat from French expansionism. The 
issues became joined when it came to the questions surrounding the Spanish 
Netherlands. The economic growth of the Dutch Republic owed much to the 
failure of Antwerp to preserve its international role as the major port for the Low 
Countries during the Eighty Years War. Inevitably, the Dutch were always going 
to be very reluctant to allow any intervention from, predominantly France, but also 
any other potential trading rival, which might restore Antwerp to its former 
position. Territorial gains in the Spanish Netherlands were therefore not only a 
threat to the frontiers of the newly consolidated Republic, but also a potential threat 
to the economy which underpinned it. 
With England there was also an element of sympathy, particularly among the 
Orangists, who saw the possibility of exploitation of Stuart links and religious 
confraternity; but there was also an element of tension because of what was 
perceived by most as a greater economic threat than France, and the obverse of the 
Orangist view that the Stuart link was a threat to the sovereignty of the provinces 
and likely to support such dynastic monarchist ambitions as William 11 had 
displayed. Hence an alliance between France and England, aimed principally at the 
Dutch, deprived them of the possibility of help from either of the two perceived 
greatest powers in Europe. Spain was weak, and the Hapsburg Emperor was 
preoccupied by the Turkish incursions into the eastern part of the empire. 
Although there is still no real consensus about Charles 11's religious 
motivations there is agreement that for his own political purposes he 
needed a source of finance which did not require the approval of Parliament. See for example, P. Sonino, Louis X7V and the origins of the Dutch War (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 59-63. 
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Therefore when the bishoprics of Munster and Cologne joined forces with the two 
large allies and increased the territorial landward threat, the vulnerability of the 
Republic was quickly evident with the fall of Utrecht, Overijssel and Gelderland, 
disasters which changed the motivation of the pacifists who now saw a combined 
military and economic threat as likely to destroy their hard-won independence for 
ever. 
Within the stadholderless period the Republic went to war three times with 
England, the first time with the Republican government of Cromwell, which the 
new Dutch administration under the raadpensionafis de Pauw had recognised in 
January 1651. However, recognition did not imply unqualified approval of 
regicide, nor did English assertion of rights of trade and shipping embodied in the 
Navigation Act of October in the same year endear them to the Dutch merchant 
interest. Mutual interest, arising from common religious and republican cause, 
counted for little as relations deteriorated into war in May 1652, and yet the peace 
treaty which the English forced on the Dutch at Westminster in April 1654 was 
underlined by Cromwell's motives for keeping the House of Stuart, through its 
connections and refuge in the Netherlands, in a powerless position and of 
establishing a common Protestant cause. The repercussions of this treaty were to 
be far-reaching beyond the lifetime of the first stadholderless period. One of the 
outcomes of the diplomacy of the First Anglo-Dutch Wars was the beginnings of 
the friendship between De Witt and Coenraad van Beuningen, then pensionary of 
Amsterdam, which was to last until the late 1660s when their differences over 
France proved greater than their common interests. 16 
The Restoration of Charles 11 in England in 1660 effectively weakened the English 
hold over the Dutch Republic. The King's lack of sympathy for the aims of the 
Wittian regime removed most of what friendly feelings there were towards the 
English and provided the opportunity for the economic tensions already existing 
between the two countries to resurface. The inability of the royal houses to work 
'6. Rowen. De Witt, p. 67. 
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in concert over the present and future status of the young Prince of Orange did, 
however, act to a certain extent to the benefit of De Witt in the short term. Until 
the determination of a longer-term role for the Prince had to be faced when he 
reached his majority, for the time being the Wittian regime was the sovereign 
authority of the Republic. 
The gradual further deterioration of relations between England and the Dutch 
Republic has generally been ascribed to the resurgence of economic warfare, the 
renewal of the Navigation Acts and the introduction of a ten-mile fishing limit 
around the coast of England. This consensus by historians naturally has its 
nuances, but whether it was primarily caused by the machinations of the newly 
appointed ambassador to The Hague, Sir George Downing, the negotiations by De 
Witt with the French or the colonial struggles across the Atlantic, the Second 
Anglo-Dutch War (1665-67) can justifiably be described as a trade war. Only 
Baxter in his study, strongly underpinned by the importance of dynastic conflict, 
saw the war as a direct result of the purely personal/political breakdown between 
Charles 11 and De Witt. " And although Pincus denies economic causes for the 
war" he argues that to the English, Dutch trading practices were another 
manifestation of the republicanism which was a threat to the restored monarchy. " 
However, before this deterioration in relations finally led to war in 1665 the Dutch 
continued to strive for working alliances with both the English and the French. 
With England the negotiations were mainly over trading disputes often dating back 
to the Commonwealth period and earlier. A Treaty was finally signed in 
September 1662. In April of the same year De Witt had succeeded in making a 
treaty with the French which included terms for military support in the event of 
threat from England and an agreement on satisfactory tariff policy, but crucially 
17 
. Baxter, William III, pp. 32-3; Israel, Dutch Republic, p. 753; Jones, 
Anglo-Dutch Wars, pp. 145-150; Rowen, De Witt, pp. 449-50; Geyl, 
Orange and Stuart, 192-93. 
Is. Pincus, op. cit., p. 441. 
Ibid., p. 443. 
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omitting discussion of the status of the Spanish Netherlands. " 
By 1664 the relations between the Dutch and the English had reached such a low 
point and the increase in English attacks on Dutch shipping were so great that war, 
declared by Charles II in March 1665, could be seen to be inevitable. The early 
English ascendancy was overcome in 1667 as the Dutch achieved a superiority at 
sea through their privateering activities and the attack on the Medway. The Peace 
was signed at Breda in July 1667. The elements of victory by the Dutch, which 
were in the long run to be tainted by the agreement to concede the acquisitions of 
the English during the early stages of the war, particularly the transformation of 
New Amsterdam to New York, were in the short term offset by the acquisition of 
Surinam by the Dutch. 
Throughout the war the role of France had fluctuated from supportive ally of the 
Dutch to competitive major (Catholic) power. At the core of the distrust between 
the Dutch and the French was the French interest in the Spanish Netherlands and 
its potential impact on the security and trade of the Republic. Two months before 
the Peace of Breda, the French had undermined the terms of the 1662 treaty with 
the introduction of tariffs on the import of foreign manufactured goods. This was 
compounded by- a very open breach between France and Spain and the threat of 
incursions into the Spanish Netherlands. 
Therefore by 1667 the Republic could not be sure of any treaty with either France 
or England. The internal divisions of the States which had continued throughout 
this period, were often caused as much by the intervention of the foreign powers 
and their ambassadors, as by the ideological differences between Orangists and 
Republicans, or Coccejans and Voetians. These differences could extend beyond 
those obviously taking opposing views and, by the end of 1668, even Van 
Beuningen and De Witt were unable to reconcile their different views of the 
possible potential of French or English friendship. 
". Rowen, De Wilt, p. 469. 
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For all its maritime strength and superiority and the apparent "glorious end" to the 
Second Anglo-Dutch War, " the Dutch Republic remained in its vulnerable 
geographical position. Its style of Government had reduced its credit among the 
crowned heads of Europe, particularly the Emperor and it was becoming 
increasingly clear that its continued existence as a political force to be contended 
with was founded solely on the basis of economic wealth and the lead it had 
established in international maritime trade. 
French success against Spain in the Spanish Netherlands, after the invasions of 
1667, led to the creation of the incongruent Triple Alliance between the Dutch 
Republic, England and Sweden. This alliance was primarily the formation of a 
partly successful international pressure group against Louis XIV, but its 
consequences released France from any lingering responsibilities to the Dutch 
under the terms of the 1662 alliance. The gloves were off and the economic 
warfare, renewed with the introduction of the 1667 tariffs, was succeeded by the 
landward threat from the alliance of France with Cologne and Munster. 
The fragility of the Triple Alliance made prevention of the signing of the Treaty of 
Dover between England and France in 1670 impossible. Thus, by 1670, the final 
negation was achieved of all the diplomacy of the Dutch with France and England 
during the preceding ten years. 
Together with its geographical vulnerability, the Republic's position was also 
considerably weakened by the serious underfunding of its military forces. " The 
troubles of 1650 had been stimulated by fears of excessive demands for 
rearmament and the supporters of De Witt were aware that the army was 
synonymous with Orangist power. And it was the coming of age of the Prince 
21 
. Rowen, De Witt, P. 683. 
22 
. The success of the Dutch war reforms which had been effected during 
Maurits' stadholderate (see Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. 267-71) had 
contributed to the suspicion of royalist militarism, but its imitators 
included Brandenburg-Prussia, one of the more secure of Dutch allies and 
the provider of many mercenaries in 1672, ibid., p. 270. 
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which provided an Orange symbol to take over as Captain-General. It was only 
the delay of war from the summer of 1671 to the spring of 1672 which gave the 
Republic time to overcome its internal struggles over military expenditure enough 
to meet the co-ordinated French and English attacks with anything like a prepared 
army. 
The two previous Anglo-Dutch conflicts had been naval affairs and the threat of 
real invasion and battles on the European inland frontiers required new measures. 
Baxter estimated that in June 1672 the Dutch had only 50,000-60,000 active 
soldiers dispersed throughout the Republic. " But even these forces were hardly 
well-prepared. Many of the senior officers were in effect German mercenaries and 
many other officers were civilians holding appointments arising from nepotism and 
patronage. Little practical training and few manoeuvres had taken place and despite 
the threat to their commerce from French tariffs and military advance, the States of 
Holland and Amsterdam in particular were still reluctant to commit themselves to 
military expenditure which would pave the way for the reinstatement of the Prince 
of Orange. 
The war officially started between France and the Republic on 6 April 1672. By 
that stage William had been attending the Council of State for two years, and had 
been Captain-General for two months, but De Witt was still clinging to control of 
foreign policy. War with England had effectively started a month earlier with the 
naval attacks in the Channel. The French invasion added a new dimension which 
had not been present in the earlier two Anglo-Dutch Wars. Franken suggests that 
this changed the Dutch foreign policy from one dominated by trade to a check on 
French imperialism. " 
In the event, the Dutch acquitted themselves creditably at sea, but this was little 
23. Baxter. William III, p. 64. 
Frank-en, Coenraad van Beuningetis politieke en diplomatieke aktiviteiten 
in de jaren 1667-84, English sununary, P. 258. 
' 
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defence against the combined land forces from France, Munster and Cologne. The 
enemy advances in the east and the subsequent retreat, first to Utrecht and then 
back into Holland, were only halted by the success of the waterline. Dutch 
mastery of the sea and the inland waters was so vital to its very survival that it was 
the one form of defence at which it could normally prove superior to any enemy. 
The provincial states began to believe that they would have to give into the might 
of France and make concessions acceptable to Louis XIV. They sent de Groot to 
make overtures to the French King, but critically they were rejected. " For the first 
time the initiative in forming Dutch policy began to shift from the ruling class to 
the mass of the population. They had already shown their displeasure at the 
apparent weakness of the ruling class to tackle the enemy in allowing the French to 
push to the frontiers of Holland and Zeeland. De Witt was beginning to be 
identified as the villain of the piece, having been the principal formulator of the 
unsuccessful Triple Alliance. But early rioting had not been focused; rather it had 
been directed not at central policy, but at the local vroedschap level where each 
town determined its own policy. 
After Louis XIV's rejection of the Dutch terms in June 1672 and his retaliation 
with more excessive ones of his own, the mass of the population began to focus 
their attention on changing the balance within the Republic. Latent Orangism 
became blatant and the restoration of the Prince to the stadholdership was the 
rallying cry. 
The Dutch did not have to look far for a scapegoat or a saviour. After twenty 
years of power, De Witt had at last become exposed to an effective opposition. 
His persistence with a pro-French attitude was seen to have been misguided and on 
the other hand his completion of the Triple Alliance totally ineffective. There 
could therefore be no dependence on his abiliiy as far as foreign policy was 
concerned. He had already begun to lose the support of friends like Amsterdam's 
23 
. D. J. Roorda, Het Rampjaar 1672 (Bussurn, 197 1), pp. 55-6, Israel, Dutch 
Republic, pp. 799-800. 
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van Beuningen and his resources became restricted. 
Having lost the confidence of his peers and having been vilified in pamphlets, De 
Witt now fell victim to the anger of the masses. The attack on him and his 
brother, Cornelis, on 21 June resulted in his prolonged illness and effective loss of 
control of the power of state and, more sinisterly, in the execution of his attacker, 
Jacob van der Graeff, eight days later. " This was interpreted by the mass as a 
martyrdom, and comparisons were made with the execution of Buat for Orangist- 
inspired treason in 1666,27 and calls for the elevation of the Prince were 
strengthened. The civil unrest, often sustained rather than controlled by the civic 
militias, forced the hands of the towns and eventually all the Holland 
representatives agreed to the revocation of the Perpetual Edict on 3 July and the 
appointment of William as stadholder six days later. 
Less than two weeks later, the final overthrow of De Witt was brought about first 
through accusations of treason against his brother and, after his sentence fell short 
of death, the violent reaction of the crowd on the night of 20 August and the 
murder of both the De Witt brothers. Three days later Gaspar Fagel was appointed 
raadpensionails and the internal conflict began to subside. " 
In contrast to the fall and death of De Witt was the dramatic rise to favour and 
power of the Prince of Orange, whose education De Witt had tried to direct, but 
who was also strongly influenced by his family and its history. The Prince was 
available for the use of the Republic, at the right age, with the right military 
tendencies, and with a large body of supporters who were prepared to overlook his 
father's extremism in the face of the strong external threats. These supporters had 
26 
. Rowen, De Witt, p. 873, P. Geyl, Orange and Stuart 1614-72 (London, 
1969), pp. ' 347-9. 
27 
. Rowen, op. cit., p. 882. 
For a full chronological, narrative discussion of the events of 1672 from 
the internal Dutch perspective, see Roorda, Het Rampjaar, and for the 
motives of the regents, Roorda, Partij en Factie. 
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the added help of the more popular movements and the church, who saw Orangist 
principles as more allied to their own sympathies. 
It was an inexorable move from the assumption of the role of First Noble of 
Zeeland in 1668 to the restricted appointment as Captain-General of the forces, to 
the revocation of the Perpetual Edict and confirmation as stadholder in the 
provinces of Holland and Zeeland in July 1672, with nominal status in the 
occupied provinces of Utrecht, Overijssel and Gelderland. 
In 1672, the Dutch Republic was only a hundred years old and during that time, 
while the system of government remained unchanged, some changes were taking 
place in practices and the role of officials. The basic structure of government had 
persisted from the later middle ages, and particularly from the time of the Emperor 
Charles V, with the provincial assemblies being authorised by the representative 
decisions of the constituent towns and the States General by those of the provincial 
assemblies. With independence, the States General had assumed the final decision- 
making role in financial and military matters hitherto in the hands of the imperial 
or Spanish overlords. 
In 1643, an Instruction was issued for the States General on which decisions could 
not be taken without the approval of the Provincial States: the size of the army; 
sending of embassies; formation of alliances; declaration of war; and conclusion of 
peace. The provincial estates had, with the Union of Utrecht, established their own 
individual sovereignty, a privilege which they continued to guard jealously. '9 Price 
has warned that it can be misleading to apply modem concepts of the sovereignty 
of states to the political system of the Dutch Republ iC. 30 Nevertheless, whether it 
was their "privileges" or "sovereignty" which they were determined to preserve, 
such preservation was innate to the provincial states. In this system, the stadholder 
J. C. Boogman. "The Union of Utrecht: Its Genesis and Consequences, BM. G. N., 
iciv (1979), pp. 377-404. 
". J. L. Price. Holland and the Dutch Republic, p. 209. 
!'( 
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was no more than one member of the nobility with one vote as such in the 
provincial assemblies. Theoretically there could be a different stadholder in each 
of the seven provinces, chosen by the states. In practice there were never more 
than two, often the five provinces of Holland Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland and 
Overijssel being represented by the same one, and stadholders were nearly always 
members of the branches of the Orange family. 
By taking on the leadership of the Revolt, William the Silent had established a role 
for the stadholder which was to be strengthened by Maurits and Frederik Hendrik. 
By confirming their role as military leaders they effectively separated themselves 
from many other functions of the state. Despite the continual war until 1648, these 
were concentrated on the exploitation of the resources of the Dutch which were to 
flourish in peacetime. Meanwhile Frederik Hendrik and William 11 extended their 
military leadership to a level comparable with that of European royalty and by 
overtly pursuing dynastic policies succeeded in separating the stadholdership from a 
large part of the ruling classes. Frederik Hendrik's more conciliatory approach to 
the States avoided major tensions, but the underlying differences over military 
policy after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 grew more intense during the less 
tempered stadholdership of William 11 1648-50. However, the twenty years of De 
Witt's power changed the political state permanently and it was one of the major 
restraints on William III that he could never assert himself in the way his 
forefathers had done, despite being granted many of their privileges "in perpetuity" 
for his family. " Previously privileges had been granted to each stadholder for life 
only. In effect, this concession was emptier than their lifetime appointments. 
The events of 1650, and more particularly the Act of Exclusion of 1654 and De 
Witt's justification of it in his Deductie, established a raison d'&at which brought 
political theory near to reality. The ideas expounded in de la Court's Het Interest 
van Holland reflected the working ideology which could not be undone by the 
changes of 1672. 
31. Res. Holl. 2 February 1674. 
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But while the stadholders were changing their role and status as theoretical servants 
of the States, the membership of the ruling classes was also changing. The power 
of the nobility, of whom the Prince of Orange had been primus inter pares during 
the Revolt, had been eroded, until only a few members played a role of any 
significance and these were mainly close supporters of, and often related to, the 
stadholders, functioning principally as advisers to them. Price's theory that the 
Princes of Orange were not in fact primus inter pares, but rather "universal 
patrons" draws rather a nice distinction, but nevertheless is substantiated by the 
evidence of actual practice during the stadholdership of William 111.12 By the time 
he acquired political power the number of nobles with any real political interest 
had dwindled to a mere handful, particularly in Holland, although in the more rural 
provinces there was still some assertion of noble rights. In Zeeland, for example, 
there were only six representative towns and as two of these (Veere and 
Vlissingen) were William's "vassals", together with the three nobles the Orangist 
were able to establish a powerful party. William III was able to consolidate this 
small group of aristocratic supporters in 1674-75 when Utrecht (1674) and 
Gelderland and Overijssel (1675) were re-admitted to the Union. However, from 
those available in Utrecht, he preferred the support of the more centralist Dijkveld 33 
to the parochial Amerongen. 34 
The presidency of the States of Utrecht was conferred on Van Reede van 
Renswoude for life. This act of patronage by the Prince might have had very little 
significance since Renswoude was already eighty at the time. However he lived 
for another eight years until 1682, acting on the Prince's behalf through both war 
and peace. His alleged support for William 11's attempt on Amsterdam in 1650 
had led to a sharp decline in his influence in the first stadholderless period, and his 
restoration to favour under William III was in some circles seen as a threat of a 
". Price, *Dutch Nobility", p. 102. 
3'. Everard van Weede, Heer van Dijkveld. 
". Roorda, "William III and the Utrecht Government Regulation", p. 109. 
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return to the policies of 165 0.35 
The restoration to influence of a member of the nobility closely linked to the 
actions of the least favoured Prince of Orange contributed to the failure of the 
consolidation of a group of noble supporters to be as effective as it might have 
been. The re-entry to the Union in 1675 of Gelderland accompanied by the offer 
of the Dukedom to William further raised the spectre of monarchical tendencies, 
with or without his active connivance. But perhaps more importantly for the real 
political significance of the Dutch Republic, the role of Fagel and the influence of 
Amsterdam in the negotiations for the re-entry of principally Utrecht, but also the 
other two provinces, confirmed the importance of both in the maintenance of the 
Prince's authority. "' 
With the freedom from Spanish rule, the States General became the ultimate 
legislative body of the Republic, in financial and military matters, and the 
provincial States retained their own sovereignty in provincial matters, including 
local excise duties. As these provincial bodies comprised the representatives of the 
leading towns and were only empowered to act by the decisions of the towns, the 
ruling citizens in the towns had acquired considerable political power. This 
cumbersome political system of the Republic has led to what is a common problem 
arising between specialist and general histories. In the case of the Dutch Republic, 
the more general European history may argue that the politics of the Republic were 
determined by the will of the most powerful town of the most powerful province, 
that is Amsterdam. However, this is not a view substantiated by more specialist 
Dutch historians and, as several modem studies have shown even during the 
stadholderless period, when there was no apparent opponent to the will of 
Amsterdam, there was an effective centralised system of policy-making (or 
35. M. N. B. W., III, pp. 103 7-8: "A Is prinsgezind staatsman had Johan van 
Reede in de statenvergadering veel invloed... " 
36 
. For a full discussion of the terms of the re-entry of Utrecht to the Union, 
see D. J. Roorda, 'William III and the Utrecht Government Regulation: 
background, events and problems', A. H. N. XII (1979), pp. 85-109. 
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"decision-making" as Grever calls it)". This could work independently of the 
restrictions imposed on it by the system, and not solely because the complexities of 
the system precluded easy consultation. Thus it was that in the later 1660s De 
Witt was able to arrange the Triple Alliance almost single-handed. Part of the 
main argument here will be to pursue this further in the case of William III, Fagel 
and Amsterdam during the years 1672-4. 
Much work has already been done on the regents themselves, that is the ruling 
classes within the towns, " but there is as yet no real consensus on their 
constituents in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. The general themes of 
discussions have been the changes during the seventeenth century from the rise of a 
merchant elite to the gradual growth of an increasingly aristocratic and contracting 
ruling class of rentiers rather than merchants, and a subsequent decline in quality. " 
All these questions are bound up with the social, economic and religious 
background of the time as well as the developments in political ambitions and have 
often been simplistically divided into generations, with the final quarter of the 
century dismissed as degenerate, with one or two exceptions. Such structured 
examination, together with the limited use of economic statistics, has provided 
good material for sterile arguments on the Dutch decline, but does provide a firm 
basis for understanding the real society of the period. 
31. Grever, J. H., "The Structure of Decision-Making in the States-General of 
the Dutch Republic 1660-68", Parliaments, Estates and Representation, 1 
(1981), pp. 13-33, cites particular examples of how De Witt overcame the 
"official" processes to achieve swift decisions. See also Price, Holland 
and the Dutch Republic, p. 213. 
Prak, de Jong, Coymans, op. cit., JI. Price, 'The Rotterdam Patriciate 
1650-72', unpublished PhD Thesis, University of London, 1969, and 
building on works such as J. E. Elias, Geschiedenis van het 
Amsterdamsche Regenten Patriciaat (rhe Hague, 1923) and others. See 
also Roorda, Partij en Factie, pp. 28-9 on Japikse's study of party 
alignments in the factional politics of Veere. 
P. Burke, Venice and Amsterdam, A Study of Seventeenth Century Elites, 
2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1994) makes the point that "aristocratization does 
not necessarily imply a complete role change but that the merchant elite 
were simply imitating aspects of the noble style of life", p. xvi. 
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The regent class was narrow, but at least in Amsterdam not exclusive. 40 
Qualification for membership was very dependent on patronage, or financial 
competence. In the smaller towns where the practice of intermarriage between 
merchant houses and regent families led to a contraction of the membership, it was 
by the middle of the seventeenth century possible to talk of a closed family 
network. 
There are very real problems associated with assertions of closed oligarchies 
controlling any constituted authority. These are complicated when the nature of 
these oligarchies is essentially family groupings. The general description of an 
oligarchy is that it is a closed group with common interests, which maintains its 
power and authority by excluding those outside its particular family, interest, party 
or class group. However, very rarely are the fundamental interests which give the 
oligarchy its cohesion spelt out. There may be broad statements of policy which 
are understood by all, such as the communist ideal of state ownership of all the 
means of production. In the seventeenth century Dutch Republic, survival of the 
States was a common theme. But membership of the oligarchy which Soviet 
Russia confined to members of the Communist Party, was far vaguer in the Dutch 
Republic. The criteria included an acceptable level of wealth, citizenship of an 
acceptable period and professions of allegiance to the Reformed Church. 
These criteria could be enhanced quickly by marriage into a family already 
acceptable to the ruling group, or could be maintained by ensuring marriage only 
between acceptable family groupings. But marriage as a political expedient, 
despite having played a focal role in the politics of states for centuries, has always 
had a very variable success rate, and its impact is often of very short duration. " 
What such theories tend to overlook is the fact that structured analysis of the 
See below pp. 87-88. 
Prak, in his study of the Leiden regency from 1700 to 1780 supports this 
argument that some modem historians have overdone the importance of family connections in the development of factions, Prak, Gezeten burgers, 
p. 5 8. 
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composition of ruling groups, whether it be the British House of CommonS, 42 or the 
Amsterdam regent class in the late seventeenth century, however convincing, 
cannot be the whole picture. History is a study of man's political, social and 
economic interaction and each individual has their own history within the family, 
civic/institutional organisation and state. There may be cultural and family 
similarities, but there are as yet no clones. One member of a group may support 
the overriding aims of the rest of the group, but within that group they may have 
greater or lesser understanding of the issues involved; they may assert themselves 
or be passive - each reaction may influence the way decisions are reached and 
implemented. More importantly, individuals or small groups may break away or 
develop links beyond their oligarchic grouping, for avaricious, altruistic or 
cultural/religious reasons. These tendencies can work to the good of the oligarchy 
by keeping it vibrant and alert to changes. Arguments for closed oligarchies, such 
as are alleged about the Dutch regent class in the later seventeenth century, point to 
evidence that this vibrancy was being lost, and by the mid-eighteenth century had 
sown the seeds of their final demise. 43 
But, although there may be some validity in this argument, it is invalid to put it 
forward on its own. The changes in the Dutch Republic, just like the changes in 
the industrial organisation and structure of late nineteenth century England, were 
also determined by international events. The stimulus which both had brought to 
the international economy gradually changed their own status within it. Therefore 
the regent oligarchy of a Holland town in the early eighteenth century was having 
to perform within a very different political and socio-economic environment from 
that of its forebears a century earlier. 
We can ascertain that members of the ruling classes filled posts from minor town 
L. Namier, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III 
(London, 1975). 
Boxer, Dutch Seaborne Empire, pp. 302-330 illustrates the eighteenth 
century "the Periwig Period" as a time of decline in industry and 
commerce, exacerbated by a "conservative and unenterprising mentality" 
(p. 3 12). 
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officials to representatives on the Raad van Swat and States General; that the same 
family could have members filling minor paid secretariat jobs and acting as 
advisers to the Prince of Orange"' (although some families never rose above the 
minor level); and, as the century progressed, these families began to dominate the 
local civic guard as well, with senior members holding the major commissions; " 
and that these trends substantiate the arguments that the regent class was becoming 
increasingly closed and oligarchic. Nevertheless, we cannot therefore assume that 
the nature of the oligarchy is simple, coherent and static. As we will see later, in 
Amsterdam at least there was still a very wide membership, many of whom were 
of a quality comparable with those of the earlier years of the century and who were 
prepared to take individual initiatives which maintained the vibrancy of 
Amsterdam's role within the changing demands of the Republic. " 
By 1672, the political structure of the Dutch Republic had adjusted to the demands 
and circumstances of the century. Despite the major upheavals of the Revolt, the 
events of 1618, when the ultimate defeat was inflicted on Advocat Oldenbarneveldt 
by Prince Maurits, and the dramatic changes of fortune caused by the excessive 
militarism (cut short by death) of William II in 1650, there had been no major 
revolution in the system of Government. The roles and titles of various principals 
however did change. The title of Advocat had been changed to raadpensionarls 
after the execution of Oldenbarnevelt in 1618. The De Witt period had established 
the raadpensionafis of Holland as a central figure in the administration of the 
Republic as a whole, and by judicious manoeuvring, his successor Fagel continued 
this role, accommodating himself to the changes required by the re-emergence of 
the stadholdership. By the extension of the powers of the griffier in 1670 (the 
". See Appendix V, for office holders in Amsterdam, 1672-84. 
For full biographical details of all members of the vroedschap, see Elias, 
Vroedschap. 
This is supported by Burke's analysis of the occupations and country home ownership of the Amsterdam ruling class from 1618 to 1748, in 
which he demonstrates that the wetsverzetting in Amsterdam delayed the 
transition to a rentier class of regents until 1700, Burke, op. cit., p. 132. 
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post then held by Fagel) and his careful combination of these powers with those of 
the raadpensionaris in 1672 in the Instructie Raadpensionafis, the role of the 
raadpensionails was not diminished and, as will be seen, in many ways Fagel was 
able to exert the influence thus gained to enforce decisions which William III was 
unable to do. 
William III had no first hand experience of a stadholder to follow, but merely a 
concentration of education on what he should expect (from his own family and 
their supporters), and what was expected (from De Witt and those given 
responsibility for his education in 1666). Geyl went so far as to say that William 
proved better than his teacher, "' that is, a greater success than De Witt, no doubt 
because in the final analysis he was accepted while De Witt was rejected. 
What was restored to the Prince were the rights previously held of appointment, or 
at least veto of, many local officials. In the case of Amsterdam and the other 
major towns of Holland this did not extend to membership of the vroedschap or the 
appointment of burgomasters, but did still apply to the schepenen. " He was 
however able to take the opportunity after the popular revolts of the late summer 
1672 to use the practice of old of changing the membership of various bodies by 
welsverzettingen (changes of law), attempting to install a more pro-Orangist 
representation in the basic institutions. This power was far more effective in the 
three provinces re-admitted to the Union in 1674-75, when William's profile as 
saviour of his country was still high and he could make the most positive use of 
Fagel's skill at re-structuring the administration to the best effeCt. 49 
P Geyl, "Willem 111, de Stadhouder-Koning", Studies en Strijdschriften, 
Part 11 (1958), p. 154. 
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- The following towns were answerable to the Prince: Rotterdam, 
Schiedam, Gorinchem and Alkmaar, "The other towns retained complete 
freedom'of co-option", I L. Price, "The Rotterdam Patriciate 1650-72", 
unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, 1969, pp. 2-24. 
Roorda, "William III and the Utrecht Goverm-nent Regulations", p. 109, 
"The whole set up of a permanent administration to provide for the needs 
of the population ... was for him of secondary importance. It was more 
essential to have a machinery which could react to the demands of the 
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In 1672 the Republic was governed by essentially the same system of 
representative institutions as a hundred years earlier, with the implementation of the 
final policy decisions on financial and military matters in the hands of the States 
General. " The stadholder, however, as Captain General of the forces, as well as 
the First Noble in five of the seven provinces and despite the deeply rooted anti- 
monarchist tendencies, fulfilled a role as a central representative of the States in the 
eyes of foreign courts, but still remained their servant and theoretically subject to 
their decisions. He had a close working relationship with the raadpensionalls, and 
although he did maintain a small circle of close advisers, these were not established 
on the semi-official lines of Frederik Hendrik's "secret committees", which were 
predominantly filled by the stadholder's appointees. " The close alliance of the 
raadpensionarls and the Stadholder did in fact establish a central administrative 
force, which the provincial bodies were not always able to dominate, and it was 
this balance which led to the intricate shifts and compromises which were to 
characterise the following dozen years, influenced as they were by the demands of 
both war and peace. 
Always near the centre of these shifts and compromises was the Amsterdam 
vroedschap and its representatives at the States of Holland, the Council of State, 
the Gecommilleerde Raad and on ambassadorial duties. The regents of Amsterdam 
had to accommodate themselves rapidly to the changes effected by international 
events and the re-emergence of the House of Orange. In 1666 Gillis Valckenier, 
then the new rising star of Amsterdam, had been one of those made responsible for 
William's education as Child of State. In 1672 Valckenier eventually joined and 
quickly took the leadership of the group within Amsterdam which pressed for the 
day, a reliable apparatus of embassies, the army camp, and trustworthy 
counsel from experienced colleagues like Fagel. " 
For a concise discussion on the evolution of decision-making practices in 
the States of Holland after the Revolt, see Israel, Dutch Republic, pp. 
277-80. 
Israel, Dutch Republic, p. 526; see below, pp. 180-181 for a full 
discussion on the nature of "secret committees" during the stadholderate 
of William Ill. 
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repeal of the Perpetual Edict and set itself up behind the Orangist cause. The 
balance of political power in Amsterdam had been shifting throughout the later 
1660s, but in September 1672 a more dramatic change was enforced by the 
wetsverzetting. This purge of leading opponents of the House of Orange from most 
of the vroedschappen of the Holland towns was an attempt to ensure support for 
the Prince of Orange. Much of this study will be an analysis of the extent to 
which this was successful in Amsterdam, and how its impact affected the overall 
role of Amsterdam in the determination of States policy. 
The wetsverzettingen which took place in the Holland towns in the first half of 
September 1672 were the final phase of the transition from the Wittian regime to 
the stadholderate of William III. The States of Holland had given William 
authority to effect the necessary changes in the local administrations on 27 August. 
In part these changes were a response to the demands of the populace, who saw the 
opportunity for influencing changes to their advantage arising out of the momentum 
of the local revolts over the preceding two months. In Rotterdam the vroedschap 
was purged by the forceful intervention of the civic militia on 22 August. 52 But 
response to these demands, apart from the immediate reaction in Rotterdam, had a 
far more realistic base to it. William III had been restored to the privileges of his 
forefathers within a very short time after a twenty-year break. By a large 
proportion of the regent classes this had been accepted either willingly or at least 
with equanimity. 
It was therefore essential to ensure that the Prince was secure in his appointment 
beyond the immediate crisis, and could rely on the powerful town regents to 
support his aims. And the approval of the States of Holland five days after the 
purges in Rotterdam took the initiative away from the militias and the people. 
The casualties of the policy of welsverzetting were of course firstly, those who had 
". Israel, Dutch Republic, p. 803. 
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always opposed Orangist power on ideological grounds, and secondly, those who 
had benefited by their patronage and protection. Insofar as the exclusion of these 
people also met the demands of the masses, the welsverzettingen were a response 
to popular demand. But, although renowned Loevensteiners and radical dissenters 
were purged, those whose sympathies to either the Republican or Orangist/Calvinist 
causes were a matter of political judgement were less likely to be excluded. 
Naturally the traditional Orangist towns of Haarlem and Leiden came off lightest 
and the towns with more overtly anti-Orangist elements, such as Amsterdam, Delft 
and Dordrecht, were more severely dealt with. The following chapters will provide 
a general introduction to Amsterdam in the 1660-1680s, through a discussion of its 
social, cultural and religious background and its economic structure. This will 
provide the framework for a detailed analysis of the vroedschap as it emerged from 
the 1660s through the welsverzetting to its new appearance in 1672-73. 
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Chapter 4 
Amsterdam at the end of the Golden Age 
Seventeenth century Amsterdam was a melting pot which refused very few rejects 
from the religious and political intolerance of other parts of Europe and created 
such a mixture that it became endowed with a reputation as a city of toleration, the 
home of refugees, an entrepreneur's paradise, a centre of cultural riches and the 
arbiter of a rational pursuit of the welfare of the Republic. At least two modem 
studies have made comparisons between Amsterdam and Venice, ' with many 
justifications, but these must be approached with a clear understanding that, unlike 
Venice, Amsterdam was not an independent city state, but was an important and 
integral part of the States of Holland. 2 Although all the major Holland towns had 
their own identities and therefore their own uniqueness, they also had much in 
common in the second half of the seventeenth century. To begin with they were, 
following Huizinga's geographical definition of Dutch civilisation in the 
seventeenth century, "concentrated in a region not much more than sixty miles 
square". ' Amsterdam was only a short ride away from Haarlem and not more than 
half a day's travel from Leiden, Delft, Rotterdam and the seat of the States of 
Holland and the States General in The Hague. Although short distances may have 
been by the few overland routes, the majority of journeys were made on the 
efficient system of inland waterways. ' The towns were bound together by their 
Burke, Venice and Amsterdam; E. O. G. Haitsma Mulier, The Myth of 
Venice and Dutch Republican Thought (Assen, 1980). The most recent 
comparative study is of Amsterdam with Rome, P. van Kessel and E. 
Schulte, Rome, Amsterda; n, Two Growing Cities in Seventeenth Century 
Europe (Amsterdam, 1997). 
2 Boogman, "The Raison dEtat Politician Johan De Witt" 
' p. 61 describes how this difference was understood in the seventeenth century, at least by 
De Witt who was anxious not to encourage "particularist independence 
movements, the city-state aspirations of the towns of Holland". 
3 Huizinga, Dutch Civilisation, p. 15. 
4 The trekschuit passenger transport was handling about 300,000 passengers 
annually between Amsterdam and Haarlem, de Vries, First Modern 
Economy, pp. 186-7. 
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short and intense history since the Revolt, by their economy and by their 
domination of the politics of the Republic. They were also divided by many of the 
issues underlying these foundations of a united province. That is to say, although 
the "interest of Holland" was a fundamental principle to all, each constituent was 
anxious that their own "interest" should have its rightful influence within that wider 
sphere. 
It is inevitable therefore that any discussion of Amsterdam in the seventeenth 
century will often cover generalisations and particulars about the States of Holland. 
In Chapter I we looked briefly at the uniqueness of the Dutch Republic in Europe; 
equally we could look at the uniqueness of Holland within the Republic. And, 
extending the corollary, we can look at the uniqueness of Amsterdam within 
Holland, but without ignoring the ties of State. The importance of Amsterdam in 
the latter half of the seventeenth century, its dominant position in world trade and 
finance and its larger population and scale of operations than all the other Holland 
towns, have led historians from time to time to simplify the image of the city, to 
imply that it was led and maintained by a group of regents following a coherent 
and single-minded policy. ' 
Amsterdam in the last quarter of the seventeenth century was of course the 
dominant city in the United Provinces, but, as we have seen, was not necessarily 
representative of the character of the rest of the Republic or even of Holland. Its 
evolution and consequent large and mixed population set it apart from other cities 
even those who were also beneficiaries of the Golden Age like Haarlem, Leiden 
and Rotterdam. By the 1660s Amsterdam had created an image of itself which 
was interpreted by those who dealt with the city as the true Amsterdam, epitomised 
Franken in particular draws a very simplistic picture of the 
singlemindedness of the Amsterdam regents after 1650: "If the ideal of 
the whole of Holland was to carry on trade in peace and quiet with all 
the Powers it was to an even higher degree the aim of Amsterdam, which 
being the great staple-market and the great financial centre of Europe had 
not the least interest in an active foreign policy which would certainly do 
damage to commerce and which would require very high taxation for the 
upkeep of a standing army", Frank-en, "Foreign Policy and Diplomacy". p. 
6. 
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by the completion in 1662 of van Kampen's great town hall with its facade 
depicting the wealth of the town and its domination of the sea. " Such expressions 
of self-confidence were to continue in buildings throughout the eighteenth century, 
but were by then an attempt to create a belief in the continuation of the Golden 
Age glory, with greater emphasis on the wealth of the individual citizens rather 
than that of the city. 
Historians of the Dutch Republic and Amsterdam have made clear the division 
between the Golden Age and the apparent beginnings of decline in the last quarter 
of the seventeenth century. For example, the former is called by Brugmans 
Opkomst en Bloei, the latter by Evenhuis, Nabloei en Inzinking, ' but this must be 
understood for the historical nicety it is, where research has conveniently found 
evidence to support a general decline thesis and has looked at Amsterdam with the 
benefit of hindsight. It has little to do with the image Amsterdam portrayed to the 
world in the 1670s and 1680s. This image was reported by several observers 
during the early years of the 1670s when the eyes of much of Europe were on the 
drama being played out in the Netherlands. The most coherent of these is Sir 
William Temple's, Observations upon the United Provinces. 
This image, which observers were so fascinated with, was created and sustained by 
a self-conscious ruling class, the membership of which was as wide as was possible 
within the system. There were old merchant families like the Huydecoopers, who 
had progressed to the rentier class, but these were still a minority in Amsterdam 
(see p. 56, note 46); there were merchants still actively involved in trade - old 
Holland families, newer immigrant families and merchant families such as the Trips 
6 For a detailed analysis of the imagery in the architecture and decoration 
of the Amsterdam Town Hall, see K. Fremantle, The Baroque Town Hall 
ofAmsterdam (Utrecht, 1959). 
7 H. Brugmans, Opkomst en Bloei van Amsterdam; R. B. Evenhuis, Ook Dat Was 
Amsterdam, Vol III, de Kerk der bervorming inde tweede heýft van de zeventiende 
eeuw - nabloei en inzinking (Amsterdam 197 1). 
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brought in through marriage; ' there were professional ambachtsheeren; there were 
members of the professions, doctors and academics; but members of the church 
were excluded. The clergy and the majority of the regent classes had established 
different political roles and consequently social status, Appendix 1, which is drawn 
primarily from Elias' Vroedschap, includes information about the occupational 
background of the members of the regent class where known. 
Although, as will be demonstrated, Amsterdam was not able to use its apparently 
dominant position always to assert its own interests over those of the other Holland 
towns, the other provinces or the Prince, the influence of its regents was felt both 
within and outside the city. The arrogance of intervention in the affairs of others 
whether paternal or merely for political advantage was a role frequently adopted by 
the regency. Amsterdam felt perfectly within its rights, under the system of 
consultation inherent in the constitution, to take a strong line over the terms of 
Utrecht's re-entry to the Union in 1674 and in particular over the level of taxation. 9 
Thus they also felt free to interfere in the affairs of Groningen over the Ornmeland 
dispute, particularly as they felt they could use the incident to bring up the issue of 
unpaid quotas dating back to 1670, " and in Middelburg during the heated dispute 
between the Cocceians and Voetians. " 
Amsterdam tended to take a strong line against Zeeland in most political issues, 
whereas in the 1680s she was pursuing active friendship with Friesland, and it is 
possible that ideological differences were in fact being used in parallel with 
Louis Trip, member of the armaments and finance firm whose daughter was 
married to Valckenier's son Wouter on 15 July 1670. 
9 G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 30 January 1674. 
'0. G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 10 and 13 July 1677; Kn. 11533, "Kort Verhael 
waer my de jegenwoordige Geschillen en onlusten tussche de Stadt Groningen 
ende van de Ommelanden sijn gesprooten... " (1677); Kn. 11534, "Receuil van 
allen de Authenticke Stukken raeckende het Geschil Tusschen de Stadt Groningen 
en Ommelanden ... " (Amsterdam, 1677). 
Knuttel, Bekker, p. 133. The leading Coccejan in this dispute was Momma, who 
after his expulsion from Middelburg was in fact welcomed in Amsterdam on his 
way to Franeker in 1676. 
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economic strategy. Zeeland had the most to offer as a competitor, whereas 
Friesland was an essential part of the Amsterdam's European hinterland trade. 
Zeeland's majority support of the Prince of Orange and the stadholdership of 
Friesland and Groningen in the hands of the Nassau branch of the House of Orange 
were the political framework which Amsterdam exploited. 
The City also embraced alternative policies with impunity towards other Holland 
towns where economic advantage was involved. This was particularly the case 
with Leiden and Haarlem, both identified as Orangist in the 1660s, although there 
were much stronger ideological links with the former and its university. The 
relationship with Rotterdam is interesting, as that town seems to have developed its 
own economic success without causing friction with Amsterdam. There was 
constant exchange of ideas between the intelligentsia of both towns, there was a 
strong English church, and many English merchants, and although Rotterdam 
usually took the majority conservative line in the States of Holland, there is a 
general impression of goodwill between the two . 
12 It is worth noting in passing 
that Delft was the only town to support Amsterdam in 1682 over the Luxemburg 
issue, and had been known to take an individual line on various occasions 
throughout this period. 13 
The practice of political power in Amsterdam in the 1670s and 1680s can be 
further understood by looking at the involvement of the secular authority in the 
administration and ideology of the Dutch Reformed Church. The regents were 
keenly interested in the status of all religious groupings in Amsterdam, whether 
native or immigrant. 
M. C. I Hart, "The Dutch Republic: the urban impact upon politics", in K. Davids, 
and J. Lucassen, eds., A Miracle Mirrored: The Dutch Republic in European 
Perspective (Oxford, 1995), pp. 76-78, discusses Amsterdam's continued 
dominance in the last quarter of the seventeenth century while other towns 
declined. However, she points. out that Rotterdam was the exception to the 
general decline. 
13. M. J. Soutendam, "Verklezingskwestie te Delft in 1676", Delftsche Courant 
(March, 1877), pp. 271-274. 
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To begin with, we will deal with the religious proclivities of the indigenous 
population as practised by their clerical representatives and the interference or 
intervention which they had to take from the regents. However, far more important 
motivators for actions taken by the regency were the immigrant communities, for 
sound economic reasons which we will look at later. Huguenots and Walloons 
were accepted as members of the reformed church. 
The reformed church in Amsterdam was orthodox Calvinist and subject to scrutiny 
at Kerkeraad level with occasional intervention from the burgomasters. Whatever 
the religious ideologies of the regency the reformed church on the whole ran itself 
according to its own strict interpretations of its beliefs and duties, accepting 
instructions from above, but making its own judgements. During the war of 1672- 
78 they were from time to time requested to say prayers for military success, 
particularly during 1676, in the build-up to the siege of Maastricht and were always 
being exhorted to make financial contributions to the week's good cause. 14 The 
dealings of the Kerkeraad are however chiefly concerned with the day-to-day 
administration of the practical affairs of the church and treatment and correction of 
wayward members of the congregation, and in 1675 and 1676, in the progress of a 
revised translation of the Bible in the light of discussions they had been having on 
church orthodoxy. " 
The burgomasters' intervention was principally in financial matters with great 
concern shown over shortfalls in the annual budget, although throughout the 1670s 
they were largely unsuccessful in reversing the trend, despite repeated 
exhortations. " They also had the right of veto in the appointment of predikants, 
". GA Amsterdam, Kerk-eraad, 23 June 1675,26 April 1676. 
15. Ihid., 13 June 1675; 27 June 1675; 12 March 1676. 
For example in 1672 the shortfall wasfl. 2011 (G. A. Amsterdam, Kerkeraad, nr. 
12,19 January 1673); in 1676 it was fl. 14,304 (G. A. Amsterdam, Kerkeraad nr. 13,14 January 1677); and in 1678 it had only fallen tofl. 9,485 (G. A. Amsterdam, 
Kerkeraad nr. 13,12 January 1679). 
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but this was a privilege they invoked only on rare occasions, " but nevertheless, 
the treatment of predikants and the congregation of the reformed Church was 
strictly monitored by the burgomasters, the Kerkeraad and thence through the 
pulpit. " Normally there was no problem over the appointment of predikants, but 
disputes in 1677 led to the formulation of an agreement between the burgomasters 
and the church authorities for appointments to be made henceforth alternately of 
stricter Calvinist and "fibertijn" predikants. "' 
The burgomasters also oversaw the Kerkeraad's intervention in issues which did 
not directly relate to the religious practices within the city. For two months in the 
spring of 1677 the Kerkeraad was seriously exercised over the affairs of Jakob 
Koelman, an evangelical predikant who until 1673 had been predikant at the 
reformed church at Sluis in Zeeland . 
20 This affair took up a disproportionate 
amount of time, comparable to that spent on the translation of the Bible, and may 
reflect the tensions over orthodoxy, which were still unresolved. He was chaplain 
on one of van Beuningen's embassies, to Denmark in 1657, and the two were in 
correspondence throughout the 1680s, when Koelman became one of the prominent 
advocates in support of the role of miracles and the supernatural in the teachings of 
the church . 
2' Koelman had been expelled from his post in Sluis in 1673 on 
publication of a pamphlet in which he outlined his own understanding of reformed 
For example on 26 February 1674: Christanus Abel; and on 3 November 1678 the 
Kerkeraad noted the burgomasters' interest in the appointment to a vacancy in the 
Noordkerk. 
Bergsma, "Church, state and people", p. 218, "Ruling elites in the Dutch Republic 
clearly set value on the Reformed Church as a central institution of society. " 
". Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. 667-68. 
Kn. 13339, "Alle de Brieven ende Schriften sedert eenigen tijd opgesteld by den 
gewesen Burgemeester CV Beuningen ... om de Christenen, en alle menschen, door het herstellen van het Eeuwig Evangelium, sonder menschelyke 
uytleggingen", p. 5 1.; E. van der Wall, "Antichrist Stormed: The Glorious 
Revolution and the Dutch Prophetic Tradition", in Hoak, and Feingold, The World 
of William and Afary, p. 15 9. 
Koelman's biographer, A. F. Krull, Jacobus Koelman (Sneek 190 1) omits this 
correspondence. 
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doctrine on superstitions and feast days. The matter had been taken up by the 
States of Zeeland and the States General and Koelman had been forbidden to 
practise as a predikant. " 
In April 1677 it was discovered that he was living and practising as a predikant in 
the house of de Nijs, a predikant from Amstelveen, in Kalverstraat' (from where in 
the 1680s he published several of his works). "' The matter was brought to the 
Kerkeraad and much debated by the brothers who consulted not only with the 
authorities at Sluis, but also the States of Zeeland and the Rotterdam authorities. " 
The intervention of van Beuningen who championed Koelman on account of his 
personal acquaintance assisted the Kerkeraad in deciding to give Koelman asylum 
in Amsterdam and to regard him as 'een soorte van een inaartelaa?, " although he 
was required to absent himself from Amsterdam for at least one month in each 
year. " Such a decision is surprising in the stance taken by van Beuningen, who 
was also a friend of Balthazar Bekker in the 168 Os, 28 one of Koelman's main 
protagonists in the debate over superstitions. As an example of intervention in the 
affairs of the church by the regency its significance is somewhat diminished since 
in 1682 they did join with twelve other Holland towns who had already passed 
". G. A. Amsterdam, Kerkeraad, nr. 13,22 April 1679. 
23 Ibid., nr. 13,29 April 1677; R. B. Evenhuis, Oak Dat Was Amsterdam 
(Amsterdam 1967), Vol. III, p. 227. 
24.1. H. van Eeghen, De Amsterdamse Boekhandel 1680-1725, Vol. IV (Amsterdam 
1978), p. 168. Koelman published three works with Jean Wasteleirs of 
Kalverstraat between 1679 and 1680, which were sold by Joh. van den Bergh also 
of Kalverstraat. 
25 G. A. Amsterdam, Kerkeraad, nr. 13,13 and 20 May 1677. 
26 Knuttel 13 339, p. 5 1. 
27 Krull, op. cit., p. 90. 
28 W. P. C. Knuttel, Balthazar Bekker, De Bestri/den van he Bijgeloof (rhe Hague 
1906), p. 151 and p. 156n. Bekker arrived in Amsterdam in 1679 and published 
his book, Het Betoverde Wereld from there in 1691, prompting Koelman's 
vigorous response. 
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resolutions against Koelman. " Personal intervention was also made by one of the 
leading regents, Geelvinck, in the matter of a dispute concerning Dr Bousset, a 
predikant of Buycksloot which was also brought to the Kerkeraad. 30 
Perhaps most noticeable, because of its absence at other times, was the attention 
paid to the management of the churches both orthodox and minority. However, 
these requirements were almost exclusively to do with the outward observance of 
the reformed church. Later in 1677, an attempt was made to restrict the behaviour 
of predikants, by encouraging stricter observance of the tenets of orthodox 
Calvinism. " This is in line with the thanks the Kerkeraad had received from the 
burgomasters in August 1674 for taking a strong line on abuses of the Sabbath 32 
and also with the restrictions on the activities of meat sellers in 1679.33 
Nevertheless, in January 1676 they were content to leave implementation of 
Sabbath Day restrictions in the hands of each distri Ct. 3' The burgomasters were 
continually concerned with the standard of music, and the quality of the organs in 
the early 1680s resulted in considerable upheavals to ensure that the right one was 
being heard in the right church. The start of these attempts at "better hannonie" 
came with the move of the organ from the nieuwe kerke to the wester and that of 
the oude to the zuider kerk . 
3' But this was merely symbolic. As the organs were 
only used before and after serviceS, 3' and were not part of the act of worship, their 
21 Krull, op. cit., 91: 1676 - Utrecht, Dordrecht, 1677 - Delft; 1678 - Leiden; 1679 - Gouda, Edam-, 1680 - Rotterdam, Alkmaar; 1681, Gorinchem, Haarlem, Nijmegen; 
1682 - Briel, Amsterdam, Leeuwaarden, Zutphen; 1683 - Hoorn, Arnhem. 
G. A. Amsterdam, G. A. Amsterdam, Kerkeraad nr. 13, April-June 1675. 
31 Ibid., nr. 13, f. 229, February 1677. 
12 Ibid., nr. 13,30 August 1674. 
33 Ibid., nr. 14,10 August 1679. 
14 G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 13 January 1676. 
35 Ibid., Res. Vroed., 25 January 1681 and II November 1682. 
36 Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 694; stricter elements in the nadere reformatie, had 
campaigned successfully in some cases to get organs removed as the use of music 
was considered one of the many signs of laxity. 
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function as a public image was the more important. At the more "spiritual" level, 
an undated paper of the early 1680's gave instructions to predikants of Amsterdam 
to work for peace within the churches and to live in "liefde, vrede en eenigheyd', 
by not raising theological differences to the level of open dispute and by trying to 
abide by the formulas laid down for the reformed church. Moderation was to be 
the order of the day, but nevertheless issues should be tackled, albeit tactfully. 
Thus the strict orthodoxy of the Amsterdam brothers persisted and although 
Balthazar Bekker took up an appointment in Amsterdam from 1679 onwards he 
was not allowed to retain his office as a predikant in the city after the publication 
of Betoverde Wereld in 1691. The level of intervention from the regency was 
cosmetic and on the whole went along with the views of orthodox Calvinism, 
asserting their patronage over the church and its congregation, whose interests they 
believed would be served better by the strict orthodoxy which would have been an 
unacceptable restriction on the more wordly interests of the ruling class. 
Schama maintains that there was a strong orthodox element in the Amsterdam 
regency which brought pressure to bear on the more tolerant majority in the middle 
of the century, " but this simplistic scenario was certainly not so in the 1670s, when 
matters of church administration were dealt with by the burgomasters, whose 
dominant theological ideals cannot be identified with strict Calvinism, rather than 
the vroedschap, or in the 1680s, when those whose ideologies were of less strict 
remonstrant origins had once again got the upper hand within the vroedschap. If it 
was the minority strict Calvinists like Backer and Tulp, who had formed the 
genuine Calvinist backbone of the*Orangist Party in 1672, they had lost all 
effectiveness by 1675, when Valckenier was at the height of his power. " The 
noted contrast between the sobriety of the celebrations of Tulp's fifty years in 
office and the opulence of the celebrations of the wedding between Wouter 
37. Schama, Embarrassment of Riches, pp. 118-119. 
38 
. See below p. 127. 
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Valckenier and Trip's daughter exemplifies this division of interpretationS. 39 No 
doubt the wedding would have received far greater censure in 1681 after the 
Amsterdam church authorities encouraged predikants to leave wedding celebrations 
where dancing took place. 'O After all the regents were quite happy by the 1660s to 
allow Cartesian principles to be taught by Arminian teachers in the Illustre Schole - 
and this of course was where many of their sons were being educated for future 
office. 
Having mentioned the role of the regency in the determination of church policy, a 
further examination of the known sympathies of the burgomasters and the 
vroedschap and their senior officials should show how little influence the church 
had in the determination of civic secular policy. " There has been a consensus 
among historians about the secularisation of Amsterdam politics in the first 
stadholderless period. " In fact, there is very little evidence to show what the 
religious philosophy of most of the regency was in the 1670s beyond discovering 
what their education might have been. But of those that more is known about, the 
"IibeMns" certainly dominated the leading characters. Valckenier himself had 
been sponsored by the remonstrants Van Loon and Schellinger, but it would need a 
vivid imagination to argue that Valckenier was in any way a religious ideologist. 
Hooft, Van Vlooswijk and van Oudtshoorn were open in their remonstrant 
sympathies. Van Beuningen was technically a remonstrant, but his humanist 
sympathies began to dominate his ideas in his dotage. He had encouraged Spinoza, 
fulfilling the role of patrician sponsor in the 1660s, at the same period as Spinoza 
'9- G. Cotterell, Amsterdam, The Life of a City (Boston, 1972), p. 185. 
40 
. Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 693. 
41 De Vries, First Modern Economy, pp. 167-8 in discussing the role of Calvinism in 
the economic development of the Dutch Republic argues that the demands of 
confessionalism applied by strict puritans "set many urban magistrates in 
opposition to the Reformed Church. Their practical interest... caused them to 
insist upon a measure of religious toleration and subordination of the religious to 
the secular authority. " 
Johan E. Elias, De Proedschap van Amsterdam 1578-1795 (Haarlem 1903), Vol 1, 
p. CXI. D. J. Roorda, "William III and the Utrecht Government Regulation, " pp. 
95-6. 
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and Hudde were sharing their scientific interests in telescopes and microscopeS. 43 
Nicolas Witsen was a pupil of the Coccejan School and had been encouraged by 
Valckenier in his early career, but his diplomatic skills led him to act as mediator 
in the Voetian dispute of 1676 and to create a reputation for the kind of 
fairmindedness which precludes obsessively strong ideologies. The one-time 
pensionary Cornelis Hop was also a "lihertyn" and it must be assumed that his son 
Jakob who was to figure so prominently in the French negotiations in the 1680s, 
was of a like mind during the 1670s. Bontemantel also lists seven other 'lihertyn' 
regents including Geelvinck and Munter . 
44 The only two members of the 
vroedschap who are known to have been stricter Calvinists (rather than those who 
were Orangists and therefore assumed by those following Fruin's interpretation of 
seventeenth century politics, to have been strict Calvinists) in the early 1670s were 
the aged Tulp and William III's staunchest, but relatively weak, supporter, Cornelis 
Backer. The former died in 1674 and the latter faded into obscurity after his 
failure to obtain high municipal office in 1675.45 
This assertion of the relative lack of interest of the majority of the regent class in 
ideological debate is not an argument against their understanding of the importance 
of the role of the reformed church in the "interest of state". It is, however, an 
argument in support of additional and alternative motives for their motivation for 
determining the policies of Amsterdam. It is in fact very little different from the 
analysis made of the majority of the Holland Regents in the sixteenth century by 
Boogman in his study of the consequences of the Union of Utrecht, in which he 
alleges that "the Holland regents should largely be classed with the fairly numerous 
groups which voiced objections to both the rigid contra-reformatory catholicism 
according to the model of Trent and the strict Calvinism of Geneva" and that what 
43. Spinoza's friendship with Hudde dated back to the mid-1650s, K. O. Meinsma, 
Spinoza en zijn Kring, pp. 163-164 (Amsterdam, 1896); Israel, The Dutch 
Republic, p. 905. 
Cited in Evenhuis, op. cit., Vol 111, p. 167: Hasselaer, van Vlooswijk, 
Geelvinck. van de Poll, Munter, Bas, Cloeck, and Van Loon. 
". N. N. B. W., VI, p. 58. 
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they really wanted was a "broad protestant church, not too rigid in matters of 
dogma, closely aligned with the State and thus subject to Government 
supervision. "" We cannot pretend to know what the real depths of belief were in 
the minds of men dead for three hundred years, however attractive a challenge this 
is to an historian. 47 But to generalise, it is very rare for a true religious ideologist 
to assume high political power, whatever outward pretence of conformity may be 
made. And it is particularly rare in successful economic states where so much has 
to be sacrificed to the altar of Mammon. In the mid-seventeenth century 
Amsterdam was the heart of the most successful contemporary economic state. 
However, this does not argue against the interests of the church having an 
influence on the politics of the regents, or that the regents might use the church for 
political ends. The Reformed Church was not an established state church in name, 
but in practice only those who conformed to its tenets could participate fully in all 
spheres of civic life. Therefore the majority of those who believed full citizenship 
was the key to the full range of benefits available belonged to the Reformed 
Church. " 
However, there were minorities of course who were never to be accepted on the 
same basis as those who conformed to the Reformed Church. " The Catholics had 
been excluded from true citizenship since the Union and were in effect an outlawed 
church. One of their churches, for example, was taken over as the English church 
46. - De Vries, First Modern Economy, p. 167 Boogman, "Union of Utrecht", p. 379, 
has also made this point, "Catholics [in Amsterdam] remained numerous, and 
many who embraced the Reformed faith, especially among the urban elites, had 
both principled and practical reasons to resist a rigorous suppression of other 
forms of religious belief". 
R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, J. van der Dussen, ed. (revised edition, 
Oxford 1993). pp. 282-302. 
De Vries, op. cit. p. 169, admits the difficulty of understanding the personal life of 
individuals and the influence Calvinism may have had on them and their approach 
to their commercial life. 
49. Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 640, quotes Nusteling's figures for baptisms in 
Amsterdam from 1671-80 as follows (including Huguenots and Walloons in the 
numbers for the Reformed Church: Reformed (40,934); Lutheran (12,520); 
Remonstrant (592); Catholic (9,535). 
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(see below) and their members were unable to take public office. Nevertheless, the 
Catholics had formed the majority of Amsterdam's population at the Alleratie and 
therefore there were few truly native Amsterdam families who did not have 
Catholic relatives who had not converted to protestantism until the end of the 
sixteenth century or even later. Among the best know of these are perhaps 
Rembrandt whose parents both came from practising Catholic families" and the 
poet Vondel whose own religion at the end was openly declared. " So while 
Amsterdam was not likely to be a city to attract Catholic immigrants, it did not 
make it impossible for them to live there. Their "hidden churches" flourished and 
Catholic merchants were to be found among the English community. There were 
also protestant dissenting groups, principally the Mennonites who had been 
practising since the early days of the Reformation, and they were treated in much 
the same way as the separatist groups in the English and German churches until the 
1670s when they were finally accepted as native Hollanders. But other sects like 
the Quakers, Collegiants and Fifth Monarchists remained beyond the pale. 
The subject of Amsterdam as a home for refugees is on the face of it an easy one 
to deal with. Perhaps there is less direct evidence for the South Netherlandish 
immigrants who had moved after the Union of Utrecht, but for the purposes of this 
discussion it has to be assumed that now in the second or third generation they can 
be considered by the late seventeenth century as native Hollanders, since most 
conformed to the tenets of the reformed church and were eligible for all the 
benefits and offices open to native Hollanders (among the Amsterdam regency in 
the 1670s were, for instance, representatives of the Flemish Sautijn and Scott 
families). They had moved to the city during its expansion and played a 
fundamental part in establishing its economic supremacy. For the most part their 
importance for further immigration was their contacts in other parts of Europe 
where persecution or economic oppression might create a need for a more friendly 
environment. 
". G. Schwartz, Rembrandt, p. 18. 
". Schama, Embarrassment of Riches, p. 97. 
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But the building works mentioned at the beginning of this chapter required the 
labour of skilled craftsmen who were drawn from within the Republic, from the 
Spanish Netherlands, from France, from Germany and from England: craftsmen 
whose skills could be used to perpetuate the image of wealth (for example 
Quellinius, the Flemish sculptor of the Town Hall gable), artists who could provide 
the kind of portraits and allegoric scenes for the perpetuation of the myth of family 
prestige and fortune. " All these workmen added to a population which needed 
services such as housing, food, clothing, education and not least churches. And 
they needed the approval and cooperation of the regents for their activities beyond 
their labour. The Amsterdam book trade had begun to burgeon in the 1660s with 
the influx of French booksellers" and the opening up of the market for anti- 
Catholic propaganda material and resulted in an expansion of all the associated 
trades and skills in much the same way. 
There is evidence in abundance of Amsterdam's willingness to accommodate 
refugees and immigrants, not only internal outcasts like Koelman, but exiles like Le 
Clerc who settled in Amsterdam in the 1680s as the proteg6e of Phillip van 
Limbourch, with whom he taught at the University. " We should, however note the 
status of Amsterdam in the "Republic of Letters", which although partly a centre of 
theological and philosophical debate, was rather more a city of practical activity. 
Hence its book trade, which was organised principally for profit became the centre 
of freedom of speech, but many of its authors were just as likely to be found in 
Leiden, Rotterdam, Utrecht and Middelburg, or in France and England. The views 
of the publishers were therefore no doubt an expeditious combination of their 
native ideologies and the demands of the market place. " Hence Pierre Bayle was 
living in Rotterdam after 168 1, but his monthly News of the Republic of Letters 
K. Fremantle, The Baroque Town Hall of Amsterdam, pp. 49ff. 
Nusteling, Welwaart en Werk-gelegenheid in Amsterdam, p. 149. 
54 R. L. Colie, Light and Enlightenment (Cambridge 1957), p. 3 1. 
The Amsterdam book trade capitalised on the re-emergence of the "Cartesian and 
Cocceian controversies" in the 1670s, selling books and pamphlets devoted to the 
discussions, Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 897. 
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was published in Amsterdam. 56 
The well-known refugees are only the very tip of the iceberg. The majority of 
immigrants were artisans and potential merchants who came with their entire 
families to establish themselves as fully participating city residents. They were 
expected to become part of the Dutch Reformed Church, unless they were 
practising members of "separatist" sects, Catholics or Jews. In order to qualify for 
welfare assistance and to facilitate worship in their own language they were given 
their own churches, the Lutherans first, followed by the Walloons in 1578 and the 
English in 1605. Alice Carter has suggested that the burgomasters had greater 
control over these churches than over the native Dutch ones principally because 
there was a smaller number of possible candidates for clerical office. 57 
Regular subsidies were made to the immigrant churches and their poorhouses. " By 
1682, it was felt that it was time to draw up a general directive on the treatment of 
French immigrants and the conditions of their residence. There had already been 
generous allowances made to French immigrants during the previous few years 
when it was becoming clear that the idea of toleration had been abandoned in 
France. The trend in France, which had begun early in the century after the 
assassination of Henri IV, was by the 1680s only too clear for those who had lost 
most of the rights they had achieved a hundred years earlier. Refugees normally 
continue to migrate to states where their predecessors have had a reasonable 
reception. They will find compatriots speaking their own language and with a 
basis in their culture, who have adapted to the economic and social structures of 
their new homes, and this was certainly the case with the Huguenots. To the 
". E. Labrousse, Pierre Bayle, Denys Potts, trs., (Oxford, 1983), p. 30. 
57 A. C. Carter, The English Reformed Church in Amsterdam in the Seventeenth 
Century (Amsterdam 1964), p. 41. Carter's study, focused on the English Church 
does not take full account of the status of the Dutch Reformed Church. The 
burgomasters intervention may have appeared light of touch, but their influence 
was not to be underestimated. 
For examples see G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 23 March 1682 (Nederduits 
church); 5 December 1682 (Walloon church). 
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advantages of some familiarity were added the willingness of the Dutch to offer "a 
variety of fiscal and social inducements" to those with skills and sufficient 
economic meanS. 5' And in 1681 one thousand houses had been built for Huguenots 
at nominal rents. 'O 
Amsterdam, like many European cities, had its share of Jewish immigrants, first the 
Sephardic refugees from Portugal and Spain who found a city where they could 
live, work and, most importantly in the case of the marranos, revert to their own 
religion. They first arrived in about 1593, were given permission to have a 
separate place of worship five years later, a consecrated burial ground in 1614, and 
given final permission for public worship in 1619. In 1639 they built a new 
synagogue, but not until 1657 were they acknowledged as Dutch citizens but 
without full rights. Between 1669 and 1675 two new synagogues were built with 
the approval of the city government, the largest in Europe, which set a new trend 
for the status of the Jews in Amsterdam. But by accepting the restrictions which 
were more lenient than those to which they had been accustomed, they were able 
to establish a role in the structure of the city which became indispensable to its 
economic function. Therefore the regents were inclined to take an interest in the 
well-being of the Jewish community, and even to encourage interchange of 
intellectual ideas, in a way they did not with the separatist groups of the protestant 
religion. By the middle of the century, the Jewish community was facing its own 
divisions with the numbers swollen by the Ashkenazi immigrants from Eastern 
Europe. These did not bring as many advantages to the Netherlands as the 
Sephardi and the majority of them settled in the eastern provinces. But where they 
did come to Amsterdam they were treated by the regents in the same way, if they 
were able to support themselves without undue difficulty. 
G. C. Gibbs, "The Reception of the Huguenots in England and the Dutch Republic, 1680- 
1690", in O. P. Grell, J. 1. Israel, N. Tyacke, eds., From Persecution to Toleration, The 
Glorious Revolution and Religion in England (Oxford, 199 1), pp. 299-300. 
'. G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 23 September 1681, when consent was given that 
"vrijheden en exemption aan de supplianten te willen stellen". Res. Vroed. 22 
November 1682; GC Gibbs, "Some Intellectual and Political Influences", 
BM. G. M., xc, afl. 2 (1975), p. 260. 
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There is no doubt that a degree of toleration towards all religions was implemented 
in Amsterdam throughout the seventeenth century, and therefore it was always 
likely to be one of the first places of refuge particularly for protestant dissenters 
and Jews. " But toleration meant just that in most cases; it was not an open ended 
invitation for all to come and practise their own particular brand of their religion at 
will, neither did it carry automatic rights of citizenship. These rights and 
privileges were restricted only to those who were prepared to conform, at least in 
word if not in deed, to what was in effect the state church. Once they had been 
accepted, the regents were then more accommodating and were prepared to accept 
and even encourage theological debate, but only as long as the ground rules of 
outward observance were acknowledged. But religious toleration was also limited 
by the social administration of the city. The welfare of the citizens was treated as 
important, particularly where their needs and the primary economic function of the 
city coincided; the indigenous poor, elderly and orphaned were looked after, but 
they were not encouraged from elsewhere. Amsterdam was not a city to create 
ghettos of impoverished refugees. The principle of toleration was utilitarian rather 
than founded on any philosophical principle, and the regents never tired of 
repeating that foreign trade would inevitably be destroyed by the establishment of 
an exclusive Calvinist supremacy, which would deny participation in the economic 
life to those immigrant groups such as the Jews who had financial and other 
resources to contribute to the wealth of the Republic. 
Only those who conformed to the Dutch Reformed Church were accorded full 
citizen status. Those whose protestantism was aligned to the Calvinist/Lutheran 
tradition were more easily assimilated, but the English protestants, whose 
reformation had started on a different base, tended to be more eccentric and the 
sects which emerged were not always willing to conform. The most prominent 
among these were of course the Brownists, but there were several other sects which 
also set up in Amsterdam, but not within the English congregation. 
61. Boogman, "Union of Utrecht", p. 279; Bergsma, "Church, state and people", p. 
203 quoting Article 13 of the Union of Utrecht: "provided that each person shall 
remain free in his religion ... " 
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All these immigrants - most of whom came because their beliefs were such that 
they were not prepared to adjust to the dictums of the ruling orthodoxy in their 
native land - created problems amongst themselves which had to be faced by the 
Amsterdam regents. Hence in 1660 the regents were not anxious to alienate the 
Jewish hierarchy who had excommunicated Spinoza and they may have encouraged 
his absence from Amsterdam, although his friendship with Hudde was renewed 
when he moved to Voorburg in 1664.62 He would have been welcomed back in the 
1670s but he chose to move from the relative isolation of Voorburg to The Hague, 
ostensibly out of concern for his health. " 
The reasons for the tolerance shown by Amsterdam to these refugees are of course 
as well known as their refuge. And the fact that Amsterdam in no way encouraged 
the impoverished from its own environs to set up permanent home in the city but 
moved them on at the first opportunity makes it clear that philanthropy was hand in 
glove with economic advantage. The skills and wealth brought by many of the 
refugees, together with their exclusion from municipal office for at least a 
generation, permanently in the case of the non-congregational sects, provided a 
strong substructure for the activities of the merchant elite. Prejudices can be easily 
overlooked if those concerned can provide welcome services but are prevented 
from becoming part of the elite. Not only money, financial skills and new 
economic activity were brought in, but also vast international networks could be 
linked into to the advantage of all. In particular the Amsterdam regency did not 
flinch from acquiring many French connections. The standard of living for the 
Amsterdammers continued to rise throughout the period, "' encouraged in part by 
the influence and wealth of the immigrant population. 
There had been many Anglican exiles from England during the first half of the 
A. Wolf, trs., The Oldest Biography of Spinoza (New York, 1927), p. 55-6; R. 
Scruton, Spinoza (New York 1986), p. 8; Meinsma, Spinoza en zijn Kring, p. 258. 
'3. Wolf, Spinoza, p. 59. 
". Nusteling, TVelwaart en Werkgelegenheid in Amsterdam, pp. 98-9. 
80 
seventeenth century - and after the Restoration there was a new generation of 
puritans who were also likely to be political refugees. The English church in 
Amsterdam was prone to conflict because of the presence of the separatist groups 
who were not part of the congregations. In addition to these there were many 
English merchants operating in Amsterdam on a semi-permanent basis who did not 
consider themselves as part of the resident community. And when in 1679 English 
Catholic merchants in Amsterdam and Rotterdam were known to be supplying arms 
to Ireland, this was not likely to endear them to their protestant compatriots 
domiciled in Amsterdam. 6' The Ambassador Sidney tried to quash rumours of 
discontent among English ministers in 1680.66 But perhaps more important to the 
argument here, Sir William Waller complained that the treatment the English 
protestants received from the Amsterdam authorities was less than fair and in the 
67 
end he left and went to live in Geneva. The English agent William Carr 
maintained that those responsible for problems two years later were Brownists who 
were out to cause trouble by supporting political refugees like Shaftesbury and 
Atterbury who were given a refuge in Amsterdam in December 1682. 
"We have a junto of very bad men mett together in this citty, 
members of the Bronist Church went to the Burgomaster to tell that 
Shaftesbury had fled for religious reasons + desired refuge in 
Amsterdam. , 61 
Carr told the burgomasters not to be taken in, but his advice was ignored and 
Shaftesbury and Atterbury were made burgers and given a house in Amsterdam. " 
This was clearly a case of the regents taking a decision on political grounds rather 
than consulting the wishes of the orthodox English church. They may have been 
more convinced by the Earl than by Carr, whom the former, after visiting him on 5 
6'. P. R. O., SP84/215, f. 138 De Wilde to Meredith 10 June 1679. 
66 Ibid., f. 237, Letter from Sidney, I May 1680. 
67 P. R. O., SP84/215, f. 237. K. H. D. Haley, The First Earl of Shaftesbury (Oxford, 
1968), p. 729, note 2, describes Waller as "the fanatical puritan magistrate who 
had been the scourge of London 
' 
Catholics, had preceded the Earl [of Shaftesbury] 
into exile and was to receive him on 2 December. " 
P. R. O., SP84/217, f. 80, Carr to Blaythwayt, 16 August 1680. 
61 Ibid., f. 153. 
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December, described as "an impudent adventurer" and "an obvious spy". " 
By seventeenth century standards Amsterdam was physically a pleasant city to live 
in, for the wealthy, the skilled craftsmen and small traders. Improvements 
continued throughout the 1670s and 1680s with the introduction of street lighting, 
the improvement of the waterways, and the general maintenance and extension of 
the fabric of the city and the large subsidies (always dependent on strict 
accountability) made to the almshouses, orphanages etc; ` in 1673 the vroedschap 
had agreed that the management of the finances of the almshouses should be at the 
discretion of the burgomasters. " 
The practical and spiritual welfare of the population of Amsterdam were not the 
only aspects of life in which the regency took an active interest. Entertainment and 
education also came under their control and scrutiny. In 1672 theatres had been 
closed in Amsterdam because of the crisis, but although they were not opened 
officially for another five years, " this did not preclude a blind eye being turned to 
some forms of theatrical entertainments and a troupe of French actors was 
74 
welcomed in the city for a month in 1673. Once the closures had been lifted 
theatres operated under fairly rigorous censorship, but William and Mary 
themselves were patrons of the theatre, making a rare informal visit to the opera in 
Amsterdam in 1681. 
Commentators were beginning to see French influences in the social life of the 
70 
- K. H. D. Haley, The First Earl of Shaftesbury (Oxford, 1968), p. 729. 
71 G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 14 July, 1673,14 December 1679,14 April 1681 
(dealing with the treatment of beggars in religious houses); 23 March 1682. 
72 Ibid., 23 June 1673. 
73 Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 694: the pressure for the reopening was led by van 
Beuningen and Hudde in the face of determined opposition from the stricter 
Voetian Calvinists. 
74. P. Scheltema, Amstels Oudheid, of gedenkwaardigheden van Amsterdam, (1855- 
1885), Vol. I, p. 103. 
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cities, not only in theatre and entertainment, but also in the personal habits of the 
population. 
"Go no further than to Amsterdam, or more especially to the Hagh, 
where you may observe all to be turned perfect Monsieurs, and in 
Amsterdam the old Hollander is so changed that there is scarce such 
a creature to be found... "" 
The influence of the French was particularly noticed in women's fashionS, 76 but 
Gregori Leti also noticed that the cosmopolitan nature of the population of 
Amsterdam led to a tolerance of a wide range of dress styleS. 77 The influence of 
immigrants on the city cannot be overlooked. Amsterdam was by seventeenth 
century standards a large city. In common with many other major trading cities it 
had a large non-native population, many temporary residents, but many real 
immigrants. Most of these immigrants came from states whose cultural 
development was on a par with the Dutch and therefore less likely to be 
overwhelmed by their adopted city's culture. The influences of the Jewish 
community were widely felt, not only in the development of sound financial 
institutions, but also in representational art, architecture and fashion. Many 
seventeenth century paintings and prints of the Dam show not only the relatively 
sober dress of the Dutch merchant, but also the more lavish decoration of the 
75 Kn. 11485, "A Representation of the present Affairs and Interests of the most 
considerable parts of Europe more especially those of the Netherlands: as they 
now stand in the beginning of the year 1677. Laid open in a Letter from Holland 
by a lover of Truth and Race". It is difficult to establish whether the French 
influences came from the Huguenot immigrants, or from the diplomatic and 
trading links with France during this period. Were they a reflection of the 
changes being effected by the French court, or a more basic acquirement from 
those fleeing that court? Gregori Leti, Teatro Belgico, o vero Ritratti historici, 
chronologici, politici, e geografici, delle sette provinde unite (Amsterdam, 1690) 
Part 2, Book 8, p, 340 shows that the spread of French immigrant families across 
the social spectrum in the 1670s and 1680s in Amsterdam, was on a ratio of 3/4 
rich families to about 300 of middle income, but many artisans and labourers. 
Such a distribution would certainly have had a widespread influence. 
76 
. Ibid. 
77 
. Leti, op. cit., p. 330. 
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foreign merchants . 
78 In May 1681 during negotiations with France where the main 
points are the trade in the East Indies, Africa and the Levant, comments were also 
made on the migration of protestant merchants, artisans and manufacturers into 
Amsterdam. The theme was in support of Dutch aims to reassert their trade, but 
did not lose the opportunity to praise their toleration to immigrants. " 
The involvement of the burger class in the government not only of the city but also 
of the States brought a non-noble stratum of society into the wider European 
diplomatic society. Education abroad was not restricted to the aristocracy, but was 
available to the sons of relatively wealthy merchants. For example, Nicolaes 
Witsen travelled broadly from Moscow to Oxford, both as part of his education and 
his early years in the service of the States. " Such a privileged education was of 
course readily available to the sons of the wealthy merchant and regent class, but a 
basic education was also available to a large proportion of children, even though 
writing was not considered an essential and had to be paid for. " Both the church 
and the regency had considerable influence in the schools. Nicolaes Tulp and Joan 
Commelin, who entered the vroedschap in 1672, were both professors at the 
Athenaeum Illustrae, " and other members had official appointments within both the 
Athenaeum and the Latynsch Schole. " As with their influence within the church 
organisation, the regency supported the teaching of the stricter ideals of the 
Reformed Church within the schools, but encouraged their own sons to experience 
79 
. See 
for example Gerrit Adriaenz Berckheyde, The New Town Hall of Amsterdam, 
c. 1675, Coll. Amsterdams Historisch Museum. 
". G. A. Amsterdam, Collectie Hudde, nr. 47,1 May 1681. 
so Witsen accompanied Boreel on his embassy to Moscow in 1664, taking with him 
a list of questions from his professors and visited the patriarch Nikon, J. J. 
Driessen, Russen en Nederlanders uit de Geschiedenis van de Betrekkingen tussen 
Nederland en Rusland 1600-1917 (The Hague, 1989), p. 59. 
Israel, Dutch Republic, pp. 686-90. 
112 Appendix 1. 
For example both Dr. Roetert Ernst and Nicholas Opmeer were "curator der Illustre Schole 
en Scholarch der Latijnsche Schole", Elias, Vroedschap, nos. 172 and 213. 
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the wider debates in the universities. 
The expansion of world trade opened the eyes of the humblest trader to the wealth 
of culture and commodities, which all passed through the Amsterdam warehouses. 
Although a number of people did go out to live more or less permanently in the 
newly acquired colonies or the "fort and factories" of the trading companies, more 
probably only went for a few years and then returned. " Their knowledge and 
experience of a wider world contributed to the assimilation of those aspects of 
foreign cultures which could be usefully integrated with the Dutch. 
It was in the interests of the Amsterdammers to establish and maintain favourable 
trade with all parts of the ever-expanding commercial world, and in the next 
chapter we will see how this interest informed the political activities of the 
regency. 
84 
. Boxer, Dutch Seaborne Empire, p. 245. 
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Chapter 5 
Economic Interest and the Politics of Amsterdam 
In terms of economic history, the years 1672 to 1684 are a very short period. And 
examining the economic history of one city for such a short period makes for a 
contracted study, notwithstanding that that city is Amsterdam on the crest of the 
Golden Age. However, as part of the purpose here is to examine how the 
economic situation influenced those who were in a position to determine foreign 
policy, that is the regent class and those with whom they shared common interests 
among the non-regent merchant class, traditional methods of analysis cannot be 
strictly employed. 
Contemporary observers were as constrained as economic forecasters are today in 
making judgements about the situation and the actions necessary to rectify 
unsatisfactory trends. Unlike economic historians, they could not put events into 
an historical context, but merely make comparisons with past developments and 
future ambitions. And if economic historians themselves, with the advantage of 
hindsight, are very divided as to whether the 1670s and 1680s were in fact the 
beginning of economic decline in the Dutch Republic, the future must have been 
even more obscure to those involved in the decision-making. ' 
De Vries and van der Woude, The First Modern Economy, p. 412, have recently 
revived this debate, arguing that the 1660s and 1670s saw the beginnings of a 
change in the Dutch economy resulting from the mercantilist activities of England 
and later France, under Colbert's policies, and ibid., p. 675: "... the ongoing 
elaboration of restrictive laws governing foreign trade, especially by England and 
France, brought the growth of international trade to a standstill and put the 
Republic - the all-too-conspicuous beneficiary of free trade - under increasing 
pressure". Their argument, based on a wealth of detailed evidence, is very 
convincing, but it does appear rather perverse that they are unwilling to accept any 
correlation between political events and economic activity, ibid. p. 674. While 
Israel, "The Amsterdam Stock Exchange and the Revolution of 1688", in J. I. 
Israel, Conflicts of Empires (London, 1997), p. 328 sees the crash of 1672 
"occasioned by invasion" as a cause for the cessation of public building and the 
dramatic slump in the property market, De Vries and van de Woude argue that 
this was a growing trend from 1663 which culminated in the halt in investment in 
land and improvements in 1672. Writing in the 1680s, the Italian, Gregori Leti, 
Teatro Belgico, p. 317 observed that Amsterdam's "aggrandimento" had ended in 
1675, as a result of the war. 
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By the late seventeenth century economic theories were developing, many of which 
were related to the amount of money in circulation and the benefits of trade. No 
longer were governments closely constrained by the belief that there was a finite 
amount of wealth in the world, but were developing a deeper understanding of the 
methods for creating wealth. Planning therefore was a positive part of economic 
life, based on current trends, experience of the past and assumptions about the 
future. For the Dutch Republic the main considerations were competition in the 
long-distance carrying trades, control of international re-export trade and 
appropriate fiscal mechanisms. Therefore their concern was principally in those 
overseas areas where they were seeking to expand and maintain their interest at the 
expense of England and France, the inland European markets, the more entrenched 
traditional European supply sources from the Baltic, and the Fisheries. Imposition 
of taxes or rules of trade by their major competitors were seen as a direct threat to 
the sovereignty of the economic strength which underpinned the Republic. French 
tariffs and English Navigation Acts became issues for the development of foreign 
policy and played a major part in the waging of war in the late seventeenth 
century. 
Amsterdam's population peaked in 1681 at about 220,000.2 No doubt the steady 
growth in numbers to that date was in large part due to the establishment of 
immigrant families, and the halt in the 1690s to the general pressures on population 
then operating throughout western Europe. However it is interesting to note that 
this peak was achieved before 1685, when the flood of Huguenots are generally 
assumed to have left France. Graham Gibbs quotes the figures for the Walloon 
Church in Amsterdam's new arrivals in the years 1681-89 as a total of 5,840, of 
whom the largest proportion came between 1685 and 1688 (3,977) with the peak 
years 1686 (1,246) and 1687 (1,067). ' In fact, the Amsterdam vroedschap was 
2 For details of the estimates of Amsterdam's population in the seventeenth century, 
see H. Nusteling, Welwaart en Werkgelegendheid in Amsterdam, Appendix I 
(Appendix III below). 
3 G. C. Gibbs, "The Reception of the Huguenots in England and the Dutch 
Republic". p. 279. 
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already discussing the problem of the large influx of Huguenots in 1681 and 1682, 
although still taking a largely paternalistic attitude towards them. ' But, although 
these particular immigrants may have had political and economic significance for 
the regents, they were only a small part of the wide range of immigrants choosing 
Amsterdam for their refuge. Between 1681 and 1705 it is estimated that about 2.6 
per cent of the population of Amsterdam were French refugees. ' Besides the 
Huguenots from France immigrants included, of course, the protestants from the 
Southern Netherlands, Jews and marranos from Spain and Portugal and religious 
and political refugees other parts of Europe, the growing Jewish community, and 
even traders from other Holland townS. 6 
It would therefore appear to be justified to say that by the 1680s Amsterdam had 
attracted the optimum number of immigrants with commercial expertise and capital, 
financial acumen or manufacturing skills, from among those who felt that the city 
would offer them not only safety from persecution, but also economic security. 
Limitations on public service restricted most immigrants with wealth to the 
commercial sector and attitudes towards the poor did not encourage settlement of 
unemployable immigrants, despite the avowedly greater concern shown generally 
for the welfare of the population. Taken alongside the immigrants, there was not 
a noticeable number of native Amsterdammers leaving the city for economic 
advantage elsewhere, either within the Republic or overseas. Boxer has shown that 
there was little success in the colonies in attracting settlers from the Republic, 
beyond the lower calibre of direct employees of the commercial companies. ' 
Overall a growing population, attracting immigrants for positive economic reasons, 
was one of the main advantages for Amsterdam in the 1670s and 1680s. This 
advantage was sustained by the constant monitoring of the immigrants, by 
4 See above p. 76. 
5. Gibbs, op. cit., pp. 295-96. 
6. Lcti, Tealro Belgico, pp. 333-40. 
7 
. Boxer Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800, pp. 215-22. 
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restrictions on some of their activities and by positive encouragement of those who 
might be a burden, to re-emigrate. Unlike Rotterdam, Amsterdam did not 
encourage the establishment of foreign-owned firms within the city apart from 
political and religious refugees with the right credentials, and therefore on the 
whole wealth generated in Amsterdam remained within the City to the benefit of 
the citizens! 
There were close links between the ruling regents and the merchant class. 
Aspirants to the regency normally came from the merchant class and the marriage 
alliances between wealthy merchant houses and the families of regents supported 
the greater success of both sides, financially and politically. Some merchant 
houses remained outside the ruling class themselves, but established such close 
links through marriage and shareholding that their influence was almost as great as 
that of their regent relatives and colleagues. During the 1680s one of the most 
closely linked, non-regent merchant families was that of the merchant house of 
Hochepied, whose daughter Catarina had married Nicolaes Witsen in December 
1674. 
Even at the wealthiest and most powerful levels there was still strong involvement 
in, or at least dependence upon, active commerce. Louis Trip, who was brought 
into the vroedschap in 1672, as an ally (and father-in-law) of Valckenier, was - and 
remained primarily - involved in the family munitions trade, with close links with 
the de Geers in Sweden. 9 Two other leading regents, Huydecooper and Boreel, had 
married directly into a branch of the Trip family joined by marriage to the 
powerful, but non-regent Coymans family. So although Huydecooper was himself 
above the basics of trade, his family involvement was so close that commercial 
concerns were still paramount. 
P. W. Klein, '"Little London"', British merchants in Rotterdam during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, D. C. Coleman and Peter Mathias, ed., 
Enterprise and History, Essays in honour of Charles Wilson (Cambridge, 1984), p. 
117. 
9 For full details of the Trip family's commercial connections in Sweden, America 
and with the V. 0-C., see Klein, De Trippen, pp. 474-75. 
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However, aside from this example, we can see that this widespread system of 
intermarriage and family alliances gave great advantages to the Amsterdam regent 
and merchant classes. The number and diversity of commercial, trading and 
financial concerris in Amsterdam were such that intermarriage was spread 
throughout a very large class which, far from contracting as a result, was still 
expanding by the development of new organisations and the immigration already 
mentioned above. And of the seventy members of the vroedschap from 1672 to 
1684, at least twenty-two (approximately one third) were still closely identified 
with the original basis of their wealth in trade. Appendix I lists the direct trading 
interests and connections of the members of the vroedschap and shows how wide 
and potentially powerful this top rank merchant class was. Particular attention is 
drawn to men like Corver, who was one of the dominant men of the 1680s and yet 
was not the rentier oligarch of the smaller towns. In fact in the 1670s, starting 
with the wetsverzetting, the Amsterdam vroedschap began to attract proportionately 
more merchants than in the recent past as merchants from immigrant families like 
the Sautijns and Scotts also began to move into the regent class, providing an 
injection of fresh blood not readily available in smaller towns. Seven of the ten 
new members introduced at the wetsverzetting in September 1672 were identified 
as "merchants". 
There is a problem in defining "active participation in commerce". It is, of course, 
recognised that the demands of municipal office would preclude full-time 
commitment to business, but where there is some evidence that members were 
taking an active "interest" in their business concerns, they have been included as 
"merchants". The actual degree of participation would need a detailed study of the 
day-to-day running of the various merchant houses and their employees. No doubt 
the regent merchants of the 1670s were of a different mould from their 
grandfathers, because they were operating in a different time and in an established 
commercial world. And full participation in the day-to-day affairs of the city, 
which was taken seriously by most members of the vroedschap would of course 
preclude much time being spent on other business. But in order to make the most 
of their connections, influence and interest within the ruling group, they would 
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certainly have to be fully cognisant of the current concerns of what was after all 
the basis of their financial and regent status. The majority lived in the city within 
close walking distance of all the primary organs of trade, all of which were within 
"a few minutes walk" of each other; " and even those with country estates also had 
town houses. For example Hasselaer lived on the Keizersgracht "over de broitwerli 
Ve Kroon"' and had an estate at Hofstede on the Vecht. However, on the whole it 
was only a minority, among whom were several of the more influential regents in 
the 1670s and 1680s, who also owned property outside Amsterdam. " 
And, immediately below these in social ranking, and perhaps in some cases 
exceeding them in wealth and potential influence, were merchants, manufacturers 
and financiers, many originally from immigrant families, dominated by the likes of 
those already mentioned - Coymans, Deutz, and Hochepied - but also including van 
Bambeeck, Bartolotti and others, many of whom, like Lanschot, Stabroek and 
Pellicorne, exerted their influence in local chambers of the trading companies 
independently of family connections. " These were the men who provided much of 
the capital for commercial investment, and, for example, without Coymans' money 
the new West Indische Compagnie would have failed within its first ten years. 13 
Not only did this network represent an enormous amount of wealth for investment 
but with its connections in all parts of the Republic's trading empire it had a strong 
and active interest in the Republic's foreign policy. The strength of capital enabled 
10. De Vries, First Modern Economy, p. 148, Map 4.1. 
". Among those with properties outside Amsterdam were Pancras, Geelvinck, 
Hasselaer, Hulft, Huydecooper, De Graeff, De Vicq (Dr. F. ), Corver, Ranst, 
Witsen, Trip and Commelin . See Appendix I for the known addresses of the 
members of the vroedschop from 1672-1684. 
Of these financiers, the oldest merchant banking house was Weduwe Jean Deutz 
and Co., which first lent money to the Emperor in 1659 during the period while 
Deutz's brother-in-law, De Witt was in control of the foreign policy of the Dutch 
Republic, de Vries, First Modern Economy, p. 13 9 and 14 1. 
13 One or two of these merchants did have representation on the important, but less 
prestigious offices, such as thesauris extraordinaris, for example Pellicorne in 
1672 and Bambeeck in 1679. 
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the Bank of Amsterdam to conduct its cashiers! business free until 1683, and the 
Bank withstood the run on it in 1672, despite having debts repayable at call of over 
fl. 7m. 14 A brief study of the rate of bankruptcies in Amsterdam between 1670 and 
1688 shows that despite the small increase in the war years, there was a resilience 
among the core of the commercial world. Bankruptcies increased from III in 
1671 to 136 in 1673 and 137 in 1675, although they dropped to 97 in 1674, and 
dropped again to 83 in 1683.15 Interest rates remained low, rising from 3.5 per 
cent in 1673 to 4.5 per cent, but quickly being reduced to 3.5 per cent again on 
conclusion of the peace in 1678. " 
There was also one other advantage enjoyed by Amsterdam which by 1680, as the 
English consul, William Carr noted, was not enjoyed by many other cities. " The 
demise of strong men like Valckenier and Hooft at the end of the 1670s did not 
leave Amsterdam without able men. Van Beuningen, who remained a force of 
some weight well into the 1680s, was one of the first to argue in favour of peace 
in 1675 on the grounds that one small South Netherlands town was not worth the 
trade of Amsterdam. Nicolaes Witsen produced a treatise on shipping, . 4cloude en 
Hedendaegsche Scheepsbouw en Bestier; in 1671" and throughout his years of 
service to the City there was hardly a subject on which he could not speak or write 
to great effect. In 1678 he was instrumental in restoring trading links with France 
through the Southern Netherlands, " and in 1679 he worked hard to establish a fair 
V. Barbour, Capitalism in Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century (Michigan, 
1963), p. 44; Israel, "Amsterdam Stock Exchange", p. 328; De Vries, First Modern 
Economy, p. 133: the Amsterdam bank "weathered the storm of 1672 nicely since 
it held in its vaults a metal stock sufficient to cover 90 per cent of total deposits". 
". W. F. H. Oldewelt, 'rwee Eeuw Amsterdamse faillissementen en het verloop van 
de conjunctuur (1636 tot 1838)', Tijdschrift, LXXVI (1962), pp. 421-35. 
16 G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 3 January 1673 and 16 October 1679. 
17 B. L. Add. 41820 f12, W. Carr to W. Blaythwayt Amsterdam 21 March 1681 
(Appendix II). 
Gebhard, Witsen, pp. 63-73. 
'9. G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 2 April 1678. 
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deal for the Dutch in the Baltic. He pressed the negotiators for: 
"egaliteit der tollen niet anders en worden geconsideert als andere 
landschappen en plaetsen by syn Majesteit van Sweden 
geconquesteert, en suIx de Hollands schepen op die drie gewyde 
provincien traficquerende egael gestelt niet de Sweedsche. "" 
At a more fundamental level the mathematical brain of Johannes Hudde was 
applied throughout the 1670s to making improvements to the accounting systems 
which were implemented in the 1680s. His activities were not restricted to 
Amsterdam itself, he was also closely involved with Paulus de Roo, who was 
based in Batavia, in reorganising the accounting system for the VO. C. " After 
1683 Hudde concentrated his efforts on the VO. C, taking over as President and 
consolidating the influence of the ruling oligarchy in the activities of the major 
trading company. " Cornelis Geelvinck had a superior knowledge of the workings 
of the financial organs of the City and, together with Witsen and Hudde, was able 
to apply his efficient methods to the improvements to the city's waterways which 
were essential for the defence of the city, the maintenance of amenities and 
principally for the improvement of traffic movement. In 1682 Hudde took these 
improvements further and introduced a system of measuring the water level in the 
1j, thus providing a regular and accurate indication of sea levels as a further aid to 
shipping. 23 These men may have been rentiers, they may have formed an 
oligarchy, but over and above the struggles of local power politics, they were 
making positive contributions to sustaining the commercial life of the city, 
including financing drainage schemes. " 
Ibid., 17 May 1679. 
F. Gaastra, Bewind en Belied bij de VAC. 1672-1702 (Zutphen, 1989), p. 253; 
For further discussion on Hudde's work and the suggestions made by Johannes 
Phoonsens, see J. G. van Dillen, Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis der Wisselbanken 
(The Hague 1925), Part 1,165-78. 
". F. W. Stapel, "Johannes Hudde over de balansen van de Oost Indische 
Compagnie", E. HJ., xiii (1927), p. 217. 
13 Lambert, Dutch Landscape, p. 218. 
Ibid., p. 214. 
93 
The level of civic improvements throughout the 1670s and 1680s was of a less 
prestigious nature than the building of the town hall in the 1660s, but were a direct 
result of the buoyancy of confidence within the city and the need to maintain and 
improve standards to meet the current demands. Although in the early years of the 
1670s they were mainly directed towards defence, they were soon more clearly 
connected with the practical concerns of the city's welfare, safety and hygiene. 
Together with the improvements to the waterways and sluices, bridges were 
improved and many new ones built, " street lighting was introduced through the 
innovative skills of van de Heyden as a safety and security measure. 16 Such 
improvements would not have been possible without large expenditure, good 
housekeeping and a skilled workforce, all of which resources Amsterdam had. 
Much of the concern of the Amsterdammers throughout the 1670s and 1680s was 
with taxation, but for those determining policy, the constant high level of duties on 
consurnables was not a serious problem. This, as ever, was a problem for those on 
lower incomes who spent the larger proportion of their income on necessaries. "' It 
only became a problem therefore where it affected the level of consumption, and 
this was not generally the case in a period of growing demand. However, greater 
concern was felt over personal taxation" and import duties, particularly where this 
was related to war expenditure. This will be looked at in more detail in chapter 9, 
but the latter will be referred to from time to time where appropriate during the 
following discussion. The complexities of import duties are fairly predictable: 
whether they affected the cost of internal manufactures; whether they prevented the 
import of competitive goods; whether they were imposed equally throughout the 
". See below p. 132, note 58. 
26 Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 681. In 1670,1800 street lamps had been installed 
and a further 600 added by the time of the Peace of Nijmegen in 1678. 
27 
. 
De Vries, First Modern Economy, pp. 103-5. Before 1675 no-one was exempt 
from taxation under the gemeene middelen, which covered all the main consumer 
goods, but after 1675 a system of exemptions related to income was introduced. 
28 Ibid., P. 107, wealth taxes, the 100th and 200th penningh, were levied as the need 
arose and the latter was levied twenty-eight times between 1671 and 1678, during 
the war with France. 
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Republic, or on goods from different sources; and, whether they damaged the 
potential for re-export. 
And of course all these questions were borne in mind during decision-making 
where the fundamental issues were related to the political and military decisions 
about foreign policy. 
By the 1670s the Amsterdam domination of the VO. C. was so great as to make it 
in effect an Amsterdam company. Over half the capital was owned in Amsterdam 
and until 1684 at least, the VO. C. was still expanding. 29 In contrast to the trials of 
the old W. LC., the Charter for the VO. C. was renewed free in 1672 as payment for 
services in the second Anglo-Dutch war. So at the outset of hostilities, the 
company was confident and secure. Throughout the 1670s it was able to withstand 
several setbacks which would have finished weaker organisations. In 1672, the 
VO-C lent money to the States as part of the war effort, but repayments were of 
course slow and the company was at the same time faced with interest rates in the 
East Indies 3 per cent above those in force at home, interest payments rising from 
fl. 200,000 in 1670 tofl. 700,000 in 1675. " The effect of this in 1673 was that 
creditors had to be - and, more importantly, were - satisfied with company bonds 
rather than payments. Throughout these years the Company was heavily indebted 
to loans authorised through Amsterdam mainly to offset slow returns on 
expeditions, but these loans were always agreed and, after 1676, when a dividend 
was paid for the first time during the war, became more rare. " This mutual 
support system worked to the advantage of both the City and the Company. 
Glamann has argued that all the Anglo-Dutch wars ended to the advantage of the 
Dutch in the East Indies, but the VO. C. did not necessarily see that they had 
2'. F. Gaastra. "The Shifting Balance of Trade of the Dutch East India Company", L. 
Bluss6 and F. Gaastra, ed., Companies and Trade: Essays on overseas trading 
companies during the Ancien Regime (Leiden, 1981), p. 48. 
31 
. Ibid., p. 
64. 
". Ibid., p. 66. 
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secured their position thereby, and they continued to see the English as the strong 
rival it was in this long-distance trade. 
The arguments over the relevant clauses of the treaty of Westminster extended for 
almost a year after the peace was made in February 1674. To the English the 
Dutch were exposing their vulnerability by moving from a policy of mare fiberum 
to mare clausum, while the English were pursuing the more open policy. " This 
was partly as a result of the stagnation in the development of Dutch shipping with 
which both the English and French were beginning to compete and the clauses in 
the English Navigation Acts insisting that their own trade should be carried on in 
English bottoms. " 
Although in effect the balance between the Dutch and English carrying trade 
remained fairly stable, gains by the one being offset by losses elsewhere, the 
Amsterdammers saw three major factors as causing problems to their trade, which 
by 1680 they believed to be in serious trouble. They were able, after the Peace of 
Westminster in 1674, to re-establish the terms prevailing after the Peace of Breda 
in 1667, until 1678, but they felt that the English were in a strong position to 
capture markets which the Dutch war effort made vulnerable. This view was the 
more naive since they themselves had been able to exploit markets throughout the 
Eighty Years War, and was perhaps more a failure to understand the real causes of 
English expansion. 
Secondly there was the evidence of falling prices. For example white pepper 
". C. C. Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean (van Gorcum, 1971), p. 473. 
33. P. R. O. SP/84.197, f. 3 1, Letter from Arlington 24 November 1674: "Mons. van 
Beuningen appeared soe good a temper and disposition towards the Treaty of 
Commerce which Mons. Fagell assures mee, he hath power and directions from 
hence to expedite... " but ibid., f. 85,4/4 December 1674, Arlington wrote: "I am 
sorry to understand by yours that the Marine Treaty and that the Indies is not 
finisht, the Pensioner told mee hee had sent Monsieur van Beuningen such a 
power as he desired to conclude it, and I told him that I thought neither party 
would... " 
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prices dropped by a third between 1670 and 1687 (the low point being in 1680)", 
and this trend was reflected in other trades as well. But if prices were dropping in 
some of the older trades, new markets with new potential were being established, 
and it was in the East that one of the major new commodities, tea, was being 
established. Scheltema cites Tulp as one of the early promoters of the tea trade in 
Amsterdam. " 
And finally, this perceived decline in the East India trade was reflected in falling 
share prices, which in 1670 were at 500, but by May 1678 had fallen to 428 and 
even with the recovery after the war had still not, in March 1681, reached 45 0.36 
Whether justified or not, this crisis of confidence largely determined their actions 
in the 1680s with strong reaffirmations of their commercial priorities. Policy 
during the Luxemburg crises of 1682-84 was argued very strongly on grounds that 
war would mean markets lost to England, if, as was most likely, she remained 
neutral. 
Nevertheless, the East India trade was still, and was to remain for some years, one 
of the strengths of Dutch and particularly Amsterdam commerce, but there were 
changes taking place, because of the growing involvement of the English and to a 
lesser extent the French in the East, and because of the changes of supply and 
demand. As a result of this, consideration had to be given to the security of the 
trade, much of the pressure being exerted from within the Amsterdam chamber by 
34. W. A. Horst, De peperhandel van de Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie', 
Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudhiedkunde, R. vii, D. 3 (1942), 
p. 99. 
Scheltema, Amstels Oudheid, of gedenkwaardigheden van Amsterdam, 7 vols. 
(Amsterdam, 1855-1885), vol. i, p. 98; he also cites Witsen as one of the early 
promoters of coffee, particularly traded through Surinam. 
36. Carr to Blaythwayt, 21 March 1681 (Appendix II); PRO SP/84 199, f. 5, letter to 
Sir Joseph Williamson 7/17 May 1675: "... a second peece of newes is, that the 
East India Actions are fallen unto 428, and are like to fall on Monday next to 
400... " For the pattern of share prices in the V. O. C. for the period 1671-1690, see J. 1. Israel, Amsterdam Stock Exchange", Appendix, "Movement of the V. O. C. Share Prices (Amsterdam Chamber) 1671-90", p. 347. 
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Hochepied . 
3' However by strengthening their own position, Amsterdam had a 
greater success in achieving supremacy over Zeeland rather than their overseas 
competitors, who were better equipped to withstand commercial antagonism. 
Problems were not unknown in the organisation of the VO. C. in Batavia and as 
well as the intervention in the accounting system by Hudde, Amsterdam had sent 
out Dirck Blom in 1679 to take over as President of the Heeniraden following the 
crisis of confidence in employees and consequent sackings. " The necessity of such 
intervention which took the highly unusual form of asking a member of the 
vroedschap to resign his seat and take his administrative expertise abroad shows 
just how important it was to Amsterdam to ensure that the company continued to 
run efficiently. 
In the West Indies, the picture was very different from that in the East. In relation 
to the English the Treaty of Breda in 1667 had further strengthened the Dutch 
position in the East Indies, but in the West their acquisition of Surinam was in fact 
offset in the long run by the loss of New Netherlands. The West Indische 
Compagnie had been weakened during its struggle with Portugal, and the 1672-78 
war with France had an outlying battle arena in the West Indies. The loss of the 
Barbados sugar was reflected in a fall in sugar as a percentage of total commodity 
sales in Amsterdam from 8.80 per cent in 1650 to 2.02 per cent in 1670 and 0.20 
per cent in 170 0.39 But to the Dutch the greater loss at the time was that of 
Tobago to the French and the major market lost for the slave traders as the French 
began to establish their own sources of manpower in West Africa, " However, this 
loss was also principally a Zeeland loss, and although Amsterdam fought to the last 
to retain Tobago"' she was still slave trading with the Spanish colony at Curacao. 42 
37 R. A., The Hague, V. O. C. papers, 104.03,20 July 1676. 
38 Gaastra, Bewind en Beleid, p. 25 1. 
39 
. K. Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade 1620-1740, p. 14. Table 2. 
". C. C. Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean, pp. 463-4; Menkman, De West- 
Indische Compagnie, p. 150. 
". G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., in particular October 1677. 
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This is perhaps the point at which clarification should be made about the difference 
between the Dutch problems With the English and the French. It is misleading to 
say that one or the other was the more serious competitor, because the 
interdependence and competition were on completely different bases. The English 
were by this time well established as competitors in the long-distance carrying 
trade, in the fisheries, and to a lesser extent in manufactures. But what England 
was not was a very important market for Dutch trade. The English did complain 
bitterly about imports of Dutch pottery, but this was justified by arguments that the 
English potteries were not supplying demand. " And when the Dutch succeeded at 
Breda in restoring some of their rights over carrying European hinterland trade for 
the English market they were establishing a superior position in the carrying trade 
rather than the market place. The latter half of the seventeenth century was a 
period when most of western Europe was developing a demand for consurnables, 
and in a period of general expansion of trade to fulfil this demand at home the 
carriers were more likely to compete for suppliers than markets. " 
But the French were one of the Republic's major customers, and sources of goods, 
whether raw materials like salt, or supplies of wines and cloths, as well as 
beginning to challenge the Dutch in carrying trades, mainly in the Mediterranean. 
We will look later at the Dutch/French trade, but suffice it to say at this stage that 
the distinctions between these two major developing economic powers and their 
relations with the Amsterdammers created different problems which, on the whole, 
demanded different solutions. We shall see that in the last resort the 
Amsterdammers managed to withstand the competition from both with a greater 
degree of success in the short term than their pessimism and misjudgment of the 
continued) 
Goslinga, op cit., 208. 
P. R. O. SP/84 199, f. 274-322, letter from van Beuningen to Charles 11, November 
1675, claiming that the Dutch were free to continue exporting pottery to England 
because the law enacted three years earlier banning Dutch imports was not yet 
effective. 
44 De Vries, First Modern Econonty, p. 42 1, demonstrates that by the 1670s the 
English had established a carrying trade completely separate from that of the 
Dutch. 
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situation justified. 
But there were still some favourable developments in the West Indies for 
Amsterdam, if not for the Dutch Republic as a whole. The Amsterdammers in fact 
capitalised on Zeeland's misfortunes and in the early years of the war successfully 
privateered in the Caribbean, and losses to the English were recovered after the 
45 Peace of Westminster. In 1679 only the Amsterdam and Stad and Land 
chambers of the W. I. C. were in profit, the Zeeland and Noordquartier chambers in 
particular making substantial losses. 46 Goslinga has argued that the losses in the 
Caribbean were to the advantage of the Dutch in that they removed a damaging 
financial burden, but losses were not generally seen as rationalisation at the time. 
However, the Nicuive West Indische Conipagnie which was set up in March 1674, 
after the Peace of Westminster and the agreement of status in the Caribbean 
between the Dutch and the English, did produce a more effective company with the 
balance once again definitely favouring Amsterdam. In 1674 there was only one 
director of the W1C. on the vroedschap, the relatively less influential de Vicq, but 
in the early 1680s, regents like Scott, Opmeer and van Heuvel became directors 
and strengthened Amsterdam's hold on the Company. 47 
On the whole, however, matters in the West Indies could not be seen as 
advantageous at this time with constant shortages of capital, and the 
Amsterdammers were unhappy at losing any ground to their competitors. In 1682 
the serious position and need to establish a firm base in Surinam, now their major 
asset in the West, led Amsterdam to agree that in the short term the colony should 
be free of all fiscal impositions. " The new establishment of the Societeit van 
Sitfinaine was based on a three-way division of ownership between Amsterdam, the 
'3. Goslinga, op. cit., 470. 
46. R. A., The Hague, Secret Notulen, W. I. C. 1675-1700. 
Van de Bijl, Idee en Interest, discusses in detail the growing disadvantage of the 
Zeeland towns at the hands of Amsterdam. 
48 G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 27 November 1682. 
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WIC. and the Heer van Somelsdijk, for which each of them made a payment to 
Zeeland of fl. 260,000, on condition that the new company would be based in 
Amsterdam and all dealings managed there. 49 
If it is fairly easy to list the advantages and drawbacks in the long distance trades, 
those in the European and'Mediterranean trades were less clear. In the seventeenth 
century it was common to divide the trading areas of the world in two, as Sir 
George Downing did in 1663, " with the distinction made between the "rich trades" 
of the East and West Indies and the Mediterranean, and the bulk carrying trade in 
northern Europe. However, while supremacy in the East and West Indies could be 
fairly long-term and only overthrown by major upheavals, the situation in the 
Levant, also classed as a "rich" trade, was more unstable. 
Navigation was, of course, far easier in the hospitable waters of the Mediterranean, 
but so was attack from enemy shipping and the possibility of blockading, and 
convoying was essential for security. So although the returns on the trade could be 
high, the outlay was also high. By the 1670s the Dutch had established sixteen 
"handelhitizen" in Smyrna, a few less than the English, who were trading in 
parallel with the Dutch, and a few more than the French, with whom they were in 
competition. 5' Amsterdam was well represented at a high level in the Levant, by 
not only Everard Scott, but also Gillis Sautijn. Both were merchants trading in 
Italy and the Levant, and the former was also a prominent banker and the latter 
was with his brother in the gunpowder business. " In the Levant the interests of 
Amsterdam coincided with those of Haarlem and Leiden and, with the latter in 
particular, the Amsterdammers were able to turn economic assistance to good 
". A. R. H. Societeit van Suriname, nr. 564; Menkman, op. cit., pp. 154-55. 
V. Barbour, 'Dutch and English Merchant Shipping in the Seventeenth Century', 
E. H. R. Il (1929-30), p. 265. 
". Van Dillen, Handboek, p. 357. 
Sautijn was a member of an extraordinary embassy to England in 1675, to 
negotiate the terms of the Marine Treaty. 
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advantage when their political differences began to narrow. In March 1681 
Amsterdam gave qualified support to Leiden's request for strengthening the 
convoys to Smyrna, qualified that is by ensuring that such convoys did not restrict 
the trading freedoms too much. " 
The importance of the Mediterranean trade was that, like the European hinterland 
trade, returns could be relatively quick, but in the 1680s Amsterdam was having to 
work hard to maintain a reasonable representation in the Levant and much angst 
was caused by attempts to stabilise the situation. In this respect it had far more in 
common with the other "trading areas" in northern Europe where competition could 
be more evenly balanced. 
The Baltic had long held an important place in Amsterdam's trade as a supplier of 
raw materials and market for manufactured goods as well as the source of the grain 
trade, and probably for as long as it had been important, it had been fraught with 
insecurities. These arose mainly from the political fluidity of Danish, Swedish and 
German alliances and the control of the Sound. After 1660 the Dutch were also 
faced with a loss in carrying goods for the English market, as the English sustained 
the terms of the Navigation Acts with an improved and enlarged merchant fleet 
carrying their own goods; but in effect there was enough trade in the Baltic to 
accommodate them both. One example of this has been found in the level of cloth 
exports to the Baltic by the English and Dutch. The Dutch share of the market 
increased from 55 per cent in the period 1661-70 to 66 per cent in 1681-90, while 
the English share declined from 40 per cent to 33 per cent. However, in real 
terms, the Dutch exports increased by 100 per cent and those of the English by 50 
per cent. 5' The relative loss by the English was to some extent caused by the 
Swedes and Danes purchasing their own shipping, usually Dutch, in order to 
circumvent the Navigation Acts themselves. French efforts were to prove less 
5'. G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed. 16 March 1681. 
54 
. H. Zins, England and the Baltic in the Elizabethan Era, H. C. Stevens, trans. 
(Manchester, 1972), p. 167, Table 7.2; De Vries, First Modern Economy, p. 415. 
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successful despite the establishment in 1669 of Colbert's Compagnie du Nord, 
partly because during the war in particular the Dutch were unable to carry French 
salt to the Baltic and French captains had no compunction in getting their cargoes 
made up in Amsterdam. The French threat too was however very real after 1679, 
and improvements were made to Dunkerque harbour to facilitate French Baltic 
trade. " 
Continual efforts were made to maintain the Baltic trade and these were seen as 
particularly crucial in 1675, when the Swedish alliance with France threatened to 
halt it. In April of that year the Amsterdammers had increased difficulties with the 
Danes over the Sound tolls, exacerbated by what they saw as the non-cooperation 
of the States of Holland generally, who were more prepared to abandon trading 
privileges to assist the war effort. Roger Meredith in a letter dated 2 April 1675 
wrote 
"... We heare of 4 shipps of Amsterdam going to Sweden laden with 
salt were stopp'd at Copenhagen by the Resident of this state there, 
which something choques the towne of Amsterdam that claims a 
custom in the case, but is well approved of by the States... The 
States of Holland having agreed upon the state of warre are chiefly 
busied at present about letting the imposts... "" 
Taken together with the ever present threat from enemy shipping, the vroedschap 
had to take a strong line and resolved to maintain a strong convoy system. 57 And 
two months later they took a firm stand against declaring war with Sweden without 
first establishing the exclusion of trade from all hostilities. " In effect they 
". Van Dillen, Handboek, p. 334. 
56 P. R. O. SP/84 197, f. 199. 
G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 26 April 1675. 
53. G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 31 July 1675; The English translation of the final 
paragraph of the declaration of war on 15 June 1675 reads, "... we strictly prohibit 
alle persons whatsoever to molest hinder or disturbe the traficking marchants, 
subjects and inhabitants of the King of Sweden, their ships, goods or merchandise 
by water or by land, so long as the said king doth grant the same liberty to the 
Marchants and inhabitants of this State... ", P. R. O., SP84, f. 47. 
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legislated for what had been done clandestinely with the Spanish during the Revolt. 
These efforts by the Amsterdammers during the war paid dividends with imports 
from the Baltic, which dropped from 62,000 lasts in 1670 to 14,000 in 1672, rising 
once more to 60,000 in 1679.59 And further efforts, often fairly fraught, in the 
years 1680-81, to establish good trading relations with the Swedes and Danes 
safeguarded the Baltic trade for another quarter of a century. 
To all intents and purposes the situation in the Baltic was therefore relatively 
stable, after its established fashion, but the political intervention of the French and 
the crises of the 1670s, had made the Amsterdammers more aware of the frailty of 
even the "moederhandel". As we have already seen, it was the French, with their 
alliance with Sweden and Colbert's Conipagnie A Nord, who introduced a new 
element to an old story, and created a renewed determination in the 
Amsterdammers to strengthen the framework of their commercial structure. One 
result of this was that until 1686 convoy and licence charges increased as a 
percentage of costs from 3.98 per cent in 1675 to 9.49 per cent in 1680. ' 
In two areas, the fisheries and the Muscovy trade, the Dutch position was not under 
serious threat. In fact, in the latter, the situation had never been more secure. " 
The only real competition had once again been the English in the mid-century, but 
in 1649 the English were expelled from Moscow and by the 1670s the Russian 
trade was dominated by the Dutch, and in particular the Amsterdam firm of de 
Volgelaer, owned by Coenraad van Klenck's father, and also Sautijn's firm. The 
van Klenk family had established themselves so securely into the confidence of the 
59 
. Van Dillen, Handboek, p. 333. 
60.1 A. Faber, "Graanhandel, Graanprijsen en Tarievenpolitieke in Nederland 
gedurende de tweede helft der zeventiende eeuw", Tijdschrift, LXXIV (1961), pp. 
533-9; De Vries, First Modern Economy, p. 415. 
In 1667 new trade regulations were introduced which gave the Dutch greater freedom in the Russian trades, permission being granted by the Tsar until 1755, 
Driessen, Russen en Nederlanders, p. 57. 
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Muscovites that van Klenk senior was given the rank of "Goost", which in Britain 
today would entitle him to use the royal coat of arms and "by appointment to the 
crown" on his merchandise, and in 1675 Coenraad was sent as the States 
ambassador to MOSCOW. 62 From time to time there was a decline in the trade, but 
the prospects of the westernisation of Russia were already being laid and the 
Amsterdammers were not slow to take advantage. Nicolaes Witsen had already 
established contacts that he was to use to advantage during the ascendancy of Peter 
the Great. 
The limitations of climate and terrain meant that the Russian trade had to be 
carried on according to a strict timetable, which could be worked to advantage. In 
contrast, the nature of the fisheries (despite the inherent seasonal nature of the 
trade) exposed them to competition and danger. However Dutch superiority in the 
Greenland Fisheries was secure. Its importance for Amsterdam was, as with most 
commodities, in the re-export market, but there were prominent shipowners in the 
whale fisheries, and in April 1677 agreement was reached for freedom of trade in 
the fisheries between France and the Republic, thus once again pre-empting the 
peace. "' Protection was also afforded the fisheries by continual resistance to the 
imposition of damaging taxes on salt, an essential prerequisite for the fishing trade, 
even as early as 1673, when other taxes were generally accepted as part of the war 
64 effort. In August 1682 there were differences With Gelderland over fisheries 
through the Zuyder Zee which echoed the disputes of the inland carrying trade. 65 
Nevertheless this trade was dependent on the security of the fishing fleets. 
Amsterdam was therefore always willing to acquiesce in the annual contributions 
"'. B. Raptschinsky, "Uit de Geschiedenis van den Amsterdamschen Handel op 
Rusland in de XVIle eeuw, Georg Everhard Klenck", Amstelodamum, xxxiv 
(1937), pp. 57-83. 
G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 21 April 1677. 
Ibid., 21 November 1673. 
63. - Ibid.. 12 August 1683, for disputes over inland trade see for example, GA 
Amsterdam, Missieven en Requesten van Particulieren (Binnenland), 15 March 
1673 Letter to Cornelis Hop as pensionary of Amsterdam from Roshuysen about 
the cost of goods which were not "haVzo veel uit Groningen en Friesland. " 
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made to the fisheries, and apart from the three years from 1672 to 1674, when a 
ban was imposed on the Greenland Fishery, the fleet remained stable throughout 
the 1670s - 155 ships in 1671,148 in 1675, but rising steadily in the early 1680s 
to reach 242 by 1683.66 
We now come to the most complex part of the story, that nearest home, and more 
concerned with overland trade. Of course overland trade was still mainly water- 
borne in the seventeenth century, and for the transport of hinterland goods to and 
from Germany and beyond, the Rhine, Maas, Wesel complex to Rotterdam was the 
major arterial route. " Rotterdam, by the late seventeenth century, was one of the 
foremost economic towns in Holland, but its different approach to foreign trade 
mentioned earlier and its excellent port facilities which were of use to all of 
Holland meant that Amsterdam did not on the whole come into conflict with 
Rotterdam as they did with the Zeeland towns. There were however minor 
conflicts between Amsterdam and Rotterdam in the Mediterranean after 1674, when 
Rotterdam had been granted a Director of the Levant trading company. " The 
Holland towns in fact joined in imposing local excises on internal trade between 
Friesland and Zeeland, and this minor economic warfare persisted throughout the 
period. " But Amsterdam's loyalty to other towns did not go beyond her own 
interests and in 1682 no sympathy was given to Haarlem's complaint that Friesland 
manufactures were being sold through Amsterdam at the expense of native Holland 
". C. G. Zordragen, Bloeijende Opkomst Der Aloude en Hedendaagsche 
Groenlandsche Visschery (Den Haag, 1727), p. 302, Holland List. See also 
Barbour, English and Dutch Shipping, p. 267, Note 1. 
67 For the importance and complexity of the internal Dutch trade in the seventeenth 
century, see de Vries, The First Modern Economy, p. 179ff, Maps 5.1 and 5.2 
showing the beurtveer services network. 
'. R. A., The Hague, Levantshandel papers 1.03.01, f. 18. 
69. For examples G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., for turf, 2 September 1681, and wijn, 
9 November 1682. Amsterdam had imposed restrictions on Zeeland trade in 1671 
and the regulations worked effectively until 1680 when "de strijd opnieuw 
ontbrandeff Faber, "Graanhandel, Graanprijzen en Tarieven politiek", p. 536-6. 
Under the 
; 
erms of the Union of Utrecht it was in theory forbidden to introduce 
internal taxes, but this was one of the many clauses which had never been 
implemented, de Vries, The FirstModern Economy, p. 96. 
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goods. 
The hinterland trade was the one to benefit most from the improvements to the 
waterways particularly the major improvements to the Lower Pthine and Maas in 
1682.7' 
On the whole, therefore, the Fisheries, the hinterland trade and the Russian trade 
remained stable and secure parts of Amsterdam's economic base in this period. 
There were minor difficulties from time to time, but these required standard 
measures and no serious rethinking of policy. But in the scale of things they were 
not the highest of priorities. 
By contrast the other overland trade - that through the Southern Netherlands (or of 
course around the coast) from France - provided the Amsterdammers with their 
biggest headache throughout the 1670s and 1680s, and the greatest need for 
readjustment. At the end of the Republican period, Jacques Accaria de Serionne 
saw the beginning of the problems for the economy in the last part of the 
seventeenth century, and the vulnerability of trade with France, Spain and 
Portugual and their Mediterranean islands as critical. " It was mainly in relation to 
the French trade that the Amsterdammers were constantly harking back to the past. 
To them the Golden Age of French/Dutch trading relations was embodied in the 
Treaty of 1662, whatever disadvantages that had been thought to contain at the 
time. It was in relation to the French trade that the so-called Peace Party of the 
mid 1670s pressed for easing of restrictions on trade and it was with regard to the 
bans on French trade that in the late 1670s and early 1680s much rhetoric was 
brought forth in support of the tenets of Pieter de la Court's Het Interest van 
Holland. For example, on 19 July 1678, the vroedschap declared, 
'o. G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 20 July 1682. 
71. Ibid., 23 March 1682. 
72 
. Jacques Accarieas de Serionne, La Richesse de la Hollande, (1778), p. 52; he believed that the strengths of the Dutch trade were in the East Indies, America, the 
Levant and the Rhine and Meuse overland trade. 
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"Que la prohibition du commerce do France sera fait ici aussi hien 
qu'en Angleterre, cela parissant absoluement necessaire au succes 
de la Guerre, et le Commerce de cet Etat ne se peuvant mesmejaire 
qu'and lAngleterre sera en guerre pas qu'ilfaudra n6cessairement 
cinpescher le commerce de France comme le seul moyen de 
I'affbiblier. 03 
However, economic relations with France were never to be the same again. The 
advent of Colbert's ambitious plans and the attempts to bring France on to an equal 
competitive footing with England and the Dutch Republic introduced a new era. 
So while the Amsterdammers saw the difficulties of trade in the 1670s primarily as 
a result of the war and the restrictive French taxes of 1667, and therefore reversible 
if peace and a satisfactory commercial treaty could be achieved on the basis of the 
pre-Colbertian measures, they were in fact prosecuting an abortive policy in the 
long run. Therefore, although the terms of the Treaty of Nijmegen did restore 
1664 tariffs on Dutch goods in France, and help in the economic recovery of the 
early 1680s, this was only a temporary reprieve and could in no way negate the 
progress the French had already made. The only Amsterdammer who had a real 
grasp of the new French threat was van Beuningen, who had had first hand 
experience of Louis XIV's France. The general reluctance of the majority of 
Amsterdammers to become involved in any major way in issues outside the 
immediate interests of the city may have restricted their understanding of the wider 
questions, and this will be discussed further. 
By showing such a willingness to accommodate the French trade in order to bring 
as much as possible through Amsterdam, the city to some extent weakened itself 
Politically there was a strong, barely concealed, interchange between the French 
Ambassadors and Amsterdam, which ensured that the French were able to count on 
the city and, while not undervaluing the power of Amsterdam, the French were 
able to exploit its obsessive mercantile interest. 
Of course at the beginning of the war in 1672, when the military threat was very 
73 
. G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 19 July 1678. 
108 
real, the Amsterdammers had been as willing as others to impose a complete ban 
on French trade and to a certain extent some lasting advantages were drawn 
therefrom. The ban on French wine and brandy led to an expansion in home 
production which there was a reluctance to relinquish later on. In 1674 Amsterdam 
had agreed to an increase in brandy excise duty, so long as it was imposed 
throughout all the provinces; 74 in 1677 they consented to a proposal that local 
brandy should be excluded from local taxes; in 1678 they agreed to a request from 
local wine merchants that Spanish and Rhine wines should also be taxed; and in 
1680 the vroedschap was quite happy to acquiesce in imposing a minimum price 
on French wine. " In the long run it was once again the Zeeland towns, 
particularly Middleburg, which suffered most with the loss of the French wine 
trade. In other manufactures as well, cessation of trade with France gave the 
impetus to home manufacturers, most notably the paper and cloth trades, and the 
resulting competition in the 1680s with the latter brought Amsterdam and Leiden 
closer together, as we have seen. 
However, during the war the French also undermined the advantages the Dutch had 
achieved over the Spanish during the last thirty years. At the same time as 
capturing the bullion market and capitalising on the Spanish economic decline, the 
Dutch had also succeeded in working with the Spaniards and much trade went 
through Seville and Cadiz. The Dutch fine cloth trade was still dependent on 
Spanish wool and trade became very vulnerable during periods of French 
aggression as it was a simple matter for Dutch ships to be blockaded in Spanish 
harbours. In these circumstances retaliation was ineffective, and the only ways 
seen by Amsterdam as safeguarding trade through, and with, Spain was by peace 
with France, or by pursuing the policy mentioned earlier with regard to the 
Fisheries, of concluding trading treaties separate from hostilities. This was done in 
". Set at fl. 16 per vat, Ibid., 6 December 1674. 
75 
. G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 21 July 1680; the price was set at not less than "6 
stuyvers de pint". Brandy and Wijn were kept separate for taxation purposes. 
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1675 with the trade from Spain through Bayonne, which continued unhindered. 76 
We therefore have a rather contradictory picture of Amsterdam's economic situation 
in the 1670s and early 1680s. Their predominance among the other towns of 
Holland and particularly their gains at the expense of Zeeland, the wealth of capital 
and entrepreneurial manpower and their development of markets, continued to grow 
despite the pressures of war. We have seen that the financial institutions and the 
major trading companies had not only withstood the drain on resources, but had 
also consolidated their strength in Amsterdam. But nevertheless, there was 
throughout the period an undercurrent of insecurity, reflected in underlying trends, 
which prevented a positive approach to further economic possibilities. Amsterdam 
was no longer making major investment in the Zaandam shipbuilding industry, 
which was losing its technical dominance in world shipping. It was perhaps this 
single fact of failure to look globally to the future, exemplified by the attitude 
towards shipbuilding, which is most noticeable at this time. The local measures 
sustained the position of Amsterdam itself within the Republic, but on the whole 
the attitude was one dominated by a policy of reestablishment rather than progress, 
in a period when conditions required positive rather than negative readjustment. 
There was no lack of awareness of the problems, real and potential, but there was a 
misunderstanding of the underlying causes. 
The relatively successful outcomes of the wars with England had strengthened the 
belief that there was an achievable economic balance with England, that could be 
struck by negotiation and continual watchfulness at sea. But this failed to take 
account of the greater resources and independence of the English economy, which 
put it on a par with the Dutch while still in relatively early stages of growth. And 
this was even less well understood with regard to the French. The punitive 
measures taken in 1667 by Colbert, together with the military aggression in 1672, 
failed to undermine Amsterdam's belief in its dependence on France for upholding 
its economic base. On this understanding, throughout the whole period the 
16 
. G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 19 December 1675, 
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measures that were taken were only retaliatory in the short term, and on the whole 
were aimed at restoring the status quo ante. Therefore, in the important period 
from 1678 to 1681, while there was much detailed negotiation over individual 
clauses in commercial treaties, the Dutch argued in all cases for Ve reciproque 
liberteit ende viljheid van de conitnercie", with agreements being based on earlier 
treaties. 77 But even in the face of such agreements, they were already pursuing a 
more closed and defensive policy in their overseas trade as a natural reaction to 
situation as they saw it, which in the long run did not stand up against the more 
positive policies of their competitors. 
Where Amsterdam did exploit its own resources, that is in relation to the North 
Holland and Zeeland towns, it was in fact undermining the strength of the Dutch 
economy generally in the interests of safeguarding its own. 
The 1670s and 1680s were a period of economic readjustment in Amsterdam, 
because there was an awareness that things were changing and needed to be faced, 
although the interpretation of change was that its causes were temporary and 
possibly reversible. In the 1670s this was dealt with in an ad hoc manner as the 
vicissitudes of the war demanded. But after 1678, and most particularly in 1680- 
81, a definite policy can be seen emerging. There is evidence of considered 
statements of commercial priorities and of a structured approach to agreements with 
competitors, with some acknowledgement of the worth of shared markets. 
The basic precept that the security of the state rested on superiority in trade and 
commerce, and that this in turn demanded peace, was no more than a foundation 
on which to build a more complex approach to foreign policy. The seventeenth 
century saw a shift in international conflicts from the dynastic, territorial struggles 
of the fifteenth and sixteenth century to a greater emphasis on the consequent and 
complementary economic issues. The potential for armed conflict at sea, whether 
declared or waged through quasi-legal piracy, which had escalated with the 
The French of course on those pertaining in the early 1660s and the Swedish on 
those of 1668. 
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discovery of the Americas and the dramatic increase in wealth and trade, blurred 
the distinction between merchantmen and warships. With the Navigation Acts the 
English government had stated clearly that primacy on the seas was an issue which 
was always likely to lead to international struggles. Control of the seas and trade 
routes was essential to maintain the growing economies of western Europe in the 
seventeenth century. France understood that all the strengths of a pompous, 
autocratic monarchy were vulnerable if they could not be sustained by a vibrant 
economy and this meant competing with the leading international traders in their 
own field. We have seen in chapter I how this theory of "interest of state" had 
been articulated by several Dutch commentators and this was not lost on Colbert 
and those implementing his policies. 
These challenges to the Dutch maritime supremacy were not always perceived as 
clearly as they might have been. Efforts continued to be made to reach 
compromise agreements through economic and marine treaties, such as the 
longwinded negotiations following the Peace of Westminster in 1674. There was 
still largely a reactive rather than proactive approach to economic policy. 
Amsterdam's reaction to the French invasion of 1672 was to raise tariffs on some 
goods and ban trade in the higher-profile ones. When this did not have any 
perceptible effect on the progress of war or peace, but did have a damaging effect 
on their own income, they immediately pressed for a reduction of tariffs and a 
lifting of bans. 
In the West Indies the war was fought out entirely on the basis of supremacy 
within the region, having little to do with the threat to the very existence of the 
state from the French invasion. Similarly the Fisheries struggled to maintain their 
centuries-old hold on the northern waters, fully participating in the distribution of 
war funding. 
The political and strategic importance of the Spanish Netherlands was in the end 
subjugated to the greater need for economic welfare. Trade with France was not 
dependent on peace in these states; political security might be, but had proved 
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more resilient and was to do so for another hundred years and with a different 
scenario. It was far more important to keep the ships coming into and out of 
Amsterdam than to keep long, slow land routes open. Nowhere was the shift of 
the balance from the dynastic to the economic Within warfare more clearly 
demonstrated than in the ease with which the States of Holland, critically 
represented by Amsterdam and Rotterdam at Nijmegen, abandoned the question of 
the Spanish Netherlands and one of the Prince's major strategies. The religious and 
dynastic policies of Charles V and Phillip II, which had given birth to the Dutch 
Republic, reached their nadir at Nijmegen, although their echo was to be listened to 
more strongly in 1702. 
However, even though the States may have been reacting to events rather than 
anticipating the future, and appeared to be harking back to an idealised world of 
the 1650s and 1660s, where peace and economic supremacy proved the theory that 
they were indivisible, there was some acknowledgement that they were reacting to 
a different set of circumstances. The Dutch Republic had been the pioneers in 
moving the world of international trade on from the mercantile dominance of the 
Italian city states to one of chartered companies supported by a firm banking and 
insurance infrastructure. The rigour with which the new West Indische Compagnie 
was granted its charter in 1674 took account not only of the demands in the 
Caribbean, but also of the importance of a strong and committed organisation at 
home. 
It has already been indicated earlier in this chapter that the majority of the regents 
of Amsterdam who were largely responsible for the decisions taken by the city on 
matters of policy during war and peace relating to the economy of the States, and 
particularly of the province of Holland, had their roots firmly in the mercantile 
establishment of the city. The following two chapters will analyse further the role 
of these regents, their backgrounds, personal and factional interests, and their role 
during and after the ivetsverzelling in Amsterdam. 
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Chapter 6 
The Structure of the Amsterdam Vroedschap after the 
Wetsverzetting 
An analysis of the changes within the Amsterdam vroedschap needs to be put 
within a clear chronological framework for the period in question, 1672-1684. For 
Amsterdam there were always two chronologies: two lines following generally 
parallel courses which converged from time to time. One line followed the 
development and internal history of the city as a international entrep6t, the other its 
role as a major influence in the determination of the Republic's foreign policy. 
Many of those most influential in the first sphere held key roles in the other. These 
were members of the merchant families who had evolved into what is commonly 
called the ruling merchant elite. Membership of the burgertneesterschap, the 
vroedschap and schepenen identified the most prominent among them. ' 
Although the year 1672 was a year of change in the Dutch Republic and its 
constituent towns and provinces, all the changes took place within the established 
structure. The restoration of the stadholder in the unoccupied provinces was to an 
office which had remained vacant, but had not been disestablished. And of course 
the stadholdership of Friesland and Groningen had remained with the Orange- 
Nassau family throughout the previous twenty-two years. Purging the 
vroedschappen was a method of political surgery which had been used in the past 
and, even where it was most incisive, did not interfere with the basic system or 
bring in members dedicated to a radical new form or government; rather it was 
likely to introduce those who would uphold the more conservative traditions of the 
stadholderate. And finally, the occupation of parts of the Republic by the French 
For the careers of members of the vroedschap between 1672 and 1684, see 
Appendix 1. Members are listed in aphabetical order. Most of the details have 
been extracted from the comprehensive entries in Elias, Vroedschap, and the first 
reference to each member, during the discussion on the politics within Amsterdam, 
is therefore followed by the number of the Elias entry. Appendix V list members 
elected as schepenen from 1672 to 1678, together with pensionarissen and 
secretarissen, from 1666 to 1684. 
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was in some ways a repetition of the threat of subordination to a greater power of 
which the Dutch had had ample experience of from the Spanish. What had 
changed was not therefore the internal structure of administration in the States, but 
the external influences and the potential relationship between the new stadholder 
and the States of Holland and the City of Amsterdam. ' 
With this in mind, it is necessary to understand that the changes which 1672 
brought about in the government of Amsterdam were not likely to make great 
alteration to what was after all a very successful organisation with its own internal 
dynamism. For the purposes of this analysis we will start with a survey of the 
regent class after 1650 and the close relationship between De Witt and Amsterdam 
through his connections with the Bickers and the De Graeffs. ' Then, following the 
death of Cornelis de Graeff and the weakening of the raadl)ensionaris's influence 
in Amsterdam, we will consider the role of the new members of the 1660s, 
particularly Valckenier (Elias 166) and Hooft (Elias 177). 
The importance of the Amsterdammers in drawing up the Perpetual Edict, and the 
interpretations of Valckenier's role in this, will lead on to the apparent changes in 
support among some of the rising regents during the last few years before 1672. 
We will then move on to a more detailed exposition of the structure of the 
vroedschap and the wetsverzelling in Amsterdam For this I will draw widely on 
Bontemantel, who laid the foundations for the later more structured works by 
Wagenaar and Elias, but the whole of this chapter will be in the nature of survey 4ý 
history with individual analysis used only where particular incidents require it. The 
basic structure of the chronological framework will start with the welsverzelting 
leading to the development of a strong peace party by 1675, consolidated in the 
2 Like William III after him, De Witt fully appreciated the importance of 
Amsterdam's co-operation and support and the risks involved in losing it: 
Boogman "The Raison dDat Politician Johan De Witt", p. 61 
3 The Bickers and De Graeffs were the leading Amsterdam families in the middle of 
the seventeenth century. The Bickers were removed from office in 1650, the De Graeffs in 1672. 
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Conccpf tot E-cniglicit in 1676, and the drift towards a more oligarchic government 
after 1679 and particularly after the death of Valckenier in 1680. Finally we will 
look at the tensions of the period 1682-84 from the vie%%point of both chronologies. 
Further to the discussion on the nature of oligarchies in Chapter 3 (pp. 53-55) in 
Amsterdam, as in other towns, intermarriage was frequent and extensive family 
networks developed. However, with its much larger population and proportionately 
larger concentration of merchant elite (local, immigrant and foreign), " these 
networks became so widespread that in effect some relationships were nominal 
only. The convenience of marriages made for common interest in the 1650s and 
1660s may have ceased to be relevant in the 1670s when the political situation 
drew together erstwhile opponents or separated those who previously had common 
interests. The continual small addition of new blood, attracted by the potential of 
Amsterdam's commercial growth, brought not only new money, but also a Wlider 
range of possible alliances between families. ' 
The elite of the ruling classes were the members of the vroedschal) and the 
schcI)cncn. Membership of the former did not preclude membership of the latter, 
and the control of the administration by a select, although quite large, number of 
representative families can be seen clearly through a study of the membership of 
both bodies. The schel)cnen included both older experienced regents and younger, 
ambitious men (see Appendix V). The vrocdschap was the major representative 
body from which the burgomasters were elected, nominees for States office were 
drawn, and definitive town policy was drawn. Many of the influential members of 
the vroctischal) in 1672 were already quite active in the 1660s, providing the core 
of an experienced membership ready to take over in the 1670s. Appointment for 
life meant not only a continuation of the same methods and some policies, which 
gave the vroedschal) a resilience %vhich could withstand the loss of so many 
influential members in September 1672, but also a continuation of some personal 
4 Leti. Tealro Relgico, p. 333. 
S. For example, Everard Scott, elected to the vroedschap in 1674. see Appendix 1. 
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and factional disputes. During the first stadholderless period the towns had 
exercised their privileges to the full and the senior Amsterdam regents had been in 
the fortunate position of having close relations and influence with the 
raadpcnsionafis, De Witt. When Fagel was made raadpensionaris of Holland on 
20 August 1672, the new administration took the opportunity of the local revolts 
and the ivelst-circifingen to wrest back some of that power. 
In Amsterdam the purge took place on 10 September 1672, with new members 
being appointed to office on 15 September. Ten members of the vroedschap and 
five schepcncn were replaced. Of the thirty-six [thirty-seven]" members of the 
vrocdschap in 1672, seventeen had been members since before the death of 
Cornelis de Graeff in 1665, nine had been elected between 1666 and 1672 and ten 
replaced those who were removed in 1672. ' 
The ruling burgornasters before the ivelsivrzelling were van der Poll, Reynst, 
Oudtshoorn (Elias 152,157 and 181) and Hooft; after 15 September Hooft and 
Oudtshoorn remained in office and Hudde (Elias 197) was elected burgomaster 
together with van Beuningen (Elias 189). However, this was only a short-term 
Munter is not mentioned in Elias. As he continued in office and was elected 
burgomaster on several occasions it is difficult to account for the omission, or to 
account for the numerical discrepancy this causes, unless he was one of the few 
burgomasters, like Cornelis Bicker before 1650, who exceptionally never became 
part of the vrtwdschap. and Andries De Graeff who was burgomaster before his 
election to the vroedschap on the death of his brother in 1665, Burke, Venice and 
Amsterdam, p. 21-22. However, these two examples arc of cases where brothers 
were both serving in the administration and the rules of election to the vroedschap 
did not allow such close family relations to become members concurrently. There 
was no such issue in the case of Munter, who also served for many years as 
Thesauris, an office normally held by a fully elected member. 
7 The weisverzetting in Amsterdam, September 1672: 
1'roedichap members removed: Jan van de Poll (ruling burgomaster); Lambert Reynst 
(ruling burgomaster); Joan Blacu; Ilans Bontemantel; Dr Roetcrt Ernst-, Nicolaes Rochusz 
van Capclle.; Andrics De Graeff; Pieter Schaep; Johan Ifulft; Dr Willem Backer (Elias, 
1'roedschap). 
Replaced by; Louis Trip-, Jean Appelman. Michiel Tiellcns; Hendrick Becker; Coenract van Klenck. Gerard Bors. Joan Commelin; Nicolaes Opmeer; Dirck Blom-, Gillis Sautijn (Elias, 
1'roedschap). 
Schepenen removed: Pieter de Gracff. Dirck Spiegel; Nicolas van Wavercn; Arnoout llooft. Gerard Bors (Brugmans. Geschiedenis van Amsterdam, 111. p. 180). 
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burgomastership and the new influences within the vroedschal) were more clearly 
reflected in the elections at the beginning of 1673. Hudde remained (as oud 
burgcnnccstcr) and Valckenier, Geelvinck (Elias 167) and Huydecooper (Elias 
191) were elected. Of the four, only Valckenier had served as burgomaster before 
the u, cIs%-cr. -ctthkq (his first term had been in 1666); on the whole the 
btsrgcnnccstcrschaj) of the 1670s was dominated by long-serving members of the 
vroedschal), but whose experience of office was varied. Munter and Pancras (Elias 
161) had both been burgomastcrs before 1672. * Oudtshoorn and van Vlooswijk 
(Elias 16S) were the most experienced burgomasters before 1672, but there is 
evidence that their influence was limited to a greater or lesser extent after the 
Irctst, cmelling. 9 
It will be seen that in many ways the changes effected in 1672 were little more 
than an extension of what had been happening within Amsterdam since the death 
of Cornelis de Graeff in 1665. Those removed from office were republicans who 
had made clear their opposition to the reinstatement of the House of Orange, but 
those that replaced them were not conspicuous Orangists, but rather men who were 
prepared to support the Prince during the crisis of 1672. And many of those who 
remained were still known to be republican in outlook, particularly Hooft and van 
Vlooswijk. The completion of the removal of the De Graeff family by the purge of 
the younger generation on the schepcnen can be seen as an attempt to complete the 
severance of links with the De Witt administration, but the De Graeffs soon began 
to benefit from patronage in a small way again as the zeal of the purges weakened 
after 1675.10 
Throughout the 1650s De Witt derived much of his support from the Amsterdam 
I 
. hfunter in 1670 and Pancras in 1667,1669 and 1670. 
Oudtshoorn was burgomaster in 1656,1660,1662,1663, and 1668 and van 
Vlooswijk in 1656,1657,1660.1661,1666,1668,1669,1671, but although the 
former was to hold office again after die Concept lot Eenýgheit in 1676, the latter 
remained out of office until his death in 1687. 
'0. See below P. 152. 
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regents. The conflict with William 11 was still ftesh in their memories, the interests 
of the city were served by the policies of De Witt and the close relationship 
between the raadj)cnsionafis and the De Graeffs who dominated the vroedschap 
ensured this support. Nevertheless mutual co-operation was not unequivocal and in 
1661 De Graeff had shown disquiet over De Witt's policy. " Gradually, during the 
1660s more tensions began to appear between the raadpensionafis and Amsterdam, 
as tile influence of Valckenier in particular began to shift the balances within the 
vrocdschal). 
Family groupings had survived the forced removal of Bicker from the vrocdschap 
in 1650 as the closeness of the connections between the major families remained. 
But their permanent removal from positions of authority within the Amsterdam 
regency did not seriously affect the balance within the vrocdschal), while the De 
Graeff family retained influence. And the vibrancy of the Amsterdam economy 
and the continuing growth of wealth gave increasing power to a wider range of 
those already building merchant empires and republican status. Second and third 
generation representatives like Huydecooper were able to participate more fully in 
the internal politics of the city, confident that their business and patronage 
networks would continue to provide their security. The purchase of inland estates 
and the display of increasing wealth has given rise to the argument for the growth 
of a rentier class removed from real participation in business. Gary Schwartz has 
shown how Joan Huydecooper's patronage of the arts had long lasting effects and 
such a study is of great value to the art historian. " However for the student of the 
place of Dutch history in the development of Modem Europe, Huydecooper pales 
into insignificance beside his more dominant colleagues on the vrocdschal) and, 
according to Burke, he was "not typical of the majority of [his] colleagues in 
Rowcn, De 11711, p. 541. De Witt was chagrined by Dc Gracffs understanding 
that it would be impossible to prevent William III from one day returning to 
office. no matter what might be determined by the States. See also Valckcnier's 
interpretation of the Perpetual Edict, below pp. 162-163. 
0. Schwartz. "Jan van der I leyden and the I luydecoopers of h1aarsevem", J. Paul 
Getty Museum Journal (1983), p. 204, note 13; and Rembrandt. his life. his 
fiimiýy. his paintirkps (London, 1985). p. 283. 
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office" in his patronage of the arts. " (11alf a generation earlier Jan Six the elder in 
the 1650s and 1660s had likewise been a patron of Rembrandt, but again, although 
Six was an active member of the regency, he was not a leading political figure)" 
Schwartz has shown how Huydecooper -%vith Valckenier, Scott and van Vlooswijk, 
as landowners of Maarseveen, "came to form a redoubtable enclave of Amsterdam 
regents in the territory of the Utrecht politicians". " 
However, in the 1660s and 1670s the transition was not complete and many of 
those participating in the city government still had first-hand experience of their 
businesses. In this way, rather than arguing for a decline in the quality of members 
of the ruling class, this would prove a strengthening of their experience, drawing 
both on the confidence of status, tempered by the reality of the basis of that status. 
Elias argued that the mid-1660s in Amsterdam saw a shift from a religious division 
between Remonstrants and Contra-Remonstrants (Coccejans and Voetians) to a 
secular division between Republicans and Orangists; this is echoed by Roorda in 
his study of the Utrecht Government Regulations of 1675. "' The secularisation of 
divisions may indeed have occurred, but it did not lead to a straight division into 
two parties and it would be misleading to imply that political alignments were at 
any time strictly on religious or ideological political lines. While generalisation 
can be made it must always be understood that the nuances of support for any 
particular issue are probably far more complex than Elias' theory suggests. The 
Revolt of the Netherlands against Spanish rule had become subsumed into a fight 
for religious freedom and Amsterdam had in time adjusted its religious politics to 
Burke. Venice and Amsterdam, p. 9. 
Schwartz, Rembrandt, pp. 174 and 283. 
0. Schwarz, Jan van der Ileyden. loc. cit. lluydecooper was in this instance again 
not comparable with his contemporaries as his family had established themselves 
as landowners during the previous generation, while those like Valckenier and 
Scott were the first of their families to buy country estates. 
Elias, 1roedschap. p. CXI. Roorda, *Williarn III and the Utrecht Go% -ernment 
Regulations". pp. 95-96, dates the shift from "Voctians v. Cocccjans" to "Statists 
v. Orangists" to the crisis of 1672. 
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the prevailing trend. There were always those who supported the more overt 
Calvinism of the contra-remonstrant movement and those who remained truer to the 
ideals of arminianism, but during the first stadholderless period the importance of 
these professed allegiances became less critical as prosperity grew. International 
conflicts developed for political, territorial and economic causes and not for 
religious freedom, although this might be cited as a complementary ideological 
reason. Treaties with the United Provinces invariably had a core of clauses 
protecting trade, and William III's "crusade" against Louis XIV was never a single 
issue conflict between Protestantism and Catholicism. 
Within the changing structure of the vroedschal), a new set of rules began to apply 
to political choices. The orthodox interpretation of this new framework is that a 
middle party developed. Historians have tended to put anyone into this "middle 
party" who did not fit in with traditional roles of republican or Orangist. " This is 
misleading. Not only is the concept of "parties" within the Amsterdam ruling class 
fallible, but it is an over-simplification to ascribe unity to any group of politicians 
who come together either during crises or for particular constitutional aims. 
"Middle parties" are commonly made up of those with one common interest, but 
with a much wider variety of individual interests. The struggle of the individual 
within the overall factional structure" in fact can be seen as the dominant theme of 
Amsterdam politics through the later 1660s and the 1670s, after the Peace of 
Westminster in February 1674.9 
The epitome of the individual using the potential of factional politics for his own 
Kurtz. Willem III en Amsterdam, p. 214, identifies the beginnings of three political 
groups in 1665 among the regents: Valckcnicr and the Orangists; Wittians, and 
llooft and middle party. 
18. Roorda, Partij en Facite, identified the importance of faction as wcll as party in 
the politics surrounding the events of 1672, but his definition of a faction, p. 190, 
implies a greater permanence of "bonding' between its members than that used in 
this study. see also. Grever, 'Structure of Decision Making% p. 152, explanatory 
note. 
". A full discussion of the divisions within Amsterdam is given in chapter 7 below. 
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ends was Gillis Valckenier: 
"0 staetzucht cijcnbaei 
i-en, locktc i? jonstcrdieit 
Hoc sirch, hoc alijt ghij tiýit 
Itz 'thart vatz Valckenier. "'-' 
Valckenier quickly filled the power vacuum within Amsterdam on the death of De 
Graeff, replaced by his brother Andries but not to the same effect, and the 
consequent reduction in De Witt's influence. Ile was elected burgomaster for the 
first time in 1665 and, on 15 April 1666 became a member of the commission 
responsible for the education of the Prince of Orange, alongside De Witt and three 
other representatives of the States of Holland. He therefore had vital experience of, 
and influence over, both internal Amsterdam politics and the future government of 
the States. Another politician of great influence in the 1670s, van Beuningen, was 
also establishing a highly individual role for himself in the 1660s and cannot be 
placed within any hypothetical party grouping. 
Van Beuningen, who had already established a reputation as an ambassador with 
the interests of Holland and particularly Amsterdam ever his first priority, began to 
find De Witt's intransigent pro-French attitude a cause for concern and bad 
gradually distanced himself from the raadpcnsionarls by 1670 . 
2' And Rowen notes 
the close friendship between Joan Munter and De Witt came under threat in 1670.22 
But alliances between members merely because they were disaffected with De Witt 
did not establish long-term parties which could overcome the factional differences 
which were always close to the surface. " 
". Caption under portrait of Gillis Valckcnicr. Amsterdam Ilistorisch Museum. 
21. De Witt had great respect for van Beuningen's political methods because he *meer 
oog hail voor het akqemen belang van de Republiek dan de particularistisch 
Amsterdamse faktieman die Valckenier was". Franken, Coenraml van Beuningens 
polifiek en diplontatieke aktiviteiten in de jaren 1667-84, p. 77. 
22. Rowcn, De 1171t. p. 783. 
23. Common interest may have brought members like Munter and Valckenier together 
briefly in 1672. but it will be seen (pp. 151-152) that thcse were very temporary 
alliances. 
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Between 1670 and 1672 the struggle for power within Amsterdam appeared to have 
little to do with external affairs, although the loss of De Witt's credibility and 
influence may well have highlighted the opportunities for Amsterdam to take an 
active role in foreign policy. At this stage Valckenier's influence in Amsterdam 
was in the face of his own unpopularity. D'Ailly quotes adverse descriptions by 
some of his contemporaries: 
flooft: "schchn, schagniijti" 
Hop: "zoo grol ititgcinakt datc dczc onislag vrocg 
Tulp(zoon): "onAvccIcndc phiijin sttijcke? ' 
Van de Poll: "claphouttoopu" 
Van Vloos%vijk: "sijn nrcc gcckc sooncn Ic ziillcn ntiticcrcn" 
De Graeff- "quacde hcjcnlligC"24 
In 1671 he was balked of the burgomastership by a return of support for the De 
Graeff faction and for the only time in his career he accepted the role of 
representative at the States of Holland in The Hague. He also failed to get his 
son's father-in-law, Trip, elected as schcpcn. It was not until July 1672 that 
Valckenier finally committed himself to the group within Amsterdam which was 
working for the restoration of the House of Orange. ' By force of personality and 
established superiority he took over the leadership of this group and, by biding his 
time until the February 1673 elections, was able to ensure that he held the 
burgomastership for the two crucial years following the ivasverzating. After 1672 
two of those critics cited above (Van de Poll and De Graeff) had been removed 
from office; Hooft and van Vlooswijk remained in opposition. Hooft continued as 
a fully participating member of the vrocdschap although he refused office as 
burgomaster again until 1677. Van Vlooswijk was sidelined by a strategic 
appointment to the Amsterdam Admiralty for seven years. A fuller analysis of the 
power struggles within Amsterdam between 1672 and 1684 is given in the next 
chapter, but I will establish here the framework within which the analysis will be 
made. 
2'. A. E. D'Ailly, Zeven E-euwen Amsterdam. 11, p. 196. 
21. liontcmantc], Regeeritkize. 11,17-18. 
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The irctsi-cm-aling of 10 September 1672 has been interpreted widely as an 
Orangist purge of republicans, but we have already seen that not all those opposed 
to the group supporting the Orangist restoration were removed from the 
vrocdschap. D'Ailly suggests that the list submitted to the Prince for approval was 
drawn up by Valckenier. 2" I have found no further evidence of this list, which 
appears to have been apocryphal, and we will see in the next chapter that only one 
of the new members (Trip) can be described as an uncritical supporter of 
Valckenier. "" 
However, the irctsicizzetting temporarily imposed a unity on the Vroedschap which 
was closely associated with the need for preserving the security of the city against 
the possibility of further French incursions into Dutch territory. The practical 
considerations of such security ensured that the efforts of members were focused 
on water defences both within the city and in the crucial hinterland. " The Prince 
of Orange had raised the issue because of the need to use water as a defence, but 
the general opinion of the vroedschap was that, even at this stage of the war, 
Amsterdam would only take a decision which was the least disruptive to the daily 
life of the city. The management of the waterways was always of course of prime 
importance and the work of Geelvinck and Hudde, in particular, in the 
modernisation and improvement of the sluices in 1672 was crucial not only to the 
security of the city but also to its present and future economy. '9 The main points 
'. D'Ailly, loc. cir. 
27 
. 
Franken, Coenraad van Beunirkizens politiek en diplonsalieke aktivilei en in de 
jaren 1667-84, pp. I 10- 11, accepts the view that the new members were 
Valckenier's men-, his error in saying that Witsen, not Iludde was made 
burgomaster in 1672. may have been based on the assumption of the controlling 
influence Valckenier is alleged to have had over Witsen, see Appendix I for 
Witsen's career. 
Some of the practical defences are illustrated in Marc Hamelecrs cn Erik Schmitz. 
'Zeven Kaarten van Corriclis Koel van Militairc Versterkingcn buiten Amsterdam 
(1674)', Amsteloclamunt. lxxxvi (1994), pp. 91-106. 
G. A. Amsterdam. Res. Vrocd, 21 October 1672. By quoting the ancient privileges 
accorded Amsterdam. Ilaarlern and Leiden by Charles V. acknowledgement is 
made to the fact that action regarding the waterways had an effect beyond the city 
limits. 
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in the discussion were firstly that enough water was provided in summer to allow 
trading ships through and secondly that flooding in winter had to be avoided to 
prevent damage to the city. " Flooding the land was used as a weapon of war to 
prevent further French advance, but such flooding was used as a preventive barrier 
securing the city well outside its limits. 
The security of Amsterdam was therefore set firmly within the context of its 
economic life. In contrast to the desire for security for the city was the reluctance 
to increase military expenditure unnecessarily. This was the issue over which 
conflict had developed with the Prince's father in 1650 and was to precipitate the 
crisis of 1684. In 1673, however, Amsterdam fully supported the military 
resistance to the French, and merely exercised restraint on its cost. In May of that 
year, Waldeck wrote to pensionary Hop urging Amsterdam's support for 
fortifications at Weesp, but followed it up with a direct letter to Valckenier, no 
doubt in an attempt to ensure an influential response to his request. A few days 
later, on 25 May, Waldeck wrote to the burgomastcrs as a group requesting billets 
for five companies for between one and nine days, offering payment of 100 ducats 
in advance. " Once agreement was reached, Waldeck was in negotiation with Blom 
(who had some responsibility for troop movements and supply, working to 
Geelvinck) over palisades and water control. But the experience of billeting these 
five companies of Waldeck's men in the spring of 1673, when promises of payment 
in advance for food and supplies were not kept, " gave rise to resistance to further 
billeting and a downfight refusal to take Witgensteyn's cavalry regiment. " 
" Ibid. 
31. O. A. Amsterdam, Missieven Requcsten van Particulieren (Binnenland), Waldeck to 
llop and Waldeck to Valckcnier. May 1673. 
32. G. A. Amsterdam, ibid., Waldeck to the Amsterdam burgomasters, 30 May 1673. 
The soldiers had received no pay for six weeks. 
33. O. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 2 October 1673: *... te versocken, dat de admissie 
de voorsz. gemelle Regimenten, soolarul niet met special paten van Sijn Iloog. 
selfis ... sullen gelieven te declineren. " 
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Throughout the entire period of the war until 1678, the prevailing interest in 
Amsterdam was to preserve as normal an economic life as possible. This purpose 
was not deflected by the interests of security in the early years, although the 
methods for pursuing it varied. As the immediate threat of French advance into 
Holland receded, the balance tipped once more in favour of legislation that would 
most benefit trade rather than the prosecution of the war. This coincided with the 
Peace of Westminster in February 1674 which took England out of the military 
war and reestablished her as a trading rival. The Dutch were thereafter more 
anxious than ever to secure favourable trading rights and excise duties. 
Peace with England followed close on the Slaal ran Oorlogh" for 1674, which was 
associated in that year with the appointment of the Prince of Orange to the offices 
of Captain- and Admiral-General in perpetuity. Amsterdam's accord in the latter 
was tempered by an enquiry about the status of the Prince when Utrecht was 
readmitted to the Union. " At this stage, lip service was still being paid to the 
myth that Amsterdam and the Prince were working together without divisions, but 
in reality it was little more than lip service. Once Amsterdam had shown its 
gratitude to the Prince for his military successes by exempting him from repayment 
of thefl. 2m debt in March 1674,36 their policies no longer reflected the intentions 
of the irctsi-cizaling, but were made solely on the grounds of parochial and 
provincial interest. The vrocdschaj) pointed out that peace with England in 1674 
meant that the city would be in credit over contributions for military expenditure 
and they should thus be excused further contributions under the 100 and 200 
pcinfingh. " The city was anxious that the Peace of Westminster should not be 
made purely on diplomatic procedures; terms had to be favourable to both the 
States of Holland and in particular Amsterdam. Van Beuningen as one of the chief 
The annual agreement for funding military expenditure approved every December 
by the States of Holland. 
G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed.. 30 January 1674. 
Baxtcr. P. 110; Res. I loll. 24 March 1674. 
O. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vrocd., 26 February 1674; Muninicrit Register, fol. 137. 
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negotiators of the peace treaty was deputed by Amsterdam to put their interests 
first in the negotiation of the terms of the Marine Treaty which was largely 
concerned with the relative status and interests of the Dutch and English East India 
Companies. Van Beuningen was present, as one of the accredited ambassadors, but 
the deputation to London to negotiate Marine Treaty, had two additional 
38 
representatives from Amsterdam, Corver (Elias 194) and Sautijn (Elias 215). 
The degeneration of relations with France had begun with Colbert's decision to 
impose swingeing tariffs on Dutch goods in 1667; during the early part of the 1672 
war the Dutch had retaliated with high import duties on French goods, particularly 
on the salt crucial to the herring industry, and a total ban on the import of French 
wine and brandy. By the end of 1673 Amsterdam had begun to query these 
restrictions, " and resistance to excessive military expenditure quickly became 
inextricably linked to the complexities of the taxation system. By the end of 1674 
the Amsterdam vrocdschap found it impossible to agree to the proposed level of 
taxation. "' 
However, in 1674 there was not yet a group which could be called a "peace party"; 
policy was directed to life as near as normal while ensuring the French retreat of 
1673 was pursued and maintained by judicious military expenditure and 
generalship. Van Beuningen, who was allowed to act as spokesman for the city, 
remained confident of his overriding concerns for the interest of Amsterdam. The 
diplomatic relations between Valckcnier, Van Beuningen and Fagel ensured that the 
Prince could still count on the support of Amsterdam for the war effort, even if that 
support was no longer so wholehearted. Eventually, however, van Beuningen's 
protection of the interests of the city were to work to the detriment of his relations 
G. A. Amsterdam. Register op het Reccuil van Tractatcn van Cornelis Hop, 
pensionaries van Amsterdam, 166-1680, nr. 65. This was hard work lasting at least 
from September until December 1674. 
)9. G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 4 December 1673. 
See chapter 9 below for a full discussion on the issues surrounding military 
expenditure and tax levels. 
127 
with the Prince and Fagel, and Valckenier was to enlist others to act as go-between 
as his own "Orangist" sympathies waned. 41 
It was the events of 1675 which began to speed up the change in Amsterdam's 
policies. The re-entry of Gelderland and Overijssel to the Union (Utrecht had been 
readmitted in 1674) was accompanied by the offer of the Dukedom of Gelderland 
to the Prince of Orange in April 1675. This proposal misjudged the sentiments of 
a large proportion of the Dutch who still looked on the House of Orange as their 
saviours, but as one of themselves. Sovereignty was the prerogative of the States. 
The Dutch Republic may not have had democratic tendencieS, 4' but neither was it 
at all inclined towards the quasi -monarchism to which William 11 had aspired. In 
each of the provinces there were strongholds of Orangist sympathies, notably parts 
of Zeeland and the three provinces which had been released by the Prince from 
French occupation, but in Holland there were only pockets like Haarlem, Leiden 
and one or two of the smaller towns. The Amsterdam vroedschap did not take the 
issue too seriously, but did take the trouble exceptionally to minute the members 
present and voting (only 20 out of a potential 36) . 
4' However, the vote in the 
States of Holland was on the whole favourable to the Prince with those supporting 
his elevation (the fidderschap, Dordrecht, Gouda, Rotterdam, Gorinchem, 
Schiedam, Schoonhoven, den Briel, Hoorn, Edam and Medemblick), outnumbering 
those in opposition (Haarlem, Delft, Leiden, Amsterdam, Enkhuisen and 
Monnickendam) with Alkmaar and Purmerend abstaining. 44 The opposition of 
purportedly Orange towns like Haarlem and Leiden demonstrates the depth of 
41 See also chapter 9 below. 
P. Geyl, "Willem III, de Stadhouder-Koning", p. 148. 
Those present and voting were: Pancras, Hudde, Valckenier, Hooft, Backer, 
Bronckhorst, Grootenhuys, Boreel, Roch, Tiellens, Becken, Klenck, Bors, 
Commelin, Opmeer, Blom, R. Hudde, Cloeck, de Vicq and Scott. The absentees, 
including leading members, were: Van Loon, Oudtshoorn, Trip, Appelman, 
Geelvinck, Vlooswijk, Hinlopen, Van Beuningen, Huydecooper, Van Neck, 
Corver, Graafland, Witsen and Munter. G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 9 February 
1675. 
44 
. Secret Res. Holl., 9 February 1675. 
If 
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understanding that there were political implications which should have serious 
consequences for the Union if the Prince's status was changed. In the end it was 
the advice from Zeeland, " where the strength of the support for the Prince was 
greater, that made the major contribution to his decision to reject the offer, but by 
then much damage had been done to his reputation. Personal ambition had moved 
on to the agenda alongside the political and economic security of the Republic and 
the defeat of Louis XIV. 
The change of mood which was taking place in Amsterdam was most tellingly 
illustrated by the appointment of Hooft's nominee, van den Bosch, in 1675 as 
pensionary. " His opponent was Heemskerck, the nominee of Valckenier, but the 
success of van den Bosch not only implied a majority of support for the policies of 
Hooft over those of Valckenier. Bontemantel is quite clear in his assertion that van 
den Bosch was schooled by De Witt; he had also worked with Fagel -a point 
overlooked by Baxter who sees his appointment as a straight return to Wittianism 
in Amsterdam. " But as we have already seen, Fagel had himself learnt much of 
his craft under De Witt. Van den Bosch became the correspondent of the French 
Ambassador, d'Estrades, a crucial role as the "peace party" led by Hooft began to 
gain ascendancy in Amsterdam. The appointment of van den Bosch which an 
historian of the House of Orange like Baxter can ascribe to party politics can in 
fact be the starting-point for an argument that politics in Amsterdam were more 
complex than straight divisions between "parties". By 1675 the few real Orangist 
regents were eclipsed by the patronage struggles of the more powerful, whose 
interests tended far more to the personal. Personal interest led directly to the 
creation of factions. Those colluding in th ese factions were completely aware of 
their temporary nature and that they were usually alliances of convenience. That 
45 
. Hollandse Hercurius in March 1675 published a letter from the Prince to the 
States of Zeeland dated 18 February 1675, explaining his intentions towards the 
Republic and his response to the offer of the dukedom of Gelderland. 
46 
. G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 5 April 1675; Bontemantel, Regeeringe, II, p. 241, 
5 April 1675, Van den Bosch replaced Hop as pensionaris, "Den gesyden van de 
Bos is geweest van de Raetpensionares de Wit en Fagel". 
47 
. Baxter, William III, p. 124. 
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Hooft was able to secure the appointment of his own nominee against that of 
Valckenier does not imply a Wittian/Orangist split, but a personal struggle between 
two very different regents with the power of patronage. The failure of Cornelis 
Backer to secure election as burgomaster in 1675 despite all the force of the 
Prince's patronage exercised by his Master of Requests illustrates the independence 
of Amsterdam in its own internal appointments system. Determination of 
Amsterdam's foreign policy therefore had to be made separate from, but within the 
constraints of, these underlying political struggles. 
The "peace party" was hampered by the entry of Sweden into the war alongside the 
French. This final denial of the Triple Alliance of 1668 had major implications for 
Dutch trade. The Baltic trade was always dominated by the power of those 
controlling the Sound and collecting tolls. We have seen how this had given the 
Danish an undue influence in the area and subjected other trading nations to the 
vagaries of the ever-changing tensions between the Swedes and the Danes. 
Amsterdam had been very anxious early in 1675 to maintain good relations with 
Denmark in order to ensure the security of ships going to Norway and in April 
they reintroduced convoys for ships going through the Sound. " The insecurity of 
the Baltic trade, the escalating competition from England and the anxiety to restore 
trade with France dominated the policy decisions within the vroedschap when 
agreement was sought to the declaration of war on Sweden. Amsterdam insisted 
that the Swedish trade should continue unimpeded despite the hostilities, a 
requirement which they carried. " 
By 1676, therefore, Amsterdam was largely treating the war as an irrelevancy to 
her main interests, but one which was an increasingly irritating burden. Fagel 
received short shrift in May 1676 when he tried to persuade Amsterdam that 
prompt payment of quotas was needed for military provisions. Amsterdam retorted 
G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed, 26 April 1675. The security of the Sound was seen 
as essential for trade not only with Sweden and Denmark, but also Norway, 
Danzig and Brandenburg. 
". Ibid., 31 July 1675. 
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that this should have been anticipated and that the money (fl. 50,000) should be 
taken from funds already raised by the Raad van Slaw. " They reiterated this 
policy in July when they only agreed tofl. 120,000 of thefl. 300,000 requested for 
the seige of Maastricht, insisting that the balance should be met from quotas on the 
200 penningh already paid. " Fagel was beginning to discover that negotiating with 
Valckenier could no longer ensure the support of Amsterdam at the same time as 
the Prince was reducing his reliance on van Beuningen as Ambassador to England 
and sending his own representatives on a parallel embassy. 
All of the leading Amsterdam regents were aware by 1676 that the only policy for 
the city to adopt was one of peace, but their internal divisions had created such a 
fragmented series of factional and individual disputes highlighted by the patronage 
struggles of 1675 and 1676, that unity of purpose seemed impossible. The 
culmination of these divisions was a concerted effort to restore unanimity for the 
purposes of peace and this was achieved through the Concept tot Eenigheit 
(Appendix IV) in 1676, the final terms of which were drawn up by Hooft and van 
Vlooswijk, and Hooft was subsequently elected burgomaster in 1677. From then 
on Amsterdam openly pursued its peace policy and the final negotiations at 
Nijmegen in 1678 were influenced by Hooft's presence there. Opposition to 
taxation for military expenditure was no longer couched in terms of bad planning 
or unnecessarily high costs but in the arguments for the advantages of peace and 
the economic ruin which would result from continued warfare. 52 
Plans were made for a return to peace in which Ve commercie en navigatie deser 
landen synde de eenigsten syl en subsistence van de Staet... "" This is of course 
the view of the Dutch merchant elite with which we have already been familiarised 
50 
. Ibid., 23 May 1676. 
5'. Ibid., 25 July 1676. 
52. Ibid., 19 July 1677. 
5'. Ibid., 25 April 1678. 
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by authors from De la Court to Kossmann and beyond. " The mood had swung so 
completely that opposition to the Prince and any further military expenditure was 
total; the personal ambition of the Prince, of which suspicion had been roused 
during the Gelderland sovereignty issue of 1675, was now exposed by Amsterdam 
as "selfs gloire". 55 It was relatively simple to put the Prince's anxiety to protect the 
Spanish Netherlands down to his military ambitions and therefore deny its 
relevance to the interests of the Dutch Republic. By July 1678 Amsterdam could 
see that it was going to gain its point and that peace would be made with France 
and Sweden without the full consent of all the allies. Few queries were raised on 
the negotiation of the treaties beyond matters of form on the navigation and 
commerce clauses and they even agreed to approve provisional military expenditure 
on a month to month basiS. 16 Peace was made on 14 August 1678 without the 
direct acquiescence of the Prince but, having achieved her aims, Amsterdam now 
had to manage her peace. 
The peace necessarily made certain changes inevitable; others such as the deaths of 
Hooft and Pancras were coincidental, but nonetheless important. The British 
Ambassador to The Hague, Sir William Temple, was replaced by Sir Henry Sidney 
and the Comte DAvaux took over as French Ambassador. Van Beuningen and 
Boreel returned from ambassadorial duties; the latter took up a new appointment as 
ambassador to France almost immediately, " but van Beuningen began to take an 
active part in the city's government for the first sustained length of time in his 
career. 
The vroedschap's immediate policy was to direct funds towards the fabric of the 
De la Court, Het Interest van Holland; Kossmann, CM. H., p. 280. 
G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed, 23 May 1678. 
16 Ibid., 2 and 26 July 1678. 
Boreel joined Odijk and Dijkveld, two of the Prince's closest personal advisers on 
the embassy to France to attempt to restore "der oude vriendschap met deeze 
k-roon", Wagenaar, Vaderlandsche Historie, Part XV, p. 3. 
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city itself and a fairly large scale repair of old, and the building of new, bridges 
was put in hand. " Funds were given to securing the city's immediate defences at 
the Haarlemmer and Leidsepoorten. " However, the tensions which had arisen 
between the city and the Prince in the last few months before the conclusion of the 
peace were strained further during the immediate post-war period over the general 
defence of the Republic. Amsterdam resorted to the terms of the Union of Utrecht 
to support her arguments for restricting the level of military expenditure and the 
sovereignty of the states. 60 
Throughout 1679 and 1680 it was unclear what policy would be adopted towards 
possible alliances between the Dutch, English and French. The difficulties this 
61 
posed the Dutch were acutely observed by D'Avaux, who after 1680 had close 
links with the Amsterdam ruling group through the new pensionary Jakob Hop. ` 
The gulf now appearing between the Prince and Amsterdam about further military 
expenditure came to a head in the spring of 1679 over the size of contributions 
required for the building of the fortifications at Naarden. Amsterdam's arguments 
against this expenditure were put into the context of the possibility of their being 
used as a base from which the Prince could repeat the actions of his father in 
threatening an attack on the city if they countered his wishes too far . 
6' Their 
resolution to oppose the expenditure stated: 
1. that it would be wiser to reduce the fortifications so that they 
would be less beneficial to an enemy should they be taken. 
2. that commerce not fortifications were the basis of the city's 
58. G. A. Amsterdam, 14 July 1679. New bridges were identified as being needed as 
follows: on the Leidsegracht (1), Angeliersgracht (1), Bloemgracht (1), 
Lauriergracht (2) and Elandsgracht (2). 
Ibid., 15 October 1678. 
Ibid., 20 November 1678. 
D'Avaux, Nigociations, pp. 10-11. 
62 Son of Cornelis Hop, pensionary of Amsterdam 1666-68, see below p. 191-192. 
". Coenraad van Beuningens politiek on diplomatieke aktiviteiten in do jaren 1667- 
84, p. 168. 
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security. 
3. that they saw only the hand of the Prince of Orange in all 
this. " 
Nicolas Witsen was deputed to negotiate with Fagel and the Prince, a role which 
he assumed with consummate ease and was to maintain during the next few years. 
This was however a battle which Amsterdam lost and the fortifications, still 
untouched by enemy bombardment today, remain a monument to William's defence 
strategy. The Prince's only retribution visited on Amsterdam was to send 
Heemskerck, who had put his own, outspoken, interpretatation of Amsterdam's 
views to the States of Holland, on the Spanish embassy. " 
From 1680-82 the Republic was able to operate on a fairly peaceful footing, and 
Amsterdam took the advantage in both hands. They began to re-establish good 
relations with France in order to put their trade back on to the most profitable 
footing, through continuing to press for a French alliance. This was in the face of 
strong opposition from van Beuningen, who persisted throughout the entire period 
in his distrust of any potential alliance with the French. The continued respect paid 
to van Beuningen by his fellow regents, despite their differences over very essential 
policy issues, is complete evidence of the calibre of his political reputation by the 
1680s. Domestic matters dominated the business of the regents as they dealt with 
a new wave of immigrants from France, and of German and Portuguese Jews. 
Regulation of the Dutch church and toleration to immigrant communities coincided 
with the English Exclusion Crisis which encouraged the Prince of Orange to 
include the religious freedom of protestant peoples within his foreign policy. 
The negotiations over the potential treaties between either France and England were 
mild affairs beside the crises of 1683 and 1684, when the threat of France at the 
seige of Luxemburg raised the spectre of Orangist militarism again in the eyes of 
G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed. 27 February 1679: the request for the fortifications 
wasfl. 300,000, but Amsterdam claimed that the time would come when they 
would have paidfl. 1m. towards the expenditure. 
". Baxter, William III, pp. 179-80. 
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the Amsterdammers, and the threat of active defiance from the major city in the 
eyes of the Prince. On the face of it, William's request for 8,000 men in 1683 does 
not seem excessive, and Amsterdam's opposition was seen as open defiance of the 
Prince rather than purely a matter of policy. 
Throughout the entire period, the business as usual policy continued alongside the 
issues which were forced on the city by external affairs: control of immigrants; 
maintenance of the fabric of the city; management of almshouses; management of 
the churches; and taxation ordinary and extraordinary. In many ways it was the 
importance of these internal matters for the Amsterdam regency which informed 
their antagonism towards a possible return to the conflicts of the 1670s. War and 
the necessary imposition of taxes, and implicit threat to secure trading routes, 
would infringe the freedom of the city to prosecute its own interests and the 
interests of the States. The regents, who in 1672 had understood the necessity of 
supporting the Prince's endeavours against the French, now felt that the economic 
threat was greater than any possible military aggression in the Spanish Netherlands. 
For the third time in a period of twelve years '66 
in 1683-84 these regents showed a 
unity which was not reflected in their everyday affairs. The following chapter will 
look at how these occasional periods of unity emerged from a strong factional 
system when external pressures put the interests of the whole city in jeopardy. 
1672 during the rampjaar, 1676-78 during the push for peace and the Luxemburg 
crisis of 1683-84. 
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Chapter 7 
Party, Faction and the Individual in Amsterdam Politics in the 
1670s and 1680s 
From the point of view of the Prince of Orange and the United Provinces of the 
Dutch Republic in the 1670s and 1680s, Amsterdam was of greatest importance as 
a political unit, based as it was on economic superiority. But Amsterdam was, as 
all political units, made up of a diversity of individuals and factions, whose 
primary interests were likely to be motivated by many other factors besides the 
politics of city and state. 
The structure of the regency in Amsterdam can be misleading. There were thirty- 
six members of the vroedschap, co-opted for life (the only ways out other than 
death were through bankruptcy or a deliberate career move away from the city). ' 
However of the thirty-six members many were virtually ineffectual; several 
members of the schepenen had far more influence, particularly those who were also 
members of the vroedschap. The vroedschap was not dependent on the approval 
of the stadholder for its membership, although annual nominations for the 
schepenen were forwarded for his notice as a courtesy. Did the real power lie with 
the four burgomasters? Burgomasters served for one year and then usually for a 
second as Oud Burgemeester and then were not re-elected for at least a year. 
Elections to the burgemeesterschap were usually made from a small group, but 
these were not necessarily allies at any one time, and they were dependent on not 
only support from others but also the success of their patronage networks. 2 The 
vroedschap had an efficient process of working, meeting regularly throughout the 
I For a discussion on the rules of entry to the vroedschap, see Burke, Venice and 
Amsterdam, p. 21. 
2 See the Text of the Concept tot Eenigheit 1676 (Appendix IV) for the regulation 
of elections to the burgemeesterschap and representation at Raad van Staat, 
Gecommitteerde Road, and the Amsterdam Admiralty. Burgomasters had to be 
over 40 before election, Burke, Venice and Amsterdam, p. 2 1; this would account 
for the failure of Witsen, who was bom in 1641, to be elected burgomaster until 
the 1680s. 
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week and delegating much of the detailed work relating to complex issues to small 
committees comprising a selected number of members. The make-up and 
effectiveness of these committees reflects the relative importance of particular 
members and provides evidence of a loose career structure among the more 
seriously involved members (see Appendix VI). This consultative process could 
also be dispensed with during periods of crisis when decisions had to be reached 
quickly, and in this way the committees reflect rather more the "normal" peace- 
time workings of the vroedschap. 
Throughout the 1670s and early 1680s only about half of the members of the 
vroedschap were able to command events through their influence and patronage 
networks and even these were dominated by the smaller core of members who 
were within the group eligible for election to the hurgemeesterschap? Principal 
among this latter small group were Hooft, Valckenier, Van Beuningen and 
Geelvinck in the 1670s and, after the deaths of the first two in 1678 and 1680, 
Hudde and Witsen. Members were not closely united by any clear, long-term, 
interest and it was therefore important for each of them to establish a network of 
support from among those aspiring to the same kind of influence. The resultant 
shifting alliances and jealousies between these various groupings were crucial to 
the line taken by the vroedschap in its intervention in States decisions. An analysis 
of the background, careers and interests of these leading burgomasters in the 
context of their activities during the 1670s and 1680s will show how the ebbs and 
flows of interest and conflict interacted with the external policies of the States of 
Holland and States General. 
Hendrik Hooft had been a member of the vroedschap since 1655 and was the son 
of the poet politician, P. C. Hooft. He had been burgomaster in 1662 and 1664, but 
was not elected again until 1672. Together with van Oudtshoorn he is the only 
member whom Elias judged it necessary to call "remonstrant". ' In Elias' discussion 
3 See Concept tot Eenigheit, clauses 3 and 4, Appendix IV, 
4 
. Elias, Vroedschap, 1, p. CXXVI. 
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this has implications of liberal, republican, anti-Orangism. As we have seen, the 
direct correlation of strict Calvinism with Orangism is not really applicable at 
regent level, but has been conveniently extended from the mass popular support for 
the House of Orange inspired within congregations by Orangist Calvinist 
predikants. This theme was picked up strongly during the historical revisionism of 
the nineteenth century and the controversies over Fruin's work which received so 
much critical debate in the earlier part of the twentieth century. 
The difficulties of identifying the most appropriate description of individual regents 
and their political, religious and ideologic interests have already been discussed. 
As much of the present chapter is concerned with analysing these interests, the 
following usage will be employed, except where direct evidence is drawn from 
contemporary commentators and later historians, when their usage will be quoted. 
The terms "Orangist" and "strict Calvinist" will be used where there is no doubt of 
such interests. However, as such simple categorisation is rare in the vroedschap 
during this period, these terms will need further qualification. It is important to 
note that these terms are not synonymous. Similarly those with strong republican 
tendencies will be referred to as "liberlijn", but again there will be need for 
qualification and variation. Although there is an implication of a relaxed approach 
to religion within the term, again it should not in every case be assumed to be 
synonymous with Coccejan or "remonstrant" tendencies. 
Hooft's opposition to Valckenier is dated to the death of De Graeff in 1665. Hooft 
was appointed to the Amsterdam Admiralty from 1666-68 and to the 
Geconunitteerde Raad from 1669-71. The former may have been an attempt to 
remove Hooft from active influence within the vroedschap but representation at the 
Gecommitteerde Raad was an important role for a member of the regency, 
particularly during critical periods of foreign policy such as the late 1660s. ' 
5 Grever, "The Structure of Decision-Making", p. 13 1; see also Clause 5 of the 
Concept tot Eenigheit, Appendix VI. 
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Valckenier secured the post for himself in 1672 as replacement for Hooft in order 
to influence events as much as possible, after failing to secure election as 
burgomaster. It has already been noted that this was the only time Valckenier took 
office outside Amsterdam, preferring to exert his influence within the City's own 
organisationS. 6 
Hooft has a largely untarnished reputation for honesty and freedom from 
corruption. Sir William Temple's description written to contrast Hooft with 
Valckenier in 1678, exemplifies the contemporary impressions of his character: 
He was "a serious, honest man, of great patrimonial riches, learning, 
with humour, without ambition, having always refused all 
employments the state had offered him, and serving only in that of 
burgomaster in his own town in his turn, and as little busy in it as 
he could ... 
He had all the credit that could be in his town, without 
seeking, or minding, or using it ...... 
However, as we have seen, Hooft did serve the States in 1666-71 and although he 
is said to have declared that he would not take office in Amsterdam after 1672' he 
did continue to serve on committees, undertaking other municipal duties and 
negotiation on sensitive defence issues with Haarlem. 9 He even succeeded in 
securing the post of pensionary for his son in 1672 and secretary in 1673 for a 
6. Grever, op. cit., p. 25-6: "For the proud regents of Amsterdam, it was more 
prestigious to stay at home, and form part of the inner circle of faction leaders 
who dominated the city, and from there tried to rule the whole republic. " 
7 Temple, Works, 11, p. 439. 
J. F. L. de Balbian Vesters, Burgemeesters van Amsterdam in de 17e ende 18e 
eewuen (Zutphen, 1932), drew on Bontemantel to conclude that Hooft refused to 
take office again until 1677 because "oprecht en rondborstig als hij was, 
verklaarde hij uit vordent zich in 1673 niet meer beschiktbaer testellen, omdat hij 
den "schelm" en den Nschagwijn" FaIckenier als burgenieesternaastzich zou 
krijgen. " 
G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 28 November 1672 and 7 March 1673. Appendix 
VI lists the membership of working committees 1672-1684; for Hooft's activities 
see also, particularly G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed, the issue over the granting of 
offices in perpetuity for the Princes of Orange, 28 January 1674, the Gelderland 
sovereignty issue, 5 February 1675; and the protection of the Baltic trades, 2 
December 1675 and II February 1676. 
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short while, until Valckenier's nominee Heemskerck was appointed. " And, of 
course, in 1675 Hooft successfully nominated van den Bosch to the post of 
pensionary. 
The major question over Hooft is why he was not included in the purge of 10 
September 1672. Bontemantel, together with Six (Elias 223) was urging a 
reconciliation between De Graeff and Valckenier as late as 26 August, and De 
Graeff subsequently sought Hooft's advice. De Graeff and Valckenier had had a 
fragile alliance since the former's election in 1665 on the death of his brother until 
1669, but a temporary revival of De Witt's influence and popularity brought this to 
an end. Hooft could not see his way to encourage De Graeff to agree with their 
proposition; De Graeff himself found Valckenier's attempts to dominate others, 
particularly van Vlooswijk, unacceptable and the reconciliation was never 
effected. " Hooft remained loyal to the line taken by Reynst who was removed 
from office, and he continued outspoken in his fears of Orangist monarchical 
tendencies. " 
Hooft's and Reynst's former ally, Nicolas Opmeer (Elias 213) was one of the new 
members of 15 September 1672 following the purge. " Opmeer had already been a 
schepen since 1659, had served at the Admiralty of the Noord Kvvartier since 1666 
and was reappointed after a year from 1673-80. He was replaced for 1673 on the 
Admiralty of the Noord Kvvartier by Spiegel, " a schepen with a republican 
reputation. The election and subsequent official appointment of Opmeer is strong 
10. Bontemantel, Regeeringe, R, pp. 64-5. 
Ibid., p. 189. 
Ibid., p. 188. 
Elias, Vroedschap, I, p. CXIX 
14 Eldest son of Hendrik Spiegel (Elias 130) who before his death in 1667 had been 
one of the leaders of the opposition to Valckenier. Dirck Spiegel had been a 
schepen since 1660 and was removed in September 1672. His removal from 
formal office-holding within the city did not therefore affect his eligibility for 
representing Amsterdam on States bodies. 
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evidence that there were ambitious men who were prepared to support the cause of 
change in 1672, without essentially changing their allegiances. Opmeer was 
considered by Bontemantel to have moved to Valckenier's side while "doch Spiegel 
hleef constant aen de sijde van Reynst en Hooft". " Bontemantel in fact assumed 
that Opmeer only began to support Valckenier's lead after his election and that his 
reappointment to the Admiralty of the Noord Kwarlier was on Valckenier's 
recommendation. 16 
After the death of Valckenier in 1680 Nicolas Witsen saw Opmeer as an ally of 
Geelvinck with whom Valckenier had come into conflict in 1676. That men such 
as Opmeer, who quickly realigned themselves with their former allies, were on the 
list of replacements in 1672 points to a certain cynicism in the support for the 
restoration of the Prince. 
Among those already on the vroedschap who also appeared to change their 
allegiances to suit the occasion in 1672, one of the most difficult to understand 
fully is Cornelis de Vlaming van Oudtshoorn (Elias 181). Oudtshoorn was closely 
related to Hooft and also first cousin to Geelvinck, but Bontemantel assures us he 
could be securely thought of as Valckenier's man. " This is one of the clearest 
cases of evidence against too much reliance being put on the family/faction 
argument. As one of the four ruling burgomasters with Hooft, Reynst and van de 
Poll (who was absent at the time), Oudtshoorn was jointly responsible for 
Amsterdam's acquiescence in the repeal of the Perpetual Edict which was "op 
verzoek van de Heeren Geelvinck en Valckenier, gehaelt en gelesen". " However, 
in 1676 his furtherance of the family interests of the De Graeffs in the service of 
the Prince were seen as a deliberate affront to Valckenier, whom the De Graeffs 
had only the previous year held responsible for the high level of taxation imposed 
'5. Bontemantel, Regeeringe, II, p. 179. 
16 
. 
Elias, Vroedschap, 1, p. CXIX. 
". Bontemantel, Regeeringe, II, pp. 1-6; Elias, Vroedschap, 1, p. CXXVI. 
". Bontemantel, loc. cit., p. 16-17. 
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on them while Valckenier's own family had escaped relatively lightly. 9 Like 
Hooft, Oudtshoorn remained as burgomaster until February 1673, when he was 
deputed as Amsterdam's representative at the Raad van Staat until 1675.20 This 
may indicate the level at which Valckenier valued his support. We can only 
assume that Oudtshoorn's support of the Organist restoration made him follow 
Valckenier's lead in 1672, which would have been in complete contradiction to 
Bontemantel's own stance and hence accounted for the latter's assumptions. 
Hooft's only close ally on the vroedschap who did not make compromises over his 
views was Cornelis van Vlooswijk, who was quite clearly removed from the centre 
by his appointment to the Amsterdam Admiralty for seven years. This was van 
Vlooswijk's second stint of duty at the Amsterdam Admiralty; he previously served 
from 1663-5. However these two remained with influence among other members 
of the vroedschap throughout the early 1670s and were jointly responsible for 
drafting the final version of the Concept tot Eenigheit (Appendix IV). The 
Concept was signed by van Vlooswijk and Hooft on 29 June 1676 and then passed 
to Oudtshoorn, Valckenier, Munter, Huydecooper, Pancras, Hudde and Trip. " 
The reconciliation effected by the Concept allowed Hooft to take office as 
burgomaster again in 1677 and to make a positive contribution to the negotiations 
of peace at Nijmegen largely on Amsterdam's terms but, by the end of 1678, he 
19 J. F. L. de Balbian Verster, Burgermeesters van Amsterdam, see entries for Andries 
de Graeff and Gillis Valckenier. In 1675 De Graeff's bill was forfl. 700,000 for 
200p compared to Wouter Trip's fl. 75,000 and Valckenier's son's fl. 10,000. Tax 
assessments had been made in 1674 just over 40 years after the previous 
assessments, when the De Graeffs were rising in importance in the regency and 
the Valckeniers were insignificant; these assessments were not to be revisited for 
another sixty years, Burke, Venice and Amsterdam, p. 17. Burke, p. 63 also 
describes De Graeff's vain attempt to escape the 1674 assessment by moving to 
Utrecht. For the tax assessments for those members of the vroedschap liable in 
1674, see Appendix I. The 1674 tax assessment, during a period of frequent 
imposition of wealth taxes, was an important feature in the maintenance of 
military expenditure. 
20. Bontemantel, Regeeringe, II, pp. 265-7. 
Aid., pp. 246-63. 
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was dead. 
Gillis Valckenier had been elected to the vroedschap in 1652, during the same 
period as Hooft, Oudtshoorn and van Vlooswijk, while De Witt was in the 
ascendant. He had many family relationships and connections within the ruling 
class, and these even extended to Hooft himself For example, in 1674 Nanning 
Cloeck (Elias 217), who was a relative of both Hooft and Hulft (Elias 199, 
removed in 1672), replaced Valckenier's father-in-law Ranst (Elias 202). Cloeck's 
alliegances are not clear, but his family is well represented in the official offices of 
Amsterdam (see Appendix V), and was a well-established regent family. Thus, 
although family patronage could strengthen the representation of families within the 
regency, family cannot be cited as the dominant pre-condition for faction. That 
there are enough historical examples of the failures of dynasticism (whether royal 
or burgelijk) to contribute to the argument against its exceptional success in 
seventeenth century Amsterdam has already been discussed. " 
That historians have ascribed total domination of the Amsterdam vroedschap to 
Valckenier from 1672 until his death in 1680 is not surprising. Most histories of 
Amsterdam between Bontemantel and Franken have either dealt with periods 
outside the 1670s or have included the 1670s within a much longer time span. 
They have therefore necessarily summarised the events and circumstances of the 
1670s by drawing on the most accessible and obvious evidence. Consequently 
even Bontemantel himself is only quoted where he gives generalised descriptions 
rather than the more detailed accounts of incidents. 
H. Brugmans, Opkonist en Bloej, for example, contends that from 1672-80 
Valckenier was supreme, basing his assertion on the opinion of Sir Henry Sidney, 
the new English Ambassador to the Dutch Republic who was appointed on 8 June 
1679. Sidney was so impressed with Valckenier after his first meeting with the 
burgomaster that he wrote: "The great Turk has not more absolute dominion and 
22. See above pp. 54-55. 
143 
power over any of his country men than he hath at Amsterdam. 
oiD 1.1 Brugmans 
in his Geschiedenis van. Ainsterdam takes his evidence at third hand from D'Ailly 
and mentions the list alleged to have been drawn up by Valckenier and says "zij 
24 
parlij volgte hein blindefings". A list was sent to William on 6 September 1672 
but according to the contemporary Bontemantel it was a list of the current holders 
of positions, not a proposal for replacements. " These generalisations naturally get 
taken up and used with varying degrees of appropriateness in the kind of broad- 
based historical studies mentioned. 
Both the ambassadors Temple and D'Avaux had strong opinions about Valckenier: 
the former would have seen him at work during the 1670s and observed the 
differences between his approach and that of Hooft; the latter's experience was 
limited to the period after Hooft's death in 1678. In some ways, therefore, Temple 
is the more reliable source and he did not see Valckenier as without opposition - 
even quite strong opposition, but grudgingly admitted his abilities: 
"He [Hooft] (see above p. 137) had all the credit that could be in his 
town, without seeking it, or minding, or using it, whereas Valckenier 
sought and counted it all that could be, without having half the 
other's, being a morose and formal man, but of great industry, much 
thought, and, as was believed, avarice, and making the terms easily 
that were necessary in the government to carry his ends. These two 
had long been enemies, and thought irreconcilable, till the French 
instruments at this time, with great art and industry, made up the 
quarrel, and joined them both in the design of making the peace 
upon the terms offered by France. "" 
Temple clearly ascribed the unity within Amsterdam to the skills of the French 
ambassadors and their agents within the city. De Fouw has seen it as the work of 
". H. Brugmans, Opkomst en Bloie, p. 180: "Falckenier was machtigen den ooit; zijn 
authoriteit wordt door een English gezant hij die van der Sultan vergeleten". 
24 
. I. J. Brugmans, Geschiedenis van Amsterdam, p. 182; D'Ailly, loc. cit, 
25 
- Bontemantel, Regeeringe, II, p. 196. 
26 
. Temple, Works, vol. II, pp. 440-41. 
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Fagel, "' and van Beuningen's biographer, Roldanus, ascribed it to Valckenier as a 
deliberate ploy to bring van Beuningen into stronger opposition to the Prince. " 
But whatever the truth, no reconciliation could have been effected without the 
overwhelming motivation of working for peace to the benefit of Amsterdam itself. 
Both Hooft and Valckenier had proven the strength of their personalities and they 
were therefore unlikely to be swayed by outside "instruments" except insofar as 
their own objectives were in concert with those of the outsiders. D'Avaux's view 
of Valckenier is more generous but confirms the strength of character which would 
not be swayed without conviction -a wise politician who "I)arle peu el qui parait 
un peu pesant, maisfernies dans ses r6sohilions, qui a de grandes vues et un tris 
grand cr6dit "' Another contemporary observer, the English Consul, Sir William 
Carr, wrote in 1681 (after the death of both Valckenier and Hooft): 
"in Ano 1676 this Citty was wholely governed by the singel faction 
of Burgemaster Valconier but the said Burgem. Valconier observing 
that his Party was weakened by the Death of some of his friends in 
the Gouverment was forced to call in Burgemaster Hooft who before 
was kept out as being an Arminian, these 2 intrest being then joyned 
then the Citty was Equally devided betweene those 2 great mean + 
all places of Trust + profit put into there hands, "" 
This is yet another view of the reasons behind the Concept lot Eenigheit and 
reflects more about the writer than about the true state of Amsterdam in the 1670s. 
As the Amsterdammers had been convinced at least since 1675 that the Prince's 
respect for the influence of the city only extended to the support he could rely on 
for his overall plans, that is, only to the extent that his own position could be 
secured to pursue his military aims, the argument for French involvement need be 
considered as no more than the obvious exploitation by the enemy of the most 
vulnerable spot in the Republic's military support. And, on the other hand, since it 
27 
. de Fouw, Ontbekende Raadspensionarissen, p. I 11. 
21. Roldanus, van Beuningen, pp. 36-7. 
29 
. Fruin, "Geschiedenis van het Burgemeesterschap", p. 319. 
'0. Carr to Blaythwayt, 21 March 1681 (Appendix 11). 
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had been clear since the late 1660s that Valckenier was likewise more interested in 
his own political power than anything else, it would not have been difficult for him 
to make concessions to the opposition which could reunite the Amsterdam ruling 
group in order not only to secure his own position, but also to strengthen the 
town's influence at a time when the towns of Holland were all moving further away 
from a continuation of the war. After all, he had done the same in 1672. 
Few vacancies occurred between 1674 and 1678, and those were only minor 
members who were on the whole replaced by relatives within the formal family 
representative structure. Nanning Cloeck replacing Valckenier's father-in-law 
(1674) has already been mentioned and Tulp (Elias 111) (a long-time and 
intransigent enemy of Valckenier), van Neck (Elias 165, bankrupt), van Loon 
(Elias 169) and van Bronckhorst (Elias 198) were replaced respectively by de Vicq 
(Elias 219), " Rombout Hudde (Elias 216), van Loon the younger (Elias 220) and 
Cornelis Valckenier (Elias 221, Gillis Valckenier's first cousin) in 1678. These 
new members were all from regent families, but none of them except Cornelis 
Valckenier took an active part and even his municipal responsibilities were at the 
secondary level. " It must be assumed that the replacement of the elder van Loon 
(Valckenier's sponsor in the 1650s) by his son would not have changed the balance 
of potential support for Valckenier. 
Only one new member came from outside the normal ruling group: Everard Scott, 
elected in 1674 (Elias 218), a member of the influential banking and trading family 
with connections in Spain, Italy and the Levant and related to the Trips. He was 
the first member of his family to achieve regent status and his association with Trip 
would have brought him within Valckenier's sphere of influence. He replaced 
Gerard Hasselaer (Elias 222) in 1674. Hasselaer was a close relative of Hooft and 
what should be noted is that he was not replaced by his son Nicolaes, who was by 
De Vicq died in 1678 after serving for only three years, and was replaced, in 
1679, by his son. 
32 
. Ile had been secretary in 1676 (Appendix V). 
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then in his late twenties (a perfectly normal age for election on the family 
structure). Nicolaes Hasselaer did not find a place until the death of Graafland 
(Elias 196) four years later. The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from this is 
that the politics of the ivetsverzetting were still partially effective and while Hooft's 
opposition was so great, the exclusion of the younger Hasselaer was a political 
move. Of course Scott had much to offer; he was to take an active, specialist role, 
being the only member who was a director of the newly constituted (1674) WIC. 
until the election of de Vicq the younger (Elias 226) and van Heuvel (Elias 225) in 
1679. " And Hasselaer may not have been interested at this stage; he does not show 
up as a nominee for any other office, particularly that of schepen, where a role in 
the regency ensured younger members of representative families greater prestige 
than that of the less effective members of the vroedschap. 
Therefore, rather than the deaths and replacements of the mid-1670s working to 
Valckenier's disadvantage, in a minor way his support was being consolidated. 
Carr's letter therefore remains an interesting and valid example of contemporary 
interpretations of the politics of Amsterdam, but its ardent anti-republican views 
render its overall veracity open to some question. Carr's judgement can also be 
questioned further when his comments about Hudde's politics are considered. 
"this Burgern [Valckenier] being Dead last Octob, then Burgem Van 
Beuengen grew strong in his intrest + this yeare there is a hope 2 
new Burgems (vis) Burge Corver + Burge Opmer, so that there is 
only one of the ould rank Commonwealth men left which is Burge 
Hudde + Burge Van Beuengen still remaines the 4th, "" 
At the time Hudde was not considered an "ould rank Commonwealth man" by 
anyone else. 
We have already seen how between 1670 and 1672 Valckenier, after nearly twenty 
Scott was president of the Amsterdam Chamber of the TVIC. from July 1681, 
A. R. H., W. I. C., 336. After Scott's death in 1682, Opmeer became a bewindhebber 
and immediately was elected president of the Amsterdam chamber, ibid., 337. 
34 
. Carr to Blaythwayt, 21 March 1681 (Appendix II). 
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years in the vroedschap was unable to get his own way despite the power of 
money and patronage in the face of opposition. In 1671 he had failed to get either 
of his nominees, Munter or Trip, " elected and failed himself to be elected 
burgomaster. Neither did he lead the movement for the repeal of the Perpetual 
Edict in 1672 and the elevation of the Prince to the County of Holland. "Der Heer 
Valckenier adviseeren niet gevoecht te sijn op 'I Eeuwich edict te aviseeren; waer 
op eenige discoursen sijnde gevallen, argunienteerde verder, dat het edict in sijn 
geheel can gelaeten werden. "" The original change of policy came from 
Geelvinck, Pancras, Hinlopen, Corver and Backer. " Eventually Valckenier joined 
the group which was dominated by Geelvinck and Pancras. Thereafter it has been 
assumed by historians such as Elias that Valckenier took over the leadership of this 
group and that Pancras was his "createur" . 
38 Bontemantel himself, no doubt in the 
frustration of having been removed from office, found it impossible to understand 
how the Prince could have forgiven Valckenier and his colleagues their opposition 
to his restoration in January 1671. According to Bontemantel, Valckenier's 
persistence that he knew nothing of it all is invalidated by his knowledge of what 
went on. 39 
Elias lists Valckenier's allies in 1671 as Oudtshoorn, Munter, Pancras, 
Huydecooper, Hudde, Geelvinck and Trip. " This list bears considerable 
similarities to those receiving the Concept tot Eenigheit in 1676 after it had been 
drafted by Hooft and van Vlooswijk (Oudsthoorn, Valckenier, Munter, 
". Elias, Vroedschap, 1, p. CXVII. 
36. Bontemantel, Regeeringe, II, p. 18. 
37 
. 
Ibid. 
3'. Elias, Geschiedenis, p. 164. 
39. "Syn soon, den secretares, soude geyst hebben, dat de instatie van Syne Hoogheyt 
sijn vaeder heeft gemoereernt eenige op te stellen, die [sijn vaderj s[-]e fraey 
mannen te weesen, doch [dat syn vaderl nimant gerecommandeert. " Bontemantel, 
Regeeringe, 2, Bilage 7, p. 226. 
". Elias, Geschiedenis, p. CXXVI. 
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Huydecooper, Pancras, Hudde and Trip), but as we have seen, the views of this 
group were not unanimous over such an important issue as the restoration of the 
Prince of Orange until July 1672. The omission of Geelvinck from this group in 
1676, when he had serious differences with Valckenier, is of significance, and 
suggests that rather than the group all being allies, they were the senior members 
of the vroedschap, whose agreement to issues of major importance was essential 
for determining a common policy for Amsterdam. 
The ivelsverzelling temporarily disguised all other points of view and allowed 
Valckenier to establish his reputation through domination of the burgomasters for 
the next two years. His path was somewhat smoothed by the decision of van 
Beuningen not to remain in parochial office but to return to ambassadorial duties in 
the States' service in 1673, and Hooft's publicised withdrawal from elected office. 
The only other possible contender for major influence at this stage was Geelvinck 
and during this period he and Valckenier had established a close working 
relationship. Of the other two mentioned as the central core of influential 
members from 1672-84, Hudde and Witsen, the former was still biding his time 
and the latter was at the beginning of his career. 
The burgornasters in 1673 (Hudde, Valckenier, Geelvinck, Huydecooper) and 1674 
(Valckenier, Trip, Pancras, Munter) were as much of a coherent group, under the 
leadership of Valckenier, as was possible within the factional politics of 
Amsterdam: 
In 1673 the grouping was more of individuals with a common viewpoint 
determined by external events and the security of the city; in 1674 it reflected 
Valckenier at the height of his influence. Trip and Pancras are the only two 
serving burgomasters in the 1670s who can without question be seen as 
Valckenier's men, and we have seen how recently Valckenier's total influence over 
Pancras dated from. Trip, however, owed his position on the vroedschap 
completely to Valckenier. Valckenier had recently made a marriage arrangement 
between his son, Wouter, and Trip's daughter. Trip was also the only 1672 
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replacement member to serve as a burgomaster in the 1670s (in 1674,1677 and 
1679, in 1674 and 1679 alongside Valckenier). From then (that is from the death 
of Valckenier) until his own death in 1684 he took a far less active part in 
Amsterdam politics. No doubt on the personal level his vast Swedish trading 
interests, particularly during the Baltic crisis of 1675, were invaluable, but his early 
election to the burgenjeesterschap in 1674 can only be explained by the influence 
of Valckenier and Trip's role seems never to have been more than a supporting 
vote for his sponsor. 
Huydecooper has probably received greater attention from historians than his real 
influence justified. Difficulties in assessing where he stood have tended to align 
him with Hudde as a member of the new "middle party", the validity of which I 
have already questioned, and will discuss again later (see p. 157 below). 
Huydecooper would appear to have been motivated more by status and wealth than 
by the exercise of real political power. He is a prime example of the type of 
rentier regent who has been identified with the alleged decline in the quality of the 
Dutch ruling classes in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. His estate at 
Maarseveen and his patronage of the arts have created the image of demonstration 
of wealth at the expense of real involvement in politics, or commerce. In 1673 his 
interest in his own property took precedence over the causus belli, and he paid the 
French not to molest his estate at Maarseveen in Utrecht. " He was always near 
the centre of activity and decision-making, but his principal role seems to have 
been to communicate the decisions of the burgomasters to the representatives in 
The Hague, rather than being instrumental in making the decisions. Although he 
had a long career, holding the burgemeesterschap with regularity, in the end he 
failed to make the right political judgement in 1688 in support of the invasion of 
England and thereafter what influence he had declined. 
Schwartz, "Jan van der Heyden and the Huydecoopers of Maarseveen", p. 213-, 
Temple noted in a letter to Ormond in 1673 the importance of the inland estates 
to the rentier regents: "... and besides, in a manner all men of fortunes among 
them have a great part of their estates lying in the cantores of the States or the 
Provinces, which would all be lost upon the conquest of their land; so as they will 
lend to the last... ", Temple, Works, Vol. IL p. 236. 
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The relations between Munter and Valckenier had been of the disruptive kind in 
the 1660s and their reconciliation in opposition to De Witt seems to have 
weakened rapidly after 1672. De Witt had been surprised by the apparent alliance 
between Valckenier and Munter in 1670, as he had counted Munter as one of his 
friends, and knew that Valckenier and Munter had quarrelled bitterly over family 
matters in 1665.2 He had been unsuccessful in 1664, when he had competed with 
De Graeff as replacement for his brother . 
4' Together with Pancras, he was a victim 
of Valckenier's general unpopularity in 1671 and failed to be re-elected as oud 
burgenicester as the latter's nominee. Valckenier had shown his ability to make 
enemies by being outspoken in his opinions of van de Poll and the aged and 
revered Tul P. 44 In 1676 Munter was once again at odds with Valckenier, moving 
much closer to his brother-in-law Geelvinck, following the breakdown of relations 
between the two more senior regents. 
Valckenier did not restrict his conflicts to members of the vroedschap. His 
relationship with Cornelis Hop, pensionary 1672-5, deteriorated rapidly. The Hop 
family remained outside the ruling group, but both Cornelis and his son remained 
in the service of the city and States for many years. After the death of Valckenier 
Cornelis was restored to favour in Amsterdam, and his son, Jakob, after serving the 
city for some time, eventually went into the service of the Prince when he became 
King of England. " 
The more we look at the Amsterdam ruling group of the 1670s the more shadowy 
a figure Valckenier becomes. There is the vitriolic poem about him displayed 
under his portrait in the Amsterdam Historische Museum which seems no more 
42 Rowen, De Witt, p. 785. 
43 Bontemantel, Regeeringe, II, p. 11. 
44 Elias, Geschiedenis, pp. 162-3. 
41. This was a radical change for a civic official who had been the go-between of 
Amsterdam with the French Ambassador D'Avaux. For a fuller discussion of the 
role of Jakob Hop in the politics and administration of Amsterdam, see below pp. 
192-193. 
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than a summary of all other descriptions of a fairly unpleasant, powerful political 
intriguer. His career can be plotted simply. There is a fair selection of his letters, 
albeit scattered among major collections, rather than collected together, but they are 
on the whole businesslike and do not tell much about the man. There is certainly 
nothing like van Beuningen's later plaintive self-justification for his actions, or the 
detached academic approach of Witsen's collections to indicate what he was really 
like. The frustration of all this is that commentators and historians from 
Bontemantel to the present day tell of this one man's dominance of Amsterdam, but 
virtually always from observation and report rather than through the evidence of his 
own writings. He was wealthy, he had good contacts and he exercised a powerful 
patronage system, but did he dominate Amsterdam's policy or merely take the 
initiative when he saw the way it was going as he most certainly did in 1672 and 
1676? 
Geelvinck is also a somewhat elusive character to discover. He too had been 
elected to the vroedschap in the early 1650s, but did not reach political prominence 
until the 1670s after the ivetsverzelfing. He was probably the only prominent 
member who could be classified as Orangist in the sense that from the late 1660s 
he worked for the restoration of the Prince and for the repeal of the Perpetual 
Edict. He also worked hard in the interests of the city. His alliance with 
Valckenier in the early 1670s seems to have been based on the temporary unity 
imposed on the vroedschap by the ivetsverzetting, but was subject to the tensions 
imposed by the differences which continued to arise between Valckenier and his 
allies, despite common purpose. The most serious of the disputes between 
Valckenier and Geelvinck in 1676 led to the somewhat unlikely alliance between 
Hooft and Geelvinck. Valckenier had been responsible for the changes in office of 
secrelatis in 1676 which reflected the trends in the internal politics of 
Amsterdam. 46 The resulting quarrels gave rise to the trading of insults including 
Geelvinck pointing out that Valckenier's grandfather was only "cen schipper op 
Dirck Geelvinck had first held the post, was replaced by Dirck Munter, who in his 
turn was replaced by Cornelis Valckenier (Appendix V). 
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Leiden". 47 Attempts were made within the vroedschap to mend the breach, but 
they were largely unsuccessful. Witsen believed that the spirit of the Concept tot 
Eenigheit, which had allowed the restoration of Haringscapel to the commission 
from which he had been removed from in 1672 and the award of a commission to 
the son of Andries de Graeff, should be practised more widely. In his letter of 29 
December 1676 to Valckenier he talks of the "infamie van de Hr. van Castricum", 
encouraging Valckenier to reconcile himself to Geelvinck while maintaining the 
higher moral ground . 
4' Attempts at reconciliation went beyond the personal, 
though, and there was an enquiry by Oudtshoorn, Huydecooper and Munter to try 
to reconcile the two "die lange jaren met den anderen in vnintschap hehhen 
geleeft". This resulted in the publication of an Accord tot Wegnening van het 
different lusschen den Burgetneester Valckenier en den Heer van Castricum (C. 
Geelvinck) on II January 1677 . 
49 This difference of opinion probably accounts for 
Geelvinck's omission from those agreeing to the Concept tot Eenigheit, but the 
attempts at reconciliation afterwards demonstrate the importance of not only 
Valckenier and Hooft, but also Geelvinck to the successful prosecution of 
Amsterdam's interest at the time. 
Like Huydecooper, Geelvinck was a hard worker within the routine administration 
of the city and correspondence with representatives at The Hague. During the 
early years of the war he had overall responsibility for military movements and 
defences around Amsterdam, and was active with Hudde and Witsen in the 
management of the waterwayS. 50 
"'. Bontemantel, Regeeringe, II, p. 267. 
48 Gebhard, Witsen, p. 146; Bontemantel, op. cit., p. 268, note 1. 
49 Ibid., p. 272. 
Hameleers and Schmitz, "Zeven Kaarten van Cornelis Koel", p. 99. In 1672-73 
(G. A. Amsterdam, Missieven end Requesten van Particulieren (Binnenland), no. 
351, C. Geelvinck, II and 18 October 1672 and 3 January 1673, and extending 
his responsibilities to Utrecht and the waterline in the following autumn, ibid., 20 
October, 4 and 20 November 1673 and 4 January 1674. 
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His dominant role outlasted the death of Valckenier, when there was a distinct shift 
in the power balance within the vroedschap, and this indicates that he had reached 
his position of authority without being dependent on the other. His wealth and 
patronage were obviously such that he could operate individually in much the same 
way as Huydecooper. The principal difference between these two appears to be the 
willingness of Geelvinck to tackle issues on grounds of politics or personality, 
while Huydecooper remained more passive. " 
What is clear is that for the whole of the period under discussion no issue can be 
considered without taking account of the role and stance of Geelvinck. His 
prominence during both the restoration of the Prince and the discussions 
surrounding the Concept lot Eenigheit confirm this central and individual role. 
Like Valckenier, he tended to contain his activities within Amsterdam, only taking 
up provincial office for two years in the 1680s when he was at the 
Gecommitteerde Raad from 1681 to 1683. After 1676 representation at The Hague 
broadly followed the guidelines which had been drawn up under the Concept, 
which ensured that ruling burgomasters took a more representative role, rather than 
delegating affairs to either those they wanted out of the way or those over whom 
they had influence. 
The Concept was the instrument by which the Amsterdam regents restored unity 
amongst themselves. Its terms were very much a statement of how they should 
conduct themselves, carrying with them the implication that by the mid-1670s 
corruption had become rife and the processes for making appointments were largely 
being bypassed. The first clause which limited the number of past or present 
burgomasters within the vroedschap at any one time to twelve, can be interpreted 
either as means of restricting the chance of higher office to a small, highly 
exclusive group, or an attempt to ensure that only members with the appropriate 
experience could be elected burgomaster. The former argument is supported by the 
For Geelvinck's obituary and funeral procession, see Leti, Teatro BeIgico, II, p. 
380. 
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second clause which says that replacement for any burgomaster who has died 
should be agreed by all the ruling burgomasters, and if they cannot agree the 
number in the pool available for election may fall as low as ten. However, the 
strict terms outlined in the succeeding clauses make it clear that the Concept was 
also largely about preventing corruption among the burgomasters themselves and a 
highminded attempt to avoid the factional quarrels of the preceding years. 
Like the wetsverzetting four years earlier, the Concept was largely cosmetic, but for 
the short term it served its purpose and united the leading regents behind the 
common purpose of seeking peace as quickly as possible. It gave both Hooft and 
Valckenier a face-saving opportunity for reconciliation by putting the interests of 
the city before their political differences. By 1680 its force was spent as both the 
leading contenders for power were dead and Van Beuningen had returned to 
participate fully in the civic administration. But, during the next ten years, no-one 
was elected burgomaster who had not been serving on the vroedschap since at least 
1672. This would seem to support the argument that only members with proven 
experience could be elected burgomaster and thus avoid the kind of patronage and 
packing which Valckenier was able to achieve from 1672 to 1674 when he 
successfully sponsored the career of Trip. 
As the one member of the senior group who had been unable to patch up quarrels 
with Valckenier in 1676, Geelvinck, did not serve as burgomaster again until 1684, 
by which time the ruling group was clearly centred around those favoured by 
Hudde and Witsen with little disunity displayed on matters of States policy. Only 
Van Beuningen tended to put forward his own idiosyncratic views, but as he had 
never been deeply involved in factional disputes, his different opinions were 
respected, but ignored until they were proven to be right. Overall the Concept 
probably did contribute to a concentration of the real power in Amsterdam within a 
smaller, more coherent group, but the political situation within which they were 
operating was different by the 1680s from that which had given Valckenier the 
opportunity to exploit his political skills so effectively in the early 1670s. 
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During the 1680s and 1690s probably the most influential regent in Amsterdam 
was Nicolaes Witsen (Elias 204). From the copy of Witsen's Worte Verhael van 
ndjn levenshoop tot den jacre 1714" in the Amsterdam Archives it is claimed that 
after Valckenier's death "hadde na heere Hudde, die sijn neve was 't grootste 
gezag". " He had been elected to the vroedschap in 1670 at the age of twenty-nine 
and served for forty-seven years. He was nominated by Valckenier, but was of a 
long-serving, well-established regent family, closely related, inter alia, to the 
Huddes and Opmeers. " His life has been well-documented by Gebhard in the late 
nineteenth century, which is a useful source. 5' There is a large Witsen archive and 
his hand is relatively easy to read. He had been educated at Leiden in the 
Coccejan school and had travelled widely in Europe, including Oxford. He had 
been on an embassy to Moscow, and was married to Catarina Hochepied, a 
daughter of one of the leading merchant families. 
Both Gebhard and Franken have assumed that Valckenier's sponsorship of Witsen 
ensured the latter's domination by the burgomaster. They both, however, lament 
the lack of extant correspondence between the two in the mid-1670s when this 
domination should have been in full force. " Soon after his election, Witsen began 
to develop the kind of career which he maintained throughout his active working 
life. He entered into the service of the city at The Hague rather than remaining in 
Amsterdam, and in 1676 took up a position as Field Deputy in the service of the 
Prince. His education had been thorough and international and several pieces of 
52. G. A. Amsterdam, Collectie Witsen, f. 171-177, Kort Verhael van myn levenshoop 
tot den jaere 1714 (copied by Tydewen). 
53 
Cornelis Jacob Witsen 
Jonas Comelisz. Witsen Jan Comelisz. Witsen 
III 
ia - Gerrit Hudde Petronelle Maria - Opmeer Co elis = Opsy IIII 
Johannes Hudde = Blaeu Elisabeth - van Waveren Nicolas Opmeer Nicolaes = Rochepied 
Gebhard, op. cit. 
Ibid., p. 144. 
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his published writings have remained. 
He was clearly the more superior kind of regent who can be cited in opposition to 
the view of degeneration of the regent class. Notably during the later 1670s and 
early 1680s, he managed to establish working relationships with the Prince, 
particularly through Fagel, and yet remained a respected representative of 
Amsterdam. Witsen's development as an influential regent through representation 
and mediation argue strongly against the domination by Valckenier thesis. And 
although it may be the case that much correspondence has been lost, it is also quite 
possible that there may not have been much in the first place. There is no dearth 
of extant correspondence of either with others. Valckenier's is slightly harder to 
trace being spread among many archives, but Witsen's, as Gebhard found, is still 
very accessible. The collections of correspondence do not demonstrate that either 
was likely to have destroyed correspondence because it was compromising. Their 
views on the relevant issues were not such that this would have been necessary. 
In the 1670s Witsen remained outside the various factional disputes and was not 
elected burgomaster for the first time until 1682. Once he reached that status, he 
quickly took a leading position; Hudde was accorded the title Magnificaat after 
Valckenier's death, and van Beuningen retained some nominal status as the senior 
burgomaster, but the future quite clearly belonged to Witsen. In the 1670s and 
1680s members were unlikely to sit on sub-committees while they held office as 
burgomaster. Witsen was an exception and on several occasions, during his period 
as burgomaster, was a member of sub-committees which undertook the routine 
policy making for the vroedschap (see Appendix VI). On Witsen's first election as 
burgomaster P. de Conionde wrote him a good luck poem addressing him "so een 
Cato by de Staet": 
lf Uni lujster, Ronien, kan by onze int minst niet haalen, 
En Witsen, die was soo een Cato by de Staet, 
Een Nestor in het Veld, vorstreetd zijn raad, en daad 
Die Anistels recght bank, als een zan, door zijnd staat an 
Van Wijshed, er verstand versight heeft nie veer vor 
Het hujs, en bondereght ontfanger, als burgerheer, 
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Dus zied men in de zoon de Vader veer geleeren 
Die so iveerjaaren als een hoofd ijslaar en stuk 
Heyt raad huis, stad, en staat voor on gem heeft besoght 
Wiener deugd moch in het hert den burgeren staat geschreven 
Nu iverdt di zoon geert, girent van ider een 
Als voorbeeld van Staat kunste int vant algenicen. "" 
On the same occasion as burgomaster, he received a fulsome letter of 
congratulations from Pierre Valkenier in Frankfurt. " 
During the 1680s Witsen was closely allied to Joan Hudde, and their co-operation 
with other members of their family group has led to more valid arguments for a 
closing of the ruling oligarchy in Amsterdam during the last quarter of the 
seventeenth century. There was certainly more unity of purpose in the way of the 
1650s and early 1660s, than the struggles of the 1670s indicated. Hudde had been 
elected to the vroedschap in 1667 when he was nearly forty, but he had not been 
inactive before that. His reputation rests on two points. He was an eminent 
mathematician of his time, and had already achieved success in his developments 
to the microscope. " He rationalised the accounting procedures for the City 
Treasury. Like Witsen he seems to have remained outside factional disputes, 
achieved within a career which included many terms of office as burgomaster, and 
to have developed a reputation which has been labelled for convenience the 
leadership of a middle party within Amsterdam in the 1670s. We have seen that 
Hudde had common interests with van Beuningen, mainly in scientific and 
technical developments, " although not in his more millenarianist views, and they 
had served as burgomasters together immediately after the ivetsverzelting. They 
also both avoided the factional disputes of the 1670s. They were not to work 
closely within the city government until the 1680s, but their common interests and 
51 G. A. Amsterdam, Collectie Witsen, nr. 180, fol. 170. 
Ibid., nr 180, f. 199. 
See above p. 71. 
Jan Swarnmerdarn, who had taken the potential for the microscope forward had 
been sponsored by van Beuningen, Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 905-7. 
158 
lack of identification before then with any of the leading factional leaders may 
have contributed to the idea of their leading a "middle party", Hudde within 
Amsterdam, van Beuningen in the Republic as a whole. 
To argue for the existence of a middle party assumes that there are at least two 
other parties which are at political opposites. The idea of party was very strong in 
the nineteenth century, when these labels began to be applied to earlier periods and 
issues of Orangism and republicanism had relevance to the current situation. The 
consolidation of the Dutch monarchy after 1830 led to a revision of interpretations 
of the Republic and the arch-Orangist Fruin set the scene for a debate over 
democracy and party which is still not settled. Fruin based his structure of a two- 
party, Orangist/republican system in the seventeenth century Republic on the 
interpretation of D'Avaux who said there were two parties in Amsterdam led by 
"deux des pfincipales t6tes de la Rýpubfique ... Hooft et Valckenier". 
'O It was also 
D'Avaux who first mooted the idea of a "middle party" of those who had survived 
the wetsverzetting, but really supported neither the Orangists nor the republicans. " 
D'Avaux was writing after 1684 and admitted that his memoirs were written to 
explain the relations between the United Provinces and France from the Peace of 
Nijmegen until 1684, and it must therefore be remembered that he was justifying 
his own failure to facilitate a rapprochement with the Dutch. His summary of the 
situation covers the whole of the Republic and is not therefore easily translated to 
Amsterdam, although he was principally working in and with the regents of the 
city at the time. 62 However, he did provide contemporary material for later 
60 Fruin, R., Verspreide Geschrifilen, ed. P. J. Blok, et aL, 10 vols (The Hague, 1924), 
Vol. IV, p. 319; DAvaux, Nýgociations, p. 12. 
61. D'Avaux, Negociationsp. 1-2. D'Avaux divided the groupings in the Dutch 
Republic between the Orangists who were "interessis 6 maintenir le 
Gouvernement d I'Etat dans la dýpendance A Prince d'Orange"; "Les 
Ripublicains" who were few in number, but influential - the reninants of the 
Wittians and those forced to Wittianism by the wetsverzetting-, and those who 
were neither. 
62 Japikse's view was that in the seventeenth century Republic there were three 
parties, the republicans, the Orangists and, in between, van Beuningen and 
Amsterdam. This argument is only tenable where it is assumed that van Beuningen's ideological policies were following those generally agreed by the city 
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historians to use to their own ends. 
The legacy of this historical debate has been to impose a version of later politics 
on to the Amsterdam regency in the seventeenth century which cannot be upheld 
on analysis of the evidence. It starts with the premise that there were Orangists 
within the Amsterdam vroedschap who wanted a quasi -monarchical system of 
government of the kind that Frederik Hendrik and William 11 had appeared to be 
working towards. This is counter to the way the Union of Utrecht had established 
the Dutch Republic and the Princes of Orange had been seen within their role as 
stadholders of the various provinces. The Revolt of the Netherlands had been 
against a strongly dynastic and autocratic monarchical system, which denied the 
Dutch the opportunity to develop religious and economic freedom. Amsterdam was 
one of the later converts to the cause of the revolution, but once converted made 
the most of the opportunities opened up by freedom from Spanish domination. 
The regent class by the middle of the seventeenth century was made up 
predominantly of those whose wealth and position directly benefited from the very 
conditions which the Revolt had made possible, not least trading with the enemy 
until 1648. 
Support for the House of Orange and the office of stadholder can therefore be 
equated with more justification to support for the principles of the Union of 
Utrecht, than support for a quasi -monarchical system. No doubt there were one or 
two members of the regency who were more slavish followers of the House of 
Orange in the way that seventeenth century royalty attracted obsequious followings, 
but these were more likely to be minor members who, like Cornelis Backer in 
1675, signally failed to make any impression on the vroedschap. As we have 
seen, Geelvinck appears to have been the only leading member who really took the 
restoration of the House of Orange as a political issue for its own sake before 
government, and that neither republicans or Orangists had major influence in 
Amsterdam. Franken saw the weakness of such a simplistic structure, finding 
Roorda's "factie" theory more supportive of his own interpretation of van 
Beuningen's central role, Coenraad van Beuningens politiek en diplomatieke 
aktiviteiten in de jaren 1667-84, pp. 66-7. 
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1672. But, like all the other leading members during the early 1670s, his line 
quickly moved to the realistic politics of peace in opposition to the Prince. 
There is perhaps a stronger case to argue for a republican party, although it must 
be made within an understanding that all members of a republic, unless they are 
actively dedicated to overthrowing the constitution and imposing a different one (in 
this case a monarchy), are to a greater or lesser extent republican. Those in 
Amsterdam who have been put within the republican party in the later 1660s and 
1670s are those who were opposed to the restoration of the House of Orange to the 
stadholdership together with the offices of Captain- and A dmi ral -General. Such 
opposition is closely related to the events of 1650 and the label which was more 
commonly used in the seventeenth century of "Loevensteiners" is perhaps the more 
63 accurate. These men were supporters of the regime as it had been administered 
under the guidance of De Witt during the first stadholderless period. They were 
more prepared to see a continuation of that regime tackle the problems incurred by 
the French invasions than to risk a return to the militarist policies which had 
become a feature of the Orangist stadholdership during the 1630s and 40s. 
Essentially, however, both groupings were anxious for the security and economic 
survival of the Republic - and in particular that of Amsterdam - as established 
under the Union of Utrecht. The differences have been complicated somewhat by 
the concurrent assumptions that republicanism was consonant with arminianism as 
interpreted by Coccejus and Orangism with the contra-remonstrantism of Voetius. 
These religious disputes which emerged from the intellectual environment of the 
universities, principally Leiden, had their genesis in the crisis which resulted in the 
execution of Oldenbarneveldt after the Synod of Dordrecht in 1609. By the 1670s 
the conflict between Coccejans and Voetians had largely disappeared within the 
Amsterdam regency, which took a pragmatic view of affairs. They were to arise in 
different parts of the Republic during the next few decades, and Amsterdam was to 
take a mediating role in some of them. 
For example, Sir William Temple "... the Lovesteyn party's being so much bent 
upon the measures with France... ", Works, vol. IV, p. 109. 
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What therefore was a middle party to stand for in Amsterdam in the 1670s? 
Obviously those who have been seen as forming the core of this middle party, 
Hudde and Huydecooper, had not opposed the restoration of the Prince of Orange 
and had continued their careers within the regency unhindered. (Kurtz, in her 
study of the crisis years 1683-84, included Hooft in the middle party from as early 
as 1665 with the extremes being the Wittians and Valckenier as an Orangist. As it 
has been seen that Valckenier did not join the group supporting the Prince's 
restoration until 1672, the rest of this argument may also be treated with great 
sceptiCiSM. ). 64 Equally they had maintained a working interest in the security and 
interest of the city. In this way they did not differ from the group led by 
Valckenier, which had worked more directly for the changes in 1672. By the 
middle of the decade they were once again in accord with the moves to work 
towards peace and, after the deaths of Hooft and Valckenier, were ready to assume 
leadership of the vroedschap. In fact the only "party" line that can be found that 
was different from those assumed to have been in other groupings, is that they 
were not involved in factional or individual disputes with the other leading 
members of the regency. This may have been through lack of strong political 
interest, their own independence of patronage and interest, relative inexperience or 
influence within the ruling group, caution in order to secure longer-term ambition, 
or even a more intelligent judgement of the realities of the politics of the 1670s. 
Each of these characteristics can be applied to a greater or lesser extent to Hudde 61 
and Huydecooper, to Witsen and to those newly elected to the vroedschap in 1672 
ostensibly in the Orangist cause like Opmeer, Bors van Waveren (Elias 211) and 
Sautijn, who joined the ruling group in the early 1680s after the death of 
Valckenier. 
However, although these are all fairly strong arguments against formal party 
divisions in Amsterdam in the 1670s, we have to return to the role of Valckenier to 
finalise the point. Hooft, despite his survival of the ivasverzetting, was clearly a 
". Kurtz, Willem III en Amsterdam, p. 214. 
65 
. See below p. 23 1, note 135. 
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supporter of the Wittian-type republic and in this had to be in opposition to the 
restoration of the privileges of the House of Orange where they showed 
monarchical tendencies. But Valckenier was not in contrast a whole-hearted 
supporter of the Prince. Support for the restoration of the House of Orange in 
1672 was support for the most sure solution to the military difficulties of the 
Republic. Valckenier had been an opponent of De Witt in the 1660s, but not in 
any way an Orangist. He had successfully taken the opportunity of the weakening 
of the power of the De Graeffs in Amsterdam to further his own political ambition, 
and had introduced an era of factional disputes dominated by individual interest. 
His political ambition was closely tied up with the success of his financial interests, 
which were in turn naturally closely bound up with the wider interests of 
Amsterdam's strong international mercantile role. 
His support of the Perpetual Edict in 1667 may have been one of the most 
perceptive in that the conditions allowed in the long term for the restoration of the 
House of Orange to part of their ancient privileges, but had exclusion clauses 
which would prevent the stadholder from integrating political and military power. 
In this way, the Edict was a force in favour of the provincial and municipal 
sovereignty inherent in the Union of Utrecht, which was seen to be undermined in 
the terms of the re-entry of Utrecht, Gelderland and Overijssel in 1674-5. This 
would accord with the fairly rapid change of view of Valckenier between 1672 and 
1674, when his own interests, as reflected in the interests of the city, would have 
been undermined if the principles of the re-entry of the three occupied provinces 
had operated throughout the Republic. Apart from his actions in 1672 when he 
took over the leadership of the group working for change, but even then if the 
assumptions about his motivation in first supporting and then revoking the 
Perpetual Edict are accepted, Valckenier is in fact closer to being a republican than 
an Orangist. That he has not been so described is more likely to have occurred 
because of personal conflict with De Graeff and later Hooft, based on political 
interest and ambition, rather than on political ideology, 
Roorda argued that "party" only operated in the Dutch Republic on national issues 
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in periods of crises like the Rampjaar of 1672,66 and that the dominant system was 
one of faction and interest. We could go further and say that in Amsterdam in the 
67 
1670s at least, faction itself was subordinate to the individual. Further it can be 
argued that the "parties" of the crises were so limited in terms of unity of purpose 
that it is unhelpful and unrealistic to impose modern ideas of party on political 
movements which develop and dissolve within a few months. Roorda! s thesis deals 
effectively with the history of the various theories of party and faction which were 
developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and challenged in the 
twentieth . 
6' There is probably little real difference between his interpretation of 
interest relating to faction and the argument for individual interest subordinating 
faction, other than the perspective of the studies themselves. He was looking 
generally at the prevailing trend throughout Holland and Zeeland in the later 
seventeenth century; we are considering the determinants of policy within 
Amsterdam during a brief and singular twelve-year period. He could therefore only 
draw conclusions from a survey of a broad range of civic administrations; we are 
looking in detail at the composition of the administration of one, and the most 
influential, city. 
There is one other aspect of this discussion of political affinities which is best 
raised in the context of the interests of the only other leading regent so far not 
discussed, Coenraad van Beuningen. As we have seen, van Beuningen has 
received greater attention from historians than any other politician in the Dutch 
Republic in this period, for-reasons which have much to do with the international 
role which was so much part of affairs at the time. Foremost among these issues 
was the question of France. De Witt fell over his French policy; William III 
66 
. 
Roorda, Partij en Factie, p. 3: "De partij is dan de politieke groepering, die zo 
groot mogelijke groepen van de bevolking door een min of meer ideile binding bif 
de politiek van het gehele... ". 
In his study of the Rotterdam regents from 1650-72, Price argues against Roorda's 
theory of the role of faction in the 1672 crisis and alleges that protests "were 
directed at individual regents and particular policies", Price, "Rotterdam 
Patriciate", pp. 390-96. 
". Roorda, Partij en Factie., pp. 11 -3 4. 
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secured his place in history because of his continual wars with France and his 
religious crusade against Louis XIV. Van Beuningen fell out with both these 
leaders within the Republic because of their policies towards France, in the 
interests of Amsterdam. He always maintained that he put the interests of his own 
city first, although he acted as an ambassador for the States as a whole and until 
his last years was rarely in his native city. But as an Amsterdammer in public 
service he came to represent the city as a "true Hollander" - these are not my 
words. " And yet, this arch-supporter of the sovereignty and interest of his native 
town and province was ideologically far removed from the majority standpoint. 
From the later 1660s onwards he pursued a strong anti-French view, only moving 
towards the peace party line when he felt that the Prince was putting political 
security over the more basic interests of state for which the Republic was fighting. 
After the Peace of Nijmegen in 1678, when he returned to Amsterdam from his 
many embassies abroad, he was outwardly in opposition to the majority view 
working towards a French alliance and yet managed to retain the respect of the 
regency because of his experience and influence. In 1679 he was shrewd enough 
to foresee the influence that Witsen would have within the regency once he became 
eligible for election as burgomaster and attempted unsuccessfully to win him round 
to his anti-French views. 70 
Van Beuningen's election as burgomaster in 1680 gave credence to the general 
understanding that he was an influence within Amsterdam and the Prince had not 
yet given up hope that he might be used as an intermediary between himself and 
the city. " It was therefore van Beuningen who bore the brunt of the Prince's anger 
over Amsterdam's opposition to the request for 8,000 men during the Luxembourg 
crisis of 1682.72 The inherent difficulties in fully understanding the role of van 
69 Evenhuis, Ook dat was Amsterdam, Vol. III, p. 189. 
Franken, Coenraad van Beuningens politiek en diplomatieke aktiviteiten in de 
jaren 1667-84, pp. 172-73. 
Ibid., p. 172. 
The Prince's exasperation at the problems with Amsterdam, expressed in 
correspondence with Waldeck on 16 October 1682, is quoted in Franken, Ibid., p. 
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Beuningen in the late 1670s and early 1680s arise from his intransigent views 
against any possible French alliance, but his also implacable opposition to what has 
been seen as the militarism of William in his anti-French policy. These differences 
highlight the problems that arose when the similarities of "interest of state" were 
completely undermined by the difference methods argued for prosecuting that 
interest. Van Beuningen believed that it was essential to operate a policy of 
peaceful opposition to any French interests, but the Prince believed that the best 
way to contain French expansionism (whether territorial or economic) was by 
military strength. The importance of the Spanish Netherlands was disputed by van 
Beuningen, but suppression of its economic potential was assumed to be of critical 
importance to his fellow regents. Hence van Beuningen was in the very difficult 
position of holding influential office within his city or on States service, but unable 
to agree with either of his principals. In the last resort in 1684 he was able to take 
the side of his fellow burgomasters, because his opposition to military finance was 
greater than his opposition to pro-French views in Amsterdam. It was possible to 
separate the interests of those arguing in the longer term for negotiations to 
continue with the French, from the immediate short-term aims of the Prince. 
Only when his eccentricities became extreme and his faculties began to wane did 
his unwavering opposition to French alliances receive justification and was 
Amsterdam able to see its way to support the Prince in his invasion of England. " 
Burke has argued that his final breakdown in 1688 may have been the culmination 
of the stresses on a schizoid character who had such diverse interests as 
millenarianism and the supernatural, literature and science, and politics and 
diplomacy. " Van der Wall takes a more cynical view of his breakdown, based on 
her interpretation of the lucidity of his writings which she does not see as 
207: "Celle [conduitel de Mr van Beuningen commence aussie a estra 
insupportable... " 
". Israel, "The Dutch Role in the Glorious Revolution", p. 119. 
"Van Beuningen is a fascinating but not an isolated sample of the coexistence of 
new science, Cartesianism, astrology and millenarianism inside one man's head", Burke, Venice and Amsterdam, p. 103. 
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presaging madness, but "rather it seems that this millenarian went mad because of 
the heavy financial losses he suffered when the Amsterdam stock exchange crashed 
in the later summer of 1688". " As an historian favouring causation theories based 
on the culmination of the full range of previous circumstances, I am more inclined 
to the view that age and the stock exchange fall may have been the trigger, but the 
predisposition for breakdown was, by 1688, already inherent in van Beuningen's 
character and had been constantly exacerbated by his confrontations even with 
those with whom he had common cause. 76 Indeed his diversity of intellectual and 
political interest may have been his security against mental breakdown earlier in his 
career. 
The individuality of van Beuningen, even allowing for his continued absences on 
States' business, further substantiates the case for the absence of any formal party 
structure within Amsterdam. The regents had thought it a wise move to bring him 
into the burgomastership in 1672 to give credibility to the new regime. He had 
opposed De Witt and was in the service of the States and could therefore be 
assumed to be in support of the restoration of the Prince. He quickly returned to 
ambassadorial duties as a servant of the States and Amsterdam rather than the 
Prince, and was soon out of favour with the latter. Therefore like the majority of 
the Amsterdam regents in 1672 his support of the changes can be seen as a 
response to the needs of the crisis, and not a response based on long-held party 
allegiances. Equally his return to Amsterdam politics in the 1680s maintained the 
individuality which had always dominated his role and yet he was able to work 
with the ruling group and was seen by outsiders like D'Avaux as one of major 
influences in the city, and the one with whom matters would have to be resolved. " 
". Van der Wall, "Antichrist Stormed" p. 162-3. 
Israel, "The Amsterdam Stock Exchange", p. 339-40 drawing on contemporary 
witnesses, dates Van Beuningen's final descent into madness to the 1688 crash, 
but points out that he "had been showing signs of mental instability for some 
time... " 
77 
. D'Avaux, Negociations, p. 3 5, "Van Buning se servit de toutes forces d'artifices, 
pourfaire passer cette affaire 4 Amsterdam". 
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So far, this survey of the political alignments in the Amsterdam vroedschap has 
dealt only with those who reached burgomaster status during the 1670s and 1680s, 
and without doubt they were the most influential. During critical periods many of 
the major decisions were left solely within the hands of the burgomasters. 
However, the overall policy of the city was developed through the routine meetings 
and committees which met three or four times a week. Attendance was high and 
for many there was a distinct career structure within the regency. This pattern can 
be easily followed by a brief look at the short term careers of some of those 
elected in the ivelsverzeffing in 1672. Trip and Opmeer have already been 
mentioned. Gerard Bors had been the representative of Amsterdam at the Zeeland 
Admiralty since 1670 and was to hold this office until 1679. Thus, like his relative 
Opmeer, he was kept clear of influence until after Valckenier's death, when he too 
joined the ruling group as burgomaster in the 1680s. 
Of the rest, Appelman (Elias 207), Tiellens (Elias 208), Becker Elias 209), van 
Klenck (Elias 210) and Sautijn were all from merchant families, who had some 
part in the government of Amsterdam prior to 1672 and can therefore be 
considered as possible candidates by reason of wealth and position if conditions 
should prove favourable. Sautijn's family had moved to Amsterdam on the fall of 
Antwerp where they had begun their prosperous merchant firm dealing in laken 
with the Levant, Italy, France and Russia. " Sautijn himself never made any 
pretence to be a supporter of Valckenier, " and as he replaced his wife's uncle, 
Reynst, in the wetsverzetting there is evidence to suggest that he was selected on 
his own merits. He was certainly called early into the service of the States in the 
negotiations of the Marine Treaty with England in 1675, following the Peace of 
Westminster. 
All five continued as active members of the vroedschap throughout their lives, 
Elias, Vroedschap, No. 215, p. 573-8; Nieuwe Nederlandse Biografisch 
Woordenboek (? VNBW), IX, 950. 
79 
. N. N. B. W., VoI. X, p. 950, "Als lid den vroedschap stand hif niet aan de sijde van 
Valckenier". 
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particularly Appelman (a distant relatiVe of van Beuningen) who, although 
allegedly Valckenier's man, was in fact sponsored as schepen in 1673 by Geelvinck 
while Valckenier proposed Witsen. Appelman was the successful candidate and 
the importance of this distribution of favour has been discussed above. Appelman 
was already in his sixties in 1672 and continued as a prominent member until his 
death in 1694. 
Of the remaining two new members Dirck Blom had also held minor office before 
1672 and had strong connections in the East Indies; he was related by marriage to 
Appelman and seems to have been brought into the vroedschap for his 
administrative abilities. In 1679 he resigned his seat and went to work for the East 
India Company in Batavia, but he played a full-time part in the workings of the 
vroedschap until then. " 
Therefore apart from Commelin (Elias 212), who was a Professor of Botany and 
whose municipal responsibilities were restricted on the whole to the application of 
his professional knowledge to the development of the city's reputation, " all the new 
members were very active at various times. 
Apart from periods when they were on business, such as Sautijn's ambassadorial 
duties in England in 1674, the new members played a major part on the 
committees. There was a degree of specialisation, with members more likely to 
serve on a committee dealing with matters in which they had a vested interest. But 
there also appears to have been a kind of loose career structure based on 
experience: to take three examples, in the early 1670s Tiellens, Appelman and 
Sautijn were appointed almost without exception only to committees dealing with 
local matters commensurate with their previous experience. By 1675-6 they were 
Blom was deliberately "head-hunted" for the post of president of the Heemraden, 
after a crisis of confidence in the employees in Batavia and a number of sackings, 
F. Gaastra, Bewind en Beleid, p. 25 1. 
Commelin established the new Amsterdam hortus in 1682, Israel, The Dutch 
Republic, p. 907. 
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also being appointed to those dealing with financial matters and by the early 1680's 
Appelman and Sautijn (Tiellens died in 1679) were also being consulted on 
questions of foreign policy. (Appendix VI) 
And there was of course a continued participation at a high level (particularly on 
important financial and military matters) of already active members such as Boreel, 
Corver (Elias 194) and Hudde. Boreel was frequently used in the diplomatic 
service of both De Witt and William III on embassies to Russia, Brussels and 
England as well as taking part in the negotiations at Nijmegen. Boreel was 
following in his father's diplomatic career, and it is possible that, like his father, his 
sympathies were more inclined to the Orangists. '2 However, the use of his services 
by both De Witt and William III would also indicate a respect for his diplomatic 
skills. Thus the business of Amsterdam continued to run in well-oiled channels 
and the change of personnel in 1672 was only important in the short run, where it 
changed the balance of factional allegiances. 
Apart from Bors and Opmeer there is no evidence to link any of the 1672 
nominees closely together and certainly very little to define a clear party under the 
influence of Valckenier. On the whole the new members seem to have been 
elected because they were of the regent class and had not identified themselves 
closely with the De Graeff groupings in 1671-72, with the exception of Opmeer. 
The ivelsverzetting in Amsterdam was therefore probably a largely cosmetic 
exercise carried out to the apparent short term satisfaction of the Prince, but with 
the same kind of long-term intentions as the Perpetual Edict had been supported. 
The Amsterdam regency wished to ensure that the ruling structures would continue 
to operate as they had always done. 
After 1680 Amsterdam was no longer dominated by the parochial Valckenier and 
Hooft, but by the twin abilities of a worldly-wise van Beuningen and the moderate 
and experienced Hudde and Witsen. Franken, in his study of van Beuningen 
'2. Rowen, De Witt, p. 27 1. 
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complains that there is no evidence after the end of Bontemantel's chronicles of the 
intrigues in Amsterdam in the early 168 OS. 83 However, there was still jostling for 
place, but the ruling group was by now so secure that there was little need for 
intrigues on the scale of the late 1660s and 1670s. The major difference until late 
1682 was the strong pro-French views of the majority of the vroedschap and the 
strong and continuing anti-French policy of van Beuningen, although the latter's 
reputation prevented divisive factions developing. It was van Beuningen's tragedy 
that, after 1685, when his powers and faculties were waning, his twenty-year anti- 
French stance was finally justified by Louis XIV's actions. 
Until the end of 1682 van Beuningen was still ostensibly working with the Prince 
and Fagel attempting to conclude an alliance with England. His relations with 
Amsterdam remained good since he had always stressed the interest of Holland, 
being a true representative of the ruling merchant class, while he continued to 
pursue his anti-French policy. In 1681 D'Avaux complained bitterly about van 
Beuningen's attempts to persuade the pro-French burgomasters of the advantages of 
seeking an English alliance. " But he continued to work on slightly different lines 
from the Prince and Fagel with communication becoming more suspicious and 
intermittent all the time. The final breach and his immediate return to Amsterdam 
as a burgomaster in 1681 gave the Prince good ground for blaming him for 
Amsterdam's opposition during the next two or three years, particularly as the 
theme of the Amsterdam burgomasters since the death of Valckenier had been 
moderation, with concentration on the improvement of trade. They had of course 
opposed the first blockade of Luxemburg in 1682, but so had at least six other 
Holland towns and in any case the matter had not finally come to a head. 
8'. Frank-en, Van Beuningen, p. 177. 
94 
. D'Avaux, Negociations, 1, pp. 99-102. DAvaux, who had worked well with 
Valckenier. "qui gouvernoit absolument cette ville-hi", p. 42, found it necessary to 
seek "contact with two or three regents in Amsterdam, in league with Valckenier 
in 1672 and just coming to office [in 1681] who are good republicans ruling 
Amsterdam". In the end it was the pensionary, Jakob Hop, who became 
D'Avaux's main contact and his own "undercover agents" rather than regents. See 
also Chapter 8 below. 
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The events of 1684-85 saw the beginning of the end of van Beuningen's 
effectiveness as a politician. The previous few years had seen him as the leader of 
the anti-Prince groupings in the vroedschap, the breach and lack of trust preventing 
all correspondence between him and William. But at the same time Witsen was in 
constant touch with both the Prince and raadpensionails, without in any way 
undermining his position in Amsterdam. His mediating abilities had first been used 
in 1676 during the Voetian and Coccejan crisis, which was less vitriolic in 
Amsterdam than elsewhere, when he was representative at the States General, and 
this not only stood him in good stead later but also kept him clear of the intrigues 
in Amsterdam at that time. During his first year as burgomaster, he took an active 
part in the committees (Appendix VI) and as Deputy to the States General from 
1683-85 he kept a foot in both camps producing a large volume of correspondence 
showing his ability to deal equally with both sides, while retaining credibility as an 
Amsterdammer. As Deputy in the Field in 1676 and representative at the States of 
Holland from 1674-77, he had early been removed from the factional conflicts, and 
was not therefore involved in the political manoeuvrings of 1676. Through these 
more centralised activities he had gained experience in dealing not only with the 
Prince's advisers, but also with the wider issues facing the Republic, if not at first 
hand at least closer than Valckenier ever got. 
The relations of Witsen with the Prince in the 1680s were much the same as van 
Beuningen's with De Witt in the late 1660s; he remained on good terms with him 
but disagreed with the turn his views were taking. " In this respect the 1670s were 
the extraordinary period. At first, immediately after 1672, there was co-operation 
between Amsterdam and the Prince and Fagel but, after 1673 contacts were 
infrequent and usually indirect. Until 1675 Fagel and Valckenier were working 
closely enough for the former to use the latter as a lever on the vroedschap but, by 
1677 at the latest, there was no real working communication between the Prince 
and Amsterdam. The pattern of communications is discussed in detail in the next 
chapter. 
$5. Franken, van Beuningen, p. 7 1. 
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Of the others who survived Valckenier, Oudtshoorn served as burgomaster in 1679 
and 1680, but thereafter dropped into obscurity (although he did not die until 
1688), mainly because he opposed the family oligarchy now taking hold of the 
vroedschap. " In the crisis year of 1684 the ruling burgomasters were van 
Beuningen, Hudde and Huydecooper (the alleged 'middle party' of the 1670s) and 
Geelvinck. Geelvinck had been the representative at the States of Holland for the 
previous three years. These four burgomasters were now put into the position 
where they not only openly opposed the Prince, but also led their city so far from 
the general mood of the States. This demonstrates the strength of opposition the 
Prince's policies had engendered and the way that the Amsterdam regency could 
continue to rely on their burgomasters to take a strong line where necessary; the 
change of personnel was not likely to diminish this quality during a crisis. The 
most forceful argument was that war with France would be an economic disaster. 
The Amsterdammers still felt that they were trying to regain the ground and 
markets lost in 1672-74 and the exacerbation of these difficulties after the Peace of 
Westminster. Van Beuningen's firm belief in the continued neutrality of England 
and the failure of Charles II to recall Parliament added to these worries. 87 
The burgomasters were now operating with the kind of unity missing in the 1670s 
and therefore could be more sure of support. In 1678 Amsterdam had been just 
one of many members of the States of Holland pressing for peace, and although 
peace was pushed through in opposition to the Prince, it was the terms of the peace 
that were in question not the necessity for it - on which all sides professed to be 
agreed. In 1684 it was a straight conflict between military intervention or passive 
acquiescence of French manoeuvres. With agreement assured within Amsterdam, 
the ruling group became less consultative and more autocratic, relying less and less 
on the work of committees. The membership of the vroedschap had little choice of 
opposition leadership even if there had been major issues of dissent. For this 
reason this study does not look closely at the new members after 1680, most of 
86 
. 
Elias, Vroedschap, 1, p. CXXXI. 
". Frank-en, Van Beuningen, pp. 186-98. 
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whom would not have become fully active until the later 1680s anyway. 
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Chapter 8 
Lines of Communication between Amsterdam and the Prince 
In 1672 the Dutch Republic reinstated the Princes of Orange as stadholders after a 
period of government by the States General guided by the raadpensionalis. This 
twenty-year break in aristocratic representation at the highest level foundered 
principally on the failure of the De Witt's foreign policy and diplomacy. The 
invasion of the Republic in the early summer of 1672 may have been the trigger 
for the overthrow of De Witt, but the restoration of the Prince had been presaged 
since 1668 and coincided with the deterioration of relations between the Dutch and 
the French dating from the reimposition of heavy duties on Dutch exports to 
France. 
So far we have looked at the interests and motivations of the Amsterdam regency 
within the economic and political framework of the States of Holland during the 
1670s and 1680s. To the student of the Amsterdam regency this raises many 
interesting questions and hypotheses. But, for the student of the Dutch Republic 
and its contribution to European history in the late seventeenth century, it is 
necessary to take investigations a step further to attempt an analysis of the channels 
of communication between the regents and those working with the Prince of 
Orange to establish and implement foreign policy. The approach taken here will be 
to look in detail at some of the individual issues facing both groups and the roles 
played by Valckenier, Witsen, Fagel and van Beuningen in particular, but also 
others, setting the various relationships within the context of "events" closely 
relating the stages of war and peace to the chronology set in the earlier chapters. 
This chapter will draw largely on the contemporary accounts of Temple, D'Avaux 
and others and the records in the Fagel archive to show the shifts and balances 
between support for war or peace up to 1678 and for France, England or neither in 
the early 1680s. The crises of 1682 and 1684 will be dealt with by comment and 
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analysis rather than narrative, which can be drawn from other historians. ' 
This will extend the natural sequence to the issue which gave rise to the most 
frequent tensions and disagreements between the Prince and Amsterdam, the 
financing of military and naval expenditure, which will be further analysed in the 
next chapter. The changing relationship between the Prince and Amsterdam will 
be seen as each phase in the prevailing attitude among the Amsterdam regents 
emerges. 
Immediately after the iYetsverzetting, the relationship between Amsterdam and the 
Prince and the raadpensionails, Fagel, experienced a brief honeymoon period. 
Valckenier took office at the Gecommitteerde Raad for a few months and became 
the principal link between the city and the Prince. This did not last. Nevertheless, 
for a short time there was a real change in the government of Amsterdam which 
worked to the advantage of the Prince. The crisis summer months of 1672 had 
seen the consolidation of a group which saw the need to work for the elevation of 
the Prince of Orange and left the hardcore loyal Wittians vulnerable to reprisals 
(that is expulsion at the ivetsverzating) or to exclusion from the influential posts in 
the service of the city or the States. It has been seen that very few of the new 
members were of any immediate real influence, but were assumed to be packing on 
the side of the Prince and those who had chosen the Orangist way to defeat the 
French. Those who did control the power for the few months until the routine 
elections in the new year of 1673 were therefore drawn from members who had 
been active before 1672. 
In the normal course of events there were established channels of communication 
which were part of formal decision-making processes. The raadpensionaris of 
Holland was responsible for the implementation of the decisions of the States of 
Holland and representation at the States General by Holland included the 
1. Principally in Kurtz, Willem III en Amsterdam 1683-5; Franken, Coenraad van 
Beuninger? s politieke en diplomatieke aktiviteiten in de jaren 1667-84, pp. 204- 
237, and Baxter, William III, p. 190. 
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raadpensionaris using the widest range of his powers. In 1672 these powers gave 
the new raadpensionaris, Fagel, confirmation of the role at States General level 
which had been exercised by De Witt and his predecessors. The post of griffier, or 
administrative secretary to the States General, had already been held by Fagel since 
1670 and was subsumed within that of raadpensionaris after he succeeded De 
Witt. 2 Delft and Leiden made representations to the States of Holland that Ve 
raadpensionaris gechargeert is met definancies, met de correspondenties, en met 
de comparitie ter vergaderingh van de heeren Staten GeneraaL.. " Fruin saw this 
as "cen hervorming van geivicht: dfie ministers voor een; de raadpensionafis zou 
this in hoofdzaak slechis met de leiding der vergadering belast blijven. "' Therefore 
the new raadpensionaris had an official and influential role in both the States 
General and the States of Holland. Boogman has pointed out that the direction of 
foreign policy should strictly have been within the responsibilities of the griffler, as 
"director of the Chancery of the States General"; however, after describing how this 
role was taken over by the raadpensionaris during the stadholderless periods, he 
fails to note that Fagel's assumption of both posts after the fall of De Witt gave his 
executive powers more legitimacy than those of any other raadpensionariS. 4 The 
responsibilities of the raadpensionaris were detailed in the Instructie 
raadspensionaris in 1672. ' Fagel's work as griffier had prepared him well for the 
foreign policy role he was to take on two years later when in December 1670 the 
States General had resolved that the griffier should be present at, and record the 
resolutions of all the "besognes en konferenties bifivonen en op hun verzoek de 
gedeputeerden van advies dienen". 6 
2. The appointment of griffier was normally for life, Price, Holland and the Dutch 
Republic, p. 219. 
3 R. Fruin, Geschiedenis der Staatinstellingen in Nederland tot der val der 
Republiek, H. T. Colenbrander, ed. (The Hague, 1922), p. 295. 
4 Boogman, "Union of Utrecht", p. 397; see also Boogman, "The Raison dEtat 
Politician Johan De Witt", p. 60. 
Fruin, Geschiedenis der Staatinstellingen in Nederland, pp. 294-5. 
6. Frank-en, Coenraad van Beuningens politiek en diplomatieke aktiviteiten in de 
jaren 1667-84, pp. 31-2. Franken believes that this unusual knowledge of the 
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The post of griffier had been a promotion for Fagel from that of pensionary of 
Haarlem to which he had been appointed in 1664. Haarlem was known to be the 
most overtly Orangist of the Holland towns and therefore it could be assumed that 
Fagel was likely to have close sympathies with the Prince of Orange. ' At the same 
time the raadpensionafis was in theory at least the servant of the States of Holland 
and it was therefore imperative that he should have an adequate working 
relationship with the regents of Amsterdam, and the other representative towns. 
Much of the following discussion will be a consideration of how far Fagel was able 
to sustain both these roles during a period of considerable political changes 
responding to the demands of war, peace and economic security. 
Amsterdam's role in the normal decision-making process was as just one of the 
major Holland towns; in order of seniority Amsterdam came after Dordrecht, 
Haarlem, Delft and Leiden, but in order of wealth, interest and consequent 
influence Amsterdam was easily the most important. The method of arriving at 
decisions on straightforward matters of policy which would eventually be passed to 
the States General was similar to that for local administration, described in Chapter 
7 above! Sometimes this would involve a sub-committee comprising those with 
specialist knowledge, at others a decision would be reached at the meeting. 
The representative(s) of the vroedschap at the States of Holland would be notified 
of the decision and Amsterdam's views would be debated with the representatives 
of the other constituent towns. In most cases a majority view would be arrived at 
and passed in the same way to the States General. In some cases it was imperative 
affairs of the States General gave Fagel, whom he sees as "een voorstand 
politikus", a role in foreign policy which was above that normally associated with 
the office of grifflier, which served as a counter to De Witt. 
7. A. de Wicquefort, Histoire des Provinces-Unies, 1648-1679 (Amsterdam/Utrecht, 
1861-74), pp. 211-2, commented on De Witt's fears of a griffier being appointed 
from a town which "avait tousfours estj fort passion6e pour les interests de la 
Afaison d'Oranje". 
See Grever, The Structure of Decision Making, pp. 129 for a full description of 
the "normal" procedures, the critical, but routine, role of the grifflier being 
highlighted pp. 138-142. 
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that a unanimous decision was reached and if this was possible there would be no 
problem. Once decisions had been passed to the States General, the process of 
discussions between the representatives of the seven States would proceed to a final 
decision which would be implemented. ' 
However, more often than not the States were concerned with matters outside the 
"normal course of events" and this was particularly so in the 1670s and 1680s 
when these highly-structured decision-making processes became subject to other 
pressures. These might be, firstly, an urgency for immediate decisions brought 
about by the military or diplomatic situation. Secondly, it became common from 
1673 onwards for practice to revert to the different interests attempting to influence 
decisions at all levels. The Prince of Orange was one of the most powerful 
interests, but his role as stadholder of Holland and four of the other provinces was 
not a guarantee that the other members of the provincial States would necessarily 
support his policies. It was therefore important for him to attempt to ensure that he 
could use all the possible means at his disposal to influence those who were likely 
to have conflicting interests and to ensure that those normally loyal to the Orangist 
line remained so. As far as the States of Holland and Amsterdam in particular 
were concerned the obvious choice for influence of this kind was the 
raadpensionafis. 
The role of the madpensionafis had changed since the days of Oldenbarnevelt's 
tenure as Advocate and, in the first stadholderless period, De Witt had used the 
sovereignty of the States, particularly the States of Holland, to establish a central 
role which was effective without any higher power than the norninality of the 
States General. 
Israel, Dutch Republic, p. 276; Boogman, "Union of Utrecht", pp. 390-91: Clause 
9 of the Union - one of the three which became effective - spelt out the 
requirement for unanimity on decisions concerning war, truce, peace and financial 
burdens on the Generality. This clause informs Price's argument that the Union 
was essentially an alliance formed during the struggles against Spain, and that 
failure to agree unanimously put the Union into jeopardy, Price, Holland and the 
Dutch Republic, pp. 221-2 and 233. 
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William III had developed a shrewd understanding of the office of raadpensionalis 
through his daily contact with De Witt during his years as Child of State, and had 
seen how the foreign policy of the Republic had in effect already been taken over 
by De Witt, despite his nominal representation of the States of Holland only. By 
establishing a close relationship with De Witt's successor, William was ensuring 
greater success at working with those who might wish to perpetuate the regime of 
the first stadholderless period than if he relied for his influence on a clique of 
nobles who had no first hand experience of the politics and interests of the towns 
of Holland. In correspondence with his cousin Hendrik Casimir, he showed 
already in June 1672 that he appreciated the necessity of working with Amsterdam 
if he was to ensure their support for the war effort and also the difficulties inherent 
in a state which comprised provinces with very diverse interests. 'o At this stage 
William was exercising what Boogman has termed the "prudence of the Princes of 
Orange" who understood the necessity of giving "due consideration to the interests 
and wishes of the hegemonic province [of Holland]", " a characteristic clearly not 
demonstrated by his father in 1650. 
The nobles were of more significance on the international stage, where they could 
be seen as comparable to the ambassadorial representatives from monarchical states 
and, as the 1670s progressed, William began to send separate embassies to treat 
with foreign powers alongside those comprising representatives of the States. In 
1677 Bentinck was sent to England to represent the interests of the Prince 
alongside van Beuningen who was currently the accredited Dutch ambassador. But 
by this stage William was beginning to believe that the ambassador was an 
Amsterdammer first and a Dutchman second. 12 
The Prince of Orange did have a group of nobles with whom he worked closely 
". Groen van Prinsterer, ed., LArchives du Correspondance iniditj de la maison 
d'Orange-Nassaue (Utrecht, 1861), Letters mcxliv, p. 253 and mcxlvii, p. 255. 
". Boogman, "The Union of Utrecht", p. 402. 
12 
. Baxter, William III, p. 144. 
180 
and who represented his views where possible. Thus Odijk in Zeeland and 
Amerongen and van Reede van Renswoude in Utrecht, after the terms of re-entry 
to the Union had been devised in 1674, " could normally be relied on to push for 
the Prince's interest, and many of his military advisers were drawn from the 
nobility like Bentinck, Dijkveld and the German Count von Waldeck. 14 However, 
he was unable to make unilateral policy with any "Secret Committee" on issues of 
outstanding importance to the States. Negotiations were of course conducted in 
secret on matters of foreign policy and these were conducted by various ad hoc 
committees which appear to have been given titles arbitrarily by those commenting 
on their activities. It would appear that in the mid-1670s there was a 
Coninfittecrde lot de Sccrcte Besognes van Slaal which received reports on military 
progress and was consulted about the difficulties of persuading Friesland to 
contribute to military resourcing in 1675.1' On 19 June 1674, the Amsterdam 
pensionary, Cornelis Hop, alludes to the discussion of a "Secret Committee for 
Foreign Affairs" about the Baltic treaties. " But the nature of this committee does 
not seem to have been one of decision-mak-ing, but rather of recommendation. 
That their deliberations were communicated to the Amsterdam pensionary and then 
discussed in the i-rocdschaj), where Amsterdam gave its approval to the 
recommendation, would seem to point to the committee having met for purposes 
approved by the States General. Cornelis Hop, as pensionary of Amsterdam was 
obviously privy to secret negotiations during this period. As early as 1673 he was 
handling secret correspondence about the negotiations for an alliance with 
Denmark. " 
Roorda, Villiam III and the Utrecht Government Regulation, p. 107. 
Israel, Dutch Republic, p. 822. 
N. Japiksc. ed., Owrespondentie van Willem III en van Hans Willem Bentinck 
(1932). Part 11, p. 34. No. 36. 
O. A. Amsterdam. Register op het Reccuil van Tractatan van Cornelis Hop 
pensionaris van Amsterdam 1666-1680, nr. 65,19 June 1674. 
17. Ibid.. nr. 64,4 February 1673. 
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Their deliberations may have been secret, but the outcome of these deliberations 
were not implemented without further consultation. Quite who had the greatest 
influence within these committees seems to have varied. In 1675, while there were 
still some vestiges of support for the Prince's military policy remaining, Temple 
alleged that the "Commissioners of Secret Affairs" were "timorous of acting 
anything in the absence of both Prince and Pensioner, without being instructed in 
either of their minds". " However, after the peace, when the tensions between 
Amsterdam and the Prince were being increased over the negotiations for alliances 
with England or France, Temple's replacement, Sidney, reported on 8 July 1680 
that the Prince was sure the committee of the "deputies for forreigne affaires" 
would not agree Fagel's suggestion that their proposals should be pushed through 
without further consultation. "' A few months later Sidney refers to this committee 
as "Secret Committee for Foreigne Affaires" when they wanted to talk to him. He 
put them off on grounds of ill health and Fagel and another member [Munro] were 
deputed to go to see him. " It is therefore clear that these committees were 
instrumental in forming policy, but that the relative influence of their membership, 
whether the representatives of the States or the Prince and Fagel, fluctuated 
according to wider issues. Unlike his grandfather, Frederik Hendrik, William III 
does not seem to have had the sole power of patronage for membership of 
committees established to discuss foreign policy. Consequently, such committees, 
having several masters were more likely to be circumspect about making 
recommendations without further consultations. 
To the Prince of Orange Amsterdam was largely an unknown quantity. He made 
only rare visits to the city during the course of these thirteen years, culminating in 
his abortive week-long effort in 1683 to gain the burgomasters' support for his 
18. Temple, Works, Vol. IV, p. 247. 
'The deputies 
... will not do so without consulting their principals and that there 
are likely to be difficulties with Holland. Fagel doubts if Amsterdam agrees but 
no feares of other towns if Amsterdam agrees... ". P. R. O., SP 84/215, f. 283. 
". P. R. O. SP 84/216. U65.5 December 1680. 
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foreign policy, " and he never really came to terms with the burgomasters. His 
distrust of the motives of the city led to the breach with van Beuningen by the end 
of the 1670s and the consequent gradual undermining of the latter's diplomatic 
status. This was in the face of the evidence that the experience of van Beuningen 
on overseas missions had confirmed his anti-French bias, which was more in tune 
with the policy of the Prince than that of the majority of the Amsterdam regency 
and the Holland towns. 
The Prince never managed to negotiate directly with Valckenier, when the latter 
was arguably the most powerful regent in all of Holland, if not the Republic, but 
had to use the raadpensionarls, Fagel, as a go-between. As early as 29 October 
1672 this role was clearly established with direct communication between Fagel 
and Valckenier over the provisioning of troops. " On the whole, however, Fagel 
was more likely in these early years after the ivelsverzating to communicate with 
van Beuningen over issues relating to Amsterdam's views on foreign policy. But 
when the Prince's disaffecfion with van Beuningen began to grow as he blamed 
him for the opposition of Amsterdam, the relationship between the raadpensionaris 
and van Beuningen also began to falter. 23 So much is tantalisingly unclear about 
Fagel because of the illegibility of his hand and the consequent loss of his extant 
archive, but there are glimpses of the man who was able to set up working 
relations with Valckenier for a couple of years and later with Witsen throughout 
the crisis years in the early 1680s, and in between to maintain a flow of 
communication between The Hague and Amsterdam. However, even Fagel does 
not seem to have always been able to maintain good relations with the Amsterdam 
regents. During the six day "farce" in 1683 he undermined the bridges he had 
built by threatening the regents with another ivelsverzetting if they did not agree to 
21. Baxter, William 111, p. 189. 
22. A. R. 11. CollectieFagel. m. 1947,29 October 1672. 
13. Franken, Coenraad van Beuninizem politiek en diplomalieke aktivileiten in de 
jaren 1667-84. p. 134-5. 
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the Prince's request for additional troops. "' William Carr, the English consul who 
summed up the Amsterdam vrocdschap so simplistically, also had a description for 
Fagel: 
'Lastly I am to name Pens Fagel who is a man of good parts, but 
short of John De Witt, yet stumbles threw all the grand affares + 
bissness concernes relating to this States... "2' 
If Fagel "stumbled through the affairs of state", he did so very effectively from 
time to time. Mostly he did succeed in keeping the balance between the Prince 
and Amsterdam by judicious use of appropriate and varied personnel at times when 
both were building intransigent stands. 
Elias described Fagel as Valckenier's "alter ego" in the 1660s, but Elias was 
writing a history of Amsterdam over a broad period and saw Fagel as an 
instrument of the downfall of De Witt from the States side rather than the 
vroct/schapiwn of the towns. '6 However, the other implication of such a 
description is of a devious politician in Valckenier's mould and not therefore one 
who would "stumble". Once again it is Carr's understanding which is exposed and 
therefore, interesting as his letter is as a rare example of an English interpretation 
of the details of the administration of Amsterdam and the States in the 1670s and 
1680s, its value is very limited. 
Sir William Temple was a little less definite in his interpretation of the role of 
Fagel. In 1674, during the early days of his last embassy to the Dutch Republic he 
wrote to Coventry that "I find the pensioner is the great man here, and acts all 
under the Prince's influence, though not without some distaste among the richer 
sort of people in the towns". " The, almost throwaway, remark about the "richer 
". Baxter, William 111, p. 189. 
2S. Caff to Blaythwayt. 21 March 1681 (Appendix 11). 
2'. Elias, Geschiedenis, p. 168. 
27. Temple. Worksvol. IV. p. 29. 
1ý I 
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sort of people in the towns" recalls the status consciousness of the regent classes, 
echoing the strength of the Geelvinck's insult to Valckenier about his 
grandparentage. " Fagel came from a Haarlem family which had a tradition of 
service as anibachishcren, but it was not until later in the Republic that they 
generally reached regent status, and therefore his promotion would have been 
looked at with some disfavour by many. 2' Later, in his memoirs, Temple was more 
definite and complimentary to Fagel "whose love to his country made him a lover 
of the Prince, as believing it could not be saved by any other hand, and whose zeal 
to his own religion made him an enemy irreconcilable to France, whose professions 
as well as designs were to destroy it". " And while talking about the peace 
negotiations at Nijmegen, he gives his opinion that together Fagel and the Prince 
worked with a skill and understanding of politics/foreign affairs that was second 
only to that demonstrated a decade earlier by De Witt, " and repeating this later 
when he said only William and Fagel "had so full a grasp of the business in 
Holland, as to make a true judgement of what the general sentiments there would 
determine. 02 
Once again Temple's view is more generous than that of D'Avaux, whose 
relationship with the raadpensionaris was frequently confrontational and often 
frustrating to the French aims. The French ambassador grudgingly admired the 
political manoeuvring of Fagel, but frequently felt that he was being thwarted by 
him. D'Avaux was not negotiating directly with the Prince of Orange, but was 
See above pp. 151-152. 
. N. Japikse. Het Archief van do Familie Fagel, p. 5. 
Temple, Ilorks, Vol. 11. p. 263. 
Ibid, Vol. IT, p. 391-2. Frank-en, Coenraad van Beuningenly politieke en 
diplontatieke aktiviteiten in dejaren 1667-84, p. 34 posits the possibility that 
together William and Fagel were in fact more powerful than De Witt. 
Ibid.. p. 477, another English observer commented on the closeness of the Prince 
and Fagel at the same time noting that among his circle of close friends, "all these 
men. that are most in favour with the Prince, are divided into factions amongst 
themselves. Fagels relyes only upon the Prince". M. Lane. ed., "A Relation of the 
present state of affaires ... '. p. 313. 
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expected to deal with the raadpensionails. On one of the rare occasions he did 
speak with the Prince alone, it was a polite interchange, leading to a further 
meeting with Fagel. " D'Avaux had already grasped that the Prince's position was 
not comparable to that of a monarch and that he could not act without the consent 
of the States. 34 Ile understood that the Prince relied heavily on Fagel to ensure his 
policies and believed that Fagel was capable of persuading the regents in most of 
the towns; he also had great faith in his own abilities and undertook a similar 
strategy of approaching the representatives of all the Holland towns in The Hague 
to influence them against the Prince and the raadpensionarlS. 35 The mutual 
suspicion aroused during the inconclusive negotiations after Nijmegen inevitably 
led to greater use of informants by both Fagel and the French ambassador. 
Frequently Fagel used normal routes of communication with the Amsterdam 
burgomasters. For example in December 1673, during the conflict over subsidies 
to Brunswick-Luneburg, he took an intermediary role, " and again after the Peace 
of Westminster in 1674, he worked through van Beuningen to gain Amsterdam's 
support for subsides to Brandenburg. 17 However Fagel also had a network of 
agents working within Amsterdam to inform him of not only day to day affairs, but 
also of links with France and Friesland. It is also clear that he had "spies" 
elsewhere as well. One of these, Van Heukelom, was sending the raadpensionaris 
copies of code names and instructions on how to read them in 1679, " and evidence 
of his handwriting was still being used in 1684, by which time he appears to have 
been working in Amsterdam as well. Although one of the letters is filed 
"ontbekcnde", it is almost certainly in Van Heukelom's hand and advises Fagel to 
DAvaux. Nigociations, p. 37. 
Ibid., p. 3940. 
Ibid., p. 28. 
C. L. Grose, "The Anglo-Dutch Alliance of 1678", E. H. R.. Vol. xxxix (1924), p. 
118. 
Ibid.. pp. 119 and 125; see also below Chapter 9, p. 
A. R. H. Collectie FaSel, nr. 1972, Van Heukelom to Fagel, 29 December 1679. 
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be cautious about using the information he is passing on about the French 
Ambassador DAvaux's visit to the house of Madame Buasson in Amsterdam. A 
further undated note, possibly in the same hand adds, that "Il est sieu que M 
L'anibassadeur awit insue a messieurs dAmsterdant de demander le rappel des 
troupl)cs, a qu`il ai-ait esperer qu'ils cnftrvour Paproprosition dans la derneir 
assemble, it semple presenter quiii doute que la chose puisse veusser, cependant... 
The French may not have been written by a native speaker and if doubt is cast on 
Van Heukelom's authorship, then it merely confirms the breadth of Fagel's network 
of agentS. 39 In January 1684 he received a letter from Henrick Helt (which is the 
only one discovered from this particular correspondent) which refers to 
communications between Jakob Hop and D'Avaux: 
"De Heer Hop pcnsionaris van Amsterdam geduring converseert end 
correspondaerl met Alons. le Conile dAvaux gemeenlijck ollime den 
2+3 dag incognito dog handt hem nit als een weinig geretereenrd 
voor sijn persoon doende hel meerendeel bij bcslolen geschfiften den 
voom. Hop heefi cen gistercn persoonlijck dag gisteren hij 
geschrifie ten hitis van do cergen ambassadeur geiveest. "0 
D'Avaux's visits to the houses of various women were also reported to Fagel by 
one J. Bossier and particularly during July and August 1684 to mevrouw van 
Gravenanen, who was possibly later referred to as "madame "4' Reports of 
D'Avaux's activities were at times taken more seriously. In 1682 the rumour that a 
French bom person had been offered money by D'Avaux, then resident in 
Amsterdam, to write a book against "hooghte gedachle syn Majesteit", "Le Louis 
d'Or Exccule" was raised in the States of Holland. This was all denied by 
D'Avaux, who claimed not even to be in Amsterdam. The States of Holland 
resolved not to make anything of it. 42 The most serious issue was of course the 
infamous letters scandal of 1684 which precipitated the crisis of confidence in 
Ibid., nrs. 1996 and 1998. 
]bid., nr. 1994, Ifelt to Fagel, 29 January 1684. 
41 
Ibid., nr. 2000, Bossier to Fagel, various, July/August 1684. 
42 Res. 11oll., 12 May 1682. 
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Amsterdam's role by the Prince and the majority of the States representatives. 
The interception of D'Avaux's correspondence with Louis XIV, which made public 
his contacts within Amsterdam was a colourful incident within the bitter arguments 
raging between the Prince and elements within the States of Holland over the 
raising of a further 16,000 men to meet further possible French threats in the 
Spanish Netherlands. Although, the quarrel between William and Amsterdam was 
of an extreme nature, other Holland towns, notably Leiden, Delft and eventually 
Rotterdam, also opposed the military proposis. "' 
One of the most ubiquitous of Fagel's agents was De Wildt, whose official role was 
secretary to the VaC. He was working directly to Fagel as early as 1673 and 
wrote to him on 15 May and 29 May 1673 shortly after his arrival in Amsterdam 
about equipping ships and the possibilities for contributions from the States. "' He 
reported that Zeeland and Groningen were being difficult, but that Amsterdam 
would pay if Groningen did. Again, on I June 1673 de Wildt reported further 
about the affairs of Amsterdam to Fagel, and later (I I October) on the equipping of 
six warships for Tobago. De Wildt was reporting directly on the decision of the 
vroedschap, but why did Fagel need someone, who did not have an official role 
within the vroedschap, to report separately on decisions and actions within 
Amsterdam? 
The information which he was passing on was not of any particular significance 
and ought to have been readily available to the raadpcnsionarls through regular 
channels, but de Wildt seemed able to range from Admiralty business to 
Amsterdam's trade in the Mediterranean and the West Indies, as well as the day-to- 
Kurtzs definitive work. William III en Amsterdam, has provided a useful source 
for this crisis, and her examination of the current pamphlet literature demonstrates 
the level of propaganda which it created. See also, Franken, Coenraad van 
Beuningen! politieke en diplomatieke aktiviteiten in de jaren 1667-84, pp. 220- 
238. and Israel, Dutch Republic, pp. 830-834. 
A. R. H. Gecommitteerde Raad van Staten van Holland na 1572, nr. 1.0501, De 
Wildt to Fagel, 15 May 1677. 
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day activities of the vroedschap. " He also established an effective line of 
communication between Fagel and the secretary to the English Ambassador, Roger 
Meredith, which brought the English interpretation of the activities of the French 
ambassadors, D'Estrades and DAvaux, to the raadpensionalls's notice. " However 
minor or irrelevant the information they transmitted, Fagel does seem to have seen 
the need to establish trusted agents in many areas in order to secure his acquisition 
of appropriate information. Their length of service would seem to point to a faith 
in their ability and presumably to their receiving appropriate compensation for their 
labours. 
In May 1678 de Wildt was still reporting to Fagel, but this time on the strong 
relations between Amsterdam and Friesland again on military resources, and a few 
months later (5 August) discussing the attempts to draw Friesland into line about 
military provisioning. " This was probably of greater significance than some of his 
earlier reports as the relationship between Amsterdam and Friesland was to become 
of importance during the post-war period and the determination of foreign policy. 
By the autumn de Wildt was in The Hague still holding out hopes that the 
problems with Friesland would be resolved. But a month later he was back in 
Amsterdam negotiating with the Heer Burmamini en Camstra and again on 17 
October, writing about the Zeeland decision on the same business, enclosing a 
letter from Burmamini about the deputation from Friesland. "' 
Fagel appears to have suffered from "convenient" illness at critical times when he 
would either absent himself or be unavailable for meetings. He was also not 
- A. R. H. Collectie Fagel, nr. G. A. Amsterdam, Collectie Witsen, nr. 180, E21 1, 
1960, De Wildt to Fagel [undated] 1677. 
P. R. O., SP 84.215 (1679). f. 85. Meredith's information about D'Estrades' visit to 
Amsterdam in 1679 could not however be discovered to be of any moment as he 
appeared to be doing no more than arranging a family marriage. Ibid., f. 136 and 
138. De Wildt was updating Meredith about the provision of arms for Ireland 
through a Scottish catholic merchant based in Amsterdam. 
R. A. Collectie Fagel. nr. 1967, De Wildt to Fagel, 30 May 1678.. 
Ibid.. De Wildt to Fagel, 28 August 1678; De Wildt to Fagel, 17 October 1678.. 
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necessarily in complete agreement with the Prince, particularly during the 
negotiations at Nijmegen, when he saw that there was a probability that the only 
outcome would be the conclusion of a separate peace between France and the 
Dutch, ignoring the rest of the allies and particularly the interests of Spain and the 
security of the Spanish Netherlands. "' 
One of the most pitiable victims of Fagel's convenient periods of inaccessibility 42 
was the Count van Waldeck, who was brought into the service of the Prince and 
the Dutch army by William in 1672. We have seen that Waldeck had had his 
struggles with the Amsterdam regency in 1673, but they were as nothing compared 
with his continued efforts to meet with Fagel to push his own interests from 1675 
to 1678. 
On 20 December 1675 Waldeck wrote to Fagel to say how sorry he was he was ill 
and they could not meet, and to remind him of his undertaking to protect his 
interest and an outstanding payment of 6,000 francs. " On 9 June 1676 Waldeck 
was still bemoaning his lack of luck in getting a meeting with Fagel, but 
continuing to remind him of his presence. " By 1677 Waldeck was more plaintive; 
he had just missed Fagel again and urged the raadpcnsionafis, notwithstanding the 
important business which Waldeck knew that he had to deal with, to turn his 
attention to the business with the Frisian stadholder. 52 There was a continual flow 
of correspondence between the two; it appears that it was only personal contact that 
could not be made by Waldeck. Much of the correspondence clearly shows that 
Fagel was the accepted channel of communication between Waldeck and the 
Prince. 
This difference of opinion was noted by the English ambassador, Temple, Works, 
11, pp. 391-2. 
A. R. 11. Collcctie FaSel. ar. 1956. Waldeck to Fagel, 20 December 1675. 
Ibid, nr. 1958. Waldeck to Fagel, 9 June 1676. 
IML. nr. 1961, Waldeck to Fagel, 20 November[? ] 1677. 
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Was Fagel deliberately avoiding Waldeck? Perhaps because there was nothing he 
could do for him, or perhaps because he did not believe that his business at this 
time was of particular importance, and could be dealt with elsewhere, or perhaps 
because he simply did not want to put himself face-to-face with someone with 
whom discussions were bound to lead to conflict. To an English observer it was 
clear that "C. de Waldeck and the Pensioner cannot agree". " Whatever the truth of 
this relationship, by June 1678 Waldeck was playing the sick card himself and 
writing to Fagel urgently requesting his intervention in the peace negotiations at 
Nijmegen. "' A month later Waldeck had had enough and felt it would be unwise 
for him to continue in office while affairs were "si deficat". " 
However, Fagel's illnesses were not necessarily discriminatory. In 1676 Witsen 
wrote to Valckenier reporting that he was not able to speak to Fagel "omdal de Hr. 
raadpensionaris onpassilijke is, heb ick hen ... later koomen spreken aen desen 
middag, ivat lot Amsterdam is gepasseert lopende dif Calvinsite saeck, heb ik hem 
bekent gemactsh lot bij legging van op geldend 56 
No-one was more aware of the tensions between Amsterdam and the Prince in the 
1680s than the French ambassador D'Avaux, who publicised them with the glee 
that all political divisions are exposed by enemies. " Most of his information was 
drawn directly from his own contacts within the administration of the city. He 
encouraged the idea of remonstrant republicans working to undermine the Prince 
and was clearly in close contact with the pensionary Jakob Hop in Amsterdam in 
the 1680s. However, even D'Avaux underestimated the real balance of power 
Lane, ed., "A Relation of the present state of affaires ... ", p. 313. 
A. R. H. Collectie Fagel, nr. 1969, Waldeck to Fagel, 12 July 1678. 
$5. Ibid. Waldeck to Fagel, 15 July 1678. 
16 
. G. A. Amsterdam, Collectie Witsen, f. 158, Witsen to Valckenier, 20 [dese? ] 1676. 
57 
. D'Avaux, Negociations, p. 109, where he expresses satisfaction with his arminian 
agent's contacts even after the death of Valckenier, although by March 1681 this 
satisfaction had waned and he felt it necessary to make personal contact with 
Friesland and Groningen and report back to Amsterdam himself. 
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within the republic. He confidently led his king to believe that Amsterdam would 
remain aloof from William's militarism and failed to foresee that an incident like 
the captured letters in 1684 would render a critical, although by no means fatal 
blow to Amsterdam's reputation in the States of Holland. " He had intervened to 
strengthen the links between Amsterdam and Friesland and Groningen and in the 
early 1680s he had used an arminian cleric as his agent in Amsterdam to form 
close contacts with "two or three regents who had been in league with Valckenier 
in 1672.9 
Jakob Hop was the son of Cornelis, who was pensionary for Amsterdam until 
1675. Cornelis Hop had been introduced to Amsterdam politics in 1666 by 
Valckenier. He was the first member of his family to be educated and started a 
family tradition of working as paid officials with an influential role in civic and 
States politics, but continuing to be dependent on the patronage of their masters. 
Hop's biographer in the Nieuwe Nederlandsche Biografische Woordenboek claims 
that from 1667 to 1675 Hop "bleef... de voornaaniste ambtenaar der machtigste 
stad.. tý60 As a servant of Valckenier he has been seen as an instrument of the 
wetsverzetting and yet by 1675, when he was deputed to the Hoogen Raad, he was 
effectively out of office and complaining bitterly that Valckenier had always been 
against him. But his new appointment, drawing on his correspondence with the 
Prince and his advisers in the early years of the war gave him the opportunity to 
extend the range of influence open to both himself and, later, his son Jakob. 
Jakob Hop's (1654-1725) career in Amsterdam lasted from 1680, when he was 
appointed pensionary until 1687, when he entered William III's service as 
ambassador until 1700. From 1700 until his death in 1725, he was Thesauris 
General. The family connections continued the tradition of service to the States: 
D'Avaux, Negociations, p. 3 1, in which he boasts of his success in bringing all the 
towns of Holland against the policies of the Prince and Fagel. 
59. Ibid., p. 102. 
60 
. 
Nieuwe Nederlandsche Biografische Woordenboek, III, nr. 600. 
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his sons were also ambassadors and his nephew became secretary to the Raad van 
Staat and also Thesauris General. 
Jakob's first position was in Leiden in 1675 and he then went with Van Beveming's 
embassy to Louis XIV's camp at Gent, extending his own range of experience at 
the same time as his father's career was being forced into other spheres. He 
returned to Amsterdam after the Peace of Nijmegen. 
Hop's biographer Den Tex is fulsome in his praise of Hop's person and character 61 
and, although it is clear that it was the crisis of 1683-84 which brought Hop into 
the limelight, Den Tex does not give much evidence of his activities before he 
entered the service of the Prince. This may have been because the career of Hop 
before 1685 had a distinct French link - no doubt first established during van 
Beverning's embassy. 6' It was his expertise in dealing with the crisis between 
Amsterdam and the Prince which seems to have brought him to the attention of the 
Prince. 
In 1682 he was talking personally with the Prince and reported back to the city 
about a conversation during which he had succeeded in getting the Prince's 
patronage for Captain Sekerij of Amsterdam in the face of competition from 
representations from Leiden, Haarlem and Gouda. "' 
The other Amsterdammer who was also constantly in the service of the States, 
Boreel, had his own line of communication with his native city during the 
negotiations at Nijmegen in 1678. In August he entrusted his messages to a 
61. Den Tex, p. 77-8. 
N. N. W. B., Vol. 111,613, notes the apparent volte-face in Hop's allegiances in 1685: 
ffmaar nadat sinds 1685 de betrekking er tusschen Amsterdam en den prins veel 
beterden kwam ook in Hop's verhouding tot Willem verandering, en spoedig werd 
hij een der bekwaamste medearbeiders aan het verbond tegen Lodewijk Mr. 
63 
. G. A. Amsterdam, Collectie Witsen, nr. 180, f. 228. 
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Frenchman named d'Aguerres who was married to an Amsterdammer. " Once 
again the element of French involvement in the communication of information to 
and from Amsterdam is demonstrated. 
By 1684 Amsterdam was virtually out on a limb but it can be seen from a 
pamphlet published during that year that the city was as yet far from bending its 
will to others. " It is written in the form of a fictitious dialogue between an 
"Haagenaer" and an Amsterdammer, in which the former expresses surprise that 
the latter dares to show his face. The Amsterdammer defends himself saying that 
the people cannot be blamed for the politics of their regents but then adds that he 
does however believe in the wisdom of these regents. Later on, he asserts that 
Amsterdam has the right, by virtue of its major financial contribution to the States, 
not to be overruled by all the smaller towns. These were the kind of postures 
which merely confirmed the Prince's view of the city. 
The "wise regents" praised in this pamphlet were those who had established 
themselves as a far less divided group after the deaths of first Hooft and then 
Valckenier in the two years after the Peace of Nijmegen. Principal among them 
were Hudde and Witsen who, as we have seen in Chapter 7, had consolidated their 
reputations and experience during the troubled 1670s without incurring censure 
from either their fellow regents or the Prince's closest advisers. The poor relations 
between the Prince and van Beuningen which had steadily worsened during the 
latter years of the 1670s, endowed the elderly regent with the role of scapegoat for 
any Amsterdam policy which ran counter to that of the Prince. This allowed 
Witsen to continue to make the most of the intermediary role which he had been 
cultivating since his initial representative post in The Hague at the Gecomilteerde 
G. A. Amsterdam, Arch. Burg., nr. 351,1 August 1678. This is presumably the 
"French Agent Mons. de Guerr" referred to by Carr in his letter of 21 March 1681 
(Appendix 11), who together with "Mon Chaubert the French consul doe make 
often feasts + presents amongst the Duch... " 
Knuttel 12161, "Discours Tusschen twee wel-meenende Patrioten wegens dese 
legenwoordige verschillen zijnde d'een een Hagenaar, en dander een 
Amsterdammer". 
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Raad in 1674. 
By following a career very different from that of Valckenier who had only once 
taken up a representative post in The Hague, Witsen was able to make himself 
known as more than just a proponent of Amsterdam's policy. Therefore a more 
conciliatory relationship grew up between the Prince and Witsen, whom the former 
used to good effect in disputes not concerning Amsterdam, but in matters 
concerning the city Witsen, like van Beuningen, would still put its interests first 
and in these cases, the Prince was still more likely to use Fagel as an intermediary. 
A brief survey of the range of issues and personages with whom Witsen dealt 
during the 1670s and early 1680s will serve to argue the case for the important role 
he played in the delicate diplomacy between Amsterdam and the Prince which 
finally allowed the crisis of 1684 to be relegated to the background as events 
moved to the expedition to England at the end of 1688. 
As early as 1675, when Witsen was still a fairly junior member of the vroedschap, 
his interest was sought by those seeking to influence policy. While Valckenier, 
Hudde, Trip and Oudsthoorn were disagreeing with van Beuningen over the 
benefits of a possible alliance with England, van Beuningen thought it worth his 
while to try to win Witsen over to his point of view. Clearly, he did not feel that 
the younger man was bound to go along with his sponsor, Valckenier, but that he 
had a mind that was open to reasonable argument in the interests of Amsterdam. " 
The following year Witsen was drawn into the Momma dispute as an intermediary 
between the protagonists and was writing to Valckenier telling him about his 
meeting with Fagel about Vit Calviniste saeck"67 But, at the same time as 
prosecuting the Prince's interests in 1679, Witsen had also been identified by the 
burgomasters as the man most likely to convince Fagel that the burgomasters had 
66. Grose "The Anglo-Dutch Alliance of 1678", pp. 172-73. 
17 
. See above p. 190, note 56. 
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done all they could to support the work at Naarden. The latter no doubt fell within 
his remit as representative at the Gecommilteerde Raad, but the former task would 
have been allocated on merit, as it was reviving old sores which needed a delicate 
touch. Together they show the breadth of experience and respect which he had 
acquired in a relatively short time. Some of this may have been by default because 
of the comparative failings of the Amsterdam regents themselves to prolong the 
period of conciliation with the Prince beyond 1674. " 
By 1678, when Witsen had returned to Amsterdam he was in conversation with 
Fagel about disputes between the Admiralty of Amsterdam and the Bewindhebbers 
of the VO. C, '5' and in August 1679 he was once again acting on behalf of the 
burgomasters in correspondence with the Prince over his wishes to develop the 
71 defences at Naarden. On this occasion he was not arguing Amsterdam's 
willingness to support the extension of the fortifications, but was conveying their 
displeasure at further military expenditure, which they had so forcefully stated in 
71 Amsterdam. 
During the next few years of peace, reconstruction and negotiations for alliances, 
Witsen played a central role in all aspects of these issues which touched on 
Amsterdam's interests. He took an active role in the improvements to the city with 
the building of the new bridges and sluice. " In an undated letter from Witsen to 
Fagel (although clearly from the 1681-1682 period) he put forward the traditional 
arguments about the importance of shipping and its continuation, with reference to 
the losses of slaves. He argued strongly that the role of the Admiralty must be 
Gebhard, Witsen, p. 130, argues that Witsen's experience at the Gecommitteerde 
Raad brought him into closer contact with Fagel and the Prince just as the breach 
was growing between them and Valckenier in 1676. 
G. A. Amsterdam, Arch. Burg., nr. 351,2 January 1678. 
Gebhard, Witsen, pp. 161-65. 
See above pp. 132-133. 
Gebhard, Witsen, pp. 190-91. 
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made to work and was looking for a favourable answer and an understanding of the 
need for convoys, without which there could be no real security. 73 
Concurrently he was talking to the Prince about his views on the possibility of a 
new treaty with Spain. Witsen was careful not to commit himself, but gave 
warning that an alliance with Spain would cause a complete rift with France; this 
was quite clearly arguing for the interests of Amsterdam on the preservation of 
good relations with France. 74 But this was not his only foray into diplomatic 
relations at this time; he was also acting as go-between for Fagel and the imperial 
resident, Crampricht. 75 
On II May 1679 Witsen had written to Valckenier after discussions with Odijk, 
warning about the deteriorating relations between the Prince and Amsterdam. " The 
descent into open dispute between the Prince and Amsterdam in 1684, while 
obviously placing Witsen clearly in the opposing camp from the Prince's point of 
view, did not undermine the respect with which he was held. Witsen had 
established good relations with van Sevenaer of Friesland and had discussions with 
the peace group in Friesland, and with D'Avaux. " He also began to question 
William's influence over the States General. And yet, despite being one of the 
major contacts with the Frisian leaders, with whom Amsterdam were now clearly 
allied in the cause against the apparent militarism of the Prince, he was still 
accepted as the principal negotiator with Fagel and the Prince in the attempts to 
restore unity within the States. 78 
". G. A. Amsterdam, Collectie Witsen, f. 146, Witsen to Fagel, undated. 
74 
. Gebhard, Witsen, p. 207. 
". Ibid., p. 208. 
76. G. A. Amsterdam, Collectie Witsen, f. 164, Odijk to Wisten, II May 1679. 
77 
. Gebhard, Witsen, p. 210. 
78 Amsterdam, Res. Vroed. 24 August 1684; on 25 August 1684 Witsen received 
instructions for a meeting on 30 August to search for "... eenigheit inde Staat" and 
'ý.. goede correspondentie met zijne Hoogheit", G. A. Amsterdam, Collectie 
Hudde; Gebhard, Witsen, p. 209-10 for a discussion of the relations with van 
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The chronology of the wars can also be followed through the Vroedschap 
Resoluties, States of Holland Resolutions and States General Resolutions and 
through British and French histories. There is no shortage of references on actual 
incidents and different interpretations among historians such as Jones and Baxter. 79 
But by looking at the issues relating to these incidents from the point of view of 
the decision-makers motivation becomes clearer. Indicative are the Staat van 
Oorlogh (every December); responses to requests for money; committees within 
Amsterdam and correspondence with representatives on embassies or at The Hague 
either in the States of Holland or the States General. The first three of these will 
be dealt with in the following chapter. The final one will only be looked at insofar 
as Amsterdammers were directly involved; as representative of Amsterdam at The 
Hague or on embassies, van Beuningen had, as we have seen, a crucial role. 
Sevenaer of Friesland and his discussions with the peace group in Friesland with 
D'Avaux, and beginning to question William's influence over the States General. 
'9. Jones, The Anglo-Dutch Wars; Baxter, William 111. 
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Chapter 9 
Amsterdam and States Policy: 1672-84 
in the previous chapter we have seen how the regents of Amsterdam and the 
raadpensionafis Fagel worked within the cumbersome structure of the United 
Provinces central government by establishing working relationships at the 
appropriate level. This chapter will take this further and set the changes in 
Amsterdam's policy within the context of the decision-making processes of the 
central government, that is, the foreign policy as articulated by the States General 
and/or the Prince of Orange. 
Price has argued that the role of the States General was "co-ordinating" rather than 
"governing". ' If this was indeed the case, the strength of the position of the States 
of Holland was certainly reinforced by the physical closeness of their meetings in 
2 The Hague. Communications between Amsterdam and The Hague were daily, 
while the States of Holland were meeting and they had immediate contact with 
their permanent representatives at the States General. We have also seen that the 
decision-making processes of the States were not necessarily strictly adhered to and 
that, although the ideology underlying the Union had led to a policy of unanimity 
on decisions of war, truce and military finance, circumvention of this had been 
effective from time to time. ' Among the methods used was that of packing the 
committees with those members most likely to support the proposed policy, and 
providing the States General with little more to do than acquiesce in the advices 
I 
. 
Price, Holland and the Dutch Republic, p. 220. 
The advantages of the South Holland towns, including Amsterdam, Leiden, Delft, 
Rotterdam and Gouda, and their proximity to The Hague were strengthened by 
their privileges as being the majority of the eight permanent representatives on the 
Gecommitteerde Raad, K. W. J. M. Bossaers, "Van Kintsbeen aan ten Staatkunde 
Opgewesen", Bestuur en Bestuurder van het noordkwartier in de achttiende eeuw. 
Hollandse Historische Reeks 25 (Den Haag, 1996), pp. 74-5; J. L. Price, 
"Rotterdam Patriciate", pp. 31-2. 
Grever, "The Structure of Decision-Making", has demonstrated this by drawing on 
particular examples from De Witt's period as raadspensionaris, pp. 142-152. 
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forwarded to them. ' 
For the purposes of this study, the process of decision-making is of less importance 
in itself than the interests applied to, and the outcomes of, that process. The 
rationale behind the policies formulated by the Amsterdam regents, and their 
opposition, or sometimes grudging concessions, to the policies of the Prince and 
the States General are the principal issue. The relative influences within the States 
of Holland are under consideration here rather than whether the States operated a 
majority, consensus, or unanimous system of voting on particular issues. What 
eventually went forward for implementation at States General level was the 
culmination of the various forces at work within the States of Holland. The Prince, 
as first noble, with control of the fidderschap vote, and influence in several of the 
leading towns and more generally among the minor towns, could not however seek 
to sway the whole of the assembly through representative channels only. The 
raadpensionaris, in the person of Fagel, was without doubt the most influential 
official in the States of Holland, and had confirmed the role of his office within the 
States General as well. However, as we have seen, as an individual, paid 
officeholder he was not particularly powerful; his influence came from mutual 
support with the Prince and an ability to establish working relations with the 
important regents in the towns. 
Fagel had been pensionary of Haarlem and presumably his contacts there remained 
strong. He was quite successful in working with the Amsterdam regents, but on 
many occasions this success was within the constrictions of negotiations of the 
Prince's wishes and the contrary views of the Amsterdam regents. For all his 
importance of position he had none of the direct political power which De Witt had 
been able to exercise during the first stadholderless period. It was therefore all the 
more important to ensure, where possible, the continued support of the various 
interest groups. 
4 Ibid., p. 151, "The States General would have been doomed to helpless waiting, 
had they not maintained a special osmotic relationship with the States of Holland 
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The senior towns theoretically had equal power and influence, and from time to 
time their mutual interests would cause alliances between some of them. However, 
throughout the 1670s in particular, the self-righteousness of those who paid their 
quotas promptly interplayed with their relative size and economic muscle and gave 
Amsterdam in particular a louder voice than the rest. But it would be inaccurate to 
say that Amsterdam was able to sway the decisions of the States of Holland. In 
the crises of 1682 and even more 1684, she was left out on a limb with the support 
of one or two other towns. The failure of the States to come to a decision allowed 
the Prince to relax his own entrenched views during 1685 and both were able to 
affect an understanding of the other's view which must have contributed to the 
5 
easier passage towards co-operation in 1688. 
For the purposes of decisions within the States of Holland therefore, not only were 
relationships between members important, but the decisions of the vroedschappen 
themselves were also critical. What their representatives were authorised to argue 
for could on occasion be so out of line with the other members' views that it could 
fall at the first hurdle. Majority decisions could be agreed at the expense of the 
policy of even the most powerful town. Nevertheless Amsterdam remained the 
strongest voice in the States of Holland and her representatives and regents in the 
vroedschap were on most occasions politicians enough to operate within the system 
to ensure the greatest possible success for their policies. Only when they felt really 
threatened, whether on ideological, economic or other grounds, or when they were 
sure of the support of the majority of the other representative towns, were they 
prepared to take a firm stance. The crises of the 1680s are examples of the former, 
the push towards peace from 1677 onwards an example of the latter. 
The following argument therefore will be based on a discussion of the policies 
Amsterdam's representatives were instructed to argue for at the States of Holland, 
set into the context of their relative importance to the other issues facing the 
5 Israel, "The Dutch role in the Glorious Revolution", pp. 113-4; Kurtz, Willem III 
en Amsterdam, pp. 173-4. 
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vroedschap, and their status vis b vis those of the other Holland towns and the 
Prince of Orange. 
Amsterdam and States Policy: 1672-78 
The immediate concerns of the Amsterdam vroedschap in October 1672 were the 
war and local matters which necessarily required attention whatever the external 
disruptions; the ivetsverzetting had markedly little effect on the procedures. One of 
the first issues therefore to receive major consideration was the control of 
waterways and sluices in order to secure both the defence and trade of the city. ' 
Throughout this latter part of 1672 the issues being debated at length in Amsterdam 
were those directly concerned with the city's economic life as it was affected by 
the war. ' One of the major concerns was over the consumption of French 
manufactures. At this stage, Amsterdam was being perhaps uncharacteristically 
patriotic and saw the constant import of French goods as detrimental to home 
consumption. However, part of Amsterdam's concern was that there would be 
internal competition if the exclusion orders were not strictly followed by all 
provinces. ' Within a few years Amsterdam was to change its views on the policy 
and be among the major proponents arguing that if French goods were banned from 
the Republic there was an even greater threat from them in overseas trade. 
Steps were also taken to ensure that the French were prevented from exploiting 
Dutch resources and the States of Holland passed a resolution which gave 
Geelvinck and Prins Maurits responsibility for ensuring that Amsterdam administer 
the production of peat and hay from the villages on the Utrecht side of Amsterdam 
in order to keep it out of French hands. ' Huydecooper's payment of the French 
6 See above pp. 92 and 123. 
7 The trend of issues of importance can be seen in greater detail in the committees 
listed in Appendix V. 
8 G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 20 December 1672. 
9 Secrete Resolutien van de Heeren Staten van Hollandt ende West Frieslandt, 25 
November 1672. 
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troops not to raid his lands at Maarseveen on the Vecht near Utrecht could be 
argued as merely an extreme implementation of this policy. " 
The other issue taking up a large amount of time was an ongoing dispute with 
Haarlem over the building and financing of the Veendijk between Amsterdam, 
Naarden and Muiden. To this end pressure was put on Haarlem to co-operate in 
the completion of the Veendijk to Muiden. This was all part of their desire to see 
the fortification of the largest possible area around Amsterdam. Amsterdam was 
anxious to solve the question amicably, but Haarlem seemed willing to be 
awkward. " Naturally enough, at this stage of the war, while Amsterdam's very 
security was under threat there was little debate over requests for men and money, 
which dominated the turn of the year and the approval of the Slaal van Oorlogh for 
1673. In January 1673 Amsterdam was pressing the importance of its own security 
hard; van Beuningen was having discussions with the Prince, and Cornelis Hop 
was instructed to write to the Prince expressing Amsterdam's concern over the need 
for the dijk to Muiden to be completed. " Such concerns continued throughout the 
next year, strengthened by the success of the inundations of the summer of 1673, " 
and the repair of the sluis at Naarden in October 1673 was also part of the 
maintenance of a defensive ring around the City. 
14 
However, although Amsterdam was concerned for her own security and for the 
10 . See above p. 149. 
G. A. Amsterdam Res. Vroed., 22 November 1672. A week later, the importance 
of preserving good relations with Haarlem over defensive issues resulted in Corver 
and Hooft being delegated to talk with representatives from Haarlem, ibid., 28 
November 1682. 
". Ibid. 16 January 1673. 
Israel, Dutch Republic, pp. 798-99; A. R. H. Gecommitteerde Raad Staten van 
Holland: on 20 May 1673 it was agreed that fortifications should be put in hand at 
Nieuwerslius and on 13 July 1673 Amsterdam requested further defences at 
Hinderdam. Amsterdam's contribution to the dijk to Muiden had already been paid 
promptly on 18 April. 
14 Secrete Resolutien van de Heeren Staten van Hollandt ende West Friesland;. and 
G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 9 October 1673. 
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continual flow of trade, she was not averse to getting into disputes with the 
Admiralties over funding for naval provisions and, on 4 March 1673, demanded to 
know why a request for the essential provision of fl. 100,000 for equipage by the 
Prince of Orange could not be met by the Admiralties' contingency fund and only 
consented grudgingly to the charge being made on the new tax of the 200 penningh 
if all the other members of the States of Holland agreed. " This qualification was 
made to draw attention to a continual complaint against other members for lack of 
contributions and in particular to the current shortfall on the Saken van Staet 
because of excessive military expenditure. Van Beuningen and van Kinschot 
(pensionary of Delft) were deputed to attempt to put pressure on Friesland and 
Groningen to participate fully in equipping warships. " 
Thus, even as early as the first part of 1673, when both the Prince and Amsterdam 
were anxious to preserve the Republic, the former was prepared to assert what he 
saw as essential requirements and the latter to press for measures least damaging to 
their own purse. Bearing in mind the level of Amsterdam's contributions, and her 
relatively good record of payment, such a reaction was probably only to be 
expected. That tensions of this kind, however minor, could arise within six months 
of the ivelsverzetting should come as no surprise bearing in mind the traditional 
fear of Orange militarism which had been overlaid by the events of 1672, but not 
smothered by them, and the evidence that many supporters of the Orange revival 
were fairweather converts. 
But while Amsterdam may have quieried expenditure on naval equipage they were 
prompt in their own requests to Prince Maurits to put forward works to fortify the 
largest possible area around Amsterdam. " It will be seen that within a year or so 
Amsterdam completely reversed this policy as the military threat receded and the 
". G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 4 March 1673. 
Secrete Resolutien van de Heeren Staten van Hollandt ende West Frieslandt, 28 
March 1673. 
17. G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 8 March; on 31 March, it was reported that the 
expenditure on these fortifications for six months would befl. 1,840. 
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importance of merchant naval supremacy became paramount once more. 
As the campaigning season drew nearer in 1673, questions of the progress of the 
war began to dominate with the embassy to Cologne, and Amsterdam foremost 
among the Holland towns in stressing that nothing should be given away without 
their unanimous consent, and full representation of their views by the embassy". 
The stress that Amsterdam laid on unanimous consent over major issues highlights 
the fact that in Holland at least, the principle of unanimity on decisions was 
sometimes breached. By April Valckenier, during his short spell on the 
Gecommiteerde Raad in The Hague, and van Beuningen, once again in the service 
of the States, were working closely on the peace negotiations. Valckenier quickly 
ceded his place to a subordinate (in this case Cornelis Hop) so he could remain in 
control in Amsterdam. 
The summer of 1673 was dominated by the negotiations of treaties with the 
German states and more particularly establishing a positive working relationship 
with Denmark. Amsterdam's interest in these was predictably concerned, but not 
contentious, although in September they were raising objections to the way peace 
negotiations with France, England, Cologne and Munster were going and resolved 
"Ie declineren en afte staen". ` 
By now there was already a marked resistance to excessive military expenditure 
and the Amsterdammers were protecting themselves as far as possible against the 
expense of billeting within the city. " Earlier that year they had had to cope with 
five companies of Waldeck's men who had not been paid for six weeks previously 
and for whom no payment was made for food and supplies despite promises of 
'a. Ibid., 26 March 1673 
Ibid., 20 December 1673. 
20 
. Ibid., 2 October 1673, resolving only to admit Waldeck's regiments if they had the 
required special licence from the Prince. 
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payment in advance. " The clear impression is that the vroedschap, while anxious 
for the fortifications of the city, wanted nothing more than absolutely essential to 
impinge on daily life in the city. 
As the year declined and the threat of French advances retreated with the end of 
the campaigning season, so did the vroedschap's interest in military matters and 
once again concern began to rise on threats to commerce. In particular duties on 
salt were seen as a threat to the fisheries and opposition was mounting to 
restrictions on wines and spirits, which only a few months earlier had been agreed 
without complaint, with the introduction of the argument that, since French wine 
was freely imported into the Spanish Netherlands, restrictions were becoming 
self-destructive to Dutch trade 22 . 
The turn of the year saw the usual discussions on taxes and the Staet van Oorlogh 
and the general consent to the appointment of William to the offices of Captain- 
and Admiral -General, although Amsterdam did not let this go without raising the 
question of the terms of Utrecht's re-entry into the Union. " This, together with the 
charter for the new West Indische Compagnie, and the peace with England, were to 
dominate the early spring of 1674. The principal query that the vroedschap raised 
over the peace was that, with its conclusion, they would be in credit over 
contributions for military expenditure and should be freed from further 
contributions under the 200 and 100 penningh ; 24 van Beuningen was charged with 
protecting Amsterdam's interests in the negotiations of the marine treaty with 
England. 
G. A. Amsterdam, Missieven en Requesten van Particulieren (Binnenland), 25 and 
30 May 1673. 
22 G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 21 November and 4 December 1673. 
21 Ibid., 30 January 1674: Amsterdam's continued interest in the security of the 
waterline remained part of the terms of the discussion. 
24 Ibid-, 26 February 1674. 
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In the establishment of the new W. LC Amsterdam was able to ensure that the 
advantages she was gaining over Zeeland were confirmed with a larger share of the 
company and, being the only city with a chamber of their own, a privileged 
position . 
2' Relations with Zeeland were never good at this period and it will be 
seen over various issues how Amsterdam rarely attempted to repair these breaches, 
unlike the attitude she took towards other towns in Holland with whom she was 
involved in a mutual support system. In March they were arguing against a 17 per 
cent increase in personal contributions with the introduction of a new tax to replace 
one fixed in 1654.26 Amsterdam was not alone in objecting to further taxation and 
on 22 March representatives at The Hague were reporting back on the views of 
Delft, Rotterdam, Alkmaar and Leiden, who all felt that the impositions were 
getting out of hand. " 
The late spring and early summer of 1674 were taken up with the ratification of the 
treaties and defensive alliances with Munster, Cologne, Spain, Brunswick and 
Luneburg, but with the vroedschap beginning to object to the raising of armies 
without receiving some compensation from allies. " This year there was more 
discussion over the continuing military provisions, although in August and 
September the theme changed to import duties and the continuation of the ban on 
French manufactures. " 
The entry of the Danes, Brandenburg and Luneburg into the war in late 1674, 
enticed by Dutch subsidies, was seen not only as an increased tax burden, but also 
25 Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean, pp. 5-10. 
26 G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed, 18 March 1674: this new tax was interpreted by 
Amsterdam as an increase of one-sixth in personal taxation. 
27. G. A. Amsterdam, Missieven aan Burgemeesteren-Regeerden van Amsterdam - 
missieven van wege Gecommitteerde Raad, 1673-1708,22 March 1674; G. A. 
Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 22 March 1674. 
28 Ibid., 14 June 1674. 
29. Ibid., 14 August 1674: by now Amsterdam was arguing that a reduction in peat 
tax would have an effect of the repayment of interest on the Capital Leening. 
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as an unnecessary cause of war with Sweden, the implications of which Amsterdam 
did not let the States General overlook (see below). 
In December the vroedschap found it impossible to agree to Fagel's proposal on 
taxation levels. But as might be expected, the main issue in early 1675 was the 
Gelderland sovereignty, although competing with it in Amsterdam was the status of 
the West Indische Compagnie in the Caribbean, the maintenance of relations with 
Denmark, and the security of ships going to Norway. Within a month of this the 
controversial appointment of van den Bosch as pensionary took place, but by then 
Amsterdam was far more concerned with the protection of Baltic trade and the 
need to reintroduce convoys of ships through the Sound. " This became even more 
important in July when Sweden entered the war on the French side. " With the 
Danish attitude to Dutch traders never to be relied on it was crucial that 
Amsterdam should ensure that some degree of protection of trade with Sweden be 
incorporated into the declaration of war. 32 By now the affairs of war were 
receiving scant attention except where they touched on such matters. Although 
there was a degree of communication between the burgomasters and the principals 
determining foreign policy, on the whole Amsterdam was prepared to rely 
exclusively on van Beuningen to protect its interest, a role he fulfilled admirably 
eventually to the detriment of his relations with the Prince and Fagel. 
It was towards the end of 1675 that van Beuningen began to state clearly his 
opposition to the policies pursued by the Prince and Fagel and in October of that 
30 G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 26 April 1675. 
Samuel Tucker wrote to Williams on 6 June 1675 commenting on the pressures 
the Dutch were coming under from both subsidies to the Danes and the 
vulnerability of their trade in the Baltic: "This state is now the goose that 
everyone plucks and which will make it both poore and quiet in a little time, the 
King of Denmark's yearly income, amounts not to the sallarie this state pays to 
him neither doth that of the D. of Brandenburg to which he receives here; whilst 
the people here are taxed to extremity and have little or noe trade, and will have 
less in case of a warr with Sweden which will put a stop to there trade in the 
Sound", P. R. O., SP84,1675, f. 28 
12. See above pp. 102-103. 
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year made his policy statement that a small town in the Spanish Netherlands was of 
less concern to the States than safeguarding trade. " Early the following year these 
disagreements became open conflict as van Beuningen, on his embassy to England, 
argued strongly that the Prince and Fagel should be working to persuade the States 
that an English alliance was the best way forward to achieving peace. " But he 
was beginning to be aware that his views were no longer reflecting those of 
Amsterdam, and that they were also unacceptable to the Prince and the 
raadpensionafis. When the Anglo-Dutch alliance was eventually signed on 26 
January 1678, against the wishes of Amsterdam, van Beuningen, despite his long 
service as ambassador to England, was conspicuous by his absence. " 
In the autumn of 1675 Amsterdam's concerns were over the threat to ships in the 
Mediterranean; in December it was a request for warships to protect shipping in the 
North Sea and negotiations with Spain over inland trade along the Maas through 
the Spanish Netherlands. On these issues Amsterdam was able to enlist the support 
and interest of Dordrecht and Zeeland as well. " 
In January 1676 the question of security of Swedish trade was once again raised 
with a fairly rapid ratification of the trade treaty with an extension of the ban on 
37 
Greenland trade to I May 1676 . In 
May, however, the brewers were complaining 
about taxes on beer, while the Prince was using Fagel to persuade Amsterdam that 
prompt payment of quotas was needed for military provisions. Amsterdam's 
answer was that this should have been anticipated and that the money (fl. 50,000) 
should be taken from funds already raised by the Raad van StaatH. For the siege 
". Frank-en, Coenraad van BeuningenS politieke en diplomatieke aktiviteiten in de 
jaren 1667-84, p. 141. 
Ibid, pp. 144-145 
Ibid, pp. 156-7 
G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 12 and 18 November 1675. 
Ibid., 23 March 1676. 
Ibid., 23 May 1676. 
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of Maastricht Amsterdam again resolved that the request forfl. 300,000 should be 
met only to the sum offl. 120,000 and the balance should be met from quotas on 
the 200 penningh already paid. " Now that Amsterdam was quite secure, the 
immediacy of fortifications was wearing thin and the dijk between Amsterdam, 
Muiden and Naarden, in 1673 so vital, was now solely a source of financial 
adjustment with repayment on loans to be made within eight years. 'O 
If the opposition to the war effort was firmly resolved by the summer of 1675, but 
did not become effective until the end of 1676, it was not without a voice. During 
these eighteen months the Holland towns began to pursue with greater vigour their 
policy of withholding quotas, until by the end of 1676 Amsterdam was paying little 
over half its quotas and the other large contributors like Delft, The Hague, Leiden 
and Rotterdam were withholding more than a third. Dordrecht did keep its 
payments up to nearly ninety per cent, although as early as January 1675 it was 
Dordrecht which had raised the question of unpaid interest on the Capital Leening 
for 1672, before agreeing to the quotas for 1675.41 
In March of 1675 Leiden, supported by Amsterdam, was asking for a reduction in 
its quota for 1674 and even the smaller towns of Alkmaar, Hoorn, Enkhuisen, 
Edam, Monnickendam, Medemblik and Purmerend were demanding payment of 
interest on Danish subsidies. 42 These two complaints came in the same week as 
the States of Holland formally approved payment of fl. Im for military provisions 
and suggests that the approval of military budgets and supplementary requests for 
provisions were still regarded as a matter of formality and that the intention to pay 
was not implicit in the resolution. In other words, withholding payments of taxes 
and quotas was not yet considered a means of directing policy, but was merely an 
expression of dissatisfaction, still reflecting the traditional practice of querying the 
31 Ibid., 25 July 1676. 
Ibid., 21 July 1676. 
Res. Holl., 19 January 1675. 
12 Ibid., 21 and 26 March 1675. 
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assessment of taxes. 
But by the end of 1675 opposition was being raised even to the formal consent. A 
request for further provisioning of fl. 600,000 andfl. 180,000 for Ve Defroyment" 
received on 21 September 1675 was not agreed until 21 November and the 
payment of the 1676 quotas was queried by Delft on the same day (21 December) 
as they were agreed. And in January 1676, just one month later, Rotterdam was 
requesting a reduction in its quota again . 
4' By II January 1677 the States of 
Holland were unanimously hoping for a reduction in the requests for extra funds, 
and received a response from the States General, on 18 January, justifying the need 
for sustained expenditure. This was convincing enough for the States of Holland to 
grudgingly approve both requests both for legerlast and artillerye. 44 
in September 1676 as well, there had been strong opposition to a proposal from the 
Munt for a ban on the export of capital silver and a general ban on export, since 
this was seen as far too restrictive on trade. " The following January Heemskerck 
was deputed to an audience with the Prince to get Danish subsidies reduced since 
the level of trade was not sufficient to support them. 46 
At the same time as opposition was growing to direct measures working against the 
interest of commerce and trade, the pattern of opposition to military finance within 
Holland began to take specific shape. In January approval was given to equip 
twelve ships and a furtherfl. 1m was agreed for provisions, but two days later the 
States of Holland reduced a payment of fl. 80,000 approved by the States General 
by fl. 20,000.17 And again in March, the building of six warships was approved on 
". Ibid., 21 January 1676. 
44 Ibid., 11,18 and 22 January 1677. 
45 G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 5 Septemmber 1676. 
16 Ibid., 16 January 1677. 
47 Res. Holl., 21,22 and 25 January 1676. 
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the same day as a request from the Groote Visscherye forfl. 30,000 to compensate 
for the cost of the war was agreed. " On 31 March Temple wrote that the Prince 
believed the Holland towns preferred to arm at sea rather than support the land 
forces, as a more secure insurance for their trade - even in the event of renewed 
hostilities with England. "' Throughout 1676 the qualifications of, and discussion 
on, payments, grew with discontent centring on payments of subsidies to the allies 
as, for example, the lengthy discussion on subsidies to the Danes, Brandenburg, 
Brunswick and Luneburg in late July, which contrasted sharply with the swift 
ratification, on the Dutch side at least, of the commercial treaty with Sweden on 29 
July. " For the first time in September 1676 only qualified approval was given to 
the supplementary request for provisions followed shortly by a request by the 
States of Holland for the statement of payments outstanding. This was supplied in 
November 16765' 
Of course the grain handling trade was still one of the major income earners in 
Amsterdam, despite the growing competition from England, and it was therefore 
essential to the Amsterdammers that the trade routes through the Sound should also 
be protected. Towards the end of 1674 the political situation in the north-east had 
shown signs of working against the Dutch and intense diplomatic activity began to 
take place. English observers at The Hague began to note that Fagel was 
becoming so concerned with the risks for the alliance with Brandenburg in the face 
of the threat from Sweden, that he was paying less attention to the Surinam 
question, " and he consequently put pressure on the States of Holland to accept the 
". Ibid., 26 March 1676. 
". Temple, Works, IV, pp. 204-5. 
5'. Res. Holl., 24,28 and 29 July 1676. 
5'. Appendix VII. 
P. R. O. SP84/197, f. 38: "... that till the point of liberty of trading from one Enemy's 
port to another can pass in the States Generall; they have resolved to send 
provisional order to all the Admiralties that no English shipps shall be arrested ... of their former Resolution concerning there rule - Free Shipps free goods", 
Meredith to Williamson 20/30 November 1674. 
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necessity for concluding a swift alliance with Brandenburg, Brunswick-Luneburg 
and Denmark. " The latter met with little resistance at this stage since it could be 
seen as better to have at least one ally in the Baltic and that the one with the 
greater control over the Sound (although politically of little significance in the 
area), but there was much strong feeling against the Brandenburg alliance since 
they had defaulted over the promise of military aid in 1672 and had left the eastern 
borders of the Republic exposed to the French forces. Six months later Amsterdam 
refused to pay the Brandenburg subsidies and it was already being pointed out that 
Dutch subsidies to the Danish crown and the Duke of Brandenburg probably 
exceeded the monies these rulers raised within their own territories. " 
The Amsterdammers were beginning to feel that the political and military alliances 
forced on them by the policies of William were in large part responsible for the 
breakdown in relations with Sweden and the declaration of war in June 1675. As 
the acute and prolific English observer, Samuel Tucker, noted on 6 June 1675 that, 
together with the high levels of taxation, a break with Sweden would have 
disastrous consequences for Dutch Trade. 55 However, the States of Holland were 
able to ensure that the declaration was accompanied by the provision for the 
continuation of unmolested trade, a condition pressed with greater urgency by the 
Dutch, but with less enthusiasm by the Swedes, dominated by dreams of imperial 
grandeur. 
Throughout 1676 the alliance with Brandenburg was under discussion, Amsterdam 
delivering its final judgement in September, that while it was best to keep the 
alliance for a position in the north it should not prejudice a possible new alliance 
with Sweden. " It is clear that for Amsterdam at least, whoever they were at war 
G. A. Haarlem, Minuut Notulen, 19 January 1675; Res. Holl. 22 January 1675.. 
P. R. O., SP/84/199, f. 5: "Our great newes is, that the city of Amsterdam have 
denyed the Duke of Brandenburg", 7/17 May to Sir Joseph Williamson from [? ] 
The Hague. 
See above p. 207. 
G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 22 September 1676. 
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with was of secondary consideration to the need to enter into trade negotiations 
with not only Sweden, but also France and Denmark. 
Again in 1676, the ratification of the commercial treaty with Sweden was expedited 
without delay by the Dutch, while lengthy debates were held over continuing 
subsidies to Brandenburg and Denmark. 57 
D'Estrades, one of the French Ambassadors at the negotiations at Nijmegen, 58 
believed as early as July 1676, from his contacts in Amsterdam, that if the right 
proposals were made to the Prince, the States would be only too willing to 
conclude an early peace with France. Baxter sees this evidence of d'Estrades 
infiltration into Amsterdam, dating from 1675, as symptomatic of a complete 
breach between the Prince and Amsterdam. " On the other hand Temple, while 
accepting that the general mood of the Dutch was for peace and that they would 
gladly come to terms with France, still believed that the Prince's convictions and 
loyalty to his allies, would carry the day and keep the Dutch in the war. " Yet by 
January 1677 Temple too began to believe that the Dutch would accept peace at 
any price - even the loss of Flanders - after he had had lengthy discussions with 
Fagel and the Prince. 61 
We have seen here how the military financing was closely linked to changing 
views of the Amsterdammers and the States of Holland. This has shown how 
support for the Prince's policies had begun to wane to some extent as early as 
1673, when he failed to achieve any real military success. But until the peace was 
made with England in February 1674 and the French had finally been driven back, 
or had withdrawn from all the Dutch territories except Grave and Maastricht, there 
57 
. Res. Holl., 24-29 
July 1676; G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 31 July 1676. 
5'. The others were D'Avaux and Colbert. 
59. Baxter, William III, p. 127. 
60. Temple, Works, IL pp. 343,352-3 and 355. 
'51. Ibid., 384-6 and IV, pp. 373-7. 
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was enough unity of opinion in favour of continuing the war. However, 1674 saw 
many changes which led the provincial governments to question more and more the 
arguments in favour of continuing military actions against France and the events of 
1675 were to compound these factors. 
These changes were further reflected at the more basic level of the economic 
structure of administration of excise duties. 1674 saw the introduction of increased 
tax levels. In March import duties on salt were doubled and by September 
virtually all import duties had followed SUit. 62 In July the tax of the 200th 
penningh had also been doubled which meant that the citizens were now paying a 
double increase for the war both in direct and indirect taxation, a burden unlikely 
to be accepted lightly anywhere, even in the Dutch Republic where high tax levels 
were the norm. 63 
The States of Holland, who paid almost two-thirds of all taxation, were quick to 
point out that these increased duties were being exacted before interest had been 
paid on loans for the previous two years. " However, at this stage the unhappiness 
with high tax levels was not directly associated with a desire for peace, although 
Amsterdam had expressed hopes for an early peace in the summer of 1674, and the 
theory developed during the previous regime that only peace was really compatible 
with commercial success continued to dominate Holland politiCS. 65 Nevertheless a 
direct recommendation from Fagel to Valckenier that reinforcements be provided 
for the siege of Grave met with unconditional approval in Amsterdam. 66 
In June 1672 a total ban had been re-imposed on French imports, but throughout 
1674 these embargoes were gradually lifted, and although such imports became 
12 Res. Holl., 12 September 1674. 
63 Ibid., 21,28 July 1674. 
64 G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 14 August 1674. 
65 Wagenaar, Amsterdam, Vol. I, p. 658. 
66 G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 9 October 1674. 
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liable to the same high excise levels, they did in some way compensate for the 
earlier loss in trade and the diminution of the manufacturing industries during the 
first two years of the war. Amsterdam's commerce had also been seriously 
undermined by the massive withdrawal of capital, much of it foreign, after the 
1672 invasionS, 67 and it was therefore important for the carrying trade in particular 
to retain as many of the overseas markets as possible and this was dependent on 
the normal channels of trade being kept open unhindered. To this end Amsterdam 
saw the neutrality of England after February 1674 as a source of commercial 
advantage to the English trade, particularly in the East Indies and was therefore 
concerned in the negotiations of the Marine Treaty with England. They were able 
to take full advantage not only of Van Beuningen's presence in London as 
Ambassador, but also in the appointment of Gillis Sautijn, a Director of the 
Societeit van Suriname, and Joan Corver, as two of the six commissioners in 
London (the other four came from Rotterdam, Enkhuizen, Middleburg and 
Vlissingen) . 
6' The major clauses to be argued over were those relating to free 
access for trade from one enemy port to another. Despite what was in the end a 
fairly favourable agreement for the Dutch, during the next few years complaints 
were frequently raised that the English neutrality gave them a trading advantage, an 
argument seemingly upheld by the dramatic drop in the value of East India 
Company shares just two months after the conclusion of the treaty. 6' Although 
there is possibly still much ground to be argued over the relative rise and decline 
of the English and Dutch in the late seventeenth century, it will be seen that 
contemporaries believed the war and the English peace were disastrous to Dutch 
trade. 7' 
Amsterdam was becoming increasingly dependent on the manufactures of Leiden 
67 V. Barbour, Capitalism in Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century (1950), pp. 57-9; 
Israel, "Amsterdam Stock Exchange", p. 327. 
6'. P. R. O., SP84/197, f. 217. 
69 
. Ibid., 
f. 5: "... the East India Actions are fallen unto 428.11 
70. See above pp. 94-99 for a fuller discussion on the balance between the Dutch and 
English trade. 
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and Haarlem for re-export, and it is noticeable that throughout the mid-1670s 
Amsterdam, who had been embroiled in bitter disputes with Leiden as recently as 
1670 over local issues, frequently supported that town's claim to fairer treatment 
under taxation, and most particularly in March 1677, when the commercial clauses 
of the treaty with France were being discussed at Nijmegen . 
71 This is the more 
understandable when it is considered that one of the major markets for Leiden 
cloths was Turkey, and the losses to the trade through the French blockade of 
Dutch shipping in the Mediterranean were of a significant level, and therefore once 
there was a general discontent with the war, it was inevitable that steps should be 
taken to return to the commercial understandings achieved during the 1660s and the 
policy of the Wittian regime. The deterioration of the Mediterranean trade was 
also deepened by the intervention of the English who had been quick to seize the 
opportunity of taking over the carrying trade while the Dutch ships were still 
blockaded, and added to fears that the English attitude to both the Dutch and the 
French had not been changed by the Peace of Westminster. 
It is therefore clear that in the six months since the relief of Grave in November 
1674 was met with such euphoria and the Prince was seen as the saviour of his 
country, the mood in Amsterdam was swinging violently against him. " Pamphlets 
began to circulate in vitriolic terms about the Prince and Fagel, " and as another 
English observer wrote to Sir Joseph Williamson: 
"The people in Amsterdam half mad, it is not be believed how 
strongly the peoples' affections are alienated since that attempt of 
making the Prince, Duke of Gelderland. This country dayly decayes 
in politiques and traide and the suffrable taxes make the people 
". G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 15 March 1677. 
Res. Holl. 24 November 1674; Baxter, William III, p. 120: the relief of Grave saw 
the major threat of the French removed from Dutch territory, and in consequence 
weakened the motivation for fighting. 
73 P. R. O. SP84/199, f. 6: "The Arminians, and fifth monarchy men, still continue 
printing pasquilles against the Prince of Orange, and Pensioner Fagel; Knuttell 
11246: Twee Missieven den Eersten aan eenen goeden Priend van daenstaende 
ordeelen over Amsterdam, Haarlem, Leyden, Haegh, Holland, Den Tweede aan 
den Heer Raetpensionaris, Letters written by Rothe. In the second he refer to 
Fagel's "bloedige Handen"; Baxter, William III, p. 130. 
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made. If the war last one year more, this land will be ruined... 
The mood expressed by the pamphlets and the general impression of discontent 
were taken seriously enough for the States of Holland in September 1675 to be 
persuaded to restate their faith that the Prince was not seeking sovereignty but had 
the true interest of the Republic at heart. " 
What were the factors operating against William in 1675? There was certainly 
resentment against the aspiration to monarchy assumed to be inherent in the 
settlements in Utrecht, Gelderland and Overijssel, the Gelderland sovereignty issue 
and the Stuart connection. On the other hand, the continuation and further 
development of the war, with the ramifications of continued high taxation levels 
and threats to trade and commerce probably played as important a part as all these. 
They are of course far more complex to argue than the oft-quoted remark that 
Amsterdam would rather be subject to French rule than an Orange sovereign. " 
However, there was still some support for the war, principally in Flanders, and in 
1675 the war against Sweden was further seen as an unnecessary diminution of the 
forces for the protection of territorial interests in Flanders. Together with the 
desire for having a weak buffer between themselves and France, the Dutch were 
anxious not to have the Flemish commerce restored to the advantage of France and 
the disadvantage of Amsterdam in particular. But by the end of 1676, the States of 
Holland by Amsterdam were clamouring for peace at any price, even the cession of 
virtually all rights in Flanders to the French and the abandonment of Spanish 
intereStS. 77 I am reluctant to accept that these claims were meant in good faith, but 
were more likely to be threats to push the dilatory negotiations at Nijmegen 
forward, since, as we know, for all the advantages gained by the French out of the 
peace, the theory of the barrier towns was firmly developed and Flemish trade 
P. R. O. SP84/199, f. 6. 
States of Holland Placaet, September 1675 (translation) P. R. O., SP84/199. f. 149. 
Temple, Works, IV, p. 76. 
77. Ibid, II, pp. 384-5. 
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remained totally suppressed. " 
The point at question here is how and why the Amsterdammers were able to regain 
the advantage they had lost in 1672 and had continued to forgo as late as January 
1675. 
Within Amsterdam itself there was a clear realignment, brought about by 
Valckenier's realisation that he was no longer in total control of the ruling group. 
The introduction of the Concept tot Eenigheit, while in the end succeeding in 
uniting the regents and strengthening the oligarchy, only did so by concessions 
made by Valckenier to Hooft. 7' 
it can hardly be seen as coincidental that, as the Amsterdam regents became united 
in purpose, the debates and resolutions in the States of Holland took on a different 
nature. Throughout 1675 opposition had been expressed regularly to the payment 
of quotas, impositions of taxes and subsidies to allies, by individual towns often 
causing delay, but not final withholding of quotas and subsidies. " And in 1676 
this pattern had taken on a specific shape with the opposition centred on the 
military requests, while efforts were made to sustain or improve the position of the 
navy and the fisheries. As we have seen, from January 1676 the emphasis was put 
on restricting military expenditure while maintaining an effective level of financing 
for naval and merchant shipping. 
At this time the massive gulf between William and Holland became more apparent 
as the former continued to press for the maintenance of alliances, realising that any 
resolution of the present hostilities would not mean the end of the causes of such 
hostilities. The latter believing that the territorial conflicts were no longer their 
78. A. C. Carter, Neutrality or Commitment. The Evolution of Dutch Foreign Policy 
1667-1795 (London, 1975), Chapter 2. 
". See above pp. 142-143. 
". Res. Holl., 24 May 1675; G. A. Haarlem, Minuut notulen, 24 May 1675. 
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concern, but merely an unnecessary drain on resources by demands for subsidies, 
desired nothing more than a return to the situation operating after the Treaty of 
1662 and a reversion to a policy of neutrality. 
When on 16 September 1676 the States of Holland, at the instigation of the 
raadpensionails, requested the statement of income outstanding on the tax of the 
200th penningh, 81 this reflected the rising discontent with higher war taxation, and 
although it was agreed that payments should be made in full, the failure of the 
siege of Maastricht, in the same month was particularly severely felt. 8' As one of 
Temple's staff at The Hague, Roger Meredith, observed: 
"The discontents are great here upon this ill success and at 
Amsterdam especially the discourses are said to be very licentious, 
that city having advanced a million for the expence of the siege. is83 
From this time onwards, the States of Holland assumed a more unified policy 
reflecting a greater unity among its members. The quotas for 1677 were agreed 
without individual dissension, but the approval was qualified by a request that the 
peace negotiations be pursued vigorously and a refusal to grant further subsidies to 
the allies, " and in several cases the quotas were actually reduced by between 
twelve and a half and sixteen per cent. 's However, although there was a degree of 
accord within the States of Holland, in March Amsterdam was complaining that 
other provinces were not meeting their quotas in full and that "... haer daer van 
dispenserenden veele ende verscheyde Persoonen endfamilien haer buylen deser 
Provincien". 86 A few days later Amsterdam was requesting payment of interest for 
Appendix VI. 
Res. Holl., 1,2,12 September 1676; November 1676. 
83 P. R. O., SP84/199, Meredith to Williamson, I December 1676. 
84 Res. Holl., 10 December 1676. 
85. G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 2 March 1677; G. A. Haarlem, Vroedschap 
Resoluties, 27 December 1677. 
"'. Res. Holl., 16 March 1677. 
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the supply of ships to Denmark in 1674. " 
Throughout the following year attempts were made to make the Prince more 
accountable for expenditure and, in 1678, the release of monies was made 
dependent on the Prince providing realistic formulae for the reduction of troops 
once hostilities had ended together with demands for urgent prosecution of the 
peace negotiations. " 
Observers began to note throughout 1677 that the raadpensionalis, who in 1676 
had been prepared to argue strongly for the Prince's cause, was coming to realise 
that peace was now inevitable and was no longer able to support wholeheartedly 
the views of the Prince. He appears to have relaxed his grip temporarily on the 
Holland towns, just as the new found unity in Amsterdam and its reflection in the 
States of Holland was becoming a more powerful force. It is true that at this time 
Fagel was troubled by ill-health and was also aware of growing resentment of his 
power and influence, and that he was due for re-election in 167V9 By this time 
van Beveming, one of the principal peace negotiators, had moved far from the 
views of both the raadpensionafis and the Prince and was pressing for peace on 
the terms offered by the French going almost as far as Valckenier himself, only 
stopping realistically at the need for Flemish security; but at this stage even the 
French were prepared to concede that Flanders needed to be secured and this was 
by now hardly a major obstacle. All the negotiators and concerned parties were by 
now quite well aware that the peace was never likely to be more than a truce and 
the Holland towns were prepared to admit that the Prince of Orange had "made a 
truer judgement than they had done of the measures they were to expect both from 
France and England". 90 
8'. Ibid., 24 March 1677. 
G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 19 May 1678; 2 July 1618. 
Fagel was re-elected on 3 July 1677, Res. Holl., 3 July 1677. 
Temple, Works, H, p. 456. 
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At this point it is possible to point to further evidence of the difference in values 
held by Fagel and Valckenier. The former, by nature of his office and close 
association with the stadholder, of necessity considered the views of the whole 
Republic, albeit dominated by Holland and his service to the States of that 
province, whereas the latter even in 1677-78 was unable to exert himself beyond 
the confines of local politics, even where issues of wider importance were debated. 
And it was therefore Hooft who went to meet the negotiators as a representative of 
Amsterdam and who realised that the French terms needed to be tested before 
being accepted, in opposition to the line taken by Valckenier, who would willingly 
have conceded all to the French. " Nevertheless, political survival was as important 
to the raadpensionafis as it was to Valckenier or, come to that, to the Prince of 
Orange, and by removing himself one step from the crucial discussion he was 
safeguarding his reputation with both the Prince and the towns for life after the 
peace. 
The line taken by Van Beuningen at Nijmegen was for the improvement of trade 
with France and Sweden and, when there was a request for fifteen warships to be 
sent against the Swedes in the Baltic, Amsterdam's consent could only be obtained 
if they were equipped solely in Amsterdam. " As far as France was concerned 
Amsterdam was pressing for a return to the favourable trade position agreed in the 
Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1662. The spring of 1677 was concentrated on questions 
of reductions of moneys already paid and the negotiation of these trade and marine 
treaties, particularly getting clauses on home manufactures to the most favourable 
state, and free trade for the important grounds in the fisheries and in the West 
Indian and Guinea Trade. 
There was a concerted objection to the imposition of a new tax on the 200 
penningh; no longer were the arguments against heavy taxation merely on the 
grounds that military expenditure was too high, but more and more arguing for the 
". Ibid., H, p. 455. 
92. G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 2 March 1677. 
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advantages of peace and the economic ruin which would soon result from 
continued warfare. "' And in July they resolved to make it clear that anything 
negotiated secretly regarding the peace which pertained to Amsterdam should first 
have the consent of the burgomasters. 94 
Once again in the late summer and autumn of 1677, Amsterdam tackled the 
questions of duties on imports. In October the question of the security of shipping 
after the war was being addressed. It was resolved that the aim should be for ships 
to the West Indies to be escorted and financed by the Admiralties, a continuation 
of the policy that the Admiralties should be made to meet as much expenditure as 
could possibly be made from their coffers. " This policy was restated in December 
when Amsterdam was trying to impose rules on the use of the 200 penningh again, 
restricting it to lands milities, believing that naval funding should come from the 
Admiralties. 96 On 2 January Witsen was talking to Fagel about the disputes with 
the Admiralties. This was a prelude to the role he was to take on in 1679 as 
intermediary working with the raadpensionarls between the Prince of Orange and 
Amsterdam. Meanwhile, threats against quotas in 1678, with the impending peace 
were to become a weapon against the Prince, and when the question of 
non-payment of soldiers also came up, a compromise was struck between 
opposition to military expenditure and the rights of the soldiers to receive their pay, 
with payments being agreed on a month-to-month basis. 9' 
On 2 April the first major steps were taken to restore normal trade routes with a 
free passage for those of the enemy still in the Netherlands through Gent and the 
93. G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 19 July 1677. 
Ibid., 27 July 1677. 
Ibid., 12 October 1677. The issue at Tobago continued to be important after 
peace with France had been concluded in Europe. 
G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 20 December 1677. 
G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 2 and 26 July 1678. 
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restoration of normal trading with Gent. " A week later normal trading was 
restored in the North Sea and the Greenland trade. '9 
In the peace negotiations with France, Amsterdam put forward its well-known view 
that: 
Ve commercie en navigatie deser landen synde de eenigsten syl en 
subsistence van de Staet, sedert het begin van de oorlogh seer 
verminst en tot Engeland en ander nabeurge plactse voor en groot 
gedeelt over gegaen was ook by consummatie van de oorlog, etc. " 
and consent to the 200 permingh was only given on the understanding that peace 
was imminent. 'O' By now the various merchant groups were pressing for 
reductions in tariffs and all other means of making trading easier, perhaps most 
urgent among them the wine merchants, who had long been maintaining that such 
taxes were an infringement of ancient practices. 
"' 
The most obvious reason why the internal balance had shifted in 1677 rather than 
1675 was that the war was two years older and the consequent increase in tax 
burden, loss of trade, growing disillusionment with the allies and an awareness that 
the French could never be beaten, only contained - with the help of an unpopular 
alliance - were all stronger arguments than they had been in 1675. And the failure 
of the siege of Maastricht from July to September 1676 finally dispelled any 
pretensions William had as an effective general of a strong military alliance. 
1678 saw the obvious divisions of interests between the peace negotiators, held up 
as far as Amsterdam was concerned by the Prince's intransigence over the Spanish 
Netherlands and the commercial interest in preparing for peace and absolutely 
resolved on keeping military expenditure down and, if possible, getting refunds on 
". Ibid., 2 April 1678. 
99. Ibid., II August 1678. 
". Ibid., 25 April 1678. 
101. G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 27 April. 
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quotas already paid. "' The burgomasters now made a concerted statement that 
peace was essential to restore the life blood of the state to its full vigour and were 
prepared to support negotiations directly with the Prince. The unity of Amsterdam 
shines through these resolution of May to July 1678, with full blown statements of 
principles and intent. 'O' 
By July Amsterdam was more cooperative when it became obvious that they were 
going to gain their point and that peace would be made with France and Sweden 
without the full consent of the allies. They raised few queries on the treaties 
beyond matters of form on the navigation and commerce clauses, "' in addition to 
their agreement to approve provisionally military expenditure on a month-to-month 
basis. The principal interpretation of Amsterdam's views over treaty negotiations, 
apart from the minor matters of commercial interest was left in the hands of the 
appointed negotiators in The Hague. 
Throughout August and September the business of ratifying the treaties naturally 
predominated (the peace being made controversially on 14 August 1678), "' one of 
the major problems being the unfavourable trade balance created by French 
subsidies to Sweden. 
". G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., II May 1678. 
The burgornasters were formally sending instructions to van Beuningen and 
requesting van Beverning to put pressure on England to intervene over the 
security of Flanders, G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed, 25 April 1678, but by now 
Hooft's role as representative burgomaster at Nijmegen was becoming more 
prominent and influential, Temple, Works, II, p. 445, "Monsieur Hooft proposing... 
to make a trial and judgement of the sincerity of France... by their evacuating the 
Spanish towns and without it to continue the war, he carried his point... in spite of 
Valkenier"; and G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed, 22 July 1678 
'04. G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed, 21 July 1678. It was essential to reach "de 
reciproque liberteit ende vrijheid van de commercie" with Sweden, and a month 
later negotiations were working towards restoration of toll levels to those 
operating during the Triple Alliance period of 1668, ibid., 23 August 1678. 
The issues surrounding the Peace of Nijmegen 1678 are fully discussed in The 
Peace of Nijmegen 1676-167819, International Congress of the Tricentennial 
Nijmegen 14-16 September 1978, J. A. H. Bots, ed. (Amsterdam, 1980), with the 
tensions within the Dutch Republic highlighted in Roorda's contribution, "The 
Peace of Nijmegen, the end of a particular period in Dutch History", pp. 20-24. 
225 
Anisterdarn and States Policy: 1679-84 
By the autumn there was a change in mood and the impression given by the 
resolutions of October and November 1678 is that having achieved their objectives 
over the peace with such united effort, Amsterdam was not altogether certain what 
her objectives during the peace were, apart from restoring normality with the city 
and lowering military expenditure. A fairly large-scale repair of old bridges and 
building of new bridges were put in hand together with funds provided for the 
immediate defences of the city at the Haarlemmer and Leidsepoorten, "' but when it 
came to the general defence of the states, Amsterdam was not so happy and wanted 
to refer back to the Union of Utrecht and question the needs of the army. 107 
This period immediately after the peace until the end of 1679 is seen generally as 
that during which Valckenier reigned supreme in Amsterdam and yet there is 
something of an intimation of his decline [no-one foretelling his death] within the 
papers available. The relative lack of involvement of Valckenier in the peace 
negotiations had demonstrated that the interests of the city could be successfully 
prosecuted without him. The death of Valckenier's man Pancras, his replacement 
on the Gecommileerde Raad by the seasoned Boreel, newly returned from 
ambassadorial duties in England, and the beginning of the domination of 
committees by the moderates Hudde and Witsen" support the argument that others 
were now asserting themselves. Approval was given to the 1679 Staat van Oorlog 
and other minor military expenditure with less equivocation, " although in 
February Amsterdam was reiterating to Fagel their opinion on the deficiencies of 
the peace treaty and stating firmly their belief in the sovereignty of the states. "O 
1". G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 15 October 1678. 
107. Ibid., 22 November 1678. 
"8. See Appendix V1. 
109. G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 12,29, December and 3 January 1679. 
110. Ibid., 4 February 1679. 
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Although very concerned in such matters, immediate attention was given to the 
protection of shipping to Tobago. "' Meanwhile steps continued to be taken to 
restore trading positions with an accord being made with the English West Indian 
Company and the VO. C. and WILC. among all the tidying up necessary after the 
war, that is final agreement of terms of treaties, movement of military hardware 
etc. 112 
But the main issue at this time was without doubt the size of Amsterdam's 
contributions expected for the fortifications of Naarden and their reluctance to 
spend money on what was seen by many as provision for a base for William to 
perhaps repeat his father's attack on Amsterdam. Witsen was deputed to talk to 
Fagel and William, a role which he assumed with consummate ease. "' 
But the dissatisfaction with the Prince re-emerged in April with the question of 
authorising troops of the Duke of Neurenburg to pass through Zutphen with once 
again a clear statement that it was not up to the Prince to make decisions in such 
matters but for the sovereign provinces "is gebleven het regI om over syn territori 
to laten passeren en repasseren". '" However, in April they were prepared to put 
down a very formal resolution supporting the Prince in his position as stadholder. "5 
One of the more noticeable things about the vroedschap resoluties after 1678 is the 
greater depth they went into, with lengthier reports being made. There was the 
kind of proliferation of paper which is often associated with greater bureaucracy, 
and frequently carries the implication that decisions are in fact being concentrated 
within fewer hands. The role of Witsen, who was one of those reporting from the 
Ill. Ibid., 20 February 1679; see above p. 222, note 95. 
112 Ibid., 29 May 1679. 
See above pp. 134 and 195. 
114 G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., I April 1679. 
Ibid., 24 April 1679. 
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committee and one of the principal links between Amsterdam and Fagel and the 
Prince, is strong evidence for the concentration of the unity of purpose within the 
regency. Throughout 1679 it was Witsen who was reporting on many diverse 
matters, but especially the restitution of favourable trading terms in the Baltic, and 
there is little evidence among his papers that he was reporting solely to Valckenier, 
rather that he had assumed role of his own, as adviser to the ruling burgomasters. 
Witsen's role, established in the immediate post-war period, set the scene for the 
further concentration of effective power within the hands of the ruling 
burgomasters and their immediate circle in the early 1680s after the death of 
Valckenier. Gebhard saw Witsen as the direct successor to Valckenier, " but it 
must be recognised that although he may have succeeded him as one of the leading 
burgomasters, he did follow his practices or his politics. Once Witsen had joined 
the group of those among whom the burgomastership circulated in the 1680s, his 
influence continued to increase with domination of both final decision-making and 
the preliminary reporting work of the committees. 
By July 1679 this trend was further confirmed. An organised effort by the States 
of Holland to regularise taxation on various trades and the vroedschap pointedly 
left all decisions to the burgo masters. "' During a period when the states, the 
Prince and the French and English Ambassadors were struggling over the prospect 
of defensive alliances, two issues began to take up more and more time in the 
vroedschap, where little reference was made to foreign policy, although it was 
receiving major attention from Fagel and his agents, who were keeping a close eye 
on D'Avaux and other French operators in Amsterdam. These other matters were 
the advantages to be reaped from the Algerian slave trade and the status of the 
colony at Surinam. "' 
There is further evidence of a movement away from the involvement in foreign 
'". Gebhard, Witsen, p. 165. 
117. G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 4 July 1679. 
118. See above pp. 99-100. 
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policy with a proliferation of more parochial matters, perhaps an inevitable result 
of the peace such as the payment of fl. 1,000 to Andrei Backer for a picture for the 
entrance to the schepen kamer and the consent to one Silvert Colman retaining his 
burger rights in Amsterdam while holding his post of professor of law at Leiden 
University. 
The general air of tidying up went on throughout 1679 with various adjustments 
being made to individual contributions, "' and in particular, attention being paid to 
those finances which related either to expenditure by the Prince or his income 
before additional expenditure was approved. For example on 16 October when 
considering a States of Holland resolution for back pay for infantry and cavalry this 
was followed with a statement of the city's finances showing interest due on loans 
made during the war. And again on 26 December, when there was a request for a 
further fl. 400,000 for the Prince the vroedschap felt it right to examine in detail the 
rents paid from Holland on the Prince's properties during the year amounting to 
somefl. 500,000 including interest. "' 
This attendance to good housekeeping was made plain in early January 1680 during 
the discussion on the Swat van Oorlog when Amsterdam resolved to oppose any 
increase in military expenditure during the time of peace but couched their 
resolution to be passed to the States of Holland as hoping for a reasonable 
conclusion. "' Unusually the Staat van Oorlog was still being debated in February, 
and in March firm resistance was made against additional expenditure joined by 
Haarlem, Delft, Alkmaar, Edam and Purmerend. "' 
At this time there was a perceptible reduction in tariffs and interest rates. In 
"'. For example, see G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 20 November 1679. 
120 G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed, 18 and 26 December 1679. At fl. 115,200 
Amsterdam's payments were three times that paid by any other town. 
121 
. Ibid., 9 January 1680. 
122 
. Ibid.., 12 March 1680. 
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October 1679 all rent interest was reduced from four to three and a half per cent;... 
in January 1680 the tax on beer was reduced by a third and in February a loan to 
the administrators of the almshouses was made at three and a half rather than four 
per cent. 124 
The first half of 1680 was dominated by the issues relating to taxation and military 
expenditure, with the involvement of the senior members in lengthy committee 
work, but in June consent was finally given to the payment of the 200 penningh. "' 
in July there was a change of personnel in Amsterdam. Whereas for five years van 
den Bosch had been pensionary, this post now fell into the hands of Jakob Hop 
who, with his father, had been excluded from service by Valckenier's displeasure 
since 1675. By 1682 Jakob Hop was to be one of the most active political servants 
of Amsterdam and, as the French ambassador, D'Avaux's main contact with the 
vroedschap often in secret. As we have already seen, in the late 1680s he made a 
smooth transition to the service of the Prince. "' 
Throughout this period, although the vroedschap was rather silent on discussions 
about alliances leaving them to the secret negotiations with D'Avaux and the 
burgomasters and their representatives at The Hague, the mood of Amsterdam is 
still evident. There was a constant awareness of the need to keep French goods at 
artificially high prices, for example on 21 July 1682 a resolution was passed that 
121 Ibid., 16 October 1679. On the same day a report was made on interest accrued 
by the city during the war, totalling overfl. 3m, ibid., 22 January and 20 February 
1680. 
124 
. Ibid., 22 January and 
20 February 1680. 
See Appendix VI, and G. A. Amsterdam, Res Vroed., 5 June 1680. As early as 
the end of 1679 the burgomasters had firmly stated that Amsterdam could not 
countenance any increase in military expenditure in time of peace, G. A. 
Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 9 January 1680 quoting in full a twenty page report 
from the "Secret Notulen van Burgemeesteren". 
126 
- A. R. H. Fagel 1985,19 January, 1682. 
230 
no French wine should be sold for less than "6 stuyvers de pint", "' but there was a 
general accord with Boreel's views from Paris that an alliance with France would 
be of the greatest advantage. "' With the main questions under discussion still 
taxation and prices the need for security for trade was naturally a contingent 
priority and in August 1680 a resolution was passed pressing for the continuation 
of warships accompanying convoys. `9 In these circumstances it is not therefore 
very surprising that in April 1682 when the case for arming against France was in 
the offing, Amsterdam considered sending its own warships against the French 
interference in Algeria, while continuing pressing strongly the case for peace with 
France in the States. 130 
By the end of 1680 all the work on tax and prices seemed to have had an effect 
with a non-controversial request for continuation of tax levels for 1681 and support 
for maritime expenditure agreed without long debate, "' followed by an uncontested 
consent to a supplementary request for the Slaat van Oorlog offl. 180,000, and on 
9 December consent being given to undertake repairs to fortifications throughout 
the province. "' The only qualification made here was that of full accountability, 
no doubt a merely formal request. It could be said that during 1680 the new group 
in Amsterdam were working at all these financial matters and differences with the 
Prince over contributions and, on the death of Valckenier, began to pursue this 
moderate line more overtly. The speed with which the transition from the 
confrontational and divisive policies operating during Valckenier's lifetime to the 
more united moderate line took place demonstrates just how frail and illusory the 
true force of his power was. On the other hand, the fact that the other able and 
127 G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 21 July 1682. 
Ibid., 8 September 1679. 
129 Ibid., 21 August 1680. 
"0. Ibid., 16 April 1682. 
". Ibid.., 18/19 November 1680. 
132 
. Ibid., 2 December 1680. 
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influential regents did have to wait for his death before they could assert 
themselves fully, does also demonstrate the force of the personality of the one man. 
In the later 1670s the "group in waiting" were not of course in any way dependent 
on Valckenier's patronage or wealth; they had sufficient power, wealth and 
influence of their own. "' Therefore they must have had some respect for his 
political skills and his potential for influencing the progress of policy, even if 
thwarted. This respect may have dated back to his manipulation of events from 
1671 to 1674, and the successes of his opponents from 1675 to 1677 were seen in 
the context of the external pressures on the regency to form a coherent policy for 
the overall interest of the city. D'Avaux was unhappy about the death of 
Valckenier in 1680 as he believed he was the only member of the regency who 
would ensure that Amsterdam would remain united in favour of the French 
alliance. "' Despite the breach between the Prince and van Beuningen, it was well- 
known that the latter was less likely to forward the interests of France and was still 
closely involved in foreign policy discussions with Fagel. But D'Avaux's agents 
in both Rotterdam and Amsterdam assured him that there would be moves towards 
unity within the City. 135 
In 1681 and 1682, before the Luxemburg issue caused massive rethinking, business 
was devoted to day-to-day affairs in Amsterdam. Much of the activity was 
concerned with treatment of religious and political refugees, not only Huguenots 
from France, but also Portuguese and German Jews. This open policy coincided 
Of particular note is the relationship between Hudde and his nephew, Witsen. The 
former's administrative and intellectual strengths have been discussed, above p. 
123, but his role before the emergence of Witsen as a leading member of the 
regency in the 1680s was based on his administrative abilities. After 1680 his 
correspondence with Witsen, Opmeer and Jakob Hop in particular became far 
more political, see for example, G. A. Amsterdam, Collectie Hudde, 29 March 
1681, Hop to Hudde, 22 March 1681, Opmeer to Hudde, 26 March 1681, Hudde 
to Witsen and, G. A. Amsterdam, Collectie Witsen, 16 June 1682, Hudde to 
Witsen. By 1684 Hudde was one of van Beuningen's principal correspondents 
over the troops crisis. The consensus type of political organisation developing in 
Amsterdam after 1680 seems to have suited Hudde rather than the individual and 
factional disputes of the 1670s. 
134 
. D'Avaux, Nigociations, p. 108. 
"'. Ibid., p. 109. 
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with the English Exclusion Crisis and the Prince's declaration that any future 
European conflict would be for the religious freedom of the protestant peoples. 
Thus even before Amsterdam was called on to support aggression against France, 
which she was unable to see her way to do, the groundwork was being prepared for 
the change which would be inevitable in 1685. There is something contradictory 
in Amsterdam's reluctance to accept any other arguments against a pro-French 
policy. It clearly shows how much they felt they had been damaged by the earlier 
war, that prevention of another conflict at all costs was the ruling theory. In 1683 
they were still arguing that any military undertaking would impose serious 
restrictions on trade and quoted to Fagel the problems being encountered in the 
Baltic with Danish ships, which to their mind was a far more urgent problem than 
French aggression in Luxemburg. 116 
The summer of 1681 had been relatively quiet, with more settlement of outstanding 
taxation questions and arrears of military payments, and the continued interest in 
the long distance trade regulations. Differences between Holland and Zeeland 
began to predominate both in the East Indies and nearer home with disputes over 
changes imposed on the internal import of Friesland peat to Holland, and the 
question of favourable terms for trading through the Sound. This was just as 
negotiations were taking place with Zeeland over the proposed takeover of the 
administration of Surinam, after dominating the committee work of the vroedschap 
for several months. Early in 1682, before the troubles of later in the year began, 
there was a continuation of rationalisation of trading privileges with attempts to 
improve the Dutch position in the Baltic by working on the Danish tolls; ` and 
with reductions of the taxes on exports of grain and tobacco through Amsterdam 
warehouses. Municipal improvements continued mainly on the waterways to 
facilitate the passage for shipping. "' Concurrently in December 1681 Friesland 
Exceptionally, resistance was still being made to the Staat van Oorlog for 1683 as 
late as 4 March, which Amsterdam felt did not take full account of the needs of 
commerce, G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 4 March 1683. 
137 
. G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 2 December 1681. 
"'. Ibid., 8 February 1682. 
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and Groningen were once more in the centre of interest over the imposition of 
taxes on commerce. This assertion of rights and independence by these two 
provinces (and the support they were given by Amsterdam) was indicative of the 
stance they would later take towards the Prince's actions against France. In July 
1682 Haarlem felt driven to quote the Union of Utrecht in support of criticism of 
Friesland's actions. 139 And in January 1683 the Frieslanders themselves were 
asking for favourable treatment from Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht in the Swat van 
Oorlog. Naturally enough the autumn of 1682 showed greater interest in foreign 
affairs, but the dominant theme was still the maintenance of commerce. At this 
stage, Witsen in his first term as burgomaster, seemed to be taking the upper hand 
in the administration. It was Witsen who corresponded with Fagel over losses in 
the slave trade, 140 Witsen who kept a record of all the discussions over the 8,000 
men in 1682, and Witsen who supported Pierre Bayle with only occasional 
reference being made to Hudde as Magnificaal. 141 
But despite the greater apparent involvement of the vroedschap committees in 
discussion, it is clear that most of the major decisions about Amsterdam's policy on 
the 8,000 men were dealt with by the burgomasters' direct instructions to their 
deputies in The Hague. 
In 1683-84, however, much fuller consultation took place within the regular 
meetings of the vroedschap. Resistance to militarism followed the prevarication 
over the Staat van Oorlog in July 1683 when objections were raised to requests for 
equipping twelve warships, since the fleet "soo groot ende machtig in de Zee 
, vvaren". 142 And when the request for further men was formally made in the autumn 
support from Leiden, Delft "en sodanige andere" in opposition was welcomed by 
Ibid., 20 July 1682. 
G. A. Amsterdam, Collectie Witsen, Witsen to Fagel (undated, but filed with 1681 
papers and reflecting issues current at that time, "lossen der slaven", etc. 
Gebhard, Witsen, p. 196, G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 16 January 1683. 
142 
. G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed., 14 July 1683. 
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the vroedschap. "' The intensity of activity and discussions increased throughout 
the winter of 1683-84, firstly centering around the visit of the Prince to Amsterdam 
in November 1683,144 then around the publication of D'Avaux's intercepted letters 
in February 1684, and finally in April on the support Amsterdam could expect from 
Friesland. 145 
Quite clearly, the crisis of 1683-84 was, in the eyes of the Amsterdammers, equal 
to that of 1650 or 1672, and required unity of purpose. For the burgomasters to act 
without the full co-operation and knowledge of the whole regency would not have 
been politcally wise. Any disunity amongst the leading regents that there was, was 
not the result of factional interest, but was over the political ideology of van 
Beuningen. In this way the opposition to William in 1683-84 was far more 
coherent than support for his restoration in 1672, or the push for peace in 
opposition to his will in 1676-78. 
". Ibid., 16 Deptember 1683. See also above p. 187. 
G. A. Amsterdam, 16 November 1683, at which lengthy details of the 
arrangements, including the seating plan, were considered. 
". Ibid, 6 April 1684. 
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion 
At the end of 1688 Amsterdam was fully prepared to support the Prince of Orange 
in his expedition to England, with the subsidiary but eventually more critical 
intention of pursuing his crusade against Louis XIV. The reasons for the change of 
heart in the city's attitude to the Prince's policy and his use of Dutch military 
resources for this adventure were well-rehearsed in the Glorious Revolution 
tricentennial conferences and publications in 1988-89. The simplistic nature of the 
tradition of crediting Amsterdam with a high moral attitude against the Revocation 
of the Edict of Nantes aligned with their need for the economic security was 
successfully exposed and a more realistic understanding of the far more complex 
dynamics working within the city and its relations with the Prince was rebuilt. ' 
That Amsterdam was able to establish a successful working relationship with the 
Prince for this enterprise has its roots in the previous fifteen years of the 
stadholdership of William 111. These years had not been free of tensions and 
incident, and the relationship between the stadholder and the leading city had 
matured throughout a series of tensions and compromises which increased in 
severity throughout the 1670s and early 1680s. From the guarded co-operation of 
the 1672-74 period to the tensions of the push for peace from 1675 to 1678, 
through the "betrayal" of the States commitment to its allies and the policies of the 
Prince, to the friction of 1682 and the outright quarrel of 1684, somehow there was 
always just enough common concern for the "interest of state" to avoid declared 
conflict. 
The breach of 1684 may have left the Prince and Amsterdam in two extreme 
positions, but there always remained some potential channel of communication 
open to them to attempt to search for a common purpose. And, in the last resort, if 
the common purpose were serious enough, both parties were prepared to co-operate 
I 
. Israel, "The Dutch role 
in the Glorious Revolution", pp. 109-119. 
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despite the manifest differences between their motivation and interest. This study 
has shown that the internal political structures of the Dutch Republic - in this case 
the city of Amsterdam and the office of raadpensionatis in the 1670s and 1680s - 
were such that the security of the states and the bases of that security, as 
interpreted by the different participants, were treated as Paramount. 
It is very difficult to argue that, collectively, any governing body comprises more 
or less able politicians, and yet the application of reason does appear to have 
determined the actions of those operating during this period. Contemporary and 
historical consensus agreed that De Witt was a very successful politician, and yet 
he was unable to build bridges with either individuals, as in the case of his breach 
with van Beuningen, or popular movements, as in the case of the local pressures 
which led to his eventual fall. Neither William 11 nor those with whom he came 
into conflict were able or willing to make compromises. Nevertheless, in many 
ways, the Amsterdam regency of the 1670s and 1680s and William III were their 
direct heirs and were steeped in the ideologies and culture of their heritage. But 
throughout their stormy relationship, even the most severe breaches did not finally 
close the door to compromise and potential for future co-operation. 
The previous chapters have attempted to explain why the development of this 
relationship was so different from that of their predecessors. The reasons have of 
course been drawn from both the internal structure and politics of the Dutch 
Republic and the changing intemational scene. This study has avoided structured 
historical theories, such as the "General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century", but has 
drawn on those based on ideologies of the "interest of state". The former restrict 
the historian to selecting evidence which contributes to the theory, contradictions 
being either sidelined or explained away as individual idiosyncrasies. The latter 
allow for change, development and the influence of ideas and responses to 
circumstances. 
The seventeenth century provided the ideal circumstances for the evolution of ideas 
of state, and the Dutch Republic the almost perfect setting for debate of them. Its 
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ruling class were closely involved in these debates and in their practical 
application. The frequency of war and the consequent explosion of diplomatic 
activity leading to changing alliances and leagues, took place at the same time as 
the mercantile world and economic competition expanded, and a culture of 
religious and philosophical debate began to co-exist with rigid conformity. This 
was the background within which the Dutch Republic had reached its Golden Age, 
and had become a full and leading participant. At the centre was the city of 
Amsterdam. 
The diplomacy of the later seventeenth century continued to exploit interest groups 
within the principal participant states and institutions. And influence and interest 
were the powerful tools which the Amsterdammers were able to use to gain their 
own ends. But if through them they were able to impose limitations on the 
stadholder, other influences imposed limitations on them. The constituents of their 
own regent class reflected a wide variety of interest and influence which mirrored 
that operating throughout the States of Holland and other parts of the republic. 
Popular reaction and external pressures had forced them to compromise in 1672 
and for the next twelve years they never forgot that. Constitutionally the role of 
the stadholder was strengthened by the political awareness of William III. He too 
had learnt some of the lessons of the past and knew where his strength lay. 
The foreign policy of the United Provinces was not the result of the consultations 
through the official, cumbersome decision-making processes, it was a series of 
compromises, emergency decisions, opportunist actions, and more likely a 
shortcircuiting of the official processes. Ultimate decision-making on military 
expenditure rested with the States General, but policy was more than decisions to 
become involved in military exploits, and much rested with those commissioned to 
act for the States or the Prince as official or unofficial diplomats. It was therefore 
at the formative stage that the influence of those closely involved at whatever level 
became critical. Much of the history of the relationship between Amsterdam and 
the Prince of Orange in the last quarter of the seventeenth century is in this way an 
analysis of the formation of the foreign policy of the Dutch Republic, however far 
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removed it was at times from the official channels leading to approval by the States 
General. But it is not the whole picture of the formation of foreign policy; other 
influences and interests were at work as well, although closer analysis has shown 
that the interests of both the major participants (that is, the Prince and Amsterdam) 
more often than not infiltrated most critical parts of the Republic's government. 
Hence the role of Amsterdammers in the affairs of Friesland and Groningen, its 
weighting in the chambers of the major trading companies, its paternalistic 
intervention in religious or civic disputes in smaller towns and other provinces, the 
estates of regents in the inland provinces and their consequent influence over their 
local affairs. The list is endless. 
The influence of the Prince of Orange also reached far into the politics of the 
States, through the exercise of patronage, the assertion of control over the three 
provinces readmitted to the Union after the withdrawal of the French in 1674 and 
1675, influence in the ridderschap, the international prestige attached to a Prince of 
royal descent and, not least, the identification of the non-regent classes with the 
Orangist cause. Most importantly for this discussion, however, was his close 
relationship with De Witt's successor as raadpensionails. The change from his 
predecessors' dependence on a small group of, mainly aristocratic, supporters to a 
working relationship with the principal office holder in the States of Holland, who 
also had an important functional role as gfiffier to the States General, may hold the 
key to the success of the compromises reached vAth Amsterdam. This is not to say 
that William III did not listen to the advice of his noble friends, but he was able to 
listen to it within a clear comprehension of the reality of the exercise of power in 
the States. 
Amsterdam's attitude to foreign policy was unpredictable and changing throughout 
the period. This was as much to do with the internal Politics of Amsterdam and 
the ebbs and flows of faction, party and individual interest as with the larger issues 
of city, state and republic. We have seen in chapter 5 how the determination of 
economic policy was very much a reactive affair, sometimes to large-scale trends, 
such as the growing involvement of France in the Atlantic trade, sometimes to 
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smaller issues of tariffs on French goods brought through the inland provinces. 
This has also reinforced the argument that economic and foreign policy were 
inextricably linked within the minds of those influencing decisions in the Dutch 
Republic in the late seventeenth century. And, to go further, it can be argued that 
since that period it has been unrealistic to separate the study of economic and 
political history (or any of the subsidiary strands of history). This thesis has been 
approached from the more traditional political perspective but the primary evidence 
has frequently been that which would contribute to an economic study and the tools 
and work of the economic historian have been invaluable in defining the argument. 
By examining the activities of Amsterdam in this way there are some interesting 
conclusions to be drawn. To deal with the earlier period (1672-78) first; that there 
was considerable jostling for power and place has to be accepted and yet 
Amsterdam managed to sustain a fairly consistent policy reflected in the actions 
taken by van Beuningen, who was seen by the Prince as the personification of the 
Amsterdam administration. A partly biographical study like Franken's is naturally 
bound to put the emphasis on the activities of the one man, but time and again he 
was acting on the lines of the resolutions from the vroedschap, often on direct 
instructions from them, which would seem to suggest that either the burgomasters 
were in control of policy decisions among the thirty-six members or were prepared 
to accept their advices. At a period when all were vulnerable, the latter is probably 
the more accurate assumption. However up to 1677 at least, by when the Prince 
was getting exasperated with van Beuningen and the recalcitrance of Amsterdam, 
the main channel of communications was between Fagel and Valckenier or their 
representatives, but thereafter this line seems to break down. 
Rather than take this argument further, I will briefly draw conclusions about the 
period after the death of Valckenier in 1680. The Prince and his advisers did not 
appear to have made much allowance for changes in Amsterdam; to them the role 
of van Beuningen as Amsterdam's spokesman was unchanged (even though the 
relations between him and The Prince and Fagel had deteriorated). The Prince had 
had a working relationship With Witsen for several years, and yet even with the 
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breach of 1684 it was van Beuningen's role that assumed importance with the 
Prince, or at least was seen by historians to have done so. 
During these years Amsterdam sustained a consistent policy but, in the latter part, 
it was based on an unforced unity by the acquiescence of the majority in the 
decisions of the minority, whose major problem was dealing with the vagaries, as 
well as benefiting from, the experience of van Beuningen. 
We have seen that dominating these policies was the need to restore Amsterdam's 
trade to its former status in relation to France and England, to continue to assert 
her dominance overseas where possible, not only over foreign, but also home 
competitors and in order to do this to apply the principles of sound local financial 
administration and welfare. By the late 1670s many of the leading members of the 
vroedschap were directors of the VO. C, and although there was only one director 
of the new IVLC. until 1679 - Scott - he played an important part in determining 
policy within the workings of the vroedschap. 
Amsterdam could not of course ignore foreign policy, but in the mid-1670s she was 
prepared to state that it was not a sound basis for the security of the State and, in 
1684, to go even further and abdicate from active participation in foreign policy 
decisions. Yet within a very few years Amsterdam was once again playing a 
critically important role in foreign policy; the regents were sufficiently convinced 
by the needs of the 1688 crisis to be able to respond positively to the Prince's 
requests for support for what in many respects was the archetypical dynastic and 
militaristic enterprise. 
There are of course limitations to a study of this kind, which is putting the 
formation of the foreign policy of one state within the context of international 
issues, but without a detailed examination of those issues from the point of view of 
the other interested parties. Assumptions therefore have to be made about the 
value of researches by other historians who have studied the wider context. This 
exposes the writer to greater risks than if the study had dealt solely with, say, the 
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structure of the ruling class in Amsterdam, with only passing allusion made to the 
external influences which impacted on the regents. However, the challenge of 
seeking answers to the wider questions of European history within a detailed study 
of an important participant in that history, in this case the city of Amsterdam, 
produces a far deeper understanding of more than just the structure of the city 
government or the nature of international relations. It gives the researcher the 
opportunity of developing a fuller understanding of the nature of the later 
seventeenth century and gives the angle of the study a clearer perspective and 
context. 
Dependence on the work of others could have had an undue influence on the 
interpretations within the thesis and increased the risk of it becoming a critical 
study of the extant works. This problem was faced squarely from the outset and 
the use of recent (and less recent) relevant works, although of course being used 
for basic contextual background, was primarily as a source of discovering the gaps 
in historical research of a period which has become obscured between the first 
stadholderless period and studies of the Dutch Golden Age, and the enterprise of 
the Glorious Revolution and the French war. In this way it is in very small part a 
critical analysis of the secondary sources, but not a criticism of them. What has 
been highlighted is the lack of in-depth secondary sources on the correlation 
between the internal structures and the determination of policy. 
The primary source material was not waiting to be discovered. It was all well- 
known, generally well-catalogued and had previously been well-sifted. The 
purposes to which it had been put were different, and much had been discarded as 
irrelevant to those purposes, but it was unlikely that the current study would find 
much new material. 
The extensive use made of the extant correspondence between Valckenier and Van 
Beuningen by Franken and of Witsen by Gebhard have contributed fully to our 
knowledge of the respective roles of these leading regents. The value of these 
studies to this thesis cannot be overestimated, but once again it is what they have 
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omitted and their lamentations at these omissions, that are being looked at here, 
albeit in the context of thin primary sources. There is a case for arguing that what 
should perhaps be attempted is full research into the correspondence of Valckenier 
for its own sake, rather than as one of the principal correspondents of other leading 
regents and statesmen. This would be useful if the aim was to produce a critical 
biography of Valckenier, but would be a less effective vehicle for explaining the 
full relationship between Amsterdam and the central States organisation and the 
Prince of Orange in the 1670s and 1680s. 
At the beginning of this study two questions were posed. 2 These questions have 
become refined into a study of the relationship between the two most powerful 
interests in the Dutch Republic, the stadholder and the city of Amsterdam. In 
searching for answers to the wider questions raised it has become clear that the 
overriding interest of the majority of the regents of Amsterdam, was not the 
exercise of power for its own sake, but the influence of political power for their 
more fundamental interests of commercial superiority and wealth and the freedom 
to pursue these within an city environment over which they had almost total 
control. Subsidiary to this main aim were the individual interests of the leading 
participants. 
Therefore the key to the argument has been the motivation of those whose 
influence, or willingness to agree to financing, finally determined the policies of 
the States. Motivation is rarely single-minded, but may be a mixture of ideology, 
power and wealth. Ideology may be the cloak under which religious beliefs or 
prejudices flourish-, it may be informed by political and economic theories; or it 
may emerge through a rational analysis of contemporary needs. The desire for 
power may be at the individual level or may be influenced by territorialism or 
dynasticism. Wealth can be sought equally for the individual, the family or the 
state. 
2 See above p. 12. 
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One of the main strands of the argument has rested on an analysis of the 
contribution of the individual in the city government of Amsterdam and in the 
service of the Prince and the States. This poses a fundamental question about the 
contribution of the individual to the progress of history. This is not the place to 
rehearse the arguments about causation, determinism and the role of "great men" in 
history, but the author has clearly, with eyes open, taken the path that leads to the 
conclusion that the role of the individual cannot be discounted. This does not 
claim that the individual is paramount; they cannot operate in isolation. The study 
of history is the study of societies, communities and states and their interrelation. 
We have seen that, however dominant or isolated an individual is, they have to 
operate within a group of some kind. So the importance of a Valckenier or a van 
Beuningen in the politics of Amsterdam is only as great as that which the larger 
group will allow. The make-up of the larger group, all its individual components, 
%krill make it unique and establish its own importance in the next stage of decision- 
making. 
Autocratic and absolutist power can be defined and analysed, but it depends on 
support, whether willing or coerced, and it is clear to any rational student of 
humankind that in any such regime the motivations of those supporting the ultimate 
leader may be very varied. Some may be operating solely through self- 
preservation, others through ambition and greed. But whatever the motivation, 
their presence is indispensable to the leader. When it is lost, the regime becomes 
fragile and eventually succumbs. 
The aim here has therefore been to show how the individual worked within the 
system pertaining in the Dutch Republic in the late seventeenth century to 
influence and determine foreign policy. The study has not denied theories of 
trends, but has concentrated on the human side of them. Thus, for example, the 
secularisation of Amsterdam politics is not considered solely from a municipal 
reaction to the changing religious, political and economic circumstances, but is also 
considered from the point of view of the individual and his own factional and 
family interest. 
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By asking specific questions about status, relationships and influence within the 
Amsterdam regency, it has been possible to determine that the power of Valckenier 
was not as complete as might at first appear. When he had power and control, he 
did exercise it with the appearance of complete confidence, but he was constantly 
aware of the need to ensure that the base for such actions was secure. At times he 
was walking a tight-rope and in 1675-76 he had to seek support from those whom 
he would have preferred to exclude from power-sharing. The most prominent 
among those was Hooft, who emerges from the shadows as a republican keeping 
his wise counsel, into a shrewd politician who continued to exercise his influence 
despite his apparent withdrawal after 1672. 
The compromises arrived at between Amsterdam and the Prince were often the 
result of an ultimate common cause which may have had widely divergent 
foundations: the known level of external risks and pressures, and a rational 
perception of the basis for the strength of both city and Prince. That such 
compromises were seen as essential to both sustains the argument that Amsterdam 
had accepted in February 1674,3 with the confirmation of the status of the Prince, 
that the role of stadholder was a crucial part of the government of the Dutch 
Republic, and that the Prince understood quite clearly how best to preserve that 
status. What this study has also shown is that both were quite determined to push 
the other as far as possible within the well-understood constraints, where they 
believed their interpretations of the interests of state were the best justified. 
3 
. Reaffirmed in April 1679, see above p. 226. 
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Figure I 
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Figure 2 
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Appendix I 
The Amsterdam Vroedschap 1672-1684 
APPELMAN, Jean (1608-94), Koopman (Elias 207); Member 1672-94; NOMINATED 15.9.72 
Addre33: Singel "in de Roos" 
Quota 1674: fl. 118,000 
BACKER, Dr. Willem (1608-86) (Elias 203); Member 1670-72; REMOVED 10.9.72 
Address: Binnen Amstel 
1674 quota: fl. 110,000 
BACKER, Cornelis (1633-81) (Elias 183); Member 1658-81; Director VOC 1662 
Address: Heerengracht bij de Utrechtschestraat 
Hofstede Nijssenburch onder Overveen 
1674 quota: fl. 200,000 
BECKER, Hendrick (1621-88), Reeder ter walvischvangd (Elias 209); Member 1672-88; 
NOMINATED 15.9.72; Director VOC 1671 
Address: Heerengracht bij de Leidschestraat 
1674 quota: fl. 117,000 
BLAEU, Dr Joan (1596-73), Printer and Publisher (Elias 163); Member 1651-72 REMOVED 
10.9.72 
Address: (1) Bloemengracht; (2) Gravenstraat achter de Nieuwe Kerk 
1674 quota: fl. 355,000 
BLOM, Dirck (1632- ?) (Elias 214); Member 1672-79; NOMINATED 15.9.72; Batavia 1679 
Address: I Nieuwe Waalseiland 
1674 quota: 
BONTEMANTEL, Hans (1613-88), Koopman (Elias 171); Member 1653-72 REMOVED 
10.9.72; Director WIC 1654 
Address: Keizersgracht nast "de Wallens" over the Groenlandsche Pakhuizen 
1674 quota: 
BOREEL, Jacob, Ridder, Vrijheer van Dijnbeek, St Aecht en Meeresteyn (dates) (Elias 200); 
Member 1668-97; Burgomaster 1691,93,95,97; Gecommitteerde Raad 1680; Ambassador Russia 
1664; Extraordinary Envoy Brussels March-June 1678; Extraordinary Ambassador France 1678-80; 
Director Societeit van Suriname 1689 
Address: Heerengracht bij de Leidsegracht 
I Huis Meesteynen onder Velsen 
1674 quota: 
BORS, Gerard Oater Bors van Waveren) (1630-93) (Elias 211); Member 1672-93; NOMINATED 
15.9.72; Burgomaster 1683,85,87,89,92; Director VOC 1679 
Address: Singel bij de brouwerij "de Swaan" 
1674 quota: 
CLOECK, Nanning (1643-1702), Lawyer (Elias 217); Member 1674-1702 
Address: Keizersgracht 
1674 quota: 
COMMELIN, Joan (1629-92), Professor of Botany, Athenaeum (Elias 212); Member 1672-92; 
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NOMINATED 15.9.72 
Address: (1) Kalverstraat 'in de Crokodil"; (2) Heerengracht bij Flora 
Hofstede Zuijderhout aan't emden van der Haarlemmerhout 
1674 quota: 
CORVER, Joan (1628-1716), Koopman (Elias 194); Member 1666-1716; Burgomaster 
1681,85,86,89,92,94,95,98,1700,1,3,4,6,7,9,12,13; Director VOC 1688 
Address: Heerengracht tuschen Leidsche- en Spiegelsgrachten 
Hofstede Beeckesteyn en Velsen 
1674 quota: fl. 419,000 
DE GRAEFF, Andries, Ridder (1611-78) (Elias 193); Member 1665-72 REMOVED 10.9.72; 
Burgomaster 1657,60,64,66,67,70,71 
Address: Heerengracht tusschen de Leidschenstraat en de Nieuwe Spiegelstraat in een dubblehuis 
(I ) Hoofstede nabij den Venusberg onder Valkeveen; (2) Hofstede Valkenberg onder Heemstede 
1674 quota: fl. 150,000 
DE VICQ, Francois (1646-1707) (Elias 226); Member 1679-1707; 
Director WIC 1674 
Address: Heerengracht 
DE VICQ, Dr. Francois 1678) (Elias 219); Member 1675-78 
Address: Heerengracht 
Hofstede Spaeren Hout onder Heemstede 
1674 quota: fl. 257,000 
DE VLANIING VAN OUDTSHOORN, Cornelis, Ridder, Heer van Oudtshoorn en Griephoek 
(1612-88) (Elias 181); Member 1657-88; Burgomaster 1656,60,62,63,68,72,76,77,79,80; Director 
VOC 1677 
Address: (I) Heerengracht bij de Heidenstraat; (2) Singel tusschen de Bergstraat en den 
Bluwburgwal "in de Kleynen Dolphijn" 
(1) Hofstede Kostveloren te Oudtshoorn; (2) Hofstede Reynoord 
1674 quota: fl. 169,000 
DE VRIES, Joan (1633-1708), Merchant (Italy) (Elias 228); Member 1680-1708; Burgomaster 
1686,90; Director VOC 1681 
Address: Heerengracht bij de Utrechtschestraat 
DE VRIJ, Egbert (1626-1701), Laken merchant (Elias 224); Member 1679-1701 
Address: Keizersgracht 
ERNST, Dr. Roetert (1616-85) (Elias 172); Member 1653-72 REMOVED 10-9.72 
Address: Singel bij de Warmoesgracht "in den vergulden Keel" 
1674 quota: fl. 126,000 
GEELVINCK, Cornelis, Heer van Castricurn en Croonenburg (1621-89) (Elias 167); Member 
1652-89; Burgomaster 1673,75,84,88,89; Gecommitteerde Raad 1681-83 
Address: den Singel bij den Blauwburgwal "in de vergulden zon" 
Hofstede Ak-erendam onder Beverwijk 
1674 quota: fl. 29 1,000 
GRAAFLAND, Cornelis (1619-77), Koopman (Elias 196); Member 1667-77; Director VOC 1664 
Address: Keizersgracht over de Groenlandsche Pakhuizen 
Hofstede te 'sGraveland 
1674 quota: fl. 130,000 
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HASSELAER, Gerard (1620-73) (Elias 174); Member 1653-73; Burgomaster 1665,69 
Address: Keizersgracht over de brouwerij "de Kroon" 
Hofstede Lankskroon aan de Vecht 
HASSELAER, Nicolaes (1647-1684) (Elias 222); Member 1678-84 
Address: Keizersgracht, bij de Westerkerk 
IIINLOPEN, Jacob, Jacobsz (1644-1705) (Elias 229); Member 1680-1705; Burgomaster 1694; 
Director VOC 1695 
Address: Heerengracht bij de Nieuwe Spiegelstraat 
IIINLOPEN, Jacob Jacobsz (1621-79), Lakenkoper (Elias 182); Member 1657-79 
Address: Heerengracht 
1674 quota: fl. 240,000 
IIOOFT, Gerrit (1649-1717) (Elias 227); Member 1679-1717; (Pensionary 1672, Secretary 1673); 
Burgomaster 1708,11,14.16,17; Director VOC 1678 
Address: Binnen Amstel 
HOOFT, Henrick, Heer van Oud-Carspel in Koedijk, Schoter en Schoterbosch (1617-78) (Elias 
177); Member 1655-78; Burgomaster 1662,64,72,77,78; Gecommitteerde Raad 1669-71 
Address: (1) Breestraat; (2) Heerengracht 
1674 quota: fl. 340,000 
HUDDE, Johannes, Heer van Waveren, Botshol en Ruige Wihuis (1628-1704) (Elias 197); 
Member 1667-1704; Burgomaster 1672,73,75,79,81,82,84,85,87,88,90,91,93,94,96,99,1700,2,3; 
Director VOC 1679 
HUDDE, Rombout (1629-79) Lawyer (Elias 216); Member 1674-79 
Address: Keizersgracht 
1674 quota: fl. 143,000 
HULFT, Joan (1610-77), Merchant (Elias 199); Member 1668-72; REMOVED 10.9.72, Director 
VOC 1647; Director of the Colony Guyana 1660 
Address: Singel 
I Huis te Velsen 
1674 quota: fl. 200,000 
HUYDECOOPER, Joan, Heer van Maarseveen en Neerdijk (1625-1704) (Elias 191); Member 
1662-1704; Burgomaster 1673,75.76,78,80,82,84,86,87,89,90,92,93; Director VOC 1666 
Address: Lauriengracht 
Hofstede Goudesteyn aan de Vecht bij Maarseveen 
1674 quota: fl. 
MUNTER, Joan (1611-85), Koopman (not listed in Elias); Thesauris Ordinaris 
1672,73,75,77,79,91,85; Burgomaster 1670,74,76,78,80,82,83 
OPMEER, Nicolaes (1631-96) (Elias 213); Member 1672-96; NOMINATED 15.9.72; 
Burgomaster 1681,83,87,91,92,94; Gecommitteerde Raad 1684-86; Director WIC 1682 
Address: Keizersgracht 
1674 quota: 
PANCRAS, Nicolas (1622-78) (Elias 161); Member 1650-78; Burgomaster 1667,69,70,74,75; 
Gecommitteerde Raad 1678 
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Director VOC 1668 
Address: (1) Nieuwendijk; (2) Heerengracht 
(1) Hofstede Schoonoord onder Velsen; (2) Hofstede Wester-Amstel 
1674 quota: fl. 143,000 
RANST, Leonard (1631-73) (Elias 202); Member 1669-73 
Address: (1) de Oude Schans "in de Twee Tijgers"; (2) O. Z. Achterburgwal bij de Walenkerk 
Hofstede in de Purmer 
RENDORP, Joachim (1608-78), Brewer (Elias 159); Member 1650-78; Director Nordsche 
Compagnie 1654 (or earlier) 
Address: de Geldersche Kaay op den Zuiderhoek van de Rechtsboornsloot 
1674 quota: fl. 120,000 
REYNST, Lambert (1613-79), Lawyer (Elias 157); Member 1649-72; REMOVED 10.9.72; 
Burgomaster 1667,68,72; Director VOC 1667 
Address: Keizersgracht over de Groenlandse Pakhuisen 
1674 quota: fl. 160,000 
ROCH, Comelis (1630-81) Lawyer (Elias 205); Member 1671-81; Director VOC 1680 
Address: Flueweelenburgwal 
1674 quota: fl. 120,000 
SAUTUN, Gillis (1635-89), Koopman (Italy and Levant) (Elias 21.5); Member 1672-86; 
NOMINATED 15.9.72; Director Societeit van Suriname 
Address: Keizersgracht over de Westerhal 
1674 quota: JL 100,000 
SCHAEP, Pieter (1635-85) (Elias 195); Member 1666-72; REMOVED 10.9.72 
Addren: Keizersgracht 
1674 quota: 
SCHELLINGER, Bemard (1609-80) (Elias 150); Member 1640-80 
AddrC33: Kloveniersburgwal 
1674 quota: fl. 240,000 
SCOTT, Everard (1639-82), Merchant (Spain, Italy, Levant) (Elias 218); Member 1674-82; 
Director WIC 1682 
Address: Keizersgracht over "'t Oud Glashuys" 
1674 quota: fl. 178,000 
SIX, Jan, Heer van Wimmemum? en Vranade (1618-1700) (Elias 223); Member 1679-1700, 
Burgomaster 1691 
Address: (1) Kloveniersburgwal-, (2) Heerengracht bij den Amstel 
1674 quota: fl. 280,000 
TEN GROOTENHUYS, Joan (1621-79) (Elias 201), Member 1668-79 
AddrC33: O. Z. Achterburgwal bij de Beraniestraat 
1674 Quota: FIA00,000 
TIELLENS, Michiel (1620-79), Zijdelakenkoper (Elias 208); Member 1672-79; NOMINATED 
15.9.72 
Address: Wannoesstraat over de Servetsteeg "in den Soutlooper" 
1674 quota: 
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TRIP, Louis (1605-84), Koopman (Elias 206); Member 1672-84; NOMINATED 15.9.72; 
Burgomaster 1674,77,79; Director VOC 1678 
Addre53: (1) St. Anthoniebreestraat; (2) Singel "in de groote Pauw"; (3) Kloveniersburgwal 
Hofstede Meervliet onder Velsen 
1674 quota: 
TULP, Dr. Nicolas (1593-1674), Professor of Anatomy, Illustre Schole, Amsterdam (Elias 111); 
Member 1622-74; Burgomaster 1654,56,66,71; Gecommiteerde Raad 1663-65,1673-74 
Address: Keizersgracht, w. z. bij de Westerkerk. 
1674 quota: fl. 280,000 
VALCKENIER, Cornelis (1640-1700) (Elias 221); Member 1678-1700; Burgomaster 1696,99; 
Director Societeit van Suriname 1689 
Address: (1) Kloveniersburgwal bij de Nieuwemarkt; (2) No. 23 Kloveniersburgwal 
1674 quota: 
VALCKENIER, Gillis (1623-80) (Elias 166); Member 1652-80 
Burgomaster 1665,66,68,70,73,74,76,78,79; Gecommitteerde Raad 1672; Director VOC 1657 
Address: St. Anthoniesbreestraat 
1674 quota: fl. 227,000 
VAN BEUNINGEN, Coenraad (1622-1693); Member 1660-93) (Elias 189); Burgomaster 
1669,72,80,81,83,84; Director VOC 1681 
Address: (1) (Blijenburg, den Haag); (2) Binnen Arnstel tusschen Heerengracht and Keizersgracht 
(after 1680) 
1674 quota: fl. 100,000 
VAN BRONCIGIORST, Vincent, Ridder (1635-1703) (Elias 190% Member 1667-77 
Address: Keizersgracht 
1674 quota: fl. 100,000 
VAN CAPELLE, Nicolas Rochusz (1609-95), Koopman, lijnslager, reeder en assuradeur (Elias 
190); Member 1661-72 REMOVED 10.9.72; Director VOC 1652; Director van de Colonie 
Guyana 1660 
Address: Heercngracht 
1674 quota: fl. 146,000 
VAN HEUVEL, Isaac (1640-1686) (Elias 225); Member 1679-86; Director WIC 1674 
VAN DE POLL, Jan (1579-78) Houtkooper? (Elias 152); Member 1646-72, REMOVED 10.9.72, 
Burgomaster 1653,55,58,61,67,71,72 
Address: Kloveniersburwal 
1674 quota: fl. 150,000 
VAN NECK, Jacob Jacobsz (1629-87) (Elias 192); Member 1662-87 
AddreSE Singel bij de Gasthuis molensteeg 
1674 quota: 
VAN NECK. Jacob (1602-7) Insurance Underwriter (Elias 165); 
Member 1652-73 BANKRUPT 1673 
Address: Lauriergracht, w. z. bij de Westerkerk. 
1674 quota: 
VAN KLENCK, Coenraet (1628-91), Koopman (Elias 210); Member 1672-91; NOMINATED 
15.9.72 
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Address: (1) Ifeerengracht bij de Heerenstraat; (2) No. 96 Heerengracht 
1674 quota: 
VAN VLOOSWIJK, Cornelis, Heer van Vlooswijk, Wilverlast, Diemmerbroek en Papenkop (1601- 
87) (Elias 168); Member 1653-87; Burgomaster 1656,57,60,61,66,68,69,71; Director VOC 1667 
Address: (1) Heerengracht; (2) Kloveniersburgwal 
1674 quota: 
VAN LOON, Lieve (167-92); Alember 1677-92 
Address: (1) Singel-, (2) Keizersgracht 
1674 quota: fl. 240,000 
VAN LOON, Nicolas (1602-74), Koopman (Elias 169); Member 1653-75 
Address: KeizersgTacht 
1674 quota: fl. 240,000 
WITSEN, Nicolas (1641-1717) (Elias 204); Member 1670-1717; Burgomaster 
1682,85,88,90,93,95,96,98,99,1701,2,4,5; Gecommitteerde Raad 1674-77,87,91-92,97; Deputy 
States General 1683-85; Director VOC 1693 
Address: (1) Keizersgracht over den Schouwburg ; (2) No. 327 Keizersgracht; (3) Heerengracht 
tusschen de Utrechtschestraat en der Arnstel 
Hofstede Tijdverdrijf te Egrnond op den Hoef 
1674 quota: 
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Appendix 11 
Extract from Letter from W. Carr to W. Blaythwayt Amsterdam 21 March 
1681 (B. L. MS. Add. 41820 f12) 
"Esteemed Sir 
According to my promise I now send you a brief state of the present condition of this Citty: in Ano 
1676 this Citty was wholely governed by the singel faction of Burgemaster Valconier but the said 
Burgem. Valconier observing that his Party was weakened by the Death of some of his friends in 
the Gouvernient was forced to call in Burgemaster Hooft who before was kept out as being an 
Arminian, these 2 intrest being then joyned then the Citty was Equally devided betweene those 2 
great mean + all places of Trust + profit put into there hands, in Ano 1678 when the french King 
craftily write his letter to Amsterdam + to the States callin them his ould Allyes + good friends + 
offering them Mastriche + all that ever belonged to the States and threw them some sugar plumbs 
(vix) that he would take of Divers impositions on Duch goods, then these 2 great men contrary to 
the Politque opposed all the other Cittys + Provinces (except Gronengan + Vriesland, who had 
quarell with the P of Orange) forced a Peace + to except the terms the French offered, basely 
leaving out all their Allyes (for which this States are now sufficiently reproched by the [7) 
Denmark, Brandenburg + otheres) theare I cannot write letting you know what an Extravagant 
speach Burger Hooft made in the States, first that his principalls the Citty of Amsterdam did Except 
of the terms of the French + that they would not continue the warr any longer, nor pay a peny more 
Taxes to a warr, + that they paying above half the whole charge of the warr, ought to overrule 
those as did not pay so much, that they had payd 2000 turin of Gould for thire 200 peny, + he 
concluded his speach with these words that give him a peace although come from Hell, + no warr 
Ithough directed from Heaven, a few months after this Burger dyed, then Burgem Valconier 
gouverend all againe, but finding his party weeke + that Burgem van Beuengen would come into 
the Gouvernement by cource, he craftily unknowne to his owne party, wrote his peace with the P of 
0+ by his applying himselfe to the D of Yorke ... give me leave to tell you without a Vanity thus 
I had the hart to conduct the Burgem. to his Highness, after which day it was observed that he 
stuck fast to the Princes intrest, + Elected van Beuengen last yeare + on all occasions showed great 
Effections to our King ,+ the 
Prince, + he being Director of the East India Company caused the 
Company to make a Present to the D of Yorke last yeare, which made our Phanatiks English take 
at an ?? as if the Parliament would be angry with the Company for making the Da present, that 
this great man was so changed Aldmn Blackwell knowes, who I brought to him, and during his life 
he shewed fresh demonstrations of his respect to our King, + it was he that proposed to me that I 
would doe well to procure every post a paper of news from Whitehall for the Burgem, that they 
might be able to confront the Phanatik lyes spread in the Citty, by the English nations, this Burgem 
being Dead last Octob, then Burgem Van Beuengen grew strong in his intrest + this yeare there is a 
hope 2 new Burgems (vis) Burge Corver + Burge Opmer, so that there is only one of the ould 
rannk Commonwelath men left which is Burge Hudde + Burge Van Beuengen still remaines the 
4th, hence thee are come in that have invited the P+ Princes of Orange to thire Citty, + ... them 8 dayes, + gave great presents, the P not being in Amsterdam in 7 years, before, for this Citty is so 
chnaged in thire affection to the French within yeares that all the Art +? the French Emssaryes 
use to [make] the condition of England hfiserale + Desperate cannot any longer prevaill with the 
magistrates although the French Agent Mons. de Guerr, + Mon Chaubert the French consul doe 
make often feasts + presents amongst the Duch, there is now nobody doth so much hurt as our 
English Phanatiks who fill this Citty full every Posts with seditious papers, + lyes, sent them from 
England to prevent that mischiefe. there is now by you Sir Rob Soutwell + Mr Skellen + Mr Bertue 
now in Germany can tell how much hurt those papers doe in foraigne courts, being translated heare 
+ sent up to those parts, but to returne to the present condition of this Citty it rather decayes in its 
riches, + Traide then otherwys, the east India Actions which in Ano 1670 were 500 + once 550 are 
now but never as yet since the warr could be brought up to 450, so proportinably all other 
obligations on the land, + the Armic is no 26 monthes in avanes, + severall comptors pay not now 
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this intrest as in Zealand + the 4 Provinces that were under the french, + it is generally believed by 
many wise men that this States will never arrive to the riches + traide they had in Ano 1670, + as 
for great Heads they are gone, there being now in the Gouvernment in most Cittys very weake 
magistrates, Odike gouvemes all in Zelands, Mon Beuham in Overyssel, Van Ameron in Utrich, in 
Guelderland, Pens Fagells Brothers + such like heads else they had not ruined the P of Orange 
intrest in Electing him Duke of Guelder, but in this Province of Holland there are yet some of 
worth as Burge Huse of Dort, a good financier, Harlam Eihenhave the Pens, inn Delph the Heers 
Blaysich + van der Joose, in Leyden Pens Burgedijk, + Burg Leu Van Veyden, whos party ... have 
experence of in England, in Amsterdam 7 or eight noatable men for parts, in Rotterdam the famous 
ambassador Paws, in Furgo Burgemaster Morme, now Ambassador in Danmark, Van Beverning, in 
the Ridderscape the P of orange for the others I will name the whole number that you may see 
what number the Nobelty or, but for this party will not medel with. 
P of Orange, Baran von d'Asper, Heer Opdam, Heer Devenfort, Heer Eewarten, Heer Northwick, 
Heer Werkindan, Heer Van der Reed, Heervan den Leek, Heer Benhe. 
The Heer Masedomson is not admited into the riddersape because he retained not any of the virtues 
of his father, Lastly I am to name Pens Fagel who is a man of good parts, but short of John do 
Witt, yet stumbles threw all the grand affares + bissness concernes relating to this States, I formely 
sent the Earle of Sunderland the names of all the Magistrates of Consideration in the whole 
Gouvement the wyse the name os all thire minester abroad ...... 
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Appendix III 
Population statistics and sources for Amsterdam, 1635-1685 
Date Population Source 
1635 118,000 Kohlbrugge 
136,000 De Vries 
1655 132,000 Kohlbrugge 
134,000 De Vries 
1662 200,000 De Gouw 
210,000 De la Court (in Drugmas, p. 5 1) 
1664 138,000 Kohlbrugge 
201,000 De Vries 
1670 200,000 Temple (in Brugmans, p. 5 1) 
1680 217,000 Van Houtte 
220,000 Van de Woude 
1685 185,700 Kersseboorn (1738) 
187,000 Petty 
158,000 Schraa 
Source: H. Nusteling, Welwaart en Werk-gelegendheid in Amsterdam, 1540-1860. Een relaas over 
demografie, economie en sociale politieke van een wereldstad (Amsterdam/Dieren, 1985), Appendix 
1. 
Sources for Nusteling's population statistics: J. H. F. Kohlbrugge, "Iets over der invloed den steden". 
De Economist, 56 (1907); De Vries, Handboek; J. ter De Gouw, Amstelodeamiana, I and 11 
(Admsterdam, 1874); A. M. Van der Woude, "Demografische ontwikkeling van de Noordelijke 
Nederlanden 1500-1800, A. G. N. 5 (Haarlem, 1980); W Kersseboom, Proeven van politque 
rekenkunde vervat in drie verhandelingen, 1 (1738); P. Schraa, "Onderzoekingen naarde bewolkings 
anvang van Amsterdam tussen 1550-1650", Amstelodamum, 46 (1954); 1 A. van Houtte, An 
Economic History of the Low Countries 800-1800 (London 1977), 229. 
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Appendix IV 
Concept tot Eenigheit (1676) 
JVy burgemeestern en regeerders der stad Amsterdam, so dienende in die qualiteit als voor desen 
gediend hebbende, beloven elkanderen ter goeder trouwe te sullen naerkomen ende ons level land 
voor soo veel in ons is te praesteeren die condities hiernaer gespecificeert, sander dat wy deselve 
ofte eenige van die met onse stemmen ofte directie sullen contremineeren directelijj ofte 
indirectelijk-, ook dat wy ale geoorloofde devoiren sullen aanwenden dat niemand its ter contrarie 
en onderneme maer alles dat mogelijk is tot erlangen van deselve praestere, als namentelyk: 
Dat men niet sal excedeeren het aloude gebruijk van meerder dan twaelf 
burgemeesteren, regeerende en oude te same genome, te verkiezen. 
2. Dat een or meerder van die twaeV komende te sterven, men derselver plaelsen 
offe eenige van die niet en sal vervullen (so lange deselve niet onder tien sijn 
gekomen) als by eenparig goedvinden van alle de regeerende burgemeesteren. 
3. Dat de regeerende burgemeesteren, suh eenparig goedvinden, ook sullen 
convoceeren de oud-burgemeeteren, ende aldaer in deliberatie leggen of men een 
of meer nieuwe burgemeesteren sal maken of niet, ende hetgeene bij meederheid 
van slemmen onder regeerende en oud-burgemeesteren te samen sal wereden 
goedgevonden, sullen all gesamentlijk end een ider in het bi/sonder gehouden Siyn 
te secundeeren. 
4. Dat de regeerende en oud-burgemeesteren te same beneden het getal van tien 
sijnde gekomen, een ander, die noift burgemeester is geweest, ten tijde als men 
gewoon is electie le doen, in den verstorvene sijn plaetse sal moesten verkiesen. 
5. Dat een van de voormelde heeren sal werden gecommitteert in het collegie van 
H. E. G. Gecommitteerde Raden, een ter Generaliteit, een in den Raad van State, 
op de touren van de stad van Amsterdam in de twee laetsgenoemde, ende een in 
het collegie ter Admiraliteit aldaer. 
6. Dat de eerste die in een der respective collegien, in art. 5 genaemt, sal werden 
gesonden (bijaldien sig niemand daartoe vrijwillig en vertoont) door het lot onder 
alle de oud-burgemeesteren, voorts naar de verandering van de regeering op 
Vrouewndag te trekken, tot die commissie sal werden gedesigneert. 
7. Dat vervolgem de oudste der oud-burgemeesteren, aan de lotbeurige komende to 
volgen, in het eerst opkomende collegie sal werden gecommitteert, ende soo 
voorts, op deselve order, de in rang volgende in indefinitum. 
8. Dat in der voorstaende gevallen de respective gedesigneerden oft gecommitteerden 
aldaer sullen hebben de keuse (bijaldien sy niemand iut de oud-burgemeesteren 
weeten le disponeeren om vrijwillig waer te nemen de commissie op HaerEdele 
geconfereet of staende geconfereert te werden) of sij de voorschreven commis. Sie 
selfs voor den tijt van drie jaren willen waernemen, dan of sij liever sien willen 
dat een schepen en vroedschap, die noift burgemeester is geweest, in haer plaett 
werde gecommitteert. 
Dat by verkiesing van de laetste gevalle de respective gecommitteerden of 
gedesigneerden sullen moeten occupeeren in een subalterne collegie, sonder tot 
het burgemeestersampt verk-ooren te wereden, de Iijt van drie jaren, die haar 
respective commissie in de Gecommitteerde Raden, de Staten-Generael, den Raad 
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van State of de Admiraliteit tot Amsterdam soude hebben gedurrd. 
10. Dat die van de oud-burgemeesteren, dewelke daer in een derselver collegien is 
geweest ofte drie jaren in een subalterne bank, omdat daer niet selfs heeft willen 
dienen, heeft gevaceert, in geen van desleve wederom sla behoeven te gaen so 
lange eeen oud-burgemeester overig is, die in een der voorschreven collegien niet 
i3 geweest. 
11. Dat in de gevallen, daer twee der voorseijde collegien in een jaer komen te 
vaceeren, de oudste dergenen die aldaer sal moeten gaen sal hebben de keuse, in 
hetwelk van beide sal willen gecommitteert werden. 
12. Dat de eerste drie burgemeesteren, die om n den jare 1677 te dienen sullen 
verkoren wereden, meede by loting onder alle de oud-burgemeesteren primo 
Februarij 1677 voorseijt te trekken sullen werden gedesigneert. 
13. Dat naer de le verkiesen nieuwe burgemeester or burgemeesteren succivelijk uit 
het getal der oude sullen wereden verkoren en voor andere geprefereert degenen 
die den langsten tijt als burgemeester niet hebben gedient, ten sy sake sij waren 
gecommitteert in hei collegie van H. E. G. M. Gecommitteerde Raden, ter 
vergadering van de Staten-Generael, den Raed van State ofte het collegie ter 
Admiraliteit tot Amsterdam, ende de drie jaren harer commisse prima Maij naest 
de te doene electie niet waren geexpireert, ofte ook wel dat iemand, op publicque 
commissie sijnde buiten 's lands, selfs quam te orrdeelen, dat hij den meesten tihjt 
de3jaers, dat als burgemeester hadden te dienen, buiten Is lands soude moeten 
continueeren, en eindelijk mede dat degene, die langst uit den dienst als 
regeerender burgemeester was geweest, selfs sig wilde en wiste te excuseeren, in 
welke gevalle de naest daeraen volgende, langst buiten dienst als burgemeester 
sijnde geweest, sal moeten werden verkooren. 
14. Dat naer degenen die den lagsten tift als burgemeester niet hebben gedient 
succes, sivelijk sullen moeten verk-ooren wereden ende voor anderen geprefereert de 
oudste der oud-burgemeesteren, le rek-en den ouderdom naer den tift dat sij der 
eerst mael tot hei burgemeestersampt sullen sijn verkooren geweest en rang 
hebben genomen, dies dat die oudsten niet te naer bestaen aen degenen, die 
vooral als nieuw burgemeester of langst niet gedient hebben is verkooren, in 
welk-en geval de oudste daeraenvolgende verkooren sal moeten werden. 
15. Dat altoos de oudste in dienst als burgemeeter van de drie burgemeesteren door 
den oud-raed het vorige jaer verkooren het volgende jaer, so sig niet selfs wilde 
en wiste te excuseeren, sal werdengecontinueert, ten ware sake hhij door 
maegshcap ofte ajfiniteit van een der drie nieuw verkoren burgemeesteren wierde 
gesecludeert. 
Reprinted in R Fruin, "Bjdrage tot de Geschiedenis van het Burgerneesterschap van Amsterdam 
Tijdens de Republiek", Verspreide Geschiedenis, IV (1923), pp. 320-22. 
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Appendix V 
Burgomasters and other office-holders of Amsterdam, 1672-85 
BurgoMa3ters of AM3terdam 1671-85 
1671 Van Vlosswijk, Tulp, De Graeff, Van de Poll 
1672 (Feb. -Sept. ) Van de Poll, Reynst, Oudtshoorn, Hooft 
1672 (Sept. ) Ifooft, Oudsthoom, Hudde, Van Beuningen 
1673 Hudde, Valckenier, Geelvinck, Huydecooper 
1674 Valckenier, Trip, Pancras, Munter 
1675 Pancras, Hudde, Huydecooper, Geelvinck 
1676 Huydecooper, Valckenier, Oudsthoom, Munter 
1677 Oudsthoom, Trip, Hooft, Hudde 
1678 Ifooft, Valckenier, Huydecooper, Munter 
1679 Valckenier, Trip, Oudsthoom, Hudde 
1680 Oudsthoom, Van Beuningen, Munter, Huydecooper 
1681 Van Beuningen, Hudde, Corver, Opmeer 
1682 Hudde, Munter, Huydecooper, Witsen 
1683 Munter, Van Beuningen, Opemeer, Van Waveren 
1684 Van Beuningen, Hudde, Geelvinck, Huydecooper 
1685 Hudde, Corver, Witsen, Bors van Waveren 
Schepenen elected 1672 to 1684 
1672 Trip, De Wilhelm, Nanning Cloeck, Opmeer, Opmeer, Corver, 
Six, Hinlopen, Backer, Boreel 
1673 Backer, Corver, Roeters, De Vicq, Ranst/Tiellens, Van Neck, Appelman, 
Becker, Sautijn, Witsen 
1674 Van Neck, Appelman, Van Bronckhorst, Cloeck, R. Hudde, Van Klenck, 
Blom, Scott (the younger), A. Geelvinck 
1675 Van Bronckhorst, Cloeck, De Wilhem, Becker, Sautijn, Tiellens, De Vicq, 
Beaumont, Bentes 
1676 De Wilhem, Becker, C. Cloeck, Appelman, Scott (the younger), Boelenz, 
van Loon, van Dijk, Popta 
1677 C. Cloeck. Appelman, Boreel, Roch, Hinlopen (the younger), N. Cloeck, 
Bentes, De Vrij, D. Munter 
1678 Boreel, Roch, van Loon, Witsen, R. Hudde, Scott (the younger), 
Pellicome, Haren Carspel, Bambeeck 
1679 Van Lon, Witsen, De Vries, Hinlopen (the younger), Boelensz, De Vrij, 
D. Munter, Hasselaer, G. Hooft 
1680 De Vries, Hinlopen, Bors, Roch, Pellicome, Bambeeck, C. Valckenier, De 
Haze de Georgio, Grootenhuys 
1681 Bors, Roch, C. Cloeck, Van Loon, Sautijn, De Vrij, Oudtshoorn/De Vicq, 
Van Hcuvel, Bas 
1682 C. Cloeck, Van Loon, De Vries, Scott/Appelman, A. Geelvinck, 
Bambeeck, De Haze de Georgio, Elias, Wecrt 
1683 De Vries, Appelman, Hinlopen, De Vicq, Van Heuvel, De Woede, 11. 
Bicker, Pater, Coymans 
1684 Hinlopen, De Vicq, Bentes, Hasselaer/Bas, C. Valckenier, De Haze de 
Georgio, Grootenhuys, Elias, Hulft 
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Pensionaries of Amsterdam 1666 to 1684 
1666 Cornelis Hop 
1668 R. Van Heernskerck 
1672 Geffit Hooft 
1673 C. Van Heernskerck 
1675 Van den Bosch 
1680 Jakob Hop 
Secrelarissen of Amsterdam 1666 to 1684 
1666 SpiegeVVlooswijk 
1668 Blaeu 
1672 C. Van Heernskerck 
1673 G. Hooft/Velters/J. Geelvinck 
1675 B. Huydecooper 
1676 D. Geelvinck/D. Munter/C. Valckenier 
1677 Rodenburg 
1678 P. Hop/W. Hooft 
1680 C. Hop 
1684 B. Huydecooper 
Sources: G. A. Amsterdam, Res. Vroed.; Appelman, Notulen van I Gepasseerde in de Vroedschap 
der stad Amsterdam van 11.2.1672 tot 23.9.1694; Elias, De Vroedschap van Amsterdam; 
Bontemantel, De Regeeringe van Amsterdam; Wagenaar, Amsterdam in zijne opkomst..., Vol. 111, 
Privilegen, Poorterschap, Regering 
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Appendix VI 
Representation on Working Committees of the Amsterdam Vroedschap 
1672-84 
The following lists of the business of the sub-committees and their membership are 
included as further background to the workings of the Amsterdam vroedschap. As 
the aims of this thesis do not include a comprehensive analysis of all the activities 
of the members of the Amsterdam regency this appendix does not include the full 
details which would contribute to such an analysis (some clarification of the 
activities of individual members can be made by direct correlation with the 
bibliographical details in Appendix I). The evidence from this appendix would be 
more useful if the records of the sub-committees were extant; all that is available to 
the researcher today are the names of the members and their recommendations as 
reported to the full meetings of the vroedschap. However, from time to time 
throughout the study general inferences have been drawn from the information 
given here. 
The senior members of the vroedschap were more likely to sit on sub-committees 
dealing with important issues, but this did not preclude their membership of other 
sub-committees, particularly where they were dealing with matters in which they 
had special interest or expertise. Interest, expertise, experience and - presumably 
willingness, also determined the participation of lesser members. The frequency 
with which some names appear (for example Appelman, Tiellens and Klenck) 
indicates that there was a large core of working members, whose influence beyond 
the sub-committees was limited. In this way Cornelis Backer, who was not in 
favour with the leading regents, was able to participate effectively in the work of 
the vroedschap through membership of sub-committees. But it would be 
misleading, without closer analysis, to make assumptions that all frequent members 
of sub-committees were relatively ineffectual beyond this sphere. For example, 
Corver, who came to prominence as a burgomaster in the 1680s, was often an 
active member of the sub-committees. Ruling burgomasters were unlikely to be 
members of sub-committees, with the exception in the 1680s of Witsen (see p. 
156). 
21.10.72 Management of Sluices: Van Beuningen, Hudde, Valckenier, Geelvinck 
16.11.72 Consumption of foreign goods: Graafland, Appelman, Tiellens, Sautijn, 
Geelvinck 
28.11.72 Feendijk byde Overtoom 
(dispute with Haarlem): Hooft, Corver 
29.12.72 Negotiations between 
Admiralty and V. O. C.: Boreel, Corver, Witsen (talking to Admiralty) 
Valckenier, Pancras, Huydecooper, Becker 
(talking to V. O. C. ) 
18.1.73 Lands finanties: Pancras, Blom, Hop (neogtiating with Fagel and 
the Prince) 
31.1.73 Peter Brack's request for 
licence to trade in laken: Valckenier, Backer, Corver, Appelman 
2.2.73 Request from Gecomm. Raad 
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for 100,000 men: Valckenier, Van Beuningen, Boreel, Graafland 
3.3.73 Request from Prince of Orange 
forfl. 100,000 for "extraordinaris 
equipage ter zee Backer, Van Beuningen, Corver, Graafland, 
Boreel 
7.3.73 Security of Amsterdam: Pancras, Hooft, Backer, Van Loon, Bronkhorst 
14.3.73 Aelmoesseniers Armen: Tulp, Corver, Appleman, Tiellens 
25.3.73 Ambassadors to Cologne 
(Van Beverning and Renswoude) : Tulp, Corver, Graafland, Boreel, Trip 
14.4.73 Peace Negotiations: Valckenier to represent Amsterdam 
17.3.73 Hop replacing Valckenier: 
12.6.73 Graafland and Roeters representing 
Amsterdam on Committee for 
fortifications 
15.7.73 Admiralty issues: Huydecooper, Van Vlooswijk, Appelman, 
Sautijn, Tiellens, Trip, Klenck, Blom 
11.9.73 Hoofteld. - Valckenier, Hooft, Pancras, Backer, Van 
Beuningen, Boreel, Corver 
16.10.73 Wine and Brandy Manufacture: Corver, Graafland, Boreel, Appelman, Tiellens, 
Klenck, Blom, Sautijn 
3.12.73 Ban on Fcnch Manufactures: Appelman, Beker, Sautijn, Tiellens, Graafland, 
Klcnck 
17.12.73 Familiegeld: Pancras, Van Beuningen, Corver, Becker, 
Tiellens, Graafland, Boreel, Trip, Klenck, Blom 
14.1.74 Imposter; Corver, Appelman, Hinloopen, Klenck, Blom 
28.1.74 Captain-Generalship Pancras, Hooft, Oudtshoorn, Backer, Corver, 
Hinloopen, Roch 
30.1.74 Landsoorlog schepen: Appelman, Witsen, Tiellens, Boreel, Klenck, 
Blom 
De vervallen studien tot 
Leiden te redressen: Hudde, Beker, Corver, Witsen, Bronckhorst, 
Grootenhuys, Roch 
Familiegeld: Appelmn, Tieflens, Graafland, Boreel, Klenck, 
Blom 
7.3.74 Afiddefen: Hooft, Appelman, Backer, Corver, Witsen 
30.4.74 Holland and Zeeland 
"Gemeynschap van justitie": Backer, Corver, Grootenhuys, Witsen, Roch 
4.8.74 French manufactures and wine Appelman, Klenck, Blom, Becker, Tiellens 
18.9.74 Request from de gemeene 
spychenmakers Appelman, Tiellens, Becker 
het niewe zijds sitten huys Hudde, Appelman, BlomTieliens 
12.11.74 Increase in Staat van Oorlogh Appelman, Blom, Scott, Tiellens, Becker 
10.12.74 New W. LC. Geelvinck, Appelman, TiellensBecker. Klenck, 
Blom 
23.12.74 Admiralty report on quicksilver Appelman, Klenck, Scott, Tiellens, Commelin 
5.2.75 Gelderland sovereignty issue Valckenier, Hooft, Hinloopen, Backer, van 
necq, Boreel, Roch, Appelman, Bors, Blom 
23.10.75 Letter from Resident in Vienna Valckenier, Tiellens, Appleman, Klenck, 
Commelin, Scott 
12.11.75 Trade with Spain Bronckhorst, Cloek, Hinloopen, Backer, Corver, 
Boreel, Roch, Opmeer, Hudde 
Requests from Directeurs 
Levantshandel Becker, Sautijn, Tiellens, Boreel, Scott 
18.1175 Spanish Trade Bronckhorst, Trip, Corver, Roch, Opmeer, 
Scott 
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2.12.75 Baltic trade and protection 
10.12.75 ISec Res. Holl. 21.11.75] 
9 light frigates 
Tax of 40th and 80th penningh 
17.12.75 See Muniment Reg. K. f 15 
7.1.76 Concept Placael re Sabbath 
Hooft, Backer, Corver, Neck, Boreel, Roch, 
Appelman 
Valckenier, Bronckhorst, Neck, Corver, 
Appelman 
Hooft, Backer, Neck, Corver, Boreel, Roch, 
Appelman 
Hooft, Becker, Backer, Corver, Boreel 
Bronckhorst, Backer, Neck, Boreel, Appelman, 
Bors, Sautijn 
Becker, Sautijn, Tiellens, Appelman, Blom, 
Scott 
16.1.76 Letter from Directors Levants- 
handel re salaries 
22.1.76 Sout 
29.176 Loopende middelen; impost op 
de GoijIan 
11.2.76 Swedish trade 
14.5.76 Request for 400 men 
23.5.76 Trade from Hamburg 
Management of Gods- en Gast- 
huizen 
21.7.76 . W. LC. 
Impost op Wijn 
Request from Lemp and Tenk 
for 30 year solie licences for 
"mercurius sublimatus en 
precipitalus" 
12.8.76 Concept Placaet op Hunt 
14.9.76 Impost op Tabaq 
26.2.77 Foreign Policy 
Cost of 15 ships to Baltic 
16.3.77 Fortification of Wesel 
31.5.77 20th Article of Marine Treaty 
7.7.77 Free Trade in West Indies and 
Guinea 
10.7.77 Dispute between Groningen and 
Ommeland 
19.7.77 Afiddekn 
impost op Tabaq 
9.9.77 Request from merchants re 
imports 
15.9.77 Impost OP Wijn 
7.10.77 Six Warships to Tobago 
15.11.77 Commercial Treaty with France 
4.2.78 Letter from van Beuningen 
in London re l2th Article of 
1674 Treaty 
Becker, Sautijn, Tiellens, Boreel, Scott 
Beckler, Tiellens, Corver, Boreel, Scott 
Neck, Corver, Boreel, Roch, Appelman, Bors, 
Blom 
Geelvinck, Hooft, Scott, Corver, Bronckhorts, 
Blom 
Witsen, Geelvinck 
Trip, Scott, Appelman, Blom 
Thesaurier, Tiellens, Blom 
Trip, Becker, Scott, Appelmanb, Tiellens, 
Blom, Sautijn 
Becker, Sautijn, Tiellens, Appelman, Blom, 
Scott 
Commelin, Sautijn, de Vicq 
Appelman, Tiellens, Blom 
Becker, Appelman, Tiellens, Blom 
Trip, Tiellens, Blom, Sautijn, Scott 
Hooft, Hudde, Valckenier, Huydecooper, 
Becker. Scott 
Hooft, Hudde, Valckenier, Huydecooper, 
Becker. Scott 
Valckenier, Boreel, Appelman, Tiellens, Sautijn 
Roch, Graafland, Becker, Scott 
Hudde, Valckenier, Roch, Graafland, Scott 
Valckenier, Appelman, Backer, Graafland, Scott 
Appelman, Graafland, Tiellens, Scott 
Appelman, Tiellens, Klenck, Scott 
Appelman, Tiellens, Klenck, Scott 
Valckenier, Appelman, Boreel, Roch, Backer, 
Scott 
Boreel, Appelman, Sautijn, Tiellens, Valckenier 
Oiaison with vab Beverning) 
Valckenier, Hudde, Boreel, Roch, Backer, 
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16378 tamods imiddelen and internal 
imposten. I loll3nd 
29378 Letter from van Beuningcn 
re blockade of Dutch merchant 
shipping in French ports 
.. %3.4.78 
Con%vys and licences, France-. 
Request from 'impost meesters'; 
*Impwt' on Spanish 'seep' 
29 619 Trc3t)r negOti3tions: France. 
Spain. S%%cdcn 
17779 
23 119 
199.79 
2912-78 
4 219 
213-79 
7.679 
47-79 
2 1079 
4 12-79 
3 ISO 
6 210 
1 . 02,80 
13 KO 
197-80 
21790 
2890 
6990 
Treaty %ith England 
Ratification of French Treaty 
Wine Tax 
Continu3tion of Lands Afilitie 
Lands. lliddekn 
Military Finance 
Letters from Envoys 
Continuation of Olugo de Bors 
as Commis Fiscal 
Concept, ran Garantie between 
Spain and France 
Onhnarij Loopen. k. ifid. kkn 
Coat)". Vdn deAfonsteringe 
Corver 
Iludde. Boreel. Roch, Backer, Corver 
Iludde, Boreel, Roch, Scott, Backer, Corver, 
Sautijn 
Roch, Appelman, Tiellens, Becker, Klenck., 
Blom., Sautijn, Scott 
Roch, Witsen, Trip, Scott, Tiellens, Klenck, 
Blom 
Roch, Backer, Corver, Appelman, Tiellens, 
Becker, Klenck, Blom, Sautijn 
Huydecooper, Trip, Scott Corver, Appelman, 
van den Bosch 
Appelman, Tiellens, Klenck 
Hudde. Witsen, Appelman, van den Bosch 
Hudde, Trip, Witsen, Appelman, Roch, van 
Ifeuvil, van den Bosch 
Hudde. Trip, Witsen, Appelman, Roch, van 
Hcuvil, van den Bosch 
Geelvinck, Backer, Roch, Sautijn, van Heuvil 
Appelman, Scott, Becker, van Klenck, Sautijn 
Geelvinck, van Beuningen. Witsen, Corver, 
Roch, van Heuvil 
lluydecooper, Hooft, Corver, Becker, Klenck, 
Scott 
Huydecooper, Hooft, Corver, Becker, Klenck, 
Scott 
Stwt ran Oorlog * Van Beuningen, Huydecooper, Geelvinck, 
Valckenier, Roch, Corver, Witsen, van Heuvil, 
van den Bosch 
Drandy Van Beuningen, Huydecooper, Geelvinck, 
Valckenier, Hudde, Roch, Corver, Witsen, 
Ileuvil, Scottý Appelman 
41 Warships Van Beuningcn, Huydecooper, Geelvinck, 
Valckenier, Iludder, Roch, Corver, Witsen, 
Ileuvil 
GemeeneAlUkkn Van Beuningen, Huydecooper, Geelvinck, 
Valckenicr. Iludde, Roch, Corver, Witsen, 
Appchnan, Scott, Heuvil 
Ges"rene Afidkkn Van Beuningcn, Huydecoopcr, Valckenier, 
Geelvinck, Iludde, Roch, Corver, Witsen, 
Appelman, Scott 
poinction ý-an Btschrijving Van Beuningen, Huydecooper, Geelvinck, 
Valckenier, Iludde, Roch, Corver, Witsen, 
Appelman, Scott, Ileuvil 
Tax collecting frauds Van Beuningen, Huydecooper, Geelvinck, 
Valckenier, Iludde, Roch, Corver 
Captain de Jong and French F leet Van Beuningen, Valckenier, Iludde, Bors 
Quotas of mo burgers Backer. Corver, Becker, Sautijn, van Loon, Six, 
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29.8.80 Managemcnt of seadefences 
6.9.80 Wine and brandy tax 
Hooft, Heuvil 
Geelvinck, Valckenier, Vlooswijk, Hudde, Trip, 
de Vries, Backer 
Huydecooper, Van Beuningen, Geelvinck, 
Valckenier, Hudde, Roch, Corver, Witsen, 
Appelman, Scott, Heuvil 
3.10.80 Differences between brugomasters 
and vroedschap at Schoonhoven 
Do Belastinge ter See 
18.11.80 Foreign goods 
2.12.80 Tabago 
5.12.80 Staar van Oorlog 
25.2-81 Ships to Norway 
20th and 40th penning 
26.3.81 Groote Defenses 
30.4.81 Aelptoesseniers 
19.7.81 Dobbelen en speden 
22.7.81 Arrears of soildiers' pay 
12.9.81 French refugees 
20.9.81 Munt 
7,10.81 Surinam and Zeeland 
1 27.11.81 Shortfall of city weaponry 
17.12.81 Swat van Oorlog 
28.12.81 Swat van Oorlog: shortfall on 
military expenditure 
16.1-82 Danish tolls 
Surinam 
6.2.82 Gemeene Lands Afiddelen 
9.3.82 Difference with France over 
Spanish Netherlands 
23.3.82 Request from Nederduits church 
re poorhouses 
4.5.82 Convoy list 
11-5.82 Convoy list and licences: 
benefits to colonies 
16.7.82 Request from [Barill ... 7] en 
Schcpen 
7.9.82 Zeeland and Surinam 
France 
22.9.82 Aelmoesseniers 
26.9.82 Pierre Baille 
18.11.82 Brandenburg memorial 
Van Beuningen, Valckenier, Hudde, Corver, 
Witsen, Heuvil 
Van Beuningen, Valckenier, Hudde, de Vries, 
Backer, Witsen, Appelman, Becker, van 
Klenck, Sautijn, Scott, Heuvil 
De Vries, Roch, Bors, Hudde, Becker, Hooft 
Hudde, Vors, Appelman, Becker 
Van Beuningen, Geelvinck, Hudde, de Vries, 
Backer, Corver, Witsen, Roch, Appelman, 
Becker, van Klenck, Sautijn, Heuvil 
Van Beuningen, Hudde, Sautijn, Heuvil, 
Witsen, Appelman, Becker, van Klenck, Scott, 
de Vries 
Boreel, Roch, Witsen 
Roch, Witsen, Becker, Six 
Appelman, de Vries, Van Beuningen, Hudde, 
Corver, Opmeer* 
Hudde, Roch, Witsen, Becker, Six 
Hudde, Heuvil, Witsen, Appelman, van Klenck 
Wisten, Becker, Hasselaer 
Kloeck, Sautijn, Becker, Six 
Hudde, Bors, Witsen, Appelman, van Klenck 
Huydecooper, de Vicq, Heuvil, Neck Jacobsz 
Corver, Heuvil, Witsen, de Vries, Hinlopen 
Corver, de Vries, Heuvil, Hinlopen 
Heuvil, Appelman, van Klenck 
Hudde, Bors, van Waveren, Witsen, Appelman. 
van Klenck 
Wisten, Corver, de Vries, Bors, Sautijn, Heuvil 
Witsen, Corver, Boreel, de Vries, Bors, Heuvil 
Corver, Appelman, Commelin 
Witsen, Hudde, de Vries, Appelman, Becker, 
van Klenck, Bors, Sautijn, Heuvil 
Witsen, Hudde, de Vries, Appelman, Becker, 
van Klenck, Bors, Sautijn, Heuvil 
Appelman, Backer, van Klenck, Sautijn 
Witsen, Hudde, Boreel, Appelman, Bors, 
Sautijn, van Klenck, Hevil 
Appelman, Opmeer, Bors, Sautijn, Heuvil 
Hudde, de Vries, Appelman, van Klenck, 
Conunelin, Sautijn 
Witsen* 
Witsen, Corver, Boreel, Sautijn 
266 
5.12.82 request from Walloon Community 
over subsidy Boreel, de Vries, Sautijn, Valckenier 
23,12.82 increase in military and Guarantee 
with Sweden, Spain and Emperor Corver, Boreel, Appelman, van Klenck, Bors, 
Valckenier, Heuvil 
Il'isselbank Hudde, Munter, de Vries, Appelman. 
3.1.83 Swat van Oorlog Corver, Boreel, de Vries, Appelman, Bors, 
Heuvil 
3.2.83 Differences between Zeeland 
and Overijssel: Swat van Oorlog; Bors Van Waveren, Corver, Boreel, de Vries, 
Reduction of den Briel's quota 
29.6.83 Commis Fiscal 
Resident at Hamburg 
14.7.93 Resident in Poland: improvement 
of Baltic trade 
16.7.83 Alunt: Concept Placcaet 
26.7.83 Twelve warships 
13.9.83 8,000 men for Spain 
Appelman, Heuvil 
Bors Van Waveren, Corver, Boreel, de Vries, 
Appelman, Heuvil 
Boreel, de Vries, Appelman 
Appelman, Becker, Sautijn 
Boreel, de Vries, Heuvil, Sautijn 
Van Beuningen, de Vries, Appelman, Sautijn 
Hudde, de Vries, Backer 
Munter, Van Beuningen, Operneer, Van 
Waveren, Hudde, Corver, Boreel, de Vries, 
Appelman, van Klenck, Hooft - with Hop. 
(Report made same day. ) 
2.9.83 Shortfall on Zeeland Admiralty, 
Grain etc 
4.2.84 Swat van Oortog 
23.3-84 Tunis and Tripoli 
Burgomastcrs' report on foreign 
affairs 
24.5.84 Fortifications, artillery 
15.12.84 Levant trade 
Corver, de Vries, Appelman, Sautijn, Elias 
Corver, Boreel, Bors Van Waveren, Opmeer, 
Appelman, van Klenck, Heuvil, Hooft, de 
Vries, Cloeck 
Corver, Becker, Sautijn, Heuvil, de Vries 
Trip, Appelman, van Klenck, Sautijn 
Geelvinck, Corver, BorVan Waverens, 
Appelman. de Vries 
Valckenier, van Neck, Sautijn, de Vries 
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Appendix VII 
Extract from Statement of Income outstanding on 200th penningh 27 March 
1674-31 October 1676. (Received by the States of Holland November 1676) 
Mle due 273.74 2&7.74 24.12.74 24.5.75 20.12.75 15.7.76 
Dordrecht n fl fl fl fl fl 
due 182,838 91,419 115,380 115,389 115,389 115,389 
paid 182,838 91,419 101,200 103,000 105,800 92,000 
% Qýs 12 to 8 20 
Mar1cm due 343,820 171,910 151,488 151,488 151,488 151488 
paid 343,820 171,910 126,365 129,763 121,641 100,920 
0; Ols 16 14 20 33 
Delft due 324,360 162,180 212,241 212,241 212,241 212,241 
paid 324,360 162,180 154,264 168,842 187,956 165,180 
0; Ols - 28 22 12 22 
Lelden due 420,220 210,110 219,798 219,798 219,798 219,798 
paid 420,220 210,110 161,942 184,287 126,133 127,900 
% O"s - 27 17 43 42 
Amsterdam due 2,706,001 1,353,006 1,580,583 1,580,583 1,580,583 1,580,583 
paid 2,706,001 1,304,693 1,362.353 1,302,441 1,131,571 846,512 
% Olls - 6 10 20 25 45 
Gouda due 115,460 57,730 70,422 70,422 70,422 70,422 
paid 115,460 57,730 65,005 62,704 47,693 38,653 
% 7 11 32 46 
Rotterdam due 510,384 255,192 272,029 272,029 272,029 272,029 
paid 510,384 255,192 255,233 239,989 212,618 188,713 
a; ois 10 12 26 33 
Schiedam due 34,460 17,230 15,641 15,641 15,641 15,641 
paid 34,460 13,260 15,010 af. 9,251 9,607 
%G, ls 24 10 40 38 
Schoonboven due 13,300 6,650 5,446 5,446 5,446 5,446 
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%OIS - 7 9 30 41 
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